# DEVELOPMENT AND A RICH PERSONAL LIFE IN LONERGAN'S *INSIGHT*

One of my colleagues recently read Lonergan's *Insight* for the first time and wrote a few pages of exposition and criticism which he handed on to me as one who had long been interested in Lonergan. The issues raised were not just superficial, but penetrating, well-documented and horrifying. They found nothing new and interesting in Lonergan's system, but something quite alien to man and even to the Christian message. There were three basic objections, none of which resonated with my own reading of *Insight*. (1) Lonergan makes the pursuit of knowledge the sole aim of human life, (2) He proposes an intellectualism that discards what he calls "the empirical residue" and so neglects individuals and consequently persons, thus promoting a disregard for persons, (3) He takes scientists as his model of the ideal human being, identifies detachment and disinterestedness as their main virtues, and requires these in all of us all the time, thus leaving no room for concern for one's family or for following the Christian law of love. For me it was a case of *corruptio optimi pessima!* But could I find the source of the corruption?

Years ago I had a friend who was a much better tennis player than I, but who occasionally invited me to play tennis. Normally, after hitting from end to end for a while to warm up one of the players suggests "Shall we play for serves?" and they proceed to a game and perhaps a few sets. But on these

occasions we never reached that point. The ingredients for a proper game were hardly there. I would not have enjoyed losing nearly every point, and he was too mature a personality to enjoy an easy win. So we kept up our haphazard rallies for an hour or so, exercising our bodies and our diverse skills, and enjoying what might be called "basic tennis", but not the keen contest that comes from the discipline of a progressive game, nor the exaltation of winning a point when we have extended our effort and our mastery at a crucial stage of the game.

There is, in Insight, a metaphysics of development that helps us make sense of these experiences, and that applies in a whole range of other spheres as well. It is connected with the emergence of new relationships out of an underlying manifold, with the autonomy of lower systems, with the preservation and enhancement of values, with discoveries that are beyond deduction or prediction but are still firmly rooted in the material presented by the past. At times Lonergan gives a very schematic account of this metaphysics, at times he explains it in more familiar terms, but some aspects of it are never far from what he is doing. It seems to me that this notion especially is what has been missed in the criticism I referred to, and that when we allow for it we can accept Lonergan within the Church and the human race, and even perhaps learn a thing or two from him here and there.

Let us take rallies as the elements of warming-up "hits" at tennis. There will be a great variety among the rallies, but each will follow a certain structure. Some aspects, such as who opens the rally and from where will be of no concern but will be left to chance. The rally will probably end only with a miss; note will be taken when a ball goes out of bounds or bounces twice, but the rally will most likely be allowed to continue. A spectator used only to such play would be quite at home if, unknowingly, he were watching a genuine game. He would recognize each rally, which would still be fully the sort of thing a rally normally is — it would be "autonomous" in following the rules governing rallies — and he would still take as coincidental the ways in which rallies began and ended. At times he would marvel at the perfection of a particular rally; it would be enhanced beyond what he would be used to in other circumstances, though he wouldn't know why, nor think of asking. Other spectators, however, would know about serving and alternation of courts, and scores and winning games and the advantage points that discern between players who are particularly well matched. These latter spectators understand the game and they enjoy it more, but they still enjoy the individual rallies as well. They have contact with a fuller reality — which could emerge for the first spectator too if he were to learn what is meant by a game — and so they come to grasp intelligible relationships in what previously he was quite content to consider coincidental.

The players enjoy the rallies, far more than when they were warming up, and want to play them well, but always under the domination of the desire to win according to the rules of the game. They must not allow this desire to be inhibited by other desires that just would not make sense within a game, such as the desire to play every stroke backhand, or to use spin in each hit, or to have rallies of exactly ten strokes each. Any of these could be reasonable if "hits" is all there is to play, but not when tennis is what they are about. And the players would reject strongly the view that their rallies were suffering because the rules of the games were allowed to dominate.

I have tried to illustrate with an instance the sort of process that Lonergan calls emergence between levels of being, a process which he says builds up explanatory genera, and which he looks on as making sense of many cases of development.

> As one moves from one genus to the next, there is added a new set of laws which defines its own basic terms by its own empirically established correlations. (255)

For instance:

> If the laws of chemistry have to regard the metabolism and division of cells as mere patterns of happy coincidences, then there is an autonomous science of biology. (256)
>
> Nor does the introduction of the higher autonomous science interfere with the autonomy of the lower; for the higher enters into the field of the lower only in so far as it makes systematic on the lower level what otherwise would be merely coincidental. (256)

Passing by his account of explanatory genera in terms of various symbols for things, properties, events and laws (255-6, 259-260, 437-9), we find a later summary of the whole theory:

> Proportionate being, then, involves a number of explanatory genera, so that there is a series of levels of operation with each higher level making systematic what otherwise would have been merely coincidental on the previous level. It follows that there can be distinct, autonomous, yet related departments of science: distinct, because they deal with different levels of proportionate being; autonomous, because defining relations on any level constitute a closed system; related, because each higher level finds its materials in the coincidental manifold of the previous level, and each lower level supplies a coincidental manifold for the next higher level. (616)

Just as the progress of a particular game of tennis could not be predicted by anyone who knows everything about rallies, so, in general, no higher level can be deduced from a lower one, but the lower level sets a number of conditions to which the higher must adhere. Thus a novel has to be made up of words and the words have to keep pretty close to the rules of grammar, but few people who have a good knowledge of words and of grammar have written a novel, or could deduce what an author would produce.

This theory of "autonomous levels", "development", "emergence" or "explanatory genera" has clearly an important place in Lonergan's thought. And once we allow for it I

think we can see how the objections mentioned in my first paragraph can be met.

First, he is said to make the pursuit of knowledge the sole aim of human life. He certainly does say that we all have a desire to know, and that this is most important to us, and even that it extends as far as God, in that we have a desire to know God. But does he say that we have no other desires, or that if we do have other desires they must be subordinated to and serve this desire to know?

We should note first of all that Lonergan strongly rejects the view that there is some single human activity that can be called "knowing". Instead, he analyzes knowing into three activities that are very different from each other and have little in common (except, of course, consciousness), namely, experience, understanding, and judgment. Genuine knowing is a structure in which each of these makes a contribution. Knowing is the "correct understanding of data", not just the correctness that is found in the "yes" of considered judgment, not just the content that has been grasped as a positive possibility by an insight into data, and even less a mere unintelligent and unreflective confrontation with the data presented by our senses.

Lonergan affirms that these are three "levels" in the technical sense that he gives to this term. Through

sensation we get many images, which can persist without understanding or affirmation. But in some of the images we can grasp an insight, which holds the data they have presented in a unity that can seem coincidental when described simply in terms appropriate to images, but that is meaningful to the person who understands. The laws governing association, images, data, sensation, still apply, but a new level has emerged in which we have to add notions such as meaning, unity, possibility, intelligibility. These will dominate the images, in the sense of organizing them in a way otherwise unthought-of, but not in the sense of weakening, neglecting or disregarding them.

Similarly, the level of understanding provides us with a wealth of insights or possibilities, but the reflective level of judging raises the further question of fact, and may be able at times to select one of the possibilities as being verified. The selected possibility retains all the clarity and unifying power that it possessed on its own level, while gaining a new element, that of truth. If knowledge is what we want, all insights must be subject to judgment, so this higher level is dominant. But the level of intelligence cannot be neglected. If we cease to understand what we have affirmed, we can no longer be said to "know" it properly. The truth is what we aim at when we desire to know, but it is an intelligible truth that we want, that is, a correct understanding of the data.

Is knowing, explained thus, all that Lonergan says we do, or should do? No. We find that he refers in a number of passages to "doing" as distinct from "knowing". Indeed, he does so in a way that seems to recognize a fourth level, a level characterised not by experience, intelligence, reasonableness alone but also responsibility, a level that constitutes not experiential, intellectual or rational consciousness but "rational self-consciousness", a level whose function is not to unite us with sensible data or bright ideas or facts, but rather to produce new actuality — whether in things, by "making", in ourselves, by "doing", or in our relationships with others, by "human living".

If this is, as seems to be the case, a fourth level, then it will have its own distinct contribution to make, the creation of new things, new events in the world, new relationships among people. As befits creation that is human, all that is new in these will have some underlying basis — the facts, the possibilities, the presentations that could be known prior to the action. And these will still be autonomous, each at its own level, so that their own laws still hold, laws which, according to the theory of levels, set conditions that must be recognized and allowed for by the level above, even while that level makes its own, much richer, contribution.

Lonergan speaks quite definitely about this level that goes beyond knowledge: "Man is not only a knower but also a

doer" (599), and beyond the elements of which knowing is constituted: there are "practical possibilities" (598) that "reveal things as they might be" (598), that man "grasps intelligently and affirms reasonably" (598), and that "include intelligent transformations not only of the environment in which man lives but also of man's own spontaneous living" (598-9). By "deliberate human acts" (599) "the empirically, intelligently, rationally conscious subject of self-affirmation becomes a morally self-conscious subject" (599). He speaks of a "social order" (597) or a "good of order" (596 and passim), such as "the polity, the economy, the family as an institution" (596), whose "elements" (596) "are put into execution ... to change the situation" (597).

Later on, too, he speaks just as clearly of the distinction between knowing and doing:

> freedom ... is a higher integration of lower manifolds that can be integrated in many different manners; each element in that higher integration appears, first, as a possible course of action revealed by insight, secondly, as a value to be weighed by reflection and, thirdly, as an actuality only if it is chosen. (692)
>
> Reflection never settles the issue; it can determine that a given course is valuable or pleasurable or useful; but only the decision makes the course actual. (692-3)

What the fourth level adds is the new actuality. If freedom or decision were not recognized, that actuality would

be simply one more coincidental event to be known as a fact by judgment. But the higher level, though adding new actuality, is conditioned by the lower level, so the decision has to be of what can be grasped as a possible good of order, and judged to be a true value. This is what is meant by "an exigence for self-consistency in knowing and doing" (599), "a willingness to follow the lead of intelligence and truth" (561), "the dynamic exigence of rational self-consciousness for self-consistency (which) unfolds into a body of moral precepts" (601). All four levels are mentioned together when we are told that

> the good that man does intelligently and rationally is a manifold in the field of experience, ordered by intelligence, and rationally chosen. (603)

The intelligence, of course, must operate according to its own norms. It must be detached and disinterested in its knowing, or else what is proposed as a good of order may be a mere illusion, or a false value may be taken as a true one. Such a demand that our choices be intelligent, and that this intelligence be genuine intelligence, is very different from a demand that knowledge be the only direct aim of our choice. Nowhere does Lonergan make or assume such a restriction on human aims.

But does he indicate at all what such aims might be? Yes. He refers to them generically as "human living" or

"human development", and, especially when other people are involved, as "the drama of living". Quite concretely, one might aim "to mount a camel or ... to go fishing in a kayak ..., to speak a foreign language or to play the violin" (622). With other people one can

> generate and implement common ways, common manners, common undertakings, common commitments. (215)

One can be "the originator and sponsor of social systems" (214), which facilitate "contributing to the satisfactions of all" (214). Thus one can contribute to "technological and ... material development" (214) and "a complementary series of economic and political innovations" (214). One can aim at the "psychic, sensitive, corporal activities" (571) which follow the prompting

> to waking and sleeping, to eating and drinking, to shade in the summer and the fireside in winter, to loving and begetting children and fending for them. (471)

and in catering for these, one can help to create

> the family and technology, the economy and polity, morality and law. (471)

For oneself in particular and in the concrete one creates a "drama of living" (188) largely through one's "deliberation and choice" (188), in which one becomes involved in "the dramatic pattern of one person dealing with other persons (which) draws upon all one's resources" (470),

acquiring at times their "admiration ... approval ... respect and even their affection" (188).

The initiative for a development of oneself

> can begin in one's perceptiveness and feelings, yet it will remain frustrated if one fails to understand oneself, to plan the strategy, and to execute the tactics that secure congenial companionship or employment (472).

and this companionship and employment that a man can rightly aim at have just been described more fully as including

> Intersubjectivity, companionship, play and artistry, the idle hours spent with those with whom one feels at home, the common purpose, labour, achievement, failure, disaster, the sharing of feeling in laughter and lamenting (471).

Ultimately, the development of a man in this area can be complemented by charity, so that he wills "all the good that all persons in the universe are or enjoy or possess" (699), and may even "love all men with a self-sacrificing love" (699).

Now this, together with the few pages on "the dramatic pattern of experience" (187-191) and on "human development" (467-479), from which these quotations have been taken, and on "Common sense as object" (207-244), may indeed be a "skimpy treatment" of "personal relationships" (731), but it does seem to indicate that Lonergan's philosophical system, on his own interpretation of it, at least, is quite open to concrete persons, and that the pursuit of knowledge is not the only human aim that he allows.

A case has, nevertheless, been put forward that the logic of Lonergan's system allows no place for persons. The argument is very simple: Persons are individuals; individuality belongs to what Lonergan calls "the empirical residue"; the empirical residue is discarded; so, for Lonergan, persons have to be disregarded.

The theory of levels helps us to formulate one type of answer to this argument. The empirical residue, which includes individuality (which makes possible the existence of different individuals of the same kind), together with spatiality (which allows the same or different individuals to be in different places) and temporality (which allows them to be at different times), belongs to the lowest level of knowing, in presentation to the senses. This conditions and is taken up into the next level of our knowing in which we are able to add an accumulating set of insights into the individual (or person) concerned, as we develop a progressively richer, mainly commonsense, knowledge of him or her or it.

If we wish to name any of these insights or to find if they apply to other people as well, then we will have to concentrate on the contribution of intelligence alone and so discard the empirical residue in which our insight originated in order to associate the insight with some other empirical element. In this way we can arrive at abstract concepts.

But Lonergan insists that this generalizing abstraction is not an essential part of intellectual knowing, though it is indispensible if we wish, or need, to extend our knowledge beyond a realm in which we have the mastery of familiarity. This is the case especially if we are to become involved in practical action in that further realm. Such extension, of course, and consequently, such conceptualization, is not required for our knowledge of persons or other individuals who are close at hand.

Lonergan considered that he had something to say to us about the relationship between sense presentations, understanding and general concepts, something that had been taught by Aquinas, but forgotten and then misconceived by most of his recent followers. While using the whole book to alert us to this rediscovery, Lonergan deals with it briefly especially in the motto of his book, in the fourth of his initial comments on insight in his opening section, and in a section on "The notion of abstraction".

The motto in Aristotle's Greek on the title page is translated later as "forms are grasped by mind in images" (677), and frequently paraphrased as "insight is into data". Without data we will discover no insights, but insights are not given to us with the data. They have to be discovered in them by the creative activity of an active mind.

In terms of the theory of levels which is the theme of this essay, Lonergan later says:

> Images, apart from insight, are coincidental manifolds, but images under insights cease to be coincidental, for their elements become related intelligibly. Potency corresponds to the imagined empirical residue. Form corresponds to the insight. Again, direct insight expresses itself in abstract classical laws. (440)

The insight adds something to the data — a unification, a grasp, an order, an intelligible relationship — which brings together elements that previously seemed to be quite disparate. An insight can express itself, and does so by selecting elements in the data that are so unified, holding them still in its own enriching unity, and dropping other elements in the data that are not thus unified by this insight. The ordered expression is grasped as possibly applying to other sets of concrete data, and at this stage we have an abstract classical law. The fact that this law applies to instances other than the one initially examined, is due to the power of the insight, not to anything positive coming from the discarding of some of the data. Indeed, the value of ceasing to pay attention to part of the data is not to avoid those data but to avoid insights, so that we can now concentrate on the single insight without being distracted by further insights that might well arise in those data. What the generalizing abstraction is mainly doing is abstracting from other insights until the mind is ready to consider them. When we are ready to proceed we return to the concrete data, or to a new set of similar data, attend to them, stay with

them, investigate them, in the hope of understanding a new aspect of the object.

In Lonergan's own words:

> Insight pivots between the concrete and the abstract. ... If insights arise from concrete problems, if they reveal their value in concrete applications, none the less they possess a significance greater than their origins and a relevance wider than their applications. Because insights arise with reference to the concrete, mathematicians need pen and paper ... But because the significance and relevance of insight goes beyond any concrete problem or application, men formulate abstract sciences, with their numbers and symbols, their technical terms and formulae, their definitions, postulates and deductions. (5-6)

The relevance to other cases mentioned in the second half of this quotation is not found by collation and comparison. It is a property of the initial insight itself, of the enrichment added to the data presented. Lonergan goes on immediately to speak of "insight <u>into</u> the concrete world of sense and imagination", and of expression as derived from "what insight adds to sensible and imagined presentations" (6).

This addition made to the data is, of course, the enrichment of the data of which he speaks later, when rejecting as useless an empiricist notion of abstraction as a mere selection among impoverished replicas of the sensible data (88).

> So far from being a mere impoverishment of the data of sense, abstraction in all its essential moments is enriching. (88)

These moments are, firstly, that of "anticipation of an intelligibility to be added to sensible data", secondly, "the attainment of insight to reveal (something significant) in data", and thirdly, "the formulation of the intelligibility that insight has revealed" (88-89), with "an omission" that "is neither absolute nor definitive" "of the insignificant" (89). The formulated insight can pivot back into the concrete by being reapplied to the initial concrete data, or by being applied to similar data at another place or time or in another portion of the empirical residue.

What light does all this throw on the argument we were considering? The empirical residue conditions the intellectual knowledge of the individual or person concerned and makes that knowledge possible, but is only one constituent of it. The main constituent is the enrichment of the data that came from an insight that found something "significant" in the data and from the further insights that contribute further cumulative significant aspects. The empirical residue is what is left over when all such significant aspects have been recognized. Up to that point the data presented lead to further insights, to deeper or more extensive knowledge of that individual, and to intelligibility in what had been thought to be coincidental, but such growth will require repeated, frequent, careful attention to whatever data are available.

None of these insights need be expressed. If one of them is in fact expressed it might be found to apply to another person than the one in whom it was discovered, or might not. But the expression enables the insight to be considered as general, in the sense of possibly applying in other cases. This possible applicability to other cases does not mean that the insight did not arise in the understanding of a single case, nor that it could not be applied again to that single case if the appropriate data were again attended to. The observer is not looking at some abstract essence, but is still understanding, under one small aspect, the individual person first attended to.

A group of insights applicable to this person might possibly be found in another person as well, but the probability of this becomes extremely remote as the number of insights considered increases. We are in no way restricted to what is common to all men, we are open to any intelligibility that might be found in any individual, and perhaps only in one. The cluster of insights found in one individual, far from being something common to all might be so rare and unusual that

> only an exhaustive tour of inspection could establish that there does not exist another set of data similar in all respects. (28)
>
> For the content grasped in insight can be embodied no less in imagination than in sense; and whether there is more than one instance in sense, can be settled only by an empirical tour of inspection. (30)

> In brief, individuals differ, but the ultimate difference in our universe is a matter of fact to which there corresponds nothing to be grasped by direct insight. (29)

The individual is clearly known as an individual, but there is an element in this knowledge that is contributed by the senses or imagination, that has to be found in the "set of data" by "inspection", that embodies the content grasped in insight, that is an "ultimate difference" or "the individuality of the individual" (29). The ultimate unintelligible, sensible, element of individuality is presented by the senses. But there is another element of the individual which is intelligible, important, significant; and a further element as well, that of actual occurrence of what might otherwise have been just imagined or just grasped as a possibility. The individual is known, not in any of these alone but in a combination of all three, a combination that corresponds to the collaboration of sensation, understanding and affirmation that is characteristic of all human knowing.

Briefly:

> In that explanatory knowledge there will be affirmation, there will be understanding, and there will be experience of the empirical residue. ... Insight and understanding presuppose and complement experience; reflection and judgment presuppose and complement understanding. (486)

An individual is known by enriching abstraction, when a cluster of insights is embodied in individual concrete data at a particular place and time. If scientific knowledge is

(temporarily) desired, then the insights must be expressed, and in doing that the empirical residue is discarded, and we are free to operate on the level of understanding alone. But to say that science is possible, or even that science is valuable, is in no way to reject intellectual knowledge of concrete individuals, or to imply that there is little value in such knowledge. The suggestion that he disregards individuals involves a radical misunderstanding of Lonergan. The further implication that he promotes a disregard for human beings as persons is completely without foundation.

The critic considers it necessary to propose that "there is another kind of knowledge" which "has no place in Lonergan's system". But the account he gives of it makes it so like the type of knowledge that Lonergan in fact makes central that we must suspect a deep misunderstanding. This "other kind of knowledge" is something

> which is found when persons mutually know and understand one another ... when people who love each other talk for hours ... (The time spent on this talk) is justified by the relationship which it makes or deepens.

This seems very like what Lonergan (applying the adjective "common" to each of the 5 nouns that follow it) speaks of as initiated by

> Intersubjectivity, companionship, play and artistry, the idle hours spent with those with whom one feels at home, the common purpose, labour, achievement, failure, disaster, the sharing of feeling in laughter and lamenting. (471)

with the warning that a development that begins in these

> will remain frustrated if one fails to understand oneself, to plan the strategy, and to execute the tactics that secure congenial companionship or employment. (472)

Lonergan describes such life "in the presence of others" as "the primordial drama that the theatre only imitates" (188), and as grounded in "aesthetic liberation and artistic creativity" (188) rather than "fixity of organization" or "blue-prints for human behaviour" (188). And he develops this notion of flexibility:

> Ordinary living is not ordinary drama. It is not learning a role and developing in oneself the feelings appropriate to its performance. It is not the prior task of assembling materials and through insight imposing upon them an artistic pattern. For in ordinary living there are not first the materials and then the pattern, nor first the role and then the feelings. On the contrary, the materials that emerge in consciousness are already patterned, and the pattern is already charged emotionally and conatively. (189)

The argument that something like this "has no place in Lonergan's system, because the knowledge involved is not general" has clearly missed Lonergan's insistance that "insight pivots between the concrete and the abstract" (5), that "insights arise from concrete problems (and) ... reveal their value in concrete applications" (5) so that

> pupils have to perform experiments for themselves, doctors have to see their patients, trouble-shooters have to travel to the spot. (6)

And there is no sign that Lonergan is trying "to justify the time spent on" talk by portraying it as the acquisition of knowledge, when all he is trying to do here is to illustrate his point that "one meets intelligence in every walk of life" (173) and that

> there is intelligence in the home and in friendship, in conversation and in sport (173)

by indicating the presence of understanding in the inquiry of children, in the spontaneous learning of adults, in teaching, in talking, in example and in collaboration. (173-5)

If all this is admitted and the suggestion that is being made is that the "other sort of knowledge" does not involve such intelligence, then we must ask if the "talk" that has value and that makes or deepens a relationship, would have the same value or produce the same effect if it were in languages that were mutually incomprehensible to the persons concerned.

Lonergan's theory of levels helps us to clarify the place he gives to detachment and disinterestedness. They belong to the level of understanding, enabling that activity to do its proper work, especially in concentrating on the data available, rather than being caught up in a world of dreams.

Human knowing has the three levels of experiencing, understanding and judging. Human living has the four levels

of experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding, with the most relevant experiences being the feelings and desires that initiate an attraction towards action, and the most relevant acts of understanding being those that grasp the elements of possible coherent courses of action.

Understanding is hindered if the desire to know is not unrestricted, thus giving way to "the obscurantism that hides truth or blocks access to it in whole or in part" (380), or, more subtly, if the desire is not detached, leaving scope for

> the inhibitions of cognitional process that arise from other human desires and drives (380),

and more subtly still, if it is not disinterested, thus allowing

> the well-meaning but disastrous reinforcement that other desires lend cognitional process only to twist its orientation into the narrow confines of their limited range. (380)

There is no indication in these definitions that detachment should be concerned with the suppression of desires or feelings; its task is simply to prevent their interfering with the proper exercise of understanding. Even less is detachment a matter of limiting the range of the aims at which decision may be directed, as though knowledge should be what we aim at in every choice. Human living involves a lot more than knowledge, but our choices of food (for instance) would be silly in neglecting what we know about poisons and the

like. Decision has its own virtues, but it may not ignore the laws of the lower autonomous levels, which concern truth and intelligibility and attentiveness. Perhaps confusion arises just because the upper level of human living is so very free from laws that belong specifically to this level. What must we seek? Development? Genuineness? Friendship? The common good? Most of the best known laws are the ones that set out the conditions that spring up from the lower levels. Every decision has to allow for the truth that we know. Granted, but this is very different from saying that every decision must be a decision to seek further truth.

Lonergan asks "How are such detachment and disinterestedness to be extended over human living?" (599) and devotes a page to his answer — in terms not of excluding other desires and of aiming only at gaining more knowledge, but of ensuring that one's actions, whatever they are directed at, are in accordance with what one already knows. Self-knowledge is proposed as a base for action, not as a goal of action.

The "detachment and disinterestedness" is extended "into living" (600) when action occurs that is consistent with what is known, but it has not been so extended where there is a mere

> speculative acknowledgement of the aspiration to make one's own living intelligent and reasonable. (6)

which Lonergan calls "moral renunciation" (600, 692), and it has not been so extended when rationalization occurs, "that makes out wrong to be right" (692) thus "mitigating the moral code" (600), by bringing the inconsistency into the knowing itself, whether by denying known "matters of fact" (599) or by denying moral principles themselves. Finally, detachment and disinterestedness have not been extended into living when the will "is ready for the obnubilation that takes flight from self-consciousness" (692), neglecting to reflect on one's awareness of liability to "praise or blame" (599) that arises in one's conscience, or in the consciousness that is associated with "one's deeds, one's words, one's mixed motives".

Lonergan certainly insists that detachment be extended into human living, and he certainly recognizes that at times desires springing up in the senses or emotions will have to be renounced, but his morality allows just as readily, in other cases, the encouragement and development of such desires. The detachment concerned is simply not a rejection of desires other than the desire to know from human living. It is just the detachment that is proper to knowing, a refusal to allow other desires to hinder the proper operation of one's intelligent inquiries about oneself and about the present and total situation within which one has the opportunity to act.

We may conclude then that none of the three lines of objection to Lonergan's philosophy can be sustained. What plausibility these objections have comes from importing into his thought principles that are quite foreign to it. While prizing understanding and truth, and clarifying the conditions under which they can be secured, he recognizes and esteems persons and their individual dignity, and allows full scope for Christian and human virtues.