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HOW LONERGAN ILLUMINATES ARISTOTLE

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Bernard Lonergan was obviously influenced very greatly by Aristotle. He refers in his Verbum [1] to over two hundred different passages in Aristotle's works, as well as more than three hundred passages in Aquinas' commentaries on Aristotle, and he mentions Aristotle by name on about seventy pages of Insight [2]. But my question here is the inverse one - whether Lonergan has made a contribution to our understanding of Aristotle. This question sets a test for the power of Lonergan's own philosophy, one which can be appreciated by our contemporaries, such as Jonathan Barnes, who, after noting the lasting value of Aristotle's foundational work in the sciences of logic and of biology, remarks:

> Aristotle's more philosophical writings . . . are, paradoxically, more alive. For here Aristotle has not yet been overtaken. The Ethics, for example, can be read as a contribution to current debate, and modern philosophers still treat Aristotle as a brilliant colleague [3].

There is, indeed, a great interest in Aristotle at present. A number of articles of high scholarly quality are devoted to him every year, and there is a steady stream of books and commentaries on his works. There are, however, a number of well-known obscurities that puzzle these commentators. I propose to examine a few of these, and I hope to show how Lonergan's way of introducing us to philosophy not only helps us to make sense of these passages but even enables us to draw considerable light from them.

I plan to quote four such passages, together with evidence from leading contemporary commentators as to their obscurity. Then I shall recall some of the relevant elements in Lonergan's analysis of human knowledge, and interpret each passage in the light of these.

1. The active intellect

Aristotle's work on the soul treats first of life and sensation. Only in its third book does he discuss intellectual activity. Before long he has introduced the notion of two sorts of mind - passive and active - in a passage that is the source of the scholastic notion of an intellectus agens, a notion that is not always easily integrated into a full philosophy even by its admirers. He writes as follows:

> Mind in the passive sense is such because it becomes all things, but mind has another aspect in that it makes all things; this is a kind of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential into actual colours. Mind in this sense is separable, impassive and unmixed, since it is essentially an activity; for the agent is always superior to the patient, and the originating cause to the matter [4].

Guthrie speaks of "these exceedingly difficult sections" in Book III, chapters 4 and 5, and goes on to say:

> No scholar can approach without extreme diffidence the subject of the Active, or Creative, Reason, "perhaps the most obscure and certainly the most discussed of Aristotle's doctrines" (Ross) [5]

adding that "The distinction within nous is not mentioned elsewhere".

2. Sense and intellect

Our second passage concerns the distinction between sense and intellect, something which Aristotle has mentioned earlier on in the work but each time deferring discussion and referring forward to this passage. Despite our difficulty in deciphering its meaning we find here a good illustration of Aristotle's esteem for concrete and empirical proofs:

> It has been well said that the soul is the place of forms, except that this does not apply to the soul as a whole, but only in its thinking capacity, and the forms occupy it not actually but only potentially. But that the perceptive and thinking faculties are not alike in their impassivity is obvious if we consider the sense organs and sensation. For the sense loses sensation under the stimulus of a too violent sensible object: e.g. of sound immediately after loud sounds, and neither seeing nor smelling is possible just after strong colours and scents; but when mind thinks the highly intelligible, it is not less able to think of slighter things, but even more able; for the faculty of sense is not apart from the body, whereas the mind is separable [6]

Hamlyn translates the second-last sentence thus:

> But when the intellect thinks something especially fit for thought it thinks inferior things not less but rather more [7]

and adds a note in which, after a remark on sensation, he says:

> The way in which the intellect is contrasted with this and what it means to speak of an object as 'especially fit for thought' or 'especially thinkable' is <u>most obscure</u> [8].

3. God's ignorance of the world

Our next two passages come from chapter 9 of Book XII of the Metaphysics, which, along with chapter 7 (the intervening chapter 8 is on a quite diferent topic), is devoted to the nature of the supreme intellect, which has already, in the earlier chapters, been proved to exist. A long series of problems is examined, which we break into here:

> The nature of the supreme intellect involves a number of problems; . Whether its substance is the faculty of thought or the act of thinking, what does it think? Itself or something else? If the later, does it think the same always, or different things at different times? Does it make any difference whether its object is noble or trivial? Are there not some things which it is incredible that it should think? Evidently it must contemplate what is most divine, and without changing; any change would be for the worse, and would affect with movement what is in fact unmovable [9].

The commentators do not find any great difficulty in interpreting this text. Their problem is simply that such a great thinker as Aristotle should have held such a doctrine.

Allan says:

> God, then, possesses no knowledge of the visible universe or of the sciences as they present themselves to the human intellect. It seems useless to try to mitigate the obvious sense of the text, though scholars in all ages have tried to do so [10].

Barnes, similarly, is clear that the sort of God of whom Aristotle speaks could have no religious significance:

> Aristotle's Gods are too abstract, remote and impersonal to be regarded as the objects of a religious man's worship [11].

Guthrie has no doubt about the negative message of the text, ascribing this to "some perplexities" concerning the Unmoved Mover, which Aristotle presents at the beginning of chapter 9:

> Consideration of these leads to the conclusion that the only object of his thought must be himself [12].

And earlier in his volume he expresses amazement at this doctrine:

> Aristotle's philosophy . . . (was) a brilliant synthesis culminating in the extraordinary conception of the Divine Intellect which is the ultimate cause of the universe, while remaining completely indifferent to its existence or non-existence [13].

All the commentators seem agreed that such indifference is quite unworthy of anything that we could reasonably call "God", and they are quite satisifed that this indifference is what is taught. Nor are they attracted by the positive account which Aristotle finally gives of God, in the fourth and last of our passages.

4. God as contemplating himself.

The main positive element in Aristotle's account of the supreme intellect is usually spoken of as something like self-contemplation or thinking of himself. We find it at the conclusion of the "perplexities" of chapter 9 recently mentioned:

> Therefore, since the supreme intellect is the best thing in the world, it must think itself; its thinking is a thinking of thinking.

Guthrie, in a footnote referring to this passage, says that Düring, a respected German commentator

> has joined a long line of interpreters who shy away from Aristotle's plain but distasteful portrayal of a deity wrapped in eternal self-contemplation [14].

And Copleston, despite his care to recall a text that does not easily fit in with this, comes to what is essentially the same conclusion:

> Aristotle, then, defines God as 'Thought of Thought', noesis noeseos. God is subsistent thought, which eternally thinks itself. Moreover, God cannot have any object of thought outside Himself, for that would mean that He had an end outside Himself. God, therefore, knows only Himself. . .
>
> (Aristotle) does indeed speak in rather a different strain on occasion, as when he speaks of God as the captain of an army who brings about order in the army . . . but such remarks should hardly be pressed in view of his treatment of the First Mover[15]

So much for the four difficult passages and the standard view that commentators have of them. It is time for me to show what it is in Lonergan's thought that enables us to make good sense of them.

The Light

Lonergan's central contribution to philosophy was in introducing us to understanding, which, following the example of most

of the great philosophers, we have tended to ignore. Not that we are strangers to the word or to its meaning - we use it very frequently and communicate successfuly through it, so that there is surprisingly little variety or muddle in its ordinary usage. But we hardly attend to it at all in the way that philosophers have attended to, and inquired about, concepts, ideas, arguments, certainty, sensation, the a priori and the like.

In this Lonergan is backed up by Richard Franklin, who supported his own observation that

> Few terms are so widely employed and yet so litle examined in contemporary English-speaking philosophy as that of understanding [16]

with

> a list of recent books which use the word in their titles but give us little or no general conceptual analysis of it. . In this they follow such distinguished precedents as Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, and Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding [17].

He has strong support, also, from Gilbert Ryle, who summarises an excellent set of criteria for having understood an argument, in terms of an ability to "paraphrase it, illustrate, expand or recast it" [18]. Unfortunately, Ryle did not follow up this identification of understanding with an examination of the nature of such an ability, though over twenty years later, in pointing out that

> It is part of intelligence to seize new opportunities and to face new hazards; to be, in short, 'not a tram, but a bus' [19],

something that comes from an "ability and readiness to innovate" [20], he complained that

> Unfortunately the whole topic of originality has, until recently, been very wrongly neglected by epistemologists [21].

Lonergan stresses that understanding, especially in its fresh occurrence which we prize under the name of "insight", is a conscious state that each of us experiences for himself or herself. It is not something that we have to argue to metaphysically, but something which keeps us wide awake, and which we can identify by contrast with the previous state in which we simply could not understand the point at issue.

He insists on

> close attention to instances of one's own understanding and, equally, one's failing to understand, and . . . the repeated use of personal experiments in which, at first, one is genuinely puzzled and then catches on [22].

Our understanding is experienced as a unification of data that would otherwise be in some sense dispersed, as seeing the point, as a focus on the issue, as a grasp of a possibility. It is the source of concepts, being a power to formulate solutions to problems in a variety of ways.

Though it is essentially a unity it is by no means alien to what is multiple or dispersed, as its task, normally, is precisely that of tying such things together. Insight is into data and "forms are grasped by mind in images" [23]. So insights "arise from concrete problems" and "reveal their value in concrete applications" [24]. They can themselves "combine, cluster, coalesce, into the mastery of a subject" [25], leading to the emergence of a "higher viewpoint" [26].

Another point that Lonergan helps us to recognize is that knowledge is not the the result of one single type of action or event nor is it some common quality in a variety of activities, since it requires the coordination of activities that otherwise

are quite different from each other and distinct. Thus, we do not know in the full sense of the word if all we are doing is merely seeing, or merely understanding, or merely assenting. Each of these activities needs the others, and they all need inquiry.

We can never ensure that fresh understanding will come easily or at will, but we can stimulate it by wondering, inquiring, striving to formulate questions and to discover possible answers. Our inquiry is directed at data but aimed at understanding, and it provides us with the key to the first of our puzzing passages above.

First solution: Wonder

This spontaneous ability to inquire is a consciously active ingredient in our power of acquiring knowledge and it is open to any sort of question and any type of answer. So in the sense in which knowledge is "made" it can be said to make all things. Thus, inquiry, or wonder, a familiar conscious state or activity or drive, corresponds very well to what Aristotle called the active intellect. He was not talking about something arcane or "metaphysical" in the bad sense of that word. He was referring to something each of us should be able to recognize quite easily. And the passage quoted from his work On the Soul was not the only one where he spoke of inquiry.

The first sentence in his Metaphysics is "All men by their very nature feel the urge to know" [27]. This clearly refers to what we experience as wonder or inquiry, and coming in such an important position it would seem to carry all the weight required by a parallel to the passage we are studying in On the Soul. And in the second chapter of the Metaphysics the word "wonder" appears three times, referring to an active source of knowledge quite like that envisaged in On the Soul III chapter 5:

> That it is not a productive science is clear from the early history of philosophy. Philosophy arose then, as it arises

> still, from wonder. At first men wondered about the more obvious problems that demanded explanation; gradually their inquiries spread farther afield, and they asked questions upon such larger topics as changes in the sun and moon and stars, and the origin of the world [28].
>
> All begin, as I have said, by wondering that things should be as they are: puppets, for example, or the solstices, of the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with the side [29].

So a rough translation of the first passage I quoted from Aristotle could be put like this:

> The intellect is passive in that it can receive any sort of intelligibility, but it also has an active aspect, in that its inquiry can produce every sort of insight; in this aspect it is a lasting power, like light; for in a sort of way light makes actual colours out of things that are able to be colours. This wondering intellect is distinct from the power to understand and it is not subject to outside influence or to blending with some other power, because it contains its own dynamism. For what acts is always superior to what is acted upon, and a plan is superior to the materials upon which it works. [30]

Second solution: Deep insights

The main obstacle to understanding our second passage above is a simple, though extremely common, mistranslation. Because our acquisition of understanding has been neglected by the philosophers they have used "think", as the obvious activity of the intellect, to translate "noei" and have fathered onto Aristotle such untelligible phrases as "when the mind thinks the highly intelligible" and something "especially thinkable".

It is remarkable how much of the obscurity found in Aristotle is dispersed when we translate "noein as "to understand" or "to get an insight"; "noesis" as "understanding", "an insight", "a grasp", "seeing the point"; "noetos" as the adjective "intelligible" or the noun "intelligibility"; leaving "noema" as "concept", i.e. what has been produced in the mind by understanding; with "noetikos" as "intelligence"; and "nous" itself as another word for "intelligence", but also more generally as mind. All these are strong words that convey quite definite meaning, whereas "think", "thinking", and even "thought", are surprisingly weak words that rarely rise to the task of conveying efficiently the main activity of human minds.

Aristotle's central affirmation in this second text, which was given thus

> When the mind thinks the highly intelligible, it is not less able to think of slighter things, but even more able [31]

can, with greater fidelity to the Greek be translated as:

> When intelligence grasps something highly intelligible, it is not less able to understand slighter things, but even more so

and this, far from being obscure, makes perfectly good sense. It is common experience that almost any striking insight sparks off a number of smaller ones, so that a variety of points fall into place. And anyone who understands Newton's laws will be able, with no great difficulty, to grasp Kepler's laws as an instance of them, while being able to understand comets, projectiles, satellites and tides as well, on the same basis. More simply, understanding a circle as a set of points equidistant from a fixed point is a great help towards understanding the relationships between angles subtended at the centre and at the circumference of a circle, as well as the type of triangle that can be inscribed in a semicircle. In general, an insight unifies data,

so an insight which unifies a a large amount of varied data will more readily tie together a limited section of such data.

The first two sentences of the passage are open to similar elucidation through re-translation, especially when we realise that Plato first introduced his forms to acount for the intelligibility of things, and Aristotle readily accepts them in this sense:

> It has been well said that the soul is the place of forms, except that this does not apply to the soul as a whole, but only in its capacity to understand, and the forms occupy it not actually but only potentially. But that sensation and intelligence are not alike in their impassivity is obvious if we consider sense organs and sensation. . [32]

This leads on to the distinction, which Aristotle, typically, has proved in an empirical and concrete manner. And the point he makes here turns out to be exactly what was required for a solution of our third puzzle.

Third solution: God understands the world.

I do not think there is any solid basis at all for the extremely common view that Aristotle held that God does not know the world. But it is not hard to see how such a view arose out of the philosophical neglect of understanding and the subsequent mistranslation of Aristotle's Greek. When taken as about "thinking", the positive part of his concept of God given towards the end of the chapter is quite unhelpful; the early part of the chapter similarly makes little sense; and hence the logic of the suggestions being made is missed.

Let us start with the text given above, incorporating my retranslation of the key words:

> The nature of the supreme intellect involves a number of problems; . . Whether its substance is the power of understanding or the act of understanding, what is it that it understands? Itself, or something else? If the latter, does it always have the same insight or different ones at different times? Does it make any difference whether this object of its understanding is noble or trivial? Are there not some things which it is incredible that it should think about [a different word here - "dianoeisthai"]? Evidently it must have an insight into what is most divine, and without changing; for the change would be for the worse, and would affect with movement what is in fact unmovable [33].

Note that the early suggestion that the supreme intellect might understand itself - surely a reasonable one - is not followed up until the last three lines. The intervening passage pursues the alternative suggestion - that what the supreme intellect understands is something other than itself. And this, of course, would be have to be its main object.

The view that <u>some</u> things are trivial and unworthy to be the main object of God's mind is surely eminently reasonable to any theist. If that is all that he understands or knows then he is not to be esteemed much more than a God who knew nothing. And we can easily move on to extend this to <u>anything</u> other than himself. No such thing could be the adequate object of God's knowledge.

This seems to be where the commentators stop. But the denial is clearly in the context of a question about the central object of God's knowledge (or understanding), and an assumption that God himself is not that object. This is an alternative that has been left hanging and is yet to be considered. It remains a viable alternative to all that has gone before, and Aristotle is quite happy to accept it as the truth.

> "Evidently it must understand what is most divine and without changing" [34].

And what is most divine is God himself. This is confirmed a few sentences later:

> "Therefore, since the supreme intellect is the best thing in the world, it must understand itself" [35],

and also in the simple deduction that follows from this:

> "Its understanding is an understanding of understanding" [36].

Once this option has been taken the possibility remains open as to whether God might understand some things other than himself, as well as himself. The possibility that God might understand other things as well as, or indeed in virtue of, his understanding of himself has not been closed off.

It seems to me, that this last suggestion is the one that makes most sense of the text. And our second puzzling text above can be called in to help. If God understands himself, and if his understanding is an understading of understanding, then what he understands is highhly intelligible, and so he "is not less able to understand slighter things but more able" [37]. There is no loss to the dignity of God in his understanding things other than himself in the light of his understanding of himself. What would have upset his dignity would have been an understanding of other things that stood in the way of an understanding of himself. Once we accept that insight into self, then the problem about God's knowledge of other things vanishes. And with it vanishes one of the most persistent objections to Aristotle's philosophy.

In saying this I am not denying that Aristotle extended the category of random events very widely [38]. This does not effect my present point, since such random events were, for Aristotle, similarly outside the range of human understanding also. Much understanding is still left to this and at least as much should be ascribed to God. Aristotle's God is quite capable of understanding the <u>intelligible</u> world.

Aristotle pointed out how much randomness there is in the world. He assumed, quite plausibly, that this was completely unintelligible. Aquinas added the notion of things that are intelligible although contingent, supporting this by distinguishing the intellibilility of essence from the factualness of existence. Lonergan supported it further by the modern notion of probability, through which scientists of all sorts have found intelligible laws hidden beneath the residue of chance.

Even for Aristotle the absolute negative is not justified. While it is reasonable when talking about the main object of God's knowledge to extend Aristotle's statement that some things are too trivial to be the object of God's knowledge to all terrestrial things - as is done by the commentators quoted above - such an extension has no justification when we are talking about secondary objects of knowledge since these can be understood in the light of a principal insight of a sort that is powerful enough to be certainly worthy of the divine mind.

Fourth solution: An exciting insight.

Apart altogether from the puzzle about Aristotle's account of God's knowledge of the world, which I have just been discussing, there is the problem of the most uninspiring account he gives of God's life and occupation. What value can we find in a person whose whole activity consists in "contemplating thought" or "thinking about thinking" or "thinking himself"?

This problem is overcome by the correction in translation which I have proposed. The central affirmation becomes:

> Therefore, since the supreme intellect is the best thing in the world, it must understand itself; its understanding is an understanding of understanding. [39]

This can be put slightly differently: what it understands is itself, and since it is itself an act of understanding, it must

understand what understanding is. That is, the supreme intellect, which is ultimately required as an explanation of the world, must be self-explanatory. This is possible if it understands itself, as then it has no need to seek any further for an explanation; it understands even itself. It is a supreme insight which leaves no questions unanswered.

Therefore, it is exciting, engaging, interesting, engrossing, and powerful, for these are characteristics even of our ordinary limited insights. Even our human insights are quite the opposite to being boring. And an insight can have all its power at a single moment. It has no need to be spread out in time. I must admit that there is no positive evidence of Aristotle having reached the notion of eternity as a point outside of time altogether, but he must have come very close to it, and what he says here remains quite open to such a notion. At any rate, even without this positive notion of eternity, which is taught by Aquinas, to be essentially one who understands seems to be a worthwhile and helpful concept of a supreme being.

As for the other aspect of Aristotle's final account of the supreme being - that his insight is essentially into himself - this has meaning and reasonableness that seemed lacking when his activity was taken to be thinking about himself or contemplating himself. The uniqueness of God has a much more striking influence on the notion of God as understood than on the notions of God as thought of or as contemplated. This difference becomes particularly clear if we change the subject of the sentence. There is no such shock in saying that George is thinking of God or that George is contemplating God, as there is in saying that George understands God. In the latter case everything that is meant by God is immediately involved, and this must apply too when we speak of God's self-understanding. This has to be rich and interesting and powerful and open to every issue and every intelligible possibility.

So this correction of the mistranslations has brought out not only the reasonableness but also the attractiveness of Aristotle's account of God's own activity. And it completely under-

mines as well the view that Aristotle's God could not know, or be interested in, anything other than himself, since, as we have seen in the second passage examined, an understanding of something particularly intelligible - and God, to himself at least, is like this - carries with it an understanding of lesser things.

The problem of dualism within God is also overcome, since, while thinking of oneself seems to imply some distinction of self as subject and as object, understanding is something that can be had from within, and understanding oneself implies clarity, control, focus, and unity of all one's powers, rather than any suggestion of distinction betwen them. And, of course, we know that Aristotle insists on this rejection of dualism not only with regard to God but with regard to understanding in general. Aristotle's statement that "understander and understood are identical" [40], is one of Aquinas' favourite quotations from him, and is seen as applying in a special way to God. His theory of knowledge by identity has often been forgotten, leaving the alternative theory of knowledge by confrontation to face the objections that eventually show that its pictures and its likenesses fail to make knowledge different from any other occurrence of two things opposite one another.

This notion of God as someone who understands himself and is able, in virtue of that insight, to understand all other intelligibility is able to cope easily with John Stuart Mill's knock-out question "Who made God?" [41]. We ask who made the world because we are seeking an explanation, and "God" is simply the name we give to what ultimately gives such an explanation. So for God no further question can arise, and this is precisely the case if God fully understands himself. In understanding he already possesses the explanation, not only of the world, but also of himself. And when we, too, arrive at someone who understands all things we cannot intelligently ask questions that point beyond him.

This approach retains our way of access to God. How do I know what God is like? I understand something. We all know what understanding is. We have experienced it. We have, at times,

been very excited about it. We have been thrilled by the concepts that flowed from some of our insights. What would I be like, then, if I understood everything? This is the way of analogy, giving us something that we can follow up, and enabling us to arrive at many of the attributes of God.

Surprisingly, this same approach, which might seem to be going much too far, gives us at the same time a sound and intelligible defence of negative theology. I can say at some length what I would be like if I understood everything. But in fact I do not understand everything. God has a perfect insight. I do not. I do know that he has a perfect insight. But I do not enter into it. What more could Dionysius the Areopagite or St John of the Cross require of me?

A literary classic is said to be a work that makes more demands on us and brings new light to us every time we read it. Starting off from some of the widely recognized demands that Aristotle makes upon us, I have shown how Bernard Lonergan helps us draw light from him. Together they open up to us something of the source and the power of our own intellectual activity, and they lead us to a God whom we can admire, affirm, and - indirectly understand, and before whom we must stand in wondering awe. We must be grateful to have found such a guide.

NOTES

[1] Lonergan, Bernard J.F., Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1968.

[2] Lonergan, Bernard J.F., Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1957.

[3] Barnes, Jonathan, Aristotle, Oxford: O.U.P., 1982, Past Masters series, p.87.

[4] Aristotle, On the Soul, Book III, chapter 5, 430 a14-19.

[5] Guthrie, W.K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy, Volume 6, Aristotle an Encounter, Cambridge: C.U.P., 1981, p.309, 315.

[6] Aristotle, On the Soul, III.4, 430 a27-b6.

[7] Aristotle, De Anima II-III, translated by D.W. Hamlyn with commentary, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.

[8] Ibid. p.137.

[9] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book XII, chapter 9, 1074 b15, 22-29.

[10] D.J. Allan, The Philosophy of Aristotle, London: O.U.P., 1952, p.118. The second edition, in 1970, is much more favourable, in a major revision of the whole chapter.

[11] Barnes, J., Aristotle, p.65

[12] Guthrie, Aristotle an Encounter, p.261.

[13] Ibid., p.13.

[14] Ibid. p.231.

[15] Copleston, Frederick, A History of Philosophy, Volume 1, Greece and Rome, London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1946, p.316-7.

[16] Franklin, R.L., "Knowledge, Belief and Understanding", The Philosophical Quarterly, 31(1981)193-208, p.199.

[17] Ibid., n.8.

[18] Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966 (^{1}1949), p.163

[19] Ryle, Gilbert, "Improvisation", Mind, 85(1976)69-83 at p.69.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid., p.70.

[22] Lonergan, Bernard J.F., Collection, Montreal: Palm Publishers, 1967, p.225, in Chapter 14, "Cognitional Structure".

[23] Lonergan, Bernard J.F., Insight, p.677, translating the motto given in Greek on the title page.

[24] Ibid. p.5.

[25] Ibid. p.13.

[26] Ibid. p.13-19.

[27] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, chapter 1, 980 a22.

[28] Ibid. I.2, 982 b11-17.

[29] Ibid., 983 a13-16.

[30] See note 4 above.

[31] See note 6 above.

[32] Ibid.

[33] See note [9] above.

[34] Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII.9, 1074 b26.

[35] Ibid., 1074 b34

[36] Ibid., 1074 b35

[37] See note 6 above.

[38] Lonergan discusses this in Insight, p.129.

[39] Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII.9, 1074 b34-35.

[40] Aristotle, De Anima, III.7, 430 a4. See also 431 b17, 21, Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I q.14, a.5 c., Summa Contra Gentiles II, 98 §19, Lonergan, Verbum, p.71 - 73.

[41] See Russell, Bertrand, Why I am Not a Christian, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957 , p.3-4.