# TOWARDS A THEOLOGY OF REDEEMING HISTORY:

## Tracing the Origins and the Development of Bernard Lonergan's Theology of Redemptive History as Found in his Unpublished Papers of File 713

**By**

**Clement Papa**

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**A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of**

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Dedicated to Tom Daly SJ

## Declaration of Originality

I, Clement Papa, hereby certify that this thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution and affirm that, to the best of my knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Clement Papa

16 September 2020

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# List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| ACH (1) | "Analytic Concept of History, in blurred outline" |
| ACH (2) | "Analytic Concept of History" |
| BLPT | Bernard Lonergan as Pastoral Theologian |
| *CH* | *Christ and History: The Christology of Bernard Lonergan from 1935-1982* |
| *CWL* | Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan |
| *DLNDH* | *The Development of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History* |
| *GF* | *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* |
| *Insight* | 5th edition, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (CWL) Vol. 3 |
| IR | Insight Revisited |
| *LEER* | *Lonergan's Early Economic Research* |
| LEERH | Lonergan's Early Essays on the Redemption of History |
| *LQ* | *Lonergan's Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight* |
| *LW* | Lonergan Workshop |
| *MIT* | *Method in Theology* |
| OACH | "Outline of an Analytic Concept of History" |
| ONLDH | *The Origins of Lonergan's Notion of a Dialectic of History* |
| PA (1) | "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [The Restoration of All Things]," |
| PA (2) | "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity]." |

| | |
|---|---|
| PH | Philosophy of History |
| TH | "A Theory of History" |
| The "*Pantôn"* | Both PA (1) and PA (2) |
| TMCT | Theologising in the Melanesian Context Today |
| TP | Theology and Praxis |
| TNC | Theology in its New Context. |
| *ST* | *Summa Theologiae* |
| *TL* | *Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan* |

**Other Resources**

| | |
|---|---|
| CCC | Catechism of the Catholic Church |
| NRSV | New Revised Standard Version |
| PNG | Papua New Guinea |
| SJ | Society of Jesus |
| SVD | Society of the Divine Word Missionaries |

# Abstract

Through an intensive study of some of Bernard Lonergan's unpublished manuscripts dating back to his student days, this thesis seeks to trace the origin and the development of Lonergan's theology of a redeeming history. In order to achieve this result, the study undertakes to glean the evidence offered by two original sources: (i) Lonergan's 1935 letter to his religious superior, Rev. Henry Keane SJ, and (ii) Lonergan's historical File 713. Two items of particular relevance: (i) The *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*, [The Restoration of All Things], and (ii) the 'Analytic Concept of History' were selected from among the eight manuscripts kept in File 713. The close analysis of these two manuscripts became the main task of the thesis.

The five chapters of the thesis present the two phases of Lonergan's development in his understanding of history. The first phase is a construction of a dialectic of history; the second is a development of a theology of redemptive history. The early chapters examine the first phase by tracing the development of Lonergan's construction of a dialectic of history. Chapter four introduces a theological forum, which is then explored more fully in chapter five; these two chapters trace the development of the second phase. Further, chapter five assimilates the analysis of the first four chapters thus unifying the trajectory towards mapping out a theological narrative of a redemptive praxis.

This thesis demonstrates that, by navigating his way through the study of a dialectic of history, Lonergan devised a theological narrative which spells out the development of a redemptive praxis. The important contribution Lonergan has made through the dual development of a dialectic of history and a theology of redemptive history is seen to be relevant in meeting the contemporary challenges of Papua New Guinea's dire social concerns.

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# Prologue

Tom Daly, a Melbourne based Jesuit, occasionally flew up to the PNG Highlands between 1990 and 1994 to teach philosophy at the newly established Good Shepherd Seminary, Mount Hagen. It was during these classes that he introduced Bernard Lonergan to me. Tom had a unique way of introducing us to Lonergan's works. Usually he started his classes with a puzzle. We spent a considerable amount of time solving puzzles. Sometimes we wondered whether Tom was really our philosophy teacher or someone else altogether! But this is how Tom introduced us to the reading of *Insight*.[1] Tom's art of teaching was clear and simple. In hindsight, I realize that what Tom intended to achieve was to mentor his students to seek answers for themselves through activities, doing something about the data before them. The joy celebrated in gaining an insight to a puzzle was a small but radical step towards seeking insights into real life.

This method heightened and expanded my curiosity to seek insights in given data both in real life and from the book world when I moved on in later years to study theology at the Catholic Theological Institute, Port Moresby (1995-98), graduate studies in Rome at the Pontifical Urban University (2004-6), and some further study at Regis College in Toronto (2009-10), and finally at the Yarra Theological Union, a member college of the University of Divinity, Melbourne (2015-20). During these years I applied with appreciation Tom's method of study and my skills in the discovery of insights through meticulous research. I was able to apply them with much personal satisfaction to my Ministry. This current doctoral thesis is the result of this long path.

[1] B. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study in Human Understanding,* London: Longmans Green, 1957, 5th edition, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (CWL) Vol. 3 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1992). Henceforth, *Insight* followed by page reference.

The theme of this project was initially triggered by an article by William Burrows that I read back in my theology class in the late 1990s. Burrows, recently retired editor of *Orbis* books in the USA, was a missiologist and theologian, and had spent time as a SVD missionary in PNG in the 1970's. In his article Burrows discussed how Lonergan's theology and his method of presenting it could be applied to nurturing a dialogue between Melanesian religious experience and theology.[2] While lecturing at the Catholic Theological Institute in Port Moresby, Burrows engaged in a new conversation which was just beginning to take shape in the 1970's, that is, the dialogue between the traditional Melanesian religions and theology.[3] Equally significant during the 1970's were the beginnings of exciting times for the PNG nation which was at that time preparing for self-government and its subsequent political independence. Although there were other significant writings[4] which contributed to the emerging movements influencing the country's process of self-government, Burrows' article struck a different chord with me. He chose Lonergan's theological method to be part of this important conversation. For over forty years Burrows' proposal has been buried away in the library shelves.

In recent times, as I find myself dwelling ever more deeply on PNG's social concerns, I have read Burrows' article over and over again. My understanding has deepened that Lonergan's "method in theology is a series of do-it-yourself instructions…"[5] I take this as my starting point. In order to promote this conversation, that is the mutual dialogue between Lonergan's theological method and the Melanesian religious experience, I decided to begin with Burrows' suggestion and to deepen my understanding of it by tracing the origin of

[2] W R. Burrows, "Theologising in the Melanesian Context Today." *Point.* (1977): 242-255. Henceforth, TMCT followed by page reference.

[3] E. Mantovani, *The Dema and the Christ: My Engagement and Inner Dialogue with the Cultures and Religions of Melanesia,* (Siegburg: Steyler Missionswissenschaftliches Institut, 2014) 11-8.

[4] E. Mantovani, "What is Religion?" *An Introduction to Melanesian Religions, Point.* 6 (1984): 23-48.

[5] C.C Hefling, "Introduction" in F. E Crowe, *The Lonergan Enterprise* (Cowley: Cowley Publications, 1980) xiv.

Lonergan's theology of redeeming history. Burrows' suggestion has inspired me to reflect deeply on the impact that independence has had on PNG society, and also on how Lonergan's method might help me to discover some pastoral insights.[6] Hence, in my doctoral project I am attempting to develop a roadmap that can help me to revisit the previous national conversation with a new view. In order to do this, I begin by presenting a brief history of the PNG society.

## A Brief Prehistory of PNG Society

Before plastic, glass, bottles, metal, steel axes, guns, and football invaded this pristine world hitherto untouched by any outside contact, Rev. William Ross, SVD,[7] one of the pioneering American Divine Word Missionaries to minister to the interior PNG Highlands in 1934, recorded in his manuscript[8] details of the domestic life of the indigenous tribal communities. Ross recorded in detail the cultural sophistication of the territorial settlements in these densely populated areas. He noted the intertribal war-fares, the burial rituals, the bride wealth exchange ceremonies, the cultural and religious rituals expressed through

[6] B. Lonergan, "Prolegomena to the Study of the Emerging Religious Consciousness of Our Time," *A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F Lonergan,* (1985), 55-73.

[7] M. R Mennis, *Hagen Saga: The Story of Father William Ross, Pioneer American Missionary to Papua New Guinea* (Port Moresby: Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, 1982; reprint Port Moresby, University of Papua New Guinea, 2015), 49.

[8] W. Ross, "Ethnological Notes on Mt. Hagen Tribes (Mandated Territory of New Guinea) With Special Reference to the tribe called Mogei," *Anthropos,* 31 (Wien: St. Gabriel-Modling, 1936), 341–363. Adjacent to the first Catholic Mission settlement at Rebiamul, was the first Lutheran Mission settlement at Ogelbeng. Both mission posts were separated by the Mount Hagen colonial Government post situated at the centre. Like Ross, the pioneering German Lutheran missionary, Georg F. Vicedom and the anthropologist, Dr. Herbert Tischner, also documented their own unique encounters in G. F. Vicedom and H. Tischner, *Die Mbowamb : die Kultur der Hagenberg-Stamme im ostlichen Zentral-Neuguinea* ( Hamburg : Cram, De Gruyter & Co., 1943-1948) translated by Helen M. Groger-Wurm, *The Mbowamb: the culture of the Mount Hagen tribes in East Central New Guinea.* Vol (1) (Sydney: University of Sydney,1983) 28-40 ff. Over on the hills of the Kuta ranges were the settlements of the Leahys. The Leahys and their associates were the first to explore the unknown interior highlands of New Guinea, seeking gold and making contact with the aborigines of the interior mountains and valleys for the first time. Michael Leahy's diary recounts his adventure with his brothers Jim and Pat, and friends Mick Dwyer and Jim Taylor. Their gold prospecting expedition was a year (1933) prior to Ross' arrival. See M. J. Leahy, *Exploration into the Highland New Guinea, 1930-1935* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1991), 79-142. This resulted in the first four settlements at Mount Hagen: the Catholic and Lutheran establishments, the Colonial Government post and the gold prospectors.

colorfully decorated bodies and the variety of art-dances performed in a splendid display of intricate customary dressing.[9] He described in telling detail the complexity of an egalitarian society that had developed its own organizational structures of tribes and clans governed by localized *patricians* (big man) who occupied their leadership positions through systems of communal consensus.[10] He also noted the importance the Highlands people attributed to pig rearing, and described the fine checker-board patterns of sweet potato gardens that they cultivated with wooden tools. Ross felt privileged to have seen these things before they disappeared and to record them for posterity - the use of the stone axe, the weaving of the pandanus mat, the making and use of net bags (*bilum*), the wooden spear, bows and arrows, and the importance of pearl shells in PNG society. Ross appreciated all these things as examples of extraordinary products of human ingenuity. Ross also recognized the importance of recording the significance of the trade routes to the lowlands that had been developed overtime. He described how in trade pearl shells were a valued commodity[11] and, more significantly, he observed how the society's economic and political affairs were sustained by the well-developed *Moka*[12] exchange system. Though this description concerns just one specific ethnic region of the vast New Guinean society, it illustrates a more general view that can be had of all PNG society before contact with the outside world.

Located geographically north of Australia, and east of Indonesia, the Island of New Guinea is part of the Melanesian group of countries stretching out across the Western Pacific

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[9] For a comprehensive analysis on body-art-ritual in the *Melpa* Culture see A. Strathern and M. Strathern, *Self-decoration in Mount Hagen* (London: G. Duckworth & Co. Ltd, 1971).

[10] For a good in-depth reading see J. Ketan, *The Name Must Not Go Down: Political Competition and State-Society Relations in Mount Hagen, Papua New Guinea* (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, 2004).

[11] For a good background read see D. Gaffney, G. R Summerhayes, K. Szabo, B. Koppel, "The Emergence of Shell Valuable Exchange in the New Guinea Highlands," *American Anthropologist* https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/aman.13154#:~:text=Shell%20valuable%20exchange%20in%20the%20New%20Guinea%20Highlands,exchange%20at%20ethnographic%20present%20reflects%20deeper%20historical%20processes accessed 20 June 2019.

[12] M. R. Mennis, 187. A classic analysis on the *Moka* exchange system can be found in A. J. Strathern, *The Rope of Moka: Big-men and Ceremonial Exchange in Mount Hagen, New Guinea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1971. See also A. Strathern "Moka", *Encyclopedia of Papua New Guinea*, Vol. II, (Port Moresby 1971) 788.

Ocean.[13] Recent scientific evidence has consolidated suggestions that the history of New Guinea's civilization[14] may have begun long before the Neolithic revolution, preceding prehistory text books in its antiquity.[15] Incontestably, the origins of New Guinea are traced back to nomadic times of the stone-age period,[16] navigating a complex civilization through ancient passages of numerous gardening generations.[17] In recent times, European contact and the subsequent colonization have had great impact on PNG's contemporary history, especially affecting social change and culture.[18]

Historians tell us that while the Portuguese and Spanish navigators are believed to have sighted the island of New Guinea in their South Pacific expeditions in the 16th century, it was not until 1883 that the European colonial powers began to claim territorial occupation over the Island.[19] During the era of colonization various imperial powers had demarcated the island into three territorial regions of colonies. The western part, which was then a Dutch colony, became Indonesia's Papua Province (Irian Jaya) in 1962. Germany annexed the northern parts in 1884 and Britain, after first proclaiming a protectorate over the southern parts, formally annexed them in 1888 when they became British New Guinea. The Southern

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[13] It should be noted from the outset that the use of the term "New Guinea" implies the inclusion of the Western part of the island known as West Papua, which is part of Indonesia. The term "PNG" speaks exclusively of the Eastern end of the island, which is the independent state of Papua New Guinea.

[14] DNA clinical samplings from laboratory science as well as evidence from archeological studies have suggested that the original inhabitants of the islands of New Guinea and Australia may have migrated from Southeast Asia during the Ice Age period, perhaps some sixty thousand years ago. See Alan J. Redd, Mark Stoneking (September 1999)."Peopling of Sahul: mtDNA Variation in Aboriginal Australian and Papua New Guinean Populations".*AJHG – The American Journal of Human Genetics* 65 (3) 808–828. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article accessed by November 14, 2015

[15] A. Strathern and P. J. Stewart, "Shifting Places, Contested Spaces: Land and Identity Politics in the Pacific," *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* (Sydney: The Australian Anthropological Society Inc., 1998, 9:2): 209- 224.

[16] P. Swading, *Papua New Guinea's Prehistory: An Introduction* (Port Moresby: National Museum and Art Gallery, 1981).

[17] J. Golson, "No room at the top: agricultural intensification in the New Guinea Highlands," In J. Allen, J. Golson and R. Jones, eds., *Sunda and Sahul: prehistoric studies in southeast Asia, Melanesia and Australia* (London: Academic Press, 1977) 601-138. See also J. Golson, "The Ipomoean revolution revisited: society and sweet potato in the upper Wahgi Valley," In A. Strathern, ed., *Inequality in New Guinea Highland societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 109-136.

[18] J. D. Waiko, *A Short History Of Papua New Guinea* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1993) 37.

[19] Ibid., 43-5.

British Papua was taken over by Australia in 1906 when it was renamed the Territory of Papua.[20]

## Post World War II New Guinea History

In 1920 Australia received from the League of Nations a mandate for the government of New Guinea, as it was then called. During World War II Japan expanded its military occupation across the South Pacific, laying claim to parts of New Guinea and Papua in 1942, while the Australian military administered the rest. After the war, these two regions were amalgamated under the Papua and New Guinea Act of 1949 as the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, and placed under United Nations International Trusteeship, administered by Australia until full Independence was achieved in 1975.[21]

After World War II, the Australian government made preparations for a new state by establishing key political and bureaucratic structures. Administrative posts were later expanded and a structure was put in place to oversee future emerging local governments. Until 1941, Port Moresby grew slowly, not only as the first urban developmental model of western civilization in PNG, but also as a key strategic center for modern political, economic and educational institutions to take new forms.[22] Under the German colonial rule Rabaul had been built in the pattern of western planned cities, whilst under the British, and eventually under the Australian colonial rule, the first key government services were introduced[23] with

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[20] C. Moore, "Queensland's Labour Trade and the Annexation of New Guinea in 1883", in *Papua New Guinea: A Century of Colonial Impact 1884-1984*, (Port Moresby: The National Research Institute of PNG, 1989), 1-18.

[21] J. Waiko, *A Short History of Papua New Guinea*, 188-9.

[22] J. Conroy, The Eclipse of PNG's eight aims and the false dawn of informality http://asopa.typepad.com/asopa_people/2015/12/the-eclipse-of-pngs-eight-aims-the-false-dawn-of-informality.html#more accessed 15 December 2015.

[23] For instance electricity was introduced for the first time in Port Moresby in 1925. See "Progress in Papua". *The Argus* (The Argus Office, Melbourne Victoria). 5 September 1925. p. 12. Retrieved 29 November 2009, http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/2133340 accessed 15 December 2015. Also pipe water supply was installed for the first time in Port Moresby in 1941. See "Department of the Interior: Tenders". *The Argus* (The Argus Office, Melbourne Victoria). 25 January 1941. p. 18. Retrieved 29 November 2009. http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/8184170 accessed 15 December 2015.

'spin off' businesses taking the opportunity to open up in Port Moresby for the first time.[24] As Connell records:

> In the post-war years administration patrols travelled into still uncontacted areas; administration reached some interior areas only in the late 1960's…Towards the end of the nineteenth century planters and missionaries from Germany, Britain and Australia had established mission settlements and plantations on the coasts and islands; traders and labour recruiters moved these frontiers inland but it was not until after the Second World War, and in parts of the more remote highlands regions much later, that the social and economic institutions of colonialism – taxation, wage labour, cash cropping, missions, local government councils, health and education systems – were established throughout the country.[25]

While European contact and the subsequent formalization of western civilization were concentrated on the coastal regions, it took almost another half a century before the New Guinea Highlands were opened up to the rest of the world.[26] The Central Highlands district was eventually linked to the coast for the first time by road in the 1950's.[27] Modern agriculture was introduced with mostly imported mono cash-cropping in vast cultivated areas. Non-indigenous western entrepreneurs established large rubber, cocoa and coconut plantations mainly on the coast, while vast areas of fertile valleys up in the highlands were cultivated for coffee and tea plantations.[28] Small scale economic activities for domestic income such as rice mills, trade stores, household coffee plots, sawmills and cattle farming,[29] to name a few, were introduced to the local communities. Many of the Christian Churches opened rural schools and health facilities, and helped the colonial government in building

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[24] For example, the first butcher's shop and grocery were opened in Port Moresby in 1909. "March of Civilisation". *The Argus (The Argus Office, Melbourne Victoria).* 7 September 1909. *p. 5*. Retrieved 29 November 2009. http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/10731938 accessed 15 December 2015.

[25] J. Connell, *Papua New Guinea: The Struggle for Development* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997) 3-4.

[26] B. Connolly & R. Anderson, *First Contact: New Highlanders Encounter the Outside World* (New York: Viking Penguin Inc, 1987).

[27] B. Cleland, *Big Road: a journey to the heart of the New Guinea Highlands, 1953-56* (Paddington Qld: Red Hill Publishing, 2010).

[28] Ian, Cartledge, *A History of the Coffee Industry in Papua New Guinea* (Canberra: Papua New Guinea Coffee Industry Board, 1976), 5-7 & 15- 26.

[29] P. F. Philipp el, "Four Papers on the Papua New Guinea Cattle Industry" *New Guinea Research Bulletin* no. 63 (Port Moresby and Canberra: The New Guinea Research Unit, The Australian National University, 1975).

other civil infrastructures in the hitherto uncontacted areas.[30] Significant investment was made in critical human development principally through education and by resourcing skills for a new generation of Papua New Guineans who could manage their own affairs.[31] As Brown states, "New forms and services, with increasing technical and administrative personnel, developed in the fields of government, law, medicine, education, and agriculture, with later emphasis upon economic and political development leading to self-government and independence in the 1970's."[32]

## The PNG Contemporary Society

Rural dwellers make up ninety percent of the national population[33] of PNG. They still today maintain their livelihood by traditional subsistence gardening, hunting, gathering and fishing. Small scale cash-cropping and other economic activities, such as fishing, are important for domestic household income. With the expansion of the national economy in the last twenty-five years many PNG citizens have ventured into large scale businesses and commercial enterprises such as retailing, trucking, real-estate, hotel industry and tourism but most rural areas are still geographically remote and remain disadvantaged. These rural communities are distributed across areas ranging from high rugged terrain to swampy valleys found in vast lowland areas of waste land, and from isolated clusters of islands to distant atolls and reefs. To this day the extreme topographical challenges remain an obstacle to providing a viable transport network system linking the whole country.

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[30] G. Trompf, T. Aerts, Z. Kruczek, "The Catholic Mission and its Contribution to Development in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands," *CSMA* 20 (2013): 13-52.

[31] J. Ommerborn, "Serving Church and Nation through Education," *Verbum SVD, 37,1-2* (1996): 147-166. The establishment of the then Divine Word High School (present Divine Word University) by the Divine Word Missionaries was to cater for students from the most remote part of the country to be given an opportunity of quality education.

[32] P. Brown, *Highlands People of New Guinea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) 241.

[33] See the exact figures from The National Statistical Office of Papua New Guinea http://www.nso.gov.pg/index.php/population-and-social/other-indicators accessed 12 December 2015.

Since independence PNG has enjoyed some extraordinarily exciting times in the making of a single and unique nation out of a thousand tribes.[34] But this drive towards social integration in the post-independence era has brought enormous social challenges. People moved from the highlands, islands and lower lands and migrated to the more integrated communities within the country's modern towns looking for opportunities in education, business and employment. Consequently, new tensions began to emerge. Some of these tensions threatened the existing educational, cultural, political and socio-economic platforms of development. At times, tensions significantly disrupted the central drive towards national unity. An example of PNG's vulnerability was the civil war on the island of Bougainville[35] as it tried to embrace the prospects of being a part of a contemporary nation of plurality. Christianity has been a positive participant in helping to craft the unity of the PNG contemporary society and it continues to do so successfully. However, the European and American congregational Christian Churches have brought some new categories of division among family members in the traditionally tribal based units of communities.[36]

The intensity and rapidity of social change has dislocated the place of law and order in PNG modern society.[37] As a result, there is today in PNG instances of disorder,[38] forced tribal democracy[39] and weak national political institutions, including the public service

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[34] P. Brown, *Highlands People of New Guinea*, 242-45.

[35] M. L. O'Callaghan, *Enemies Within: Papua New Guinea, Australia, and the Sandline Crisis: The Inside Story* (Sydney: Doubleday,1999). The bloody civil war between 1989 and 1997 in PNG's former North Solomon Province (now the Autonomous Region of Bougainville) between the PNG army and the Bougainvillean rebels cost many lives on both sides. After the conflict, the Bougainville Peace Agreement with help from the United Nations has led to some positive progress, including the province achieving its autonomous status, with a referendum aiming at full self-determination.

[36] M. Ernst, *Winds of Change: Rapidly Growing Religious Groups in the Pacific Islands* (Suva: Pacific Conference of Churches, 1994).

[37] A. Strathern and P. J. Stewart, *Arrow Talk: Transaction, Transition, and Contradiction in New Guinea Highlands History* (Kent, OH, and London: The Kent State University Press, 2000), 40.

[38] P. J. Stewart and A.J. Strathern, "Money, Politics, and Persons in Papua New Guinea." *Social Analysis Issue.* 42: 2 (July 1998): 132-149.

[39] B. Standish, "Elections in Simbu: Towards Gunpoint Democracy." *The 1992 PNG Election: Change and Continuity in Electoral Politics* (1996): 277-322.

machinery.[40] This last is particularly important as it has led to a dysfunctional and inadequate provision of social services and has contributed to a slowing of civil infrastructure development. Public national institutions have succumbed to institutionalized corruption at all levels of business and government[41] and even the Church has not escaped from this. Grassroots corruption is rampant, [42] and there are problems caused by "claim" culture. [43] There is a perceived shortage of land for effective integral human development.[44] The massive impact of legal and illegal drugs has also hampered social development. The HIV/AIDS virus has spread at an alarming rate[45] and continues to increase.[46]

Increased population growth at a rapid rate has made considerable demands on the PNG government to modernize and expand the national welfare and social benefit schemes.[47] Inadequate planning, and lack of technical expertise has caused both funding and resources to

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[40] B. Standish, "Papua New Guinea's Elusive Stability," *East Asia Forum*, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/02/Papua New Guinea-elusive-stability/ accessed 30 March 2015.

[41] J. Ketan, "The Use and Abuse of Electoral Development Funds and their Impact on Electoral Politics and Governance in Papua New Guinea". https://www.academia.edu/9138198/The_Use_and_Abuse_of_Electoral_Development_Funds_and_their_Impact_on_Electoral_Politics_and_Governance_in_Papua_New_Guinea accessed 19 October 19, 2015.

[42] S. Koim, "Turning the Tide: Corruption and Money Laundering in PNG." *Griffith Journal of Law and Human Dignity*. 1:2 (2013): 240-253. See also J.F, "Papua New Guinea and Australia: Near neighbours, worlds apart," *The Economist* http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/08/papua-new-guinea-and-australia accessed 15 March 2015. See also S. Koim and G. Walton, Electoral Corruption in PNG: caught between the law and a hard place http://devpolicy.org/electoral-corruption-png-caught-law-hard-place 20170619/?utm_source=Devpolicy&utm_campaign=4974601b56-ANUUPNG_CAMPAIGN_2017_02_17&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_082b498f84-4974601b56-227683090 accessed 19 June 2017.

[43] Papua New Guinean Understandings of Corruption: Insights from a Nine Province Survey http://www.transparencypng.org.pg/_TI_PNG_Final_Jul13_v2com.pdf accessed 15 November 2015.

[44] S. Chand, "Use of Land Leases as Collateral for Accessing Formal Sector Finance in Papua New Guinea, *Issues Paper* # 07 https://pngnri.org/images/Publications/IP07_Chand_et_al_2014_Land_leases_9.pdf accessed 15 November, 2015.

[45] A. Kelly, "The role of HIV social research in the response efforts to the HIV epidemic in Papua New Guinea." *Papua New Guinea Medical Journal*. 52:1-2 (March – June 2009): 35- 43. See also A. C. Hauquitz, "Looking down the barrel of a cannon: the potential economic costs of HIV/AIDS in Papua New Guinea," *Papua New Guinea Medical Journal*. 47:1-2 (March – June 2004): 39- 49.

[46] N. Whiting, "Why don't HIV drugs work on some people in PNG?" https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-20/why-dont-hiv-drugs-work-on-some-people-in-png/12361846 accessed 20 June 2020.

[47] G. Roche, "Before we were ten men, now we are one hundred," http://asopa.typepad.com/asopa_people/2015/12/before-we-were-ten-men-now-we-are-one-hundred.html#more accessed 18 December 2015.

be invested in non-prioritized areas.[48] Both lack and neglect of basic government services have forced many rural dwellers to migrate into the cities and these people would commonly find shelter in squatter settlements.[49] The urban migrant population in PNG towns and cities continues to rise, particularly in the poor settlement areas (which are already overcrowded) and this is making critical demands on governments to expand social services.[50] There are insufficient city housing programs, no proper clean water systems and no modernized sewerage systems. Sections of these growing cities are not serviced with a reliable electricity supply, sanitation, or adequate transport systems. The squatter settlement zones are particularly neglected.[51] Hence, housing, even where it is available in many PNG towns and cities has become virtually unaffordable.

The civil institutions and the processes of governance established by the colonial government declined significantly towards the end of the last century. Many public servants who have worked in the PNG government bureaucracy from the 1970's to the present have openly expressed frustration over the collapse of a once dynamic system. Health funds have been chopped from the national budget allocations, leaving hospitals and rural clinics starved of essential resources.[52] Education funds have become a fairy-tale, for they have never

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[48] G. Mola, "Make proper plans for hospitals," *The National.* https://www.thenational.com.pg/make-proper-plans-for-hospitals/ accessed 2 June 2020.

[49] C. Papa, "The Vote: An Element of Moka in the 2002 National Elections," *Catalyst.* 32: 2 (2002): 235-244. I was appointed parish priest of the remote Kol & Ambullua Parishes (2002-4) of the Archdiocese of Mount Hagen. Roads do not exist except for the main one that only links to Kol, a former colonial Government post. But it has been neglected for years. Several schools I walked past in my pastoral visits had good infrastructure of both classrooms and teacher houses yet there was no teacher on site nor pupils on campuses. One primary school had only two teachers. Down the road the high school had just a skeleton teaching staff. Air transport was and is still the main form of transport, but is available only occasionally. Fifteen years on, no substantial road development has taken place.

[50] M. Strathern, "No Money on our skins: Hagen migrants in Port Moresby." *New Guinea Research Bulletin.* 61 (1975).

[51] F. Zocca, "The Pattern of Urbanisation in Papua New Guinea and its Pastoral Implications," *Catalyst.* 32: 2 (2002): 197-234.

[52] J. Tahana, "The hospital is out of everything: PNG crippled by drug shortage:" Radio New Zealand International, http://asopa.typepad.com/asopa_people/2017/06/the-hospital-is-out-of-everything-png-crippled-by-drug-shortage.html#more accessed 20 June 2017. See also the report on the procurement of the medical drugs by private suppliers for Public Hospitals, "Profiting from sickness: The Dark Economy of Public Health in PNG Part 1," *PNGi,* http://pngicentral.org/reports/profiting-from-sickness-the-dark-economy-of-public-health-in-png-part-i accessed 4 September 2017. See also the most recent report http://pngicentral.org/reports/big-health-donors-defraud-patients-by-ignoring-corruption/ accessed 9 October

reached the schools' purses despite the fact that a free education policy was officially announced a couple of years ago.[53] Schools are overcrowded and have no desks; text books are scarce and teaching staff are stretched to the limit. [54] Rising drop-out figures in schools have left more young people unemployed.[55] Consequently, law and order issues have escalated significantly.

Poor political decisions have led to the depletion of forest, sea and extract resources. The cancer of corruption has deeply corroded the political processes which are now characterized by dysfunctional institutions in civil governance.[56] Even my home city of Mount Hagen has no one in charge of the city amenities such as the disposal of domestic rubbish, or the maintenance of the city roads marred by huge potholes.[57] Successive governments over the years since independence have failed to provide adequate civil services to its citizens. Overseas support grants were many times diverted elsewhere and never reached the intended areas where the majority of the populace lived.[58] It has come to a time now that the PNG public want their Government to prudently manage the daily cash flow

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2018.

[53] See for instance this moving story from a PNG remote elementary school. A. Asa, "Rural areas still lack basic government services," *Post Courier.* http://www.postcourier.com.pg/News/rural-areas-still-lack-basic-govt-serivces/#.V556BNJ97IU accessed 1 August 2016.

[54] J. Glynn, *Father John Glynn's diary: Thoughts on doing it tough* http://asopa.typepad.com/asopa_people/2014/12/thoughts-on-doing-it-tough-from-the-pen-of-father-john-glynn.html#more accessed 19 December 2014.

[55] W. Seifert, "Migration and Exchange Relationships: Adjustment to Urbanization in Papua New Guinea," *Point* 1 (1975): 43-140.

[56] R. McGuirk, "Papua New Guinea votes with Corruption and Economic woes key," https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/papua-new-guinea-votes-with-corruption-and-economic-woes-key/2017/06/27/acfe1678-5afa-11e7-aa69-3964a7d55207_story.html?utm_term=.3cab52d37e28 accessed 27 June 2017. See also the classic study in K. Lasslett, "Forensically analysing grand corruption in PNG," http://pngicentral.org/reports/forensically-analysing-grand-corruption-in-png-sketching-its-forms-and-consequences accessed 21 August 2017.

[57] See for instance, "Mt Hagen city riddled with potholes," *Post Courier*. http://www.postcourier.com.pg/Stories/mt-hagen-city-riddled-with-potholes/#.VsTnF7R97IV accessed 18 February 2016.

[58] Australian aid: promoting prosperity, reducing poverty, enhancing stability, http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/australian-aid-development-policy.pdf accessed 22 November 2015.

from the national purse,[59] deliver and maintain basic government services,[60] expand the agricultural sector and boost the national economy.[61] They expect their Government to provide employment, devolve decision-making processes to the district level of administration,[62] and translate the massive income from the mining and gas industries into transforming health care, education and the social welfare services.[63]

What has become worrisome is the high rate of absence of civil governance in a modern democracy. Local rural dwellers these days often reminisce about what has happened since independence.[64] They frequently speak of how the normal operation of schools, aid posts, policing and agriculture established in colonial times have now all collapsed.[65] Essential assets of significant state infrastructure such as airstrips, wharves, rural public

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[59] P. Flanagan, "From Economic boom to Crisis Management in PNG," *East Asia Forum*, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/01/02/from-economic-boom-to-crisis-management-in-png/ accessed 7th January 2016. See also "Health services scaled down," *Post Courier* http://www.postcourier.com.pg/Stories/health-services-scaled-down/#.Vu8giNJ97IV accessed 21 March 2016.

[60] S. Howes et al, "A Lost Decade? Service Delivery and Reforms in Papua New Guinea 2002-2012", A Study Document, The National Research Institute of PNG and Development Policy Centre, Australian National University, 2014. http://devpolicy.org/publications/reports/PEPE/PEPE_A_lost_decade_FULL_REPORT.pdf accessed 15 November 2015. This study identified a considerable volume of expansions in service delivery, both Education and the Health sector in the span of over ten years, and yet the task is still enormous. The PNG Government lacks adequate resources and personnel to guarantee sustainability to an upsurge in national population.

[61] P. Barker, "Research of Economic Growth in Papua New Guinea," *Working Paper # 17* (Port Moresby: Institute of National Affairs and Jilin Province People's Government Research and Development Centre of China, December 2007).

[62] B. Reilly et al, "Political Governance and Service Delivery in Papua New Guinea (PNG): A Strategic Review of Current and Alternative Governance Systems to Improve Service Delivery", *Discussion Paper* (Port Moresby, The National Research Institute of PNG, November 2014).

[63] G. A Banks, "Papua New Guinea National Human Development Report 2014: From Wealth to Wellbeing: Translating Resource Revenue into Sustainable Human Development" http://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/aboutmassey/news/article.cfm?mnarticle_accessed 19 May 2015.

[64] S. Waide, "Our systems worked, so what happened?" https://www.pngattitude.com/2020/06/our-systems-worked-so-what-happened.html accessed 4 June 2020.

[65] P. S Kinjap, "Corruption is threat to growth, so how about the death penalty," http://asopa.typepad.com/asopa_people/2016/07/corruption-is-threat-to-growth-so-how-about-the-death-penalty.html#more accessed 18 December 2015. See also M. Namorong, "Life in the 25th Most Corrupt Nation on Earth" https://medium.com/@Mangiwantok/life-in-25th-most-corrupt-nation-on-earth-d7d14d013a46#.64mkp1bpr accessed 8 November 2016. Again see P.S Kinap, "Kicks & cuts; punch in the guts: PNG corruption escalates," http://asopa.typepad.com/asopa_people/2016/12/kicks-cuts-punch-in-the-guts-corruption-rips-up-to-a-new-level.html#more, accessed 31 December 2016.

housing, roads and bridges are now in a dilapidated state. Basic provisions of public servicing and rural infrastructure have neither been maintained nor expanded.[66]

Before moving to Melbourne in 2015 to work on this doctoral project, I found myself asking almost the same question Lonergan raised some decades ago, in an unpublished paper (File 713) found after his death: "Why is the twentieth century in such a mess?" [67] Equally urgent is my question about my country: "Why is it that a small country with a relatively sizable population of seven million, (in 2011),[68] with its huge promise of economic boom ignited by massive gas exploration, now suffers under rapid social decline?" Some of PNG's progress has been remarkable. But the economic and social outcomes are only a fringe benefit relative to the much talked-about wealth of PNG.[69] What has gone wrong? How do we get out of this mess?

To sum up, the people of PNG lived in a highly developed and sophisticated social milieu prior to being exposed to western society. Their way of life was respected by the early missionaries and the colonial powers who laid good foundations for a functioning system of governance. Since Independence, the people in their quest for the advantages of modern civilization have largely abandoned their traditional subsistence way of life and many have been forced into urban slum areas, resulting in a great decline in living standards. It was the desire to discover possible ways in which a contemporary national conversation, informed by Bernard Lonergan's theological method, might help us address these pressing questions that led me to do the research that has subsequently resulted in this thesis.

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[66] L.W. Hanson et al, "Rural Development – Papua New Guinea," *Land Management Group, Dept. of Human Geography* (Canberra, Australian National University, November 2001), 121-136.

[67] B. Lonergan, "Philosophy of History," *The Original Unpublished Manuscript, File 713*, 98.

[68] The National Statistical Office of Papua New Guinea http://www.nso.gov.pg/index.php/population-and-social/other-indicators accessed 12 December 2015.

[69] G. A Banks, "Papua New Guinea National Human Development Report 2014.

# Introduction

In the final stages of completing the draft of this thesis, in January 2020, news broke of an infectious epidemic, COVID – 19, or the Coronavirus, in the city of Wuhan of Hubei Province, China. Within days, it captured major headlines around the world. The death toll of that city surged as contracted cases swelled uncontrollably overnight.[70] As the spike continued to rise, and the virus rolled on into March, April, and then May it has spread worldwide, subsequently swamping the whole surface of the earth. This epidemic outbreak globally was unprecedented.

Europe was the second major target after China. First Italy, then Spain and France, and the United Kingdom soon followed suit.[71] By then, across the Atlantic, the United States was under siege.[72] Extraordinary steps were taken by many governments around the world to contain the sporadic spread of this virus. As a consequence, international flights were cancelled, aircraft grounded, international borders closed, universities and schools shut down, regular worship in Churches and Mosques suspended, businesses forced to lay off employees. Hospitals were overwhelmed with COVID–19 patients as tens of thousands of lives were lost, and the world is still counting. Meanwhile millions of people lost their jobs worldwide as businesses were forced to shut down.

Since March, we have been living under strict lockdown. Health authorities have warned us to take strict measures so as to beat the spread of the virus. Movements of people

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[70] C. Cadell, "Global coronavirus death toll hits 100,000, cases over 1.6 million," https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-death-toll/global-coronavirus-death-toll-hits-100000-cases-over-1-6-million-idUSKCN21S1SM accessed 11 April 2020.

[71] The Editors note, "Spain has suffered more covid-19 deaths than any country save Italy," https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/03/26/spain-has-suffered-more-covid-19-deaths-than-any-country-save-italy accessed 26 March 2020.

[72] The Editors note, "New York is fast becoming the world's next coronavirus hotspot," https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/03/29/new-york-is-fast-becoming-the-worlds-next-coronavirus-hotspot (accessed 29 March 2020. See also A. Feuer, "Coronavirus in N.Y.: Toll Soars to Nearly 3,000 as State Pleads for Aid," https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/nyregion/coronavirus-new-york-death-toll.html accessed 3 April 2020.

have been reduced as strict social distancing measures were applied. Outdoors travel and participation in any social activity with more than two people have been completely banned. Non-essential workers are working from home, students are attending classes online, while importantly, workers who are considered essential-service-providers such as doctors, nurses, shop assistants, drivers continue to attend to the needs of the communities.

Nations that are normally dependent on a cash economy are already feeling the pinch of the problem as more and more citizens lose their jobs.[73] National economics are hit hard and a global recession is on the horizon. This crisis is hurting societies both economically and socially. Many who are out of work are losing their homes as they cannot afford rentals and end up living on the streets. The homeless are absolutely vulnerable, a fact which adds to the mounting number of social factors.[74] Central governments in wealthy nations have changed their system of governance: the collecting of taxes to provide essential civil and social services will now be forced to cease as Governments try to save their vulnerable citizens who are left both jobless and homeless.

People are dying in massive numbers, hospital bed numbers are stretched to the limit, funeral homes and morgues are inundated with human corpses, people are being buried in mass graves. Such is the consequence of this pandemic, taking us into an uncharted future, while in the present we breathe an air of insecurity.[75] Indeed, the history of the world has been changed forever by this previously unknown virus. Within a matter of months, the world has suddenly become a different place. As each one of us, comes to terms with these

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[73] See for instance P. Rucker, J. Dawsey, Y. Abutaleb, R. Costa, L. H. Sun, "34 days of pandemic: Inside Trump's desperate attempts to reopen America," https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/34-days-of-pandemic-inside-trumps-desperate-attempts-to-reopen-america/2020/05/02/e99911f4-8b54-11ea-9dfd-990f9dcc71fc_story.html 3 May, 2020.

[74] The Editors note, "Might the pandemic be a lifeline for the rich world's homeless?" https://www.economist.com/international/2020/04/12/might-the-pandemic-be-a-lifeline-for-the-rich-worlds-homeless 12 April 2020.

[75] P. Clark, "No Room for Bullshit in the time of Coronavirus," https://www.ft.com/content/06e58582-704b-11ea-89df-41bea055720b?segmentId=fedb1231-d3f2-54c3-88fe-c4455b1d9a4e&fbclid=IwAR330771-5nTb__8HZ1lmPCZCwYqRNCXQFZEvF52t5Zli45wNTVTCiCctqU accessed 29 March 2020.

unprecedented events, one thing is for sure: it is making history. Undeniably, this pandemic has changed the course of history in a very dramatic way.

The *ad hoc* life that we have adapted to in the last three months (and still counting) since the pandemic erupted in our world in January, has taken away our normal daily life. This eruption has triggered a new future. The future return to 'normalcy' will have significantly embraced a new social order, as from now our world will be different, and we are immediately part of this history.[76] But, once the pandemic is over, and as we emerge from the hibernation to a *new normal* in our daily living and doing, will it be the same again? Most likely, not! Life will certainly be different after the 2020 epidemic. We would imagine that the post COVID – 19 analyses will occupy many future discussions.[77] Ongoing discussions will include countless interpretations in different fields of expertise such as the health researchers and scientists, psychologists, anthropologist, philosophers and theologians.[78]

One of the key elements of this thesis is Lonergan's study of history: we make history, history is part of us, in our living and doing. Thus, we are history makers. As this study traces the origin of Lonergan's idea of history we shall begin to see his response to an era of dramatic change. In the material that will be at the center of our study are the deep thoughts Lonergan noted as he saw, lived and experienced the emerging crises of the 1930s: the worldwide economic depression leading up to World War II; the era of political turmoil with the fall of democracy; and the rise of fascism and Stalinism in Europe. These were gloomy periods of modern history that Lonergan lived through and witnessed.[79] Living under such depressing circumstances Lonergan chose to ponder deeply the meaning of history and

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[76] N. Hemmer, "US finally gets a reality check thanks to Covin-19," https://www.theage.com.au/world/north-america/us-finally-gets-a-reality-check-thanks-to-covid-19-20200321-p54ci2.html accessed 29 March 2020.

[77] These are my personal thoughts on the effects of COVID – 19 dated the 7 May 2020.

[78] T. Kalik, "Christianity in a time of sickness," https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2020/04/03/christianity-time-sickness accessed 3 April 2020.

[79] J. A. Komonchak, "Lonergan's Early Essays on the Redemption of History." *Lonergan Workshop.* 10 (1994): 159-179. Henceforth, LEERH followed by page reference.

to work towards discovering adequate solutions to desperate times of dramatic socio-economic and political change. The parallels between his time and ours are clear. Does his work perhaps offer some insight into what our response to the current situation requires of us? This thesis explores that possibility.

## The Object of the Thesis

That history was an early interest for Bernard Lonergan is beyond dispute.[80] It preceded by many years not only his *Method in Theology (1972)*[81] but also *Insight* (1957). Archival material made available in recent times from the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto has supplied new evidence to assert that there was notably a long development of Lonergan's interest in his study of history. These resources have added considerably to the suggestion that history was crucially central to Lonergan from the beginning and remained so right throughout his life.[82] In writing Lonergan's biography Frederick Crowe noted that "Lonergan had kept until his death a manila folder marked "HISTORY" and numbered 713 in the organization of his papers."[83] This specific file, which will be carefully studied in this thesis contains collections of Lonergan's very early essays going back to his student days in

[80] F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 24. See M. Shute, *The Origins of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History: A Study of Lonergan's Early Writings on History* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), 59. Henceforth, *ONLDH* followed by page reference. See also G. Whelan, *The Development of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History: A Study of Lonergan's writings 1938-53* (Toronto: Regis College, 1997) 6. Henceforth, *DLNDH* followed by page reference. See also J. A. Komonchak, LEERH, 159-179.

[81] B. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) original ed London Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972). Lonergan dedicated not one but two chapters of *Method in Theology* to the functional specialty, History: 'History', and 'History and Historians.' Henceforth, *MIT* followed by page reference.

[82] See F.E Crowe, "Bernard Lonergan as Pastoral Theologian," *Gregorianum* 67 (1986) 451-70. Henceforth, BLPT followed by page reference.

[83] F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, 24.

Canada, then in England, Ireland, France and Italy.[84] It forms a significant part of the original evidence that discloses Lonergan's initial interest in the study of history.[85]

The object of this research is to trace Lonergan's effort towards developing a theology of redemptive history. Recent discoveries of Lonergan's unpublished material have disclosed extremely enlightening clues to Lonergan's previously uncovered work in developing his dialectic of history.[86] My study is primarily intended to further that conclusion in order to explore a possibility of the development of his theology of redemption. There is sufficient evidence discovered in the unpublished papers to suggest that "Lonergan made specific and quite extensive efforts to develop a theology of history. For Lonergan, a theory of history was needed to provide fundamental categories for directing Christian praxis in the contemporary situations."[87] In order to authenticate this premise, I have devised a framework to trace the origin of Lonergan's idea of the dialectic of history and to clarify for myself Lonergan's efforts towards developing a theology of redemptive history. The sources of my study are basically Lonergan's mostly unpublished manuscripts but three that were published posthumously are of particular interest in this thesis. These are:

(1) The "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [The Restoration of All Things]"[88]

published in *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies*;

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[84] No exact dates were allotted to most of these items in File 713 except for one, namely "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [The Restoration of All Things]", Dominica in Albis, dated the 28th of April, 1935. F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, 24.

[85] P. Brown, "Implementation in Lonergan's Early Historical Manuscripts," in the *Journal of Macrodynamic Anaysis*, 3 (2003): 231-249 http://www.mun.ca/jmda/vol3/brown.pdf accessed 12 December 2015.

[86] See M. Shute, ONLDH, 59. G. Whelan, *DLNDH*, 6. See also J. A. Komonchak, LEERH, 159-179.

[87] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 5.

[88] B. Lonergan, "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [The Restoration of All Things]" *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies*, 9 (2) (1991), 134-172. Henceforth, PA (1) followed by page reference.

(2) An "Analytic Concept of History" [89] also published in *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies,* [90] and

(3) "The Essay in Fundamental Sociology" also referred to as "Philosophy of History" which was included in Michael Shute's book, *Lonergan's Early Economic Research.*[91]

Two previous doctoral researchers who have studied and written on these manuscripts provide valuable material for consideration in this thesis: Michael Shute (1993), and Gerard Whelan (1997). Michael Shute's study: *The Origins of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History: A Study of Lonergan's Early Writings on History* was a significant break-through in a comprehensive analysis of the unpublished manuscripts kept in file 713. Shute had carefully gleaned the original data in file 713, and through his thorough examination had carefully organized the manuscripts in neatly worked out categories. Gerard Whelan followed Shute to expand the study of these manuscripts into establishing Lonergan's early thinking on his idea of history. In his own work: *The Development of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History: A Study of Lonergan's Writings 1938-53* Whelan demonstrated a clear understanding of what Shute had located, collected and documented. Whelan then attempted to refine the scope of his study by giving specific attention to the significance of Lonergan's particular focus on developing his theory of the dialectic of history.

What I aim to do in my thesis is first to incorporate what Whelan had documented from Shute's work. Building on these two studies I then explore Lonergan's specific and

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[89] B. Lonergan, "An Analytic Concept of History," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies,* 11 (1) Crowe (1993): 5-35. Henceforth, ACH (2) followed by page reference.

[90] It was two years after the publication of the *Pantôn* papers, that ACH (2) was published and appeared in the 1993 edition of *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies*. In that same year of the essay's publication, the doctoral candidate Michael Shute, the first person to have completed a comprehensive study of the papers in File 713 had his thesis published. See M. Shute, *ONLDH*. The editors of the published version of the essay, Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran made frequent references to Shute's study. They had relied on some of the findings of Shute's study especially in agreeing with the composition of the published version of the essay. See B. Lonergan, 'An Analytic Concept of History,' 33. Editorial notes, footnote, # 1.

[91] M. Shute, *Lonergan's Early Economic Research* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2010), 15-44. Henceforth, *LEER* followed by page reference.

quite extensive efforts towards developing a theology of history. I also draw on two other studies that have contributed extensively to this exploration. First, is a study of the historical manuscripts by Joseph Komonchak. In his significant contribution Komonchak positioned the manuscripts of file 713 in association with the papal documents, beginning from the reign of Pope Leo XIII to Pope Pius XI, while carefully appropriating Lonergan's theological development within the civil, ecclesial and historical context. Second, is a study by Frederick Crowe, who examines the file, especially the "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* papers from a Christological standpoint.[92] In this particular study Crowe discovers a narrative of an early part of Lonergan's Christology. Both of these studies provide an important piece of evidence that broadens and deepens the scope of this thesis. Hence, by using the works of Shute, Whelan, Komonchak and Crowe, I wish to affirm my claim that history was indeed a central concern for Lonergan, and that importantly it triggered his early work of devising a unique trajectory that would enable him to reach an explanation for his social theory. By introducing the philosophical explanation of a dialectics of history, Lonergan made extensive progress towards drawing out the central theological concern in his idea of a redemptive history.

To achieve the aim of this thesis I analyze in great detail two of the manuscripts in File 713:

(1) The "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [The Restoration of All Things]," and

(2) An "Analytic Concept of History."

Before proceeding with the study of these two essays, I found Lonergan's 1935 letter to his Provincial Superior, Rev. Henry Keane SJ a valuable document.[93] I introduce this specific letter to demonstrate its unique relationship to the historical File 713.[94] It contains

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[92] F. E Crowe, *Christ and History: The Christology of Bernard Lonergan from 1935-1982* (Ottawa: Saint Paul University, 2005), 30-7. Henceforth, *CH* followed by page reference.

[93] See Appendix B. I have inserted a copy of an edited version of Lonergan's 1935 letter to his religious superior, Rev. Henry Keane SJ.

[94] F. E Crowe, *CH*, 31. See also M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 104.

significant resources that shall provide useful data to trace the genesis of Lonergan's idea of history.[95] More importantly, the key contents of the letter reveal Lonergan's future plans, which provide the depth and volume of the central discussions already drafted in the essays kept in File 713.[96] Although it is a small segment, the letter is significant in providing an apt original source to aid this study.

The major part of this search unpacks the composition of Lonergan's idea of the dialectic of history through the study of the two essays. Basically, this thesis is arranged into two phases of development. The first phase deals with the investigation of the origin of the development of Lonergan's dialectic of history. This is a major part and so it is taken up in the first three chapters. The second part, taken up by chapters four and five, is to assess the evolution of a theological phase: towards a narrative of a theology of redemptive praxis. As these two parts are integral to the thesis they shall run parallel to each other in their entire development.

## The Structure of the Thesis

The thesis has five chapters. In chapter one I introduce the study of the origin and development of Lonergan's idea of a dialectic of history. First, I analyze Lonergan's 1935 letter addressed to his new provincial superior, Rev. Henry Keane SJ. Second, I introduce the manuscripts kept in that File 713 along with a brief account of the recovery of the manuscripts, then proceed to introduce two of the essays from the file which I selected to study in this thesis. Third, I evaluate the broad study of File 713 done by Michael Shute and Gerard Whelan. After presenting the two authors' methodologies I proceed to devise my own

[95] F. E Crowe, *Lonergan,* 19, M. Shute, *ONLDH,* 76, G. Whelan, *DLNDH,* 22, and R.M. Liddy, *Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan* (Collegeville, MN, The Liturgical Press, 1993), 32. Henceforth, *TL* followed by page reference.

[96] F.E Crowe and R. Doran's Editors' Preface in B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134 & 5.

trajectory. Hence, it becomes my roadmap to continue the framework Michael Shute and Gerard Whelan have designed in their study of the manuscripts. Finally, I adapt Joseph Komonchak's sociological and theological input to formulate a trajectory in exploring Lonergan's early expression of framing a theology of redemptive praxis. This can be visualized as follows:

Table 1. CHAPTER ONE: DISCOVERING LONERGAN'S DIALECTIC OF HISTORY




In chapter two I employ the method I devised in chapter one to initiate a strenuous study of the *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* essay. First, I investigate the main theme of the essay: the idea of restoration. Second, I study how Lonergan employs metaphysics to draw out an analytical understanding of history. Third, I navigate the Thomist synthesis in the metaphysical principle of a historical causality that Lonergan applies to appropriate the biblical interpretation of the 'fall' and 'restoration' in the First and Second Adam. This approach preludes an early expression of initiating his threefold dialectics. Fourth, I study Lonergan's second most important theme in this essay: 'the theory of human solidarity.' It is a complex trajectory Lonergan devises to knit together the Pauline notion of the mystical

body and the Thomist concept of proportionate being. He combines these two concepts to eventually cultivate a narrative of a new order. Finally, I study Lonergan's novel concept of a metaphysical redemption. This is a synopsis of the whole framework in devising his theological narrative of a redemptive praxis. Hence, it is ultimately the culmination of history. This history is sublated by Christ through the role of his Kingship. This sequence is as follows:

Table 2. CHAPTER TWO: ANALYSIS OF *PANTÔN ANAKEPHALAIÔSIS*




In chapter three I study the second essay: the "Analytic Concept of History." I devise a roadmap to ensure that there is a consistent drift from the study of the first essay onto the study of the second one. In order to design an orderly arrangement, I have divided the essay into two parts. Part one shall be pivotal, so that it can carry forward the philosophical method developed in the study of the first essay, The *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*; part two, on the other hand shall implement the theological discourse guided by the method introduced in the first

part of the study of the "Analytic Concept of History." Thus appropriately, I initiate a thorough study of the method I devised in the first phase of this thesis.

I begin by exploring the schema Lonergan designed, modelled on John Henry Newman's idea of development, then I navigate the trajectory Lonergan devised to establish his foundational structure of his idea of history: the three key concepts namely, analytic, concept and history. Second, I analyze the method Lonergan employs to appropriate his study of critical history using these three principal concepts. Third, I study the main topic of his entire work: dialectics. I spell out the brief account of its origin while at the same time, surveying his Platonic-Hegelian and Marxian sources. Fourth, I examine the process he initiates to draw on Isaac Newton's triple laws of calculus: progress, decline and recovery. Finally, I design the purpose of chapter three to introduce the second phase of the development of the thesis, which will be the theological component. This shall then be fully exploited in the fourth chapter. This can be represented as follows:

Table 3. CHAPTER THREE: AN ANALYTIC CONCEPT OF HISTORY



In chapter four I study the second part of "Analytic Concept of History." I begin by studying the relationships Lonergan establishes between Isaac Newton's laws of gravity and Hegel's dialectics of history. Navigating through this unusual integration I asses how Lonergan devises his novel concept of an 'ideal line' of history, modelled specifically on Newton's calculus. Second, I analyze each of the three approximations[97] individually: progress, decline and renaissance. Third, I study the development of each of the three approximations as they progressively shift the course of direction from social philosophy towards a theological process of redemptive praxis. Fourth, I examine the emerging theological discourse within the narrative of a redemptive praxis. Finally, I navigate the relationship Lonergan builds between the three approximations and the gift of grace through the dispensation of the theological virtues: faith, hope and charity. The following table illustrates this:

[97] Lonergan's idea of a three-fold-dialectics is seen to be written from a moving viewpoint as Lonergan's work shifted from the dialectics of history to a theology of history. At different levels and circumstance the concepts denoted slight variation in usages. In some of his writings he used the three "approximations;" in others, he used terms such as three "variables," or "differentials" or "vectors." See G. Whelan, *Redeeming History: Social Concerns in Bernard Lonergan and Robert Doran*, (Rome: Gregorian & Biblical Press, 2013), 36. The shift from the historical structure to a theological narrative it is now referred by Doran and Crowe as the three *moments* of history. See B. Lonergan, ACH (2), 33. Editorial notes, footnote, # 45.

Table 4. CHAPTER FOUR: AN EVOLVING NARRATIVE OF THEOLOGY OF REDEMPTION




In chapter five I consolidate what has been outlined starting from the study of Lonergan's 1935 letter to the study of the two essays. I evaluate the themes that he develops from his idea of a dialectic of history towards a theological method. I also process the shifts of the intellectual ferment Lonergan integrates from Aquinas' metaphysics to Hegel's dialectics, to Newton's calculus and to Augustine's theology of history. I then clarify Lonergan's novel idea of history by integrating the themes from the two essays. One of those themes that is consistent throughout the study of the two essays is his idea of education. Third, I analyze the development of Lonergan's theology of Mission and his interpretation of his distinctive approach to doing discursive theology. I proceed to study how Lonergan's praxis theology entails a true transformation of a new world order based on his interpretation of the Pauline Christology. I then study how Lonergan centered his narrative of a Christian redemptive praxis concretely within the framework of the Catechism of the Catholic Church. Finally, I sum up the study of the Theology of Mission witnessed in God's redemptive works

namely, faith, charity, and hope, which are communicated to us by the interior action of the Spirit.[98] This may be schematically shown as follows:

Table 5. CHAPTER FIVE: TOWARDS A THEOLOGY OF REDEMPTIVE PRAXIS




I trust my study will make a modest contribution to the interpretation of these significant documents in Lonergan's early life, and also point to the ways in which his insights in these documents - notes, really – can be seen to be integral to his later theological development.

[98] See T.A. Dunne, "Faith, Charity and Hope," *Lonergan Workshop 5*, 1 (1985), 49-70.

# PART ONE: A THEORY OF HISTORY

# Chapter One: The Dialectic of History

This chapter will introduce the main theme of this thesis: the study of the evolution and development of Lonergan's idea of history. Two important resources will form the essential framework of this study. These are namely,

(i) Lonergan's 1935 letter to his religious superior, and

(ii) Lonergan's very early unpublished set of manuscripts kept in a manila folder known as File 713.

The study will use these resources to trace some of the evolutionary processes that Lonergan followed to devise his idea of a dialectic of history. The study will also be tasked to clarify the development of various ideological shifts at the earliest part of Lonergan's academic life. These shifts evolved over time during Lonergan's years of preparation for the Catholic priesthood in London, Montreal and, shortly afterwards during the years of his theology studies in Rome.

In order to evaluate these proceedings, this chapter will take on the following tasks. First, it shall trace the genesis of Lonergan's interest in the study of history, zooming back to his years of philosophy at Heythrop College, London.[99] Second, it shall examine Lonergan's world of the 1930's and assess how his experiences subsequently evoked his interest in the drafting of the historical papers. Third, it shall introduce the individual items found within the collection of the historical papers kept in File 713. Fourth, it shall draw on the studies by two previous doctoral candidates, Michael Shute and Gerard Whelan and their particular contributions towards the study of the File. This study shall also draw on Joseph Komonchak's historical and theological analyses of File 713. Fifth, the study shall explain a

[99] W. A Mathews, *Lonergan's Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 32-48. Henceforth, LQ followed by page reference.

significant concept derived from the catch phrase namely, ‘a metaphysic of history,’ found originally in the 1935 letter. This concept is also found in some of the main manuscripts in File 713, particularly in two of the essays to be thoroughly studied in this thesis. Finally, this chapter shall present a synopsis of the two manuscripts at study and devise a trajectory that shall shape the overall content of this thesis namely, the theological interpretation of Lonergan’s idea of a redemptive history.

## I. Tracing the Origin of Lonergan's Idea of a Dialectic of History

The genesis of Lonergan's idea of history, according to Richard Liddy's study, goes right back to Lonergan's student days. It started with a course in the philosophy of history given by Fr. Lewis Watt, SJ in his first classes in philosophy at Heythrop College.[100] In charting Lonergan's biography, Liddy pointed out that:

> Some roots of this interest in a philosophy of history can be traced (to) his time at Heythrop and a course by Fr. Lewis Watt, S.J., on ethics and economics…Watt introduced him to Marx and to what were considered the necessary and "iron laws" of economics.[101]

These introductory lectures may have triggered special interest in issues of social concern. Liddy further noted that

> During his theology courses in Rome one part of his Church history course dealt with political questions such as the relation of the Church to revolution, liberalism, nationalism, socialism and Bolshevism. It also dealt with the Church in America, Latin America, and Asia.[102]

William Mathews, adding on to Liddy's commentary, notes that this seems to have been one of the few courses in Rome for which Lonergan kept his lecture notes, an interesting indicator of personal interest.[103]

Offering additional data to Richard Liddy's findings in Lonergan's biography, Crowe noted that as a student at Heythrop, Lonergan was already engaged in serious academic writing. Not only was he involved in serious academic discussion, but also contributed to critical studies regarding matters of mathematical, scientific and philosophical significance.[104] Among the most prominent authors that attracted Lonergan's interests in these early years were Euclid, Newman and Newton. Crowe also noted that Lonergan had contributed several articles

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[100] R. M Liddy, *TL*, 84.
[101] Ibid., 84.
[102] Ibid., 85.
[103] W. A Mathews, "Lonergan's Apprenticeship." *Lonergan Workshop.* 9 (1993): 43-87.
[104] F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, 14-6.

to a student journal at Heythrop known as the *Blandyke Papers*.[105] Among some of Lonergan's most notable contributions to this journal was his study of Euclid's 'trigonometrical formula' and also a critique of "Newman's *Grammar of Assent*."[106] The 'visualization' of his mathematical inference in Euclid's 'trigonometrical formula' will have contributed to augment his cognitive notions of 'inference' and 'conceptualism.'[107] By then Lonergan had begun to draw substantially from Newman's illative sense to seek greater clarity in his pursuit of the notion of understanding.[108] Subsequently, Newman's influence will be an interesting base for Lonergan to appropriate Newton's planetary theory of movements. These are records of fascinating evolutionary sources contributing towards the intellectual development of Lonergan's idea of a dialectic of history.

## 1. The Post-Heythrop Influences

Lonergan confessed that he had read widely during and after his philosophy studies at Heythrop.[109] The post Heythrop readings included particularly Christopher Dawson's *The Age of Gods*, and J. A. Stewart's, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas.*[110] Throughout his student days between Montreal and Rome, Lonergan was introduced first to Plato and then later to Augustine's early dialogues.[111] Lonergan said he had a sufficient read of Aquinas during this time but admitted that it took him eleven years to understand and appreciate his works.[112] Richard Liddy noted

[105] F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, 14. Also see B. Lonergan, ACH (2), footnote # 27, 33, 36, & 39 which have references to the *Blandyke Papers*.

[106] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), footnote # 27.

[107] F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, 14-6.

[108] W. A Mathews, *LQ*, 43-7.

[109] Lonergan's letter to his religious superior, Rev. Henry Keane, dated the 22nd of January, 1935. Lonergan writes: "I left Heythrop a votary of Newman's and a nominalist...I got interested in Plato during Regency and came to understand him; …I read St Augustine's earlier works during the summer before theology and found him to be psychologically exact." p. 3.

[110] F. E. Crowe, *Lonergan*, 18. Also see B. Lonergan, "Insight Revisited" *A Second Collection* (1974), 264. Henceforth, IR followed by page reference.

[111] B. Lonergan, IR, 264.

[112] Liddy noted that this was a significant time of a breakthrough in his grasp of understanding Thomas Aquinas' metaphysics. This reveals a significant chapter in Lonergan's personal life. Liddy identifies this time as a remarkable era of his early intellectual conversion. At the background was "the political ferment going on

that when Lonergan had gathered proficiency through the elementary stages in formal classes at the University level, and also externally during his private reading sessions, he was sufficiently confident and so set out to write.[113] "It seems that this particular effort to articulate his own convictions dates from the summer of 1933, before starting theology."[114] There is enough evidence to support the claim that Lonergan began to work on his idea of a dialectic of history as a student.[115]

From Heythrop, to Montreal, and onto Rome, Lonergan's intellectual development had flourished significantly. It becomes evident from the draft of the unpublished papers that Lonergan had long reflected on issues of significant social change. These reflections may have originated initially from his early readings of Christopher Dawson's study of prehistory and the genesis of human civilizations[116] together with his extensive reading of Aquinas.[117] There were some other serious readings Lonergan did in his student life including St Augustine's dialogues,[118] Plato's dialogues[119] and also John Henry Newman's idea of development.[120] These concepts were then to be translated into a framework of a study of a dialectic of history when he later appropriated his three-fold approximations as he focused his attention on reading Isaac Newton's theory of motion. It is somewhat difficult for the reader to make sense of the unusual interrelationship between vast ranges of diverse sciences Lonergan knitted together in his reading of history. Yet, in Lonergan's programmatic schema of things, there was a logical fostering of a nonconventional study of history. Thus, Lonergan

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in Europe…This combination of introspective cognitional theory and metaphysics gave him the tools with which to consider the ebb and flow, the progress and decline of human history." See R. M Liddy, *TL*, 85.

[113] B. Lonergan, IR, 268. Lonergan points out some of the early influences setting him on the course of his writing, e.g., he notes that Plato paved the way for him to develop "a theory of intellect."

[114] R. M Liddy, *TL*, 76.

[115] The 1935 letter: Lonergan told his superior that he would devise his own theory of history naming it the 'metaphysic of history.'

[116] B. Lonergan, IR, 264.

[117] R. M Liddy, *TL*, 71-3.

[118] Liddy makes reference to B. Lonergan, *Caring About Meaning*, 266-67. See R. M Liddy, *TL*, 91.

[119] F. E. Crowe, *Lonergan*, 18

[120] B. Lonergan, "Theories of Inquiry: Responses to a Symposium," *A Second Collection*, (1974), 38.

named this schema, a 'metaphysic of history.' Actually, it made perfect sense in Lonergan's narration: to link all of these sciences and their specific theories to eventually formulate his own theory of history.

Clearly, what Lonergan had planned to devise was an overwhelmingly huge project. In fact, it was perhaps his ambitious intellectual ferment.[121] However, in Lonergan's mind, there was clearly a conceivable strategy. He persisted as he implored his Religious Superior that what he had intended to do would be unprecedented, that is, to overhaul the traditional Hegelian-Marxian theories of the dialectics of history.[122] Given the diverse complexity of approaches Lonergan had initiated, one begins to see how his philosophy of history had become so central especially in the study of the unpublished papers. Yet, the key to it all is that his philosophy of history will in turn become the bedrock in preparing a method. This method shall then aid the process towards the development for a narrative of a theology of redeeming history.[123]

[121] In this study I will make an attempt to trace some of the complex paths Lonergan took. As shown above, Lonergan is noted to have based the foundation of his theory of history on a course in philosophy of history given by Fr. Lewis Watt, SJ way back in his philosophy studies in Heythrop College. Along the way, with an extended accumulation of ideas captured either from his readings or from classes, his theory of a dialectic of history develops incrementally. Throughout this study I will navigate the various sources of influence that shaped his idea of a dialectic of history from then on, including Newman, Plato, Augustine, Dawson, Hegel, Marx, Aristotle, Aquinas, and the German school of philosophy. See B. Lonergan, IR, 276-7. There we see the mixture of complexities from which Lonergan tried to forge his own path of studying history by combining mathematics, physics, other social sciences with philosophy and theology in order to define history. Richard Libby explains that clearly when he explores Lonergan's intellectual development. See R. M Liddy, *TL*, 77-90.

[122] The 1935 letter to his religious superior, Rev. Henry Keane, provides concrete evidence of the great influence Hegel and Marx had had on Lonergan's own 'metaphysics of history.'

[123] See B. Lonergan, *Insight*, 763-770. In his epilogue summing up his comprehensive study of human understanding it is clearly by far the theology of redemption that takes center stage. His philosophy of a dialectic of history shall take his whole study to the peak of his theological exposition: his concept of a redemptive history in his entire scheme of things.

## II. Lonergan's Personal Letter to Rev. Henry Keane SJ[124]

One of the major tasks of this chapter is a thorough reading of Lonergan's personal letter to his provincial superior, Rev. Henry Keane. Unlike any of his other personal letters addressed either to his former or the new Provincial Superior, this one discloses not only Lonergan's private matters but captures something that, with hindsight, can be recognized as extraordinarily significant. The content of this letter is exceptionally rich, especially insofar as it links closely with the main issues Lonergan began to develop in his unpublished papers kept in File 713.[125] We shall now examine the letter and what significant impact it had on the discussion found in his unpublished papers.

The typewritten letter is eight pages long.[126] It is dated the 22nd January, 1935,[127] after Lonergan signed off as a second year student in theology. From the letter itself, Lonergan addresses the recipient of the letter as the "Reverend Father Provincial." (1)[128] Whilst there is no mention of Rev. Henry Keane, the former Provincial Superior, Rev. William Hingston is mentioned several times in the opening pages of the text. This is a clue to suggest that the letter was addressed to Rev. Fr. Henry Keane. Just as in any other personal letters, Lonergan has a warm and friendly introduction; he shares with his new leader intimate matters with candid frankness.

After presenting a rather private matter, Lonergan goes on to raise some of the pressing concerns regarding his University studies. It seemed Lonergan was disappointed with some of the arrangements made at the university. He expresses that sincerely to his

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[124] For a comprehensive analysis of Lonergan's letter, see R. M Liddy, *TL*, 107-113.

[125] F.E Crowe and R. Doran's Editors' Preface in B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134 & 5.

[126] The copy of the letter. See appendix B.

[127] The address on the letter reads: *Via del Seminario, 120 Roma, 119*, Italy, 22 January 1935. (from B. Lonergan, theol. 2nd year).

[128] In subsequent references I shall identify the pages of the letter next to the quotation marks. The letter is eight pages long in the original manual typed version. The newly re-typed version is six pages. My numbering of pages is taken from the original version.

superior: “Going to see the professors is exceedingly difficult…Getting books from the university is simply a feat.” (1) The request to Rev. Keane to grant him access to some of books banned by the university becomes the main theme of this letter. Whilst he remained committed to his studies, Lonergan’s interest in exploring outside his given subject of study can be seen as an exceptional drive. It is understood that Rev. Hingston had already granted Lonergan the permission regarding the forbidden books. This time Lonergan sought to renew that consent with the new Provincial. The letter indicated that Lonergan was seeking the permission to have access to these forbidden books, not from the university, but from other sources. These books could be made accessible to him during his summer vacation.

Within the file of letters is another letter dated the 10th of August, 1938. It is rather a short one, of two pages. The address of that letter indicated that Lonergan was also writing to the same person, his new Provincial Superior, Rev. Henry Keane. This time, the letter is written from Dublin, Ireland.[129] The content reveals that there is a clear relationship between the two letters. It is most likely that this is a follow up letter to the one he sent in 1935. Among them is a request for permission Lonergan is seeking again from Father Provincial, that is, to renew his consent; the one he may have already given in Rome after the Provincial may have received his 1935 letter. The permission is mainly to allow him read the forbidden books; he wants the permission he gained in Rome, if possible to be extended to his stay in Dublin. There are some other relevant points which this study shall analyze in due course between the long letter of 1935 and the short one of 1938. In the meantime, the main attention of this study shall be given to the 1935 letter.

Lonergan proceeds to name some of the books he had in his private collection.

> I have a number of texts from the Oxford plain Classics (4 Plato, 2 Aristotle, Thucydides, Tacitus, Aeschylus) Pindar with trans., translated selections of Plotinus, a few manuals on the mechanics of French, by some principle of

[129] Given the short introductory part of the letter it can be concluded that Lonergan was in Dublin for a summer ministry exposure.

> accretion I have an English and a Greek dictionary and a Shakespeare; a Douay Version and the new Merk's Novum Testamentum were given me and seen simultaneously to have justified themselves; since in Italy I have yielded to the native language and to German and so have two more dictionaries; I also have a missal. (2)

These so called forbidden books were to become a significant issue and would make a notable difference in his pursuit of the study of history. They would contribute towards the expansion of an academically solid foundation to his study of a dialectic of history. The contribution of the forbidden books would make possible a significant shift, perhaps a radical move in his academic drive. This issue will be considered as the focus of this letter. What Lonergan brings to his new Provincial's attention are some of the hindrances to his desire to study something distinct from the routine order of formal study.

The letter continues on to express Lonergan's excitement concerning a future academic endeavour. Though it still retains the characteristics of a personal note, the letter features some fascinating and highly documented academic matters. It is clear Lonergan wanted his superior to know about his ambitious project as this letter clearly articulates a long term programmatic scheme. Lonergan penned his plan in this particular way, carefully disclosing his intentions. He does so in a free spirited way. While the introductory part of the letter retains the characteristics of a personal letter, the central part reveals a much studied and reflected on content. This would imply that the letter was drawn from the notes he may have already drafted: the unpublished papers which are to be gleaned in the next part of this thesis.

## 1. A Polemic Discourse in Lonergan's Letter

Fredrick Crowe pointed out in his book that Lonergan had an exchange of "some newsy letters to Henry Smeaton in his first year, 1933-34."[130] This shows Lonergan corresponded on topical issues as well as philosophical arguments with his friend, Fr. Smeaton.[131] (3) The 1935 letter has a significant reference to Fr. Smeaton as Lonergan introduces him to Father Provincial. "I had known him at school; he enjoyed a Homeric epithet of "invincible in argument;" he had been the star with his professors all (i.e. both) wanting him to defend their subject in the disputations, etc." (3) It is likely that Fr. Keane had a sufficient knowledge about the fond friendship Lonergan had with Smeaton. The letter goes on to suggest that Fr. Keane may have known also Smeaton's academic position. Lonergan writes almost a whole paragraph about Smeaton's orthodoxy, and how his own orthodoxy was questioned when the former Provincial, "Fr. Hingston paid a flying visit to the Immaculate where I had begun my theology." (3)

The particular reference Lonergan makes to Smeaton infers that he may have had a conservative view of Thomistic philosophy. This conservative interpretation in Lonergan's view was a mistaken understanding of Aquinas's works. The letter proceeds to reveal that Lonergan was critical not only of Smeaton's individual theological position but also the views that he had shared in common with others. Lonergan subsequently rejected that view, and proceeded to claim that it was a mistaken interpretation of Aquinas. In an unreservedly pointed statement he writes: "I can give you my present position in a few words. It is definite,

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[130] "Lonergan did not begin his theology studies in Rome; the status changes of 1933 (traditionally announced on 31 July) sent him to the College de l'Immaculée-Conception in Montreal (where incidentally he caught up with his old friend, Henry Smeaton, now ordained and beginning fourth-year theology. But in November his provincial superior, Fr. William Hingston, dispatched him to do theological studies with other Canadian Jesuits in Rome." F. E Crowe, *Lonergan,* 19.

[131] F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, 20-4. Crowe has examined this letter along with other correspondence Lonergan had with others especially with close friend, Henry Smeaton. In pg. 20, footnote # 53 Crowe has this reference: "There are three pieces in this correspondence: a postcard sent on arrival (Lonergan had forgotten his alarm clock – would Henry send it?), a Christmas card which must have followed soon after, and the long letter of 9 May 1934. (I have corrected minor faults of grammar in quoting these and other letters)."

definitive; and something of a problem. The current interpretation of St Thomas is a consistent misinterpretation." (3)

In the next lengthy exposition, Lonergan attempted to convince his leader that he can preclude that particular ebb of misconception, replacing it instead with St. Thomas' correct position. He writes:

> I can prove out of St Thomas himself that the current interpretation is absolutely wrong, not only can I prove it, but the issue has already been raised decisively though not completely or altogether satisfactorily by Fr. Marechal who (sic) views reign in our house at Louvain but are somewhat frowned upon here. (3)

Obviously, Fr. Marechal was an eminent Thomist scholar among Lonergan's Jesuit contemporaries. Though Lonergan admired him for his Thomistic scholarship, Lonergan disputed his interpretation.[132] In a drawn-out discussion Lonergan presents an aggressive attack on what he claims to be Fr. Marechal's mistaken philosophical position.

Lonergan considered that Aquinas' understanding of intellectual knowledge in "universal judgement" (4) was misinterpreted. Thomas' idea on the abstract phantasm, according to Lonergan, can be translated to the notion of the proportionate being. In other words, Lonergan claimed that "they did not know what the term intelligibility means." (4) Lonergan argued that a clear grasp of the concreteness of understanding Aquinas' epistemology can subsequently allow a correct understanding of the metaphysical theory of the "universal individuated by matter; real distinction of essence and existence; the whole theory of act and potency." (4) Instead, he claimed that Fr. Marechal and his contemporaries put such great emphasis on the abstractness of the Thomistic interpretation of knowledge that the "conversion to phantasm" (4) in concrete reality had been neglected. This resulted in the

[132] See G. Whelan, *DLNDH,* 22-6. Whelan claims that Lonergan was reluctant to accept Joseph Marechal's study known as 'Transcendental Thomism.' Eventually, Lonergan leaned towards Marechal and accepted his notion of the 'Transcendental Thomism,' and was even influenced by him. This is to be seen in Lonergan's later works. For the moment, the reading of Lonergan's letter clearly reveals a different atmosphere. Lonergan is pressing hard at Marcechal's inconsistency in his interpretation of St. Thomas. In Lonergan's strongest view, Marechal is 'obviously' wrong.

whole misunderstanding of the concrete cognitional proceedings of St. Thomas' teaching on universal judgement.

The letter reveals not only his proposed arguments but also further denotes that Lonergan was convinced that he had found the accurate interpretation. It also clearly demonstrated that he had devised a new application. Thus he writes:

> As to new applications, I am certain (and I am not one who becomes certain easily) that I can put together a Thomistic metaphysic of history that will throw Hegel and Marx, despite the enormity of their influence on this very account, into the shade. (4-5)

## 2. Lonergan's Letter: A Preview of the Development of a Theory of a Metaphysic of History

Lonergan's intention to develop a theory of a metaphysic of history remains a dominant premise within the content of the letter. Though the letter does not explicitly mention any of the essays in File 713, the main content of the letter does suggest some hints that Lonergan had already worked on, and was still working on the given subject. Here is an example of an explicit statement to affirm this inference: "I have a draft of this already written as I have of everything else." (5) This study will point out some details of the parallel references between the letter and the two manuscripts which will be thoroughly studied in this thesis.

The most likely reference that may provide a good clue of the link is in Lonergan's unpublished essay, The "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [The Restoration of All Things]." It is the only manuscript found in File 713 that has a date. Lonergan signed off as finishing the draft on the 28th April, 1935.[133] The letter to Father Provincial is dated the 22nd January, 1935. Fredrick Crowe discovered that these two obvious dates most probably provide the key to the shared contents between the letter and the essay.[134] The two items have a three- month

[133] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 135.
[134] F. E Crowe, *CH*, 31. See F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, 24. See also M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 104.

interval. This may suggest that the article was still in draft form when the letter may have been written. Hence, the letter Lonergan sent to his religious superior is highly suggestive of what he was drafting. This letter can be described as a shorthand leap into the depth and volume of discussion found in the *Pantôn* papers.

The main theoretical content of the letter suggests Lonergan was up to something spectacular. Having provided the hint in the letter, namely that he had "a written draft," (5) one can assume that Lonergan was referring to the draft of essays he had been working on, in what is now to be part of File 713. Hence Lonergan writes:

> It takes the objective and inevitable laws of economics, psychology (environment, tradition) and of progress (material, intellectual; automatic up to a point, then either deliberate and planned or the end of civilization) to find the higher synthesis of these laws in the mystical Body. Primitive psychology, the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt, the Greek city, Hellenism, the roman empire; then regalism, the protestant revolt, liberalism, romanticism, communism, modernism, German and Italian Fascism and the Catholic Fascism or Action with Christ as King – these all worked out from metaphysics and psychology together with, of course, the divine plan of grace. I should say my theory of the *will* (appetitus rationalis sequens forman intellectus) is as much above the current Thomist theory as my theory of intellect above their; that makes a difference. (5)

This statement is the key to his intent in the whole letter. It is in fact a synopsis that sums up a volume of compressed material relevant to what Lonergan had put together in his manuscript: The "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [The Restoration of All Things]."

This manuscript will be studied in detail in the next chapter, yet it is worth high lighting here an interesting item that closely associates with the letter, namely, Lonergan's suggestion in that essay that: the "multiple field of sciences: theological, philosophic, historical, social, political, even economic,"[135] will justify a synthetic view revealing "the metaphysical convergence of all things on Christ Jesus our Lord."[136] It is also reflected in the letter that Lonergan had offered the 'historical determination of intellect' that shall

[135] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 140.
[136] Ibid., 140.

appropriate the Thomist synthesis that will in turn introduce the threefold dialectic in the historic progress of namely, "a dialectic of fact," "a dialectic of sin," and lastly "a dialectic of thought."[137] What Lonergan intended to achieve was to devise a theory of a dialectic of history by reconstructing Hegel's dialectics: thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Modifying the principle of a 'higher synthesis' in Hegel's dialectic of history Lonergan initiated a new integration into the Thomist metaphysics, the historic clause in an unusual scheme. Lonergan's own theory of a dialectic of history shall underscore St. Paul's analogy of the mystical body of Christ, so that a theological content is centered in the "metaphysical principle of redemption."[138]

What is commonly found in the 1935 letter as well as in the *Pantôn* essay is that the content of these two original sources shall consolidate his interpretation of a social philosophy: the laws of economics, primitive psychology, civilizations, polity, social structures and governances etc. within the discourse of the theology of Sin, Grace and the Trinity.[139] The overall discussion of the *Pantôn* pointed towards the central role of Christ, the new order. Thus, history in Lonergan's view culminates in Christ: who is neither a synthesis of a political nor an ideological discourse, but "the *anakephalaiôsis* of humanity."[140] Finally, Lonergan draws on his plan for 'Catholic Action' which he derived significantly from Pope Pius XI's dedication to the feast of Christ the King. The theme that is drawn from the 1935 letter is fully exploited in the *Pantôn* essay. Hence, the fundamentals of Lonergan's ambitious project found in the letter have a clear and direct relationship to the "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* essay.

What is even more significant about this letter is that it reveals, and begins to articulate Lonergan's original thinking "in the making." The letter begins to capture

[137] Ibid., 146.
[138] Ibid., 150.
[139] Ibid., 151.
[140] Ibid., 159.

substantially the development to that point of his idea of a dialectic of history. It is hoped that the study of this letter will give a clear guide towards discovering the composition of the papers found in File 713, and their contents; the articulation of Lonergan's original plan in devising his idea of a dialectic of history has begun. The rest of the letter can be interpreted as the explanatory exposition of the key themes.

## III. The Discovery of File 713

Lonergan was a retired professor at Boston College from 1975 till March 1983. By this time, he was preparing to move back to his native Canada. He took up residency at Campion Centre in Weston just over a year before he died in November, 1984. During the transitional period of his retirement to Canada, Lonergan left behind piles of boxes containing collections of papers left in his room in Boston College. John Hochban, SJ, the archivist at the Lonergan Research Institute had the task of sorting these piles of boxes. Hochban is reported to have said that while he was packaging and rearranging the filing of the papers found in the boxes he came across a certain file, and was intrigued by the notes. "Among Lonergan's carefully numbered files he found one of unusual interest marked simply '713-History.' The file was not found in the filing cabinets where Lonergan had stored in numerical order files 101 to 938; presumably, it was somewhere in the disordered mass of papers he left lying around his room at Boston College when he moved to the Campion Centre in Weston in March 1983. These papers were collected into boxes on his return to Canada in November of that year, and File 713 turned up in 'Box 4' as numbered by John Hochban; it is unnerving to think how easily it might have been lost."[141]

What is earmarked in Box 4 is a cluster of these manuscripts found in File 713 dated in the 1930's, mostly shorthand notes manual-typed, or sketchy hand written pieces. It is "a manila folder marked "HISTORY" and numbered 713 in the organization of his papers. It contained notes on Arnold Toynbee's *A Study of History* – but these notes came later, dating from his reading of Toynbee in the early 1940's."[142] Though Toynbee's commentary notes were a later inclusion "they are not among the documents relevant to his development prior to

[141] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134. Editors' Preface Footnote, #1, (137).
[142] F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, 24.

1940."[143] Hence, the file numbered 713 refers to the specific collections of papers probably drafted before the years ranging from 1935 to 1938.[144]

Clarifying further the details of these papers, Crowe noted in his study that some of the materials in File 713 are repetitive, indicating Lonergan's early attempts at brainstorming sketchy notes on matters that gravely concerned him.[145] In many instances, related materials do appear in other parts of discrete items within File 713. The evidence in these materials indicates that Lonergan had worked seriously over and over again to define his key ideas on history as clearly as possible. Hence, this File is certainly a working folder in which Lonergan lumped all of his working notes together, many being just sketchy bits and pieces; some are even his hand written notes. This study asserts that Lonergan never intended these items to be published in their present form as they lack coherence.

### 1. A Brief Account of the Discovered Items

Along with the boxes of papers recovered from Lonergan's flat in Boston, the items contained in File 713 were later housed at the Lonergan Research Centre archive in Toronto. It was around the beginning of the 1990's that Fredrick Crowe and Robert Doran initiated some preliminary study on these discovered items. Two of them were subsequently published.[146] By this time a young doctoral candidate by the name of Michael Shute had come onto the scene at Regis College, Toronto. He came to know about this file and showed great interest in it. Crowe and Doran decided to hand the file to Shute to have a thorough

[143] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 71. Quoted from footnote # 283.

[144] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134. Footnote, #1, (137). See also M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 77.

[145] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), 2. Crowe & Doran, in their editorial in footnote # 4 point out the reversed order of sheaves in Lonergan's early filing of File 713.

[146] Fredrick Crowe and Robert Doran edited and published two of the items from file 713. The first one was published under the title "*Pantôn Anakephalaiosis* [The Restoration of All Things]", and the second one was published under the title, "An Analytic Concept of History."

look.[147] Shute took on the immediate task to make a detailed study of it. This project later became Shute's doctoral thesis.

While studying the items in File 713, Shute made some significant amendments to John Hochban's previous record. Initially, "Hochban catalogued twelve separate items. These ranged from a title page of an essay that is not in the file to a document of thirty-five pages."[148] After examining carefully these twelve accepted items Shute nominated only eight, which he deemed relevant to his study.[149] In his next major step, Shute organized the eight manuscripts in a systematic filing. This process made him the competent authority to date some of these documents. Dating the documents helped Shute to assemble them in chronological ordering. This arrangement aided Shute, enabling him to divide the eight items chronologically into two specific categories, characterized by him as "batches."[150] He listed under the Batch A column the four early documents dating most probably between 1933 and 1935. While batch B listed the next four later documents which dated most probably between 1937 and 1938.[151]

Shute then proceeded to examine each discrete item. In his careful examination of the items in file 713 Shute came across an item that had a Greek title: "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis.* He further discovered that although this leading essay had a single Greek title there were actually two distinct manuscripts; both of which had their own English subtitles: (i) "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [The Restoration of All Things]," and (ii) "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity]." Henceforth, Shute labelled each of the items with

[147] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134.
[148] G. Whelan, *DLNDH*, 36.
[149] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 71. Shute in footnote # 283 lists the rest of the items apart from the twelve items found in File 713.
[150] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 72. See also B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134. Editor's footnotes: "But if the papers that focus on the analysis of history are to be dated somewhat later in the 1930s, other papers that show more of a sociological concern seem to be earlier. That is the view of Michael Shute, who recently completed a doctoral dissertation on the subject and divides the papers into two roughly define 'batches'."
[151] See Appendix A.

different shorthand tags: PA (1*)* and PA (2).[152] After reaching a satisfactory settlement of the chronological arrangement and clarifying the status of "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* Shute made his following conclusion.[153]

> The first group, batch A, consists of four manuscripts. I tentatively suggest the maximum range for the date of composition of these manuscripts to be in the period from 1933 to 1936. The four manuscripts are: PA(1), which is twenty-five pages in length, dated 1935, and signed by the author; PA(2), which is five pages; (3) SMHS, which is five pages; and PH, a section from a larger work, probably the "Essay in Fundamental Sociology," which is thirty-five pages long.[154]

What Shute intended to establish was to identify each accepted item in File 713 as a discrete text. It is interesting to note that Shute, by clarifying the possible dating of each of these manuscripts in Batch A, places the item "Philosophy of History" which is also known as "The Essay in Fundamental Sociology" ahead of PA (1).[155] Thus PA (1) and PA (2) are both found in the first of the two categories he established, now found in Batch A of Shute's table of division. Clearly, PA (1) is the only identifiable material with the signature of the author and a date tagged onto it. The rest, including PA (2) indicate Shute's probable dating. After considering the position Crowe and Doran held and that held by Shute, I tend to position myself in between them. What is contained in PA (2) in my view is Lonergan's thirteen-point summary to PA (1). Shute, however, convinced me, in his careful study, that there are considerable differences too.[156] I take them into account in my study.[157]

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[152] Would Shute be the first one to discover the division in the "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* or would it be Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran? See B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134-38. Crowe and Doran also pointed out in their studies that there were two separate entities in the single manuscript of the "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis.***"** The "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [The Restoration of All Things]," twenty-five pages and the *"Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity]," a short paper of five pages.

[153] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, no page number provided. Shute's table of division contains the data of manuscripts in File 713 placed in chronological order.

[154] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 72. PA represents *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*, or PA (1). SMHS stands for *Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity*, or PA (2), and PH for *Philosophy of History*.

[155] The manuscript entitled, "Philosophy of History" also referred to as "The Essay in Fundamental Sociology," is now part of Michael Shute's book, *Lonergan's Early Economic Research,* LEER. Toronto Press 2010, 15-44. Of the published ones from the items in file 713, this would be the third document to be published.

[156] See M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 117-8.

[157] The approach into studying the *Pantôn* is based on two scripts. One is a copy from the original typed manuscript, which is Lonergan's own hand typed version. The other one is the published version taken from the journal: *Method*: *Journal of Lonergan Studies*. The original version does have page numbers but I

## 2. An Appropriation of the Current Study of File 713

There has been an upsurge in the renewed interest in the study of these unpublished papers since they were made public.[158] Shute's pioneering research into Lonergan's historical papers has exposed a significant amount of new data that has helped clarify Lonergan's later works including, among the most acclaimed ones: *Insight* and *Method in Theology*. What Shute did in his study was to glean the specific data from each of the discrete manuscripts within the file. He located the historical events, thus comparing them with relevant evidence gleaned from the file itself. He then collated, recorded and specified with chronological precision. Finally, Shute supplied the collated information for interpretation. Attempting his own interpretation, he also "exhorts other students of Lonergan to engage in acts of interpretation based on his work of research."[159] This appeal drew another doctoral candidate, Gerard Whelan, into the study of the file.

Whelan took great interest in what Shute had done with File 713. He appreciated what Shute had achieved so far, stating categorically:

> Shute offers us a greater understanding of the author on the basis of the essays in File 713. This can help us to answer puzzles that will remain in Lonergan's later writings unless, partly by means of these early essays, we understand the person we are dealing with.[160]

Appropriating File 713 as his major resource, Whelan aimed in his study to test his hypothesis that "in the years 1938-53, Lonergan continued to hold a dialectic of history as a concern of central importance."[161] In order to test his hypothesis, Whelan compared his work

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prefer to use the page numbers of the published one. The pages range from 134 to162. Whilst reading each script, I pause to compare the notes of one with the other to establish the similarities as well as their differences. The advantage of having the second (published) copy is that it has been enhanced by Crowe and Doran's editing. These editorial notes have informed this study to explore further insights into the interpretation of the *Pantôn*. Both Michael Shute's work and Frederick Crowe's recent work have added substantial resources to this study.

[158] See for instance P. Brown, "System and History in Lonergan's Early Manuscripts," Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis 1 (2001): 32-76 http://www.mun.ca/jmda/vol1/system.pdf accessed 3 January 2020.

[159] G. Whelan, *DLNDH*, 9.

[160] Ibid., 9.

[161] Ibid., 6.

with Michael Shute's study to devise a relevant methodology. The methodology Whelan used was Lonergan's own hermeneutical method.[162] Whelan applied two of the eight functional specialties, namely research and interpretation. Whelan demonstrated that Shute had applied research in his elaboration of File 713. In his study Whelan had applied research, interpretation and history to situate his work within the context of Shute's study of File 713. He did this by designing his work in chronological sequence to Shute's study, which had covered Lonergan's writings from 1933 to 1938. Whelan went on to provide a strong theoretical verification of his hypothesis after he had tested his evidence in File 713 and in Lonergan's other biographical manuscripts dating from 1940-53.

Although Whelan stressed that research and interpretation were the predominant functional specialties found in Shute's studies, he certainly recognized that *history* had always been a salient specialty that both he and Shute had applied in their overall expositions. Shute, for instance when charting File 713 and dividing it into two batches had applied history into categorizing data for specifications. Whelan, on the other hand, designed his study in chronological sequence to Shute's study, so that the interpretation of Lonergan's intellectual development in its historical continuity can be clearly demonstrated.

What Whelan attempted to do in his study was to devise a methodological continuum expanding an enlarged spectrum to the overall interpretation of the file. Basically, Whelan argued that a dialectic of history was a central concern in these unpublished papers, thus giving specific attention to the significance of Lonergan's particular focus on developing his theory of a dialectic of history.[163] As well as refining and appropriating the earlier sources, Whelan added extra biographical information to give Shute's interpretation an expanded

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[162] B. Lonergan, *MIT*. His book, *MIT* is divided into two parts. In the first part Lonergan deals with the transcendental method and in the second hermeneutical method. In the hermeneutical method Lonergan works with eight functional specialties. They are (1) research, (2) interpretation, (3) history, (4) dialectic, (5) foundations, (6) doctrines, (7) systematics, and (8) communications.

[163] G. Whelan, *DLNDH*, 6 & 16-58. Whelan maintained that Lonergan "continued to hold a dialectic of history a central concern."

synopsis of Lonergan's early sociological concerns.[164] Hence, Whelan added fifteen years, covering Lonergan's writings from 1938 to 1953. By inserting an extended background information, Whelan had added an improved interpretation of the historical papers.

Overall, both Shute and Whelan had enhanced the data in Lonergan's study of a dialectic of history spanning over a period of twenty years. Whelan had concluded in his dissertation, that there was sufficient evidence to prove that his hypothesis could be gleaned from Shute's "biographical claim that a dialectic of history was central to Lonergan's thinking during the 1930's and probably remained so for the rest of his life."[165]

[164] G. Whelan, *DLNDH*, 38-41.
[165] Ibid., 8.

## IV. Introducing the Study of the two Selected Manuscripts in File 713

Having presented the discovery of File 713 and the discrete items of the unpublished manuscripts contained in it, this study shall commence its specific task, namely to enhance the on-going interpretation of File 713, then to add its own contributions. To do this, two essays from the eight approved items in Michael Shute's catalogue in File 713 have been selected for close analysis, the "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis"* and the 'Analytic Concept of History.' These two significant essays are both dense and complicated. Yet they are compelling and extremely rewarding in disclosing Lonergan's original thinking. These two papers will be the focus of three crucial chapters in this thesis.

The reason for studying these two manuscripts thoroughly, as distinct from the rest of the items in File 713 is primarily a technical one as these two essays have already been published. As a result, Crowe and Doran who edited them have already provided useful details and necessary background references.[166] In refining these essays these editors have helped enhance the on-going study of Lonergan's historical papers. They also evoked a special interest for this thesis to deepen the analysis which Shute and Whelan had provided through their own special contribution to the study of the historical papers.

Secondly and most importantly, is the intention this thesis expects to achieve: to pursue a deeper understanding and to seek adequate resources to make it possible to clarify Lonergan's development of a theology of redemptive praxis. This attempt has impelled the study towards tracing the origin of Lonergan's idea of history. The opinion of the writer of this thesis is that these two earlier essays do provide original insight into the considerable development of Lonergan's theology of redeeming history. Using these two studies as its

[166] Crowe and Doran had also provided English translations for the Latin scriptural texts and inserted scriptural texts within the manuscripts where the editors knew Lonergan used a word or words, phrases or verses which appeared to be from the scriptures. The introductory notes in the editorial are both informative and invaluable. They provide helpful guide to the reader seeking to navigate some of the complicated passages in both of these essays. The editorial notes facilitate greater understanding to the historical background setting.

main resources, this study hopes to augment the understanding of the depth of Lonergan's critical study of the dialectic of history. This shall in turn provide a framework that shall help trace the development of Lonergan's theology of a redeeming history.

## 1. A Prelude to the Study of the *Pantôn* Paper

An attempt to study any of the discrete manuscripts in File 713 is a strenuous task. The study of the *Pantôn* is at times tedious. However, the rewards are worthwhile and the discovery is exciting as each relevant item is exposed in the text. Observing Lonergan's handwritten notes in the margins and noting the words or phrases he crosses out to then replace them within his text gives the reader the sure clue that it was Lonergan's own draft. It is certainly a working paper that was not yet intended for publication. The arguments in the essay are complicated yet absolutely compelling. They draw on resources ranging from scriptures to the Pontifical encyclicals; from ancient to modern philosophy; from the natural to human sciences; from economics to history; from philosophy to theology. In short, the *Pantôn* is a textual synopsis of multi-disciplinary tasks seeking solutions central to social concerns. Yet from the outset and through to its conclusion it remains firmly a work of philosophy.

Through the study of the *Pantôn* we come to know Lonergan's comprehensive understanding of the ecclesial, socio-economic and geopolitical challenges of his times. The introductory notes clearly indicated that Lonergan was concerned about the immense moral decline within society and thought seriously about crafting his version of a new world order. It is clear from the *Pantôn* papers that his version of a study of critical history with a philosophical focus enriches a sociological content: a *Summa Sociologica* to which he alludes in his letter to his Religious Superior. Hence, the *Pantôn* was a programmatic manuscript in which Lonergan set out to formulate his idea of a metaphysics of history. It was Lonergan's

ambitious project to register his theory of a *summa sociologica,* somewhat akin to Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologae.*

Despite the density of the essay, it can be seen to be a truly ambitious task: an experimental discourse to approach social concerns through the interpretation of metaphysics. As a result, the *Pantôn* is complicated, often obscure, and at times ambiguous. Still, Lonergan managed to stay on course and work his way through, while covering so many topics and hinting at vast areas of different sciences that needed specific specialization. Hence, the manuscript can best be recapitulated as an introductory text to many of the developments Lonergan will have aimed to undertake in his future career.[167] Other developments in the essay also evoke further interest and study. This thesis, however, is to remain within its terms of reference: investigation of Lonergan's dialectics of history and its relationships to the development of a theology of redemptive history.

Lastly, the *Pantôn* remains one of the most important documents in the study of Lonergan's idea of history. Essentially, it presents Lonergan's first attempt at working in the area of the philosophy of history. What has been discovered in this particular study can be an invitation to Lonergan scholars, who wish to fathom the depths of Lonergan's thoughts on history, and to pursue the richness of its content. What the *Pantôn* has achieved is to provide the original data of Lonergan's early insights that lead into a new development of his understanding. This is a significant process that allows the spontaneous shift from the theory of a dialectic of history towards linking its relationship with theology; a design of a theology of redemptive history in the making.

[167] F. E Crowe, BLPT, 451-70.

## 2. Introducing the Essay: The 'Analytic Concept of History'

The 'Analytic Concept of History' does not make for easy reading. It is virtually mind-numbing, while at the same time an enlightening academic adventure. Unlike the *Pantôn* manuscripts this essay was methodically detailed in its outline. The paragraphs were short and concise, though the shorthand-like notes in some of the paragraphs curtail the exposition of ideas in his overall work. This, however, need not deter the researcher from probing its profundity, given the originality of this essay.[168] Although the brevity in the paragraphs may seemingly restrict access to the detailed clarity to be found in the essay, the content is rich, and can reward the efforts required to plumb its depths. In fact, the overall content is extensively developed in an intensely condensed structure. For this reason, to adequately treat the essential areas the essay covers in its entirety, the analysis of the "Analytic Concept of History" is spread over two chapters in this thesis.

From the opening pages of the essay, three key concepts emerge: 'analytic,' 'concept' and 'history.' These concepts are so crucial that they finally become the title of the essay. Once Lonergan managed to construct a basic framework, the essay proceeded to develop the essential theme of the essay: a dialectic of history. Though history is the subject being pursued, dialectic is essentially a theme that transforms the whole exposition of the essay. It is a theme that is pivotal in bridging the shift between the two main topics in the essay: Lonergan's theory of a metaphysics of history and his attempt at a narrative of a theological discourse of redemptive history. The shift in the discussion, moving from a metaphysics of history to a narrative of a theology of redeeming history is neatly incorporated by the effective operations of the three approximations: progress, decline and renaissance. Hence, the essay accomplishes this progression successfully.

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[168] B. Lonergan, ACH (2). See the editor's notes.

Further analysis exhibits a unique relationship Lonergan built between the three approximations and the theological virtues: faith, hope and charity. Once again, Lonergan condensed an expansive area of theological discussion within the second part of the essay. As well as engaging the theological virtues, he draws on the evangelical counsels commonly known to religious commitment within the Church. Lonergan's theological narrative began to expand even further as he attempted to integrate mission theology. The analytical method he applied to devise a theology of redemptive history emerging gradually from the basis of 'a metaphysic of history' is both complex and compelling. Perhaps this is his ultimate aim in developing the main theme of the essay.

Lastly, the study of "Analytic Concept of History" puts into perspective Lonergan's ongoing design of a theology that engages the contemporary challenges of geo-political discourses, the global economy and the immense social change. Clearly, the introduction of missiology into his final discourse concludes that this essay provides an ongoing foundation that is "orientated towards the implementation of redemptive praxis."[169] The possibility that Lonergan may want to lead the essay to the next level of discussion would have added a nuance in Christian praxis. Hence, the notion of a new order is deeply entrenched in the essay. It shall therefore be determined from this study that Lonergan's praxis theology entails a true transformation into a new world order. This could also be relevant to his later works in contextual theology.[170]

### 3. A Comparative Synopsis of the Two Manuscripts

There are still elements of stark contrasts and striking similarities between the two manuscripts. The *Pantôn* is long, has no clear systematic outlines and is largely condensed.

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[169] M. Shute, *ONLDH,* 21.

[170] See for instance, B. Lonergan, "Theology in its New Context." *A Second Collection* (1974): 55-67. Henceforth, TNC followed by page reference.

The “Analytic Concept of History” on the other hand is short, and its outlines are clearly mapped out. Since it is a much more developed essay, its contents are abridged in a packed list of topics within this single essay. However, both manuscripts share Lonergan’s ingenuity in devising a structure that would encompass a narrative of a theology of redemptive history. The appropriation and integration of a multiplicity of combined disciplines such as anthropology and cosmology, soteriology and Christology are common to both essays. Undoubtedly, it can be concluded from this analysis that the plan of his theory of a dialectic of history penned in *Pantôn* was an initial project which was to be completed in the “Analytic Concept of History”.

Although Lonergan’s theological apprenticeship did begin with the *Pantôn*, what the “Analytic Concept of History” offers is an advanced theology with a clearly worked out methodology. What is intriguing in these two essays is that there are two different trends leading towards a single composition of a theology: a theology of redemption. The theology of redemption discovered in the *Pantôn* papers can be termed as Christologically centered, while the one in the “Analytic Concept of History” can be named a graced-centered theology, which still emerges from a methodical framework of the operations of the three approximations: progress, decline and renaissance. Although the workings of these two manuscripts differ in their theological approaches their central focus is intact within Lonergan’s broader concept of renewal. This theological process confirms that Lonergan’s methodological approach had shifted over time while the essence of his study had continued to mature.

Finally, it is clearly revealed from the study of the *Pantôn* papers that Lonergan’s main concern was to find a schema that can deliver a renewed world order through a restored social history. However, Lonergan made no explicit reference to this in the *Pantôn* papers. Only in one instance did he introduce the notion of a threefold dialectic in the historic

progress of intellect, namely, fact, sin and thought,[171] though as yet this attempt had no basic structure clearly exhibited. This can be attributed to the fact that the idea was in its infancy in the *Pantôn* papers. The 'Analytic Concept of History,' on the other hand, goes a step further by pointing out a substantially developed pattern of creative writing and displays clearly the creation of the three-fold dialectics of history. Hence, it is a much more developed essay.

[171] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 146.

## V. The societal setting to understanding File 713

Gerald Whelan's attempt to explain the methodology both he and Shute had used in their efforts to analyze File 713 necessitates that he draw considerably from Joseph Komonchak's study.[172] As is clear in his doctoral work, Whelan depended largely on Komonchak's input on the socio-political and historical setting of File 713. In fact, Komonchak provided a rich backdrop to understanding Lonergan's drafts of the unpublished papers. What Komonchak added to Lonergan's biography was the historical worldview beyond the 1930's and clarity in situating Lonergan's place in world affairs. Similarly, he had brought into focus the critical events of the ecclesial developments of the1930's, which can equally be seen as having influenced Lonergan's draft of his historical papers.

Komonchak took his readers back further into the events of World War I and the turmoil that the war had created, and also into the subsequent developments. Equivalently, Komonchak provides relevant information on how Lonergan was influenced by the Church events of the nineteenth century with the efforts of Pope Leo XIII in initiating the internal religious reforms. These developments gave birth to other important changes that followed through into the twentieth century. Komonchak perceived that the achievements of the Vatican II reforms were part of the larger movement that had already began in the 1920's. Hence, the religious reforms within the Catholic Church and the reform movements of secular governments have both contributed to Lonergan's outward look in a significant way. Such positions can also be noticed in the design of the drafts Lonergan penned in his unpublished papers.

[172] J. A. Komonchak, LEERH, 159-179. I am surprised to note that Komonchak did not make any reference to Michael Shute's thorough study of file713 although he did make a reference in his footnote # 2 to Lonergan's published versions of the unpublished essays: PA (1), and ACH (2). However, Fredrick Crowe, and Robert Doran did make a special mention of Michael Shute, in the editorial note in PA (1).

In establishing the social context within which Lonergan was developing his ideas Komonchak spelt out the explosively massive developments in Europe in the early 1900's. Industries began to flourish from the discovery and development of new machinery triggered by the invention of iron and fuel technology. Economic benefits advanced through mass production as infrastructure and engineering technology expanded. Yet the economic rewards were enjoyed by just a few. The majority of the population were found to be working people, and most of the working people were living under oppressive poverty. Pope Pius XI's social encyclical *Quadragesimo anno, On Reconstruction of the Social Order*, 1931, which was intended to commemorate the forty years of Pope Leo XIII's peerless encyclical *Rerum Novarum, On the Conditions of Workers*, 1891 was a key document that had a huge impact on Lonergan's drafts. The papal call to 'Catholic Action' was a key theme that had captured Lonergan's attention in a deeply influential way. What will be interesting to follow in the subsequent development is a theology that took shape as Lonergan responded to the Papal call.

## 1. A Need for an Economic Theory

Lonergan was twenty-two when he was sent to Heythrop College, London, for philosophy studies between 1926 and 1930. When he returned home he found himself in a depressing situation. The effects of the economic depression had extended to include massive unemployment, and poverty that hit rock-bottom in Canadian society. Living standards in Canada were appalling. A social welfare system in the country was by that time non-existent.[173] With the collapse of the economic order the Canadian banks failed, unemployment numbers soared dramatically, and the society was forced to be divided

[173] W. A Mathews, *LQ*, 49.

between the poor and rich.[174] Life for the ordinary people in Canada became extremely difficult as they had suffered the consequences of the economic meltdown. The rich were poor; the poor were not only poor but out of work.[175] "Daily, Lonergan would have read about the Depression and observed its effects around him. As a result, he began to question the causes of the breakdown of the economic order."[176]

The global socio-economic and political upheavals moved Lonergan even further into deep reflection as he went to Rome for his advanced studies. References to some of the events are found in the 1935 letter as well as in some of the manuscripts kept in File 713 which confirm that Lonergan was writing during the reign of Pope Pius XI, at a time when Europe was going through turbulent times. The world, particularly the Western world, was coming to grips with all sorts of crises: the Spanish Civil War; the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy, the French Revolution; the nineteenth-century liberals; the modern communists; the worldwide economic depression leading up to World War II; the era of political turmoil with the fall of democracy and the rise of fascism and Stalinism in Europe.[177] The experience of a decadent politico-social history that hit rock-bottom in the 1930's, and Pope Pius XI's dedication of the Feast of Christ the King made an influential impression on him.[178] Lonergan saw these various shifts, and reflected upon them, then began to take steps towards doing something about it. His empathy for the victims of these awful situations was clearly overwhelming, as he was repeatedly stating: "People are suffering; there is a pastoral need to be met."[179]

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[174] 'The Great Depression,' in *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, online edition, at http://www.thecanadianencylopedia.com accessed 9 February 2017.

[175] F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, 132-33. Crowe has reference to some of the student articles found in the local newspaper in Montreal regarding social concerns which can be found in P. Lambert, C. Tansey and C. Going (eds.), *Caring about Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan* (Montreal, 1982), 31.

[176] W. A Mathews, *LQ*, 49.

[177] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 169. See also J. Komonchak, LEERH, 161.

[178] J. A. Komonchak, LEERH, 164.

[179] F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, 132.

Komonchak recounts in his study that as the crises deepened, the responses were also significant. Secular governments, particularly the Western world, the Pope and the Church in general, the lay movements such as the 'Catholic Action Movement' in France, academics including historians, philosophers, theologians, and many more were seeking solutions for dealing with the emerging challenges. Komonchak believes that Lonergan is seen as one among them in reaching out towards finding some kind of a solution. It can be concluded in the historical files being examined for this thesis, that Lonergan was strongly drawn to focus his academic pursuits on either the study of *history* or of *economics*. Both of these were in Lonergan's view two underlying factors which needed exploring if a new societal order was to be re-established. Though the study of a dialectic of history remained Lonergan's central interest it can also be contested however, that the science of economics continued to attract Lonergan's interest, given the gravity of the economic woes of his time. As Lonergan devoted considerable time to studying economics, he thought deeply about a theory that would be able to address economic matters,[180] be relevant to socio-political change and ultimately be extended to the developments responding to integral human needs. A good piece of evidence is to show that one of the companion manuscripts in file 713 known as: "The Essay in Fundamental Sociology" is also referred to as, "Philosophy of History."

In his supplementary study of Lonergan's notes on his studies in economics, Michael Shute stated that Lonergan had to wrestle with discerning which one he preferred to pursue: a dialectic of history or the science of economics.[181] He did so by excavating further evidence in a long yet unpublished set of essays kept at the Toronto Lonergan Research Institute namely, the archive of the "A" Files.[182] This is a discrete set of unpublished papers apart from what we are examining in this thesis: File 713. From the data gleaned from the "A"

[180] M. Shute, *LEER,* 3-13.
[181] Ibid.
[182] M. Shute, *LEER,*69. See especially the footnotes 7, 8, & 10.

files, Shute discloses critical information concerning the amount of reflection Lonergan had put into writing in his early years on the significant nature of human history. It is a remarkable disclosure.

Fredrick Crowe on the other hand, adds further significant information after analyzing the *Pantôn* essay of 1935 in File 713 and the posthumous Christological notes of 1982, which date back to Lonergan's Montreal lecture notes of the 1930's: he suggests there were pulls not just in two directions, but three.[183] There were pulls not only between *history* and *economics* but also towards *Christology* as well. Crowe subsequently concludes that Christology was Lonergan's unfinished business as he turned his attention to economics.[184]

> Implicit in these two points is the view that economic questions have theological implications; in fact, when Lonergan returned late in life to his early interest, he called his course 'Macro-economics and a dialectic of history' and of course dialectic of history is a theological question through and through.[185]

Shute, however affirms that Lonergan's notes of his economic theory can be claimed to be just as original as his unpublished notes of his theory of history. In studying Lonergan's emerging interest in the study of economics, Shute suggested that Lonergan devoted a considerable amount of time to studying economics. He thought a sound economic theory would facilitate a professional approach to empirical science that could counteract the effects of the economic meltdown of the 1930's.[186] Lonergan himself also acknowledged that years later.

> When I came back to Canada in 1930, …Many theories were floating around. I was interested in Social Credit; I knew it would be inflationary if the banks dished out twenty-five dollars to everyone in the country every payday. Still, what was wrong with their argument? You had to understand the dynamic of events.[187]

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[183] See F. E Crowe, *CH*, 11 &12.
[184] See F. E Crowe, *CH*, 11 &12.
[185] F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, 133.
[186] M. Shute, *LEER*, 3-13.
[187] B. Lonergan, *Caring about Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan*, 31. Quoted in F. E Crowe, in *Lonergan*, 132.

Shute specified that Lonergan not only devised an economic method aimed at improving the standard of living of those whose lives had been negatively affected, but he also wanted to contribute to the standard science of economics.[188] Regrettably, his economic theory was never accepted as an alternative to the mainstream economic theories. It was a painful period in Lonergan's life. Lonergan, however, shelved his interest in his theory of economics and set his focus on working on his study of history.[189]

## 2. A Need for Reform

Through Komonchak's study we are alerted to the fact that Lonergan lived in a time of deep global crisis. The future of democracy was in doubt, economic depression was arguably at its worst, and social decline was at its lowest point in western civilization. From the outset, Lonergan was attempting to get to the root of the problems which were mainly generated by the socio-economic and political upheavals. The intended purpose of the drafts of the manuscripts of File 713 reveals that Lonergan was seeking something much more viable than the status quo. This intention had motivated him to explore more widely. In one of the companion manuscripts kept within File 713, namely, the "Philosophy of History," it is revealed that Lonergan was personally upset and deeply distressed at seeing failed institutions moving towards serious decline. The turn of events had triggered gloominess, and yet Lonergan glimpsed a more optimistic future in the midst of hopelessness. Writing those notes at that time, Lonergan questioned why humanity repeatedly tended to destroy the achievements of classic civilizations**.** He asked almost desperately "Why the twentieth century is in such a mess?" [190]

[188] M. Shute, *LEER,* 69.
[189] See M. Shute, *LEER,* 15-44.
[190] B. Lonergan, PH, 98.

Lonergan realized that the diseases of a decadent society were only symptoms. The real cause of the problem was the nature of decadence itself.[191] In chapter four of this thesis we will come across what Lonergan meant by the 'state of decadence' when he discusses the notion of decline in his companion essay: the "Analytic Concept of History." Here is an example to highlight what he had to say about the nature of decadence:

> Thus it is that with the course of time, the privileged enjoy a rapid but narrowly extended expansion of progress, and meanwhile the depressed are not merely left behind but more or less degraded by the set of palliatives invented and applied to prevent their envy bursting into the flame of anger and revolution.[192]

Hence, the politico-economic and social problems were symptoms of intrinsic systemic and systematic breakdown of the human standard of values. He came to the conclusion that there was a collapse of both order and integrity. Lonergan's grave concerns, and more so his frustrations, were deeply rooted in humanity's complacency and hunger for gratification. Some of Lonergan's frustrations shall be detailed in the study of the two manuscripts in the next three chapters, yet what consistently underscores his key arguments is Lonergan's view on humanity's failure or lack of adequate use of their intellect. Lonergan, therefore, strongly desired to work towards restoring the capacity of the human intellect to its given potential. In Lonergan's view, if humanity is ever to be successful in an authentically mature development, then the integral use of the human intellect has to be progressively pursued.

Pope Pius XI's theme of a 'Catholic Action' may have been a catalyst. It motivated Lonergan to think differently about the idea of reform within the context of the global crisis of his time. He wanted to devise a theory, aligned with 'Catholic Action,' that would enable the revolutionary reforms needed to address the deficient status quo. Hence, Lonergan began

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[191] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 156. Lonergan emphasizes the formation of the Catholic priesthood adhering to Pope Pius XI's specific reference to Pope Leo X111's teaching of just conditions for workers. See Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno,* (1931), # 20.

[192] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), 22.

to map out a rudimentary path of 'putting the house in order,' a project that needed some radical reform programs. For this reason, what was utterly necessary to his early interest in the study of a dialectic of history was the notion of renewal. A case in point is the companion manuscript in file 713: *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [The Restoration of All Things]. This essay gives us adequate evidence of Lonergan's first attempt of his work in the study of renewal. As we shall discover in chapter two of this thesis, Lonergan began this essay with a metaphysics of the Pauline concept of restoration. Lonergan's initial vision is identified by the phrase he chose to work towards: "a metaphysics of history." This phrase captures a glimpse of the background to the foundations of Lonergan's intellectual development in the *Pantôn* essay. It clearly represents what Lonergan had in mind: 'The Restoration of All Things in Christ.' Hence, this major task to which Lonergan devoted his entire life's work was to be based on a philosophy of history. Komonchak's social setting subsequently provides a thought-provoking incentive into exploring Lonergan's practical redemptive efforts. This is a dynamic response to Pope Pius XI's teaching about the Kingship of Christ. It is a focus which also adds a study of renewal, one in which Komonchak's idea of a theology of redemption is deeply rooted.

The appalling state of affairs in secular governments was a worry, yet Lonergan was sad to see the decline in Church internal affairs. He "was troubled by what he regarded as the decadent state of Catholic intellectual life and was committed to the task of its renewal."[193] The *Pantôn* reveals how Lonergan began to lament "the decadent state of Catholic thought"[194] and to seek to contribute to its renewal. He thought that the crafting of a new order had to begin from within the Catholic Church. To reverse the cycle of serious socio-economic and political decline in the world, and to restore long term order in the world,

[193] F. E Crowe, *CH*, 30.
[194] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134.

Lonergan believed that genuine reforms were needed. For such decisive reforms to get to the heart of institutions and societies, history had to be studied seriously.[195] In Lonergan's view the study of critical history was a way to foster recovery; to restore order, to recover or recreate what was lost and absent, and enhance basic authentic values in institutions if the Church and societies were to flourish.

### 3. Need for a new Philosophical Reading

It is clearly evident that Lonergan was informed by the enormous awareness in the world of the 1930's, and thoughtfully reflected on how to participate with others who were engaged in working towards finding adequate solutions to the crises. The companion manuscript namely, the "Philosophy of History," in File 713 discloses that Lonergan was convinced that a search into finding a solution would have to have an intellectual content. That intellectual content he thought necessary was no other than the critical study of history. Lonergan believed that the critical study of history would be the right resource to contribute towards the process of restoration and that a serious concentration on the study of critical history had to have a philosophical content, if it was to provide the necessary lens not only for shaping a new societal order, but also for bringing about a much needed renewal in the intellectual life of the Church. Hence, he judged that the need for a philosophy of history was beyond question. "[T]he hope of the future lies in a philosophic presentation of the supernatural concept of social order…"[196]

Komonchak believed that the global crises were taking place concurrently with the Catholic reform programs initiated by Pope Leo XIII. He believed that the meltdown of the 1930's had in turn brought about a resurgence of Catholic thought, which added to the overall

[195] Renewal was at the heart of Lonergan that set the initial spark to his study of critical history. See B. Lonergan, PA (1), 143-4.

[196] B. Lonergan, PH, 95.

intellectual development. He believed that the evolution of scientific research into the resurgence of Catholic theology and philosophy was not just counter resistance to the influence of modernity but a wave of movement towards a great openness to the modern age. There was already the resurgence of scientific scholarship in scriptural, patristic, ecclesial, sacramental and dogmatic studies as part of the reforms initiated by Pope Leo XIII. These studies had also stirred up a whole range of other renewals relevant to human development in the secular world. Komonchak asserted that the movement had triggered a whole surge of events that were breaking through in the many facets of Western society. Though some of the reforms Komonchak outlined in his study were to be of internal Church matters, there were some broader significant developments.

The surging wave had flowed into the Catholic academic circles in which scientific scholarship had forced a new recovery in Catholic philosophy and theology. Whelan emphasized in his study that the revival of Catholic thought of the 1930's had forged a reawakening of a renewed study in the Aristotelian-Thomistic categories. It is in this vein that this thesis undertakes to evaluate Lonergan's draft of the unpublished papers. The 1935 letter clearly points to Lonergan's intention to read the Thomist metaphysics with, so to say, a different lens. This is how he describes it in his letter:

> A metaphysic is just as symmetrical, just as all-inclusive, just as consistent, whether it is interpreted rightly or wrongly. The difference lies in the possibility of convincing expression, of making application, of solving disputed questions. I can do all three in a way that no Thomist would dream possible. [197]

The science of philosophy would inevitably become the bedrock for sociological conversation. The possibility of a robust response through a reform program meant radical adaptation to a serious study of the Thomistic philosophy.[198] The 1935 letter also reveals that

[197] The 1935 letter to the Provincial, p. 4.

[198] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 155. Lonergan makes a particular reference to Pope Leo XIII's encyclical, *Aeterni Patris: Of the Eternal Father,* August, 1879. Pope Leo XIII was evoking a retrieval of the Thomist philosophy. It seemed that Lonergan was inspired by Pope Leo XIII's call to retrieve the scholastic philosophy

Lonergan was asked by his superiors to pursue his advanced courses in theology, though his interest had always been philosophy. He did mention in the letter that he was "interested in Plato during Regency and…read St Augustine's earlier works during the summer before theology."[199] The forbidden books would have added to the list of books he already named in his letter to his Provincial. They certainly had philosophical bearing on the development of Lonergan's ideas. Sources from the two manuscripts at study supply us with names of possible books Lonergan had read.[200] The list of books is long and does not need to be included here, yet what is important to note is how Lonergan would now recreate a new reading into philosophy. He developed his accumulation of philosophical resources in arriving at formulating his noble idea of a metaphysic of history. Significantly, his appropriation and reappraisal of all of these resources influenced Lonergan's approach to social concerns in an entirely new way.

### 4. A Metaphysic of History

The concept of a metaphysic of history was central to Lonergan's overall study of critical history. Having assessed Whelan's reading into both Shute and Komonchak's studies of the manuscripts in File 713, this thesis acknowledges that the three scholars have placed a great emphasis on exploiting the central theme of Lonergan's study of 'a metaphysic of history.' Komonchak's study however had diverted from Shute and Whelan, seeking to source the origin of this concept. Hence, Komonchak claimed that a theological evolution in

in Catholic schools. This can be seen in this study as one of the major impact on Lonergan's persistent call to the study of philosophy.

[199] The 1935 letter to the Provincial, p. 3.

[200] For instance, see the editor's notes. B. Lonergan, ACH (2), 30. Footnote #3. "Lonergan surely had in mind Thompson's *Science and Common Sense: An Aristotelian Excursion* (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1937), which speaks of induction that goes from the particular to the general as an ascension, and of its reversal as a descending induction (p.32); neither form of argument can avoid uncertainty, even though the *descending induction* is put into deductive form. For Lonergan's 'begging of the question' Thompson had 'a surreptitious assumption' (p. 33)." That book is to be noted: W. R. Thompson, *Science and Common Sense: An Aristotelian Excursion* (London: Longmans Green and Co, 1937).

Lonergan's idea of redemptive history may have originated from the German Catholic Philosopher Peter Wust's work, though he acknowledges that there is no clear reference made by Lonergan himself. Komonchak, however convincingly demonstrated his position with support from an essay that Wust published alongside Christopher Dawson's article in the journal: *Order,* edited by Christopher Dawson. Lonergan had had a deep admiration for Dawson, a highly respected historian to whom he referred on many occasions as having influenced him enormously.[201]

Komonchak had further argued that Wust's second part of his major book contained a heading entitled "a metaphysics of history," a key phrase that was synonymous with Lonergan's common phrase in devising his study of a dialectic of history. Weighing the evidence in these two cases, Komonchak concluded that Lonergan's phrase: 'a metaphysic of history' may have evolved from Wust's philosophical assessment of the restoration of historical events. Hence, Komonchak concludes:

> I offer these comparisons in the hope that someone might be able to follow them up, both by a consultation of Lonergan's papers to see whether there is any other evidence that he knew Wust's work and also by a closer reading of Wust's metaphysical dialectics of history to see whether there are other points of similarity.[202]

Though Komonchak's suggestion is reasonably grounded, this thesis chooses not to pursue his concluding suggestions. The reason is simply this: there is no hard evidence drawn from the drafts of the essays of file 713 suggestive of Wust's metaphysical references in Lonergan's development of a study of a dialectic of history. Given that assessment, this thesis does not intend to explore beyond the given content found in the drafts. What this thesis depends on in Komonchak's study however, is his appropriation of the central theological concern in Lonergan's idea of a redemptive history. It maintains its own focus on studying

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[201] B. Lonergan, IR, 264.
[202] J. A. Komonchak, LEERH, 176.

Lonergan's original works especially the sources gleaned from the 1935 letter and the historical papers kept in file 713. In brief, this thesis will insist that Lonergan's narrative of a theology of redemptive of history emerged from his own theological reflection. Hence, there is no way to support Komonchak's suggestion that Peter Wust may have influenced Lonergan into formulating his future theological narrative of a redemptive praxis.

## 5. The Question of Evil

We have discovered in the early part of this chapter that Lonergan was mystified by the complexities of persistent worsening of human living conditions in the events of the great economic depression, and the subsequent socio-political turmoil caused by the World War II. Although these were significant concerns, as discussed earlier, what seemed to have mattered most to Lonergan was decadence: the entire moral erosion of common sense thinking in humanity's attitude to creating a new world order. Clearly, what was imperative to Lonergan's theological questioning into the history of human existence was originally the presence of evil. Hence, this study deems that Lonergan's evolutionary narrative of a theology of redemption has an origin in his awareness of moral depravity.

What shall resonate and persist throughout the course of the study of these two manuscripts in the following chapters will be Lonergan's questioning of the existence and relevance of original sin in modern times. The question of evil[203] will have been an important feature for Lonergan to determine towards formulating a theology, which shall be beyond the parameters of moral theology. These basic questions regarding original sin, including the questions of the existence of evil go further back to Lonergan's high school days. In writing Lonergan's biography, William Matthews takes the reader back to Lonergan's Religious

[203] R. M Liddy, *TL*, 56. Liddy points to Lonergan's grasp of Augustine's conception of dialectics: good and evil presented in his *Confession.*

Education at high school when "the language of doctrines and of apologetics"[204] was first introduced to him. This education would remain the significant bedrock on which his future theological development would stand. Moving on in later life to his senior student days, Lonergan's intellectual quest began to progress as he read Augustine's early dialogues with a Neo-Platonic influence, and also Plato's own early dialogues in the summer of 1933.[205]

Richard Liddy adds another remarkable point to William Matthews' documentary on Lonergan's biography. He suggests that Lonergan's intellectual development was not only framed from just reading Augustine's dialogues but also importantly from reflecting profoundly on his personal conversion story.

> In Augustine intellect and its activities are one part of a larger picture, the picture of Augustine's whole life: his moral struggles, his wrestling with the religious and philosophical currents of his time, his wrestling with God.[206]

Liddy pointed out that the questions Lonergan was grappling with, in the midst of massive social change aligned with Lonergan's own maturation. Growing up in an era of massive social change just like Augustine, Lonergan had to grapple with essentially important questions in ways somewhat similar to Augustine's intellectual development. As Lonergan moved on to reading John Henry Newman's work, he found something equally analogous.[207] Newman's conversion story inspired Lonergan more than the significance of his intellectual influence. These two conversion stories would have had a compelling impact on Lonergan's intellectual development towards devising a new theological discourse.

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[204] W. A Mathews, *LQ*, 27. In his mature years, Lonergan was to formulate his integrated expression of basic Catholic doctrines and apologetics translated within his deep study of history. Cf. B. Lonergan, *Insight*, 754.

[205] R. M Liddy, *TL*, 50-73.

[206] Ibid., 50.

[207] B. Lonergan, IR, 265.

## Conclusion

The focus of this chapter was to introduce the expression of Lonergan's idea of history, and to navigate the subsequent development of a theology of redemptive history through the study of the historical manuscripts kept in file 713. We are told Lonergan had never returned to this "manila folder marked "HISTORY."[208] Yet how important this file is to current research, and to the contribution it can make to future Lonergan scholarship. Michael Shute, who spent a substantial amount of his time studying these documents summed it up neatly when he clarified Lonergan's historical manuscripts: "They have the added attraction of being an early expression of an important element of his mature thought, which reveals that even during his student days in the 1930s Lonergan was on to something original."[209]

Clearly, Lonergan was up to something significantly original. The letter sent to his religious superior adds on the important aspects profoundly significant to his early thoughts. Succinctly, these manuscripts point to the sort of history that remained so dear to Lonergan from a very early age. This history was to be significantly pastoral.[210] Throughout this study, the history that speaks to Lonergan is a history that relates deeply to him about how to deal with unequal distribution of resources, the negation of social benefits and the decadence of socio-economic and political systems.[211] It is a significant point that underscores the overall treatise of this study. Fredrick Crowe adds it neatly: "From start to finish of his career Lonergan was orientated and guided by a deep-lying pastoral concern."[212] Hence, this thesis will not only trace the origins of Lonergan's idea of redemptive history but will also locate its key developments in future theological discourses towards issues of social concerns.

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[208] F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, 24.
[209] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 71.
[210] F.E Crowe, BLPT,451-70.
[211] F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, 132-33. Crowe has reference to some of the student articles found in the local newspaper in Montreal regarding social concerns which can be found in P. Lambert, C. Tansey and C. Going (eds), *Caring about Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan* (Montreal, 1982), 31.
[212] F.E Crowe, BLPT, 451.

# Chapter Two: The *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*

The study in the previous chapter discloses that the item, *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* had two separate essays in a single manuscript. Each of them had the same Greek title but with two different English subtitles.[213] The task of this chapter is to study carefully the first one: PA (1) or "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [The Restoration of All Things]." The study will also draw on the status of the second essay: PA (2) or "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* [Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity];" it will, however, remain a supplementary item to the study of PA (1). Whilst both are considered a single document in this study,[214] PA (2) will be utilized primarily as its unique contribution to the overall study. What will be important to this study is that PA (2) can offer significant benefit to exploring the key themes in PA (1).[215]

Three main themes are to be explored in the study of the *Pantôn* essay. First is to study how Lonergan devised his theory of 'a metaphysics of history,' the notions of *intellect, potency, will, reason* and *act,* and how they are incorporated into devising his basic idea of a dialectic of history based on a post-Hegelian synthesis. Second is to trace the development of Lonergan's notion of a "metaphysical principle of redemption,"[216] the complex task of appropriating the "multiple field of sciences" and incorporating them into "a synthetic view revealing the metaphysical convergence of all things on Christ Jesus our Lord."[217] Third is to carefully identify the gradual shift in Lonergan's discussion from the "metaphysical principle of redemption" to a higher culmination of history in Christ: the natural order of things finally

[213] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134-8. These clarifications are part of the editorial notes.

[214] I will not study PA (2) as fully as I will do with PA (1). Some basic points of reference will be highlighted only to enhance the study of PA (1). To emphasize the point boldly again, I consider these two as a single document in this study.

[215] Throughout this thesis I shall refer both PA (1) and PA (2) as the '*Pantôn.'* In places where I think I should make explicit references to each of the *Pantôn* documents I will revert to using Shute's shorthand tags: PA (1) and PA (2).

[216] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 150

[217] Ibid., 140.

sublated in the supernatural order, a unity that shall be completed by the participatory role of the Kingship of Christ. This shift is key to consolidating Lonergan's theological interpretation of a social philosophy within the discourse of an ontological narrative of the concept of Original Sin.

The key to exploring the *Pantôn* essay is the role of St. Paul's letter to the Ephesians, especially, 1:10, which spelt out clearly the "Pauline conception of our blessed Lord as the *Anakephalaiôsis* of all things."[218] This theme stands as the bedrock of this essay, hence it becomes ultimately the title of the paper. While serving as more than a title, it provides the basic themes of renewal, restoration and renaissance/redemption which shall then permeate the entire substance of the essay. It is on this basis that a narrative of redemptive praxis remains at the heart of Lonergan's notion of a dialectic of history.

[218] Ibid., 140.

## I. Preliminary Outline of the PA (1) Essay

In the first chapter, a framework was devised to trace the origin of Lonergan's idea of a dialectic of history. This framework shall guide this chapter to explore in detail the study of the "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis"* essay. Before we proceed to study the manuscript in greater detail, let us get a closer look at the origin of the formation of the essay, as detailed in Crowe's study, in which he enriches us with the essential background data of the document as well as his interpretative note.

> On Whitsunday 1935 Lonergan finished a carefully dated essay (the manuscript has 'Dominica in Albis, 1935,' which was April 28 that year) to which he gave the title, taking the term and the topic from Ephesians 1:10, *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis.* That is only one line of the seven-part title. It continues with the following six parts, allotted one line each: 'A Theory of Human Solidarity /A Metaphysic for the Interpretation of St Paul/ A Theology for the Social Order, / Catholic Action, / And the Kingship of Christ, / IN INCIPIENT OUTLINE.' (caps and italics as in the autograph.) The punctuation shows that the phrase 'A Theology for…'governs grammatically the next three lines, so that the final subtitle is understood as A Theology for the Kingship of Christ'; this little point of grammar is of some importance for the drift of the whole essay.[219]

Having established Crowe's historical setting of the essay, we now get into the heart of the matter by reading carefully Lonergan's own draft. Lonergan begins his essay with a quote from St. Thomas' *Summa Theologiae.*

> …we have to consider that our intellect progresses from potency to act. But everything that progresses from potency to act arrives first at an incomplete act, one that is intermediate between potency and act, before arriving at perfect act … Now (for intellect) an incomplete act is *imperfect* science, through which things are known indistinctly and with a certain *confusion* …[220]

This quote is followed immediately by his first outline.

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[219] F. E Crowe, *CH,* 31.

[220] T. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 1a, q. 85, a. 3, c. Henceforth, *ST* followed by particular reference. Lonergan's original quote was in Latin. The editors have English translation in the published in PA (1), 139.

*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*[221]

A Theory of Human Solidarity,
A Metaphysic for the Interpretation of St. Paul,
A Theology for the Social Order,
Catholic Action,
And the Kingship of Christ,
*In incipient outline*

## 1. Launching a Methodology for the Essay

The *"Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis"* stands out as the main topic within the outline. It forms the umbrella for six subtitles. There is no indication of an introduction in Lonergan's original manuscript. He, however, had a tag, '*note,'* before commencing the first sentence of his essay. The editors of the *Pantôn* essay have placed above Lonergan's *note* a label: 'introduction' in the published version. So we can assume that this is an introductory note that runs for the next three pages before he puts together a new set of outline topics. This arrangement can be viewed as a working outline in progress as there will be a subsequent outline. The editors pointed out that in the next set of a new outline, Lonergan does not repeat the original outline topics.

It was stated earlier that at this stage, the *Pantôn* was not intended for publication. This view could be contested; in fact, at the beginning of his remarks in the *note* section, Lonergan is seen to be interacting with his readers. Here he writes, "I trust the reader will be more inclined to be satisfied with suggestive ideas than to be exigent in the matter of logic development, exhaustive citation, careful exposition." (140) This implies that there was a relationship between Lonergan and his intended readers. If there was a dialogue between Lonergan and his intended readers, the next sentence draws us to an intriguing implication by

[221] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134-8. Editor's footnotes: "We have left the column of titles as Lonergan typed it; his commas show a hierarchy in the subtitles, and in fact they are not all repeated in the heading Lonergan gave the body of the work."

the writer. “The former,” Lonergan writes, “is to some extent within the range of possibility for a student; that later is not.” (140) The ‘former’ may mean an approach a student will take in writing an essay using the standard methods accepted in normal academic avenues. The ‘later’ may mean a student who may decide to use an unconventional style of writing patterns. It could be argued that this statement points to Lonergan himself, who as a student, will approach the *Pantôn* in an unconventional style. This becomes clear with the essay; it has no adequate referencing, only in exceptional cases such as the scriptures. Thus, Lonergan warns his readers that his *Pantôn* essay will not only follow the standard practice, expected to be found in an academic paper, but also of the unfamiliar direction it takes to the unbeaten paths of academic venture it seeks to explore.

## 2. Introducing the Main Theme of the Essay

Clarifying his methodological approach, Lonergan introduces the main subject of his discussion: the “Pauline conception of our blessed Lord as the *anakephalaiôsis* of all things.” (140) What Lonergan wanted to do was to approach the subject in a “multiple field of sciences: theological, philosophic, historical, social, political, even economic.” (140) Treating his main theme from across a broad spectrum his task is to blend “a synthetic view revealing the metaphysical convergence of all things on Christ Jesus, our Lord.” (140) Lonergan claims that to achieve “such synthesis constitutes of itself a manner of proof, proof that may be conceived in terms of Newman’s integration of probabilities.”[222] (140) Lonergan admits that his “presuppositions” are to be tested given that “this essay has an intrinsic justification as well as the extrinsic excuse of a student’s manifold limitations.” (140)

[222] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134-8. Editor’s footnotes: J. H. Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, London: Longmans, Green and Co., (1930) 288-92, 319-27 passim; “but Newman’s terms are regularly, not integration, but convergence, cumulation, summation, combination, coalescence of probabilities.”

The sentence that follows is an important one that holds the key to Lonergan's venture into formulating a trajectory for the *Pantôn* essay. It reads:

> The fundamental assumption of the essay is that a metaphysic is the necessary key to St Paul, as its fundamental contention is that the Thomist synthesis (pushed, indeed, to a few conclusions[223] which, if they seem new, may be regarded, I trust as a legitimate development) provides such as key. (140)

Lonergan thinks it is a "legitimate development" to foster a trend in speculative theology that "the theologian commonly fights shy of on the ground."[224] (140) Thus Lonergan conceded that St Thomas was a case in point. In his attempt to present his argument within the parameters of speculative theology, Lonergan appropriates St Thomas' metaphysical concept of 'individuation' and 'personality' pertaining to the domain of potency. Lonergan clarifies that "potency is not an imitation of the divine essence but a condition for such imitation, which is to be found in essence and act alone." (140) The principles of 'matter' and 'form' are key to the discussion regarding the progress of "the actuation of intellect and will in human operations." (140) Overall, Lonergan believes that the more he provides adequate and clear explanations to the meaning of his metaphysical conception, the better one gets to understand his "attempt to interpret St Paul." (141)

What Lonergan aims to achieve in his explanation of the metaphysical conception is to "synthesize human operation in terms of the solidarity of human intellects and the statistical uniformity, as it were, of human wills" (140-1) so that his theme of "a theory of human solidarity" is established. He does that in the main part of his thesis since this is the principal argument.

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[223] The editors' notes; "a few conclusions: The rest of the bracketed phrase is a correction by hand of the previous typed 'that do not figure, at least prominently in the current Thomist mentality.'"

[224] This quoted phrase is an English version of a French expression Lonergan used: *la verite s'impose.* The theme in this is phrase according to this thesis will be fully explored later in Lonergan's doctoral work. See B. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan CWL* 1. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 3-20. Henceforth, *GF* followed by page reference.

### 3. Presenting the Basic Argument of the Essay

Continuing the discussion, Lonergan introduces two other metaphysical concepts: cause and effect. These two concepts will coordinate the functions of what he termed 'instrumental causality' as they will contribute to seeking clarity concerning the underlying aspects of metaphysical conception. Having highlighted what he meant by a metaphysical conception, Lonergan moves on with his argument to make a paradigm shift between two organized bodies. Lonergan says:

> This metaphysical conception we find to square accurately with the conception of humanity as an organism: the purely instrumental causality of man and the way in which this causality affects all men is exactly parallel to the purely instrumental causality of the members of a body and the way in which the operation of the members affects the whole body.[225] (141)

In this important statement Lonergan indicates what he intended to do even at the start of his introductory note. It is further supported by a scriptural reference that Lonergan quotes from St. Paul's letter to the Romans.[226]

Lonergan uses St Paul's figurative image of a body: Christ with many individual members is not only an essential theological element, which will contribute enormously to his discussions on unity and restoration, but will also supplement his philosophical interpretation of his idea of human solidarity. Laying down the framework for both scriptural and philosophical arguments, Lonergan proceeds with his arguments on dialectics. He does this by applying the figurative image of both the first and the second Adam. The first Adam

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[225] F.E Crowe and R. Doran's Editors' Preface in B. Lonergan, PA (1), 136. "Present-day readers will find Lonergan's language sexist, his attitudes very unecumenical indeed, his 'enemies' those of a strongly held tradition, some of his theology (of Adam, for example) rather unreal. We need not waste time in apology for this; it was 1935, not 1991."

[226] The text from Romans 12:5. "So we, who are many, are one body in Christ, and individually we are members one of another."

has "corrupted the pre-motion and set up the reign of sin, a reign of disharmony and maladjustment in the corporate unity of man," (141) whilst Christ the second Adam "set up a new motion to harmonize, readjust, reintegrate a humanity that had reached the peak of disintegration and death described in the first chapter of Romans. This is the *anakephalaiôsis*." (141) This figurative analogy is a summary that is supported by several passages from St. Paul's letters to the Romans and the Galatians: (Romans 6:13; 12: 5, and Galatians 2:20). What Lonergan wants to demonstrate is that this highly philosophical notion of dialectics is compatible with the scriptural references. Lonergan's attempt is not only to find a synthetic solution but also to demonstrate the supernatural powers that can redeem history. This is a vital point Crowe contributes in his study of *Pantôn* essay.[227]

Lonergan concludes his introductory note in a short paragraph expressing regret that such "a vast field of thought" (142) needed comprehensive study which he could not afford to do at this stage. On the contrary, Lonergan says he will not let the purpose of his attempt be left to be defeated, adding that "the effort to include further aspects tends to give the impression more of audacious assertion than of sober speculation." (142) He intends "to counteract this influence…and the willingness to go on any point to the 'ultimate why.'"[228] (142) Lonergan ends this section by stating, "I append an outline of the argument."[229] (142) Let us now turn our attention to the examination of the second outline.

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[227] F. E Crowe, *CH*, 31.

[228] From the original PA (1) copy, Lonergan had in Latin this phrase, 'ultimum cur.' Editor's note, footnote # 7. "[A phrase that captures perfectly Lonergan's drive to get to the bottom of things, with a specific application to sin, where there is no 'cur' whatever.]"

[229] I am intrigued by this last sentence. There are two points to puzzle over. (a) Was Lonergan referring to the six new titles or topics of discussion that he is adding on to the previous six topics? (b) If PA (1) is the discussion of *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*: A Theory of Human Solidarity' perhaps he is referring it to PA (2). The most likely assumption will be the first opinion. Lonergan's use of *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* could be generic, inclusive of unity, solidary, order, restoration and peace.

## II. The Secondary Outline of the PA (1) Essay

After setting out the preliminary outline, and also spelling out the methodology of the paper and clarifying the primary theme of the article Lonergan now moves on to the main part of his essay. But before commencing the main part of the discussion he again framed a new outline with six topics. The following outline is how it appears in the original script.

*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*: A Theory of Human Solidarity

(1) Liberty as a disjunctive determination
(2) The historical determination of intellect
(3) The unity of human operation
(4) The Synthesis of human operation
(5) The unity of man in the ontological ground of his being
(6) *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis:* A Theory of Human Solidarity

It is rather puzzling to read Lonergan's second outline. He offers two outlines formulated in such an unusual way: one in the beginning and the other one after his introductory notes. Some careful reading after comparing the two outlines, shows that PA (1) is perhaps the discussion paper of PA (2). The reason for this assumption is that there is nowhere to be found the rest of the topics given from the first outline. These are namely, 'A Metaphysic for the Interpretation of St. Paul,' 'A Theology for the Social Order,' 'Catholic Action,' 'and the Kingship of Christ.' Although these topics do not contain their own title labels with a series of discussion under each of the given headings, the themes represented in these given topics in the first outline are well integrated within the six topics in the second outline.[230]

[230] In this study I've retained Lonergan's original structure, given the six substantive topics. While re-organized the settings to attain my intended results I've added some external material onto Lonergan's original outline, inserting some new subtitles as well as adding some new topics especially in the last two topics.

## 1. Liberty as a Disjunctive Determination

Lonergan introduces his first topic of discussion: 'Liberty as a disjunctive determination.' This idea is represented in just a single sentence-paragraph.[231] It reads: "The human will is a 'natural inclination that follows the form of intellect."[232] (142) Lonergan analyses this statement in great detail. He does that under five points. Each of the five points will be highlighted as the key factors.

In his first point, Lonergan clarifies the coordinated functions of the human faculties, namely, the will, the intellect, the human act and reason. Naturally, it is the disposition of the human act that responds to the inclination of the will. Yet the advanced human act is determined by the intellect. In his clarification Lonergan situates reason at the heart of all the coordinated operations of the human faculties. Reason therefore, holds the key to the outcome of the human act. That is, it influences the intellect and the will to act responsibly. Lonergan maintains that the human will, intellect and act are "to follow the dictate of reason." (142) Thus, considering the operations of the human faculties, Lonergan wants to point out that reason is indispensable in determinate events and circumstances as to whether an act is considered a sin or otherwise.

Lonergan's second point is a brief clarification on the misconception regarding the role of the will. He achieves that by drawing on Augustine's teaching on "natural inclination" and "the dictate of reason."[233] While "it is natural to man to follow the dictate of reason"

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[231] Lonergan's topic phrase: 'Liberty as a disjunctive determination' in my analysis has some reference to Aristotle's discussions on ethics. For instance, see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk II, 5.1, Bk V, 5.5, Bk VI, especially Bk VIII, 7.1 chapter 1-10, the discussion on self-mastery.

[232] Part of Lonergan's sentence is a phrase from *ST* 1, q. 87, a. 4, c. The editors:' F.E Crowe and R. Doran noted in footnote # 8 in B. Lonergan, PA (1), 167, saying: "We have translated 'appetitus' by 'inclination;' Lonergan occasionally uses 'appetite' but seems to prefer to leave the term in Latin."

[233] It can be concluded from this statement that Lonergan was making a references to St Augustine's question on how the sin of Adam affected the human race. The background of Lonergan's reference can be gleaned from the polemical conversation Augustine had with Pelagius. It was discovered from a letter Augustine initially sent to Evodius in AD 415 on his defense on grace in opposition to nature. Pelagius denied original sin and consequently ignored sinful conditions of humanity. See Augustine, "Retractions" BK II chapter 42, on the following treatise *De Natura Et Gratia.*

Lonergan explains that "to allow events to take their natural course, to permit one's faculties their natural operations and expansion, is not a title to merit but simply the absence of evil." (142) Lonergan's aim is to clarify "the Augustinian doctrine that sin is from man and everything else from God."[234] (142) It is true God gives us "both the rational motives to our will and gives us wills naturally appetitive of rational motives. Lonergan, however brings clarity by explaining that "the naturalness of this appetite may be seen in the spiritual malady of remorse, which is the phenomenon of violence done the will." (142) In other words, Lonergan is warning that there may perhaps be an obstruction to the intended role of the will if the will was to be embedded in sin.

Lonergan's third point is a clarification in understanding "the non-act of will." (143) He points out that "the non-act of will is the failure of the will to inhabit a motion that is contrary to reason." (143) But Lonergan goes on to clarify that "the will is free, (and) it is clear that when the will does act then the event is determinate." (143) The application of reason in human willing and doing determines the outcome, that is, whether or not an act is "the non-act of will." (143)

Fourthly, having clarified the notions regarding the act of will and "the dictate of reason," (143) Lonergan expands his discussion by adding two philosophical notions to explain whether an act is *objectively* or *subjectively* reasonable. "If objectively reasonable, then the human act of will is determinate in the order of pure reason. If only subjectively reasonable, then the human act is again determinate as a function of historical causation…" (143) This is a pertinent point in what Lonergan was to achieve, namely to direct his navigation towards the idea of *history*. Further on within the pages of the PA (1) essay the discussions on historical causation set the foundational phase of the arguments.

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[234] "This common phrase: 'sin is from man and everything else from God,' was an Augustinian doctrine given authority by the Council of Orange in 529 A.D" (Denzinger/Schoenmetzer, *Enchiridion symbolorum,* 392.

The fifth and final point is a brief summary of the interpretation of human freedom in relation to “a simple choice between different determinate orders of events.” (143) Lonergan explains that “if the will does not act, there is physical determination; if the will does act, then there is historical determination.” (143) He proceeds to explain his idea of the historical determination of intellect in his next topic of discussion.

## 2. The Historical Determination of Intellect

In this second topic, namely the historical determination of intellect, Lonergan has nine discussion points. The overall aim of this discussion is to analyze “the historical determination of the form or dictate presented by intellect to the will.” (143)

(a) Lonergan begins by introducing a vital notion to his discussion: phantasm. This is a significant concept that occupies a key part of his argument within the framework of ‘the historical determination of intellect.’ Before expanding his discussion, Lonergan gives a brief explanation of the proceedings of the intellect to the will, “that every act of intellect will be specified and so determined by a phantasm and that the phantasm has to be drawn from some historical situation.” (143) Phantasm may add limitation to the cumulative experience drawn from the historical situation.

(b) Lonergan moves on to dwell on the specifics of the ‘act of intellect’ and ‘the act(s) of will.’ In explaining how the act of will proceeds from the act of intellect, Lonergan identifies this relational function as “the root of the philosophy of history,” namely, “that every act of intellect is a universal.” (143) What is central to this argument is that “the one act of intellect guides a man’s many actions till it is replaced by a contradictory idea; it guides not only the actions of the originator but also the actions of those to whom he has communicated the idea either directly or by a secular tradition.” (144) Lonergan clarifies that

both the determinate event and emerging first idea may have to be based on phantasm. This idea will later enhance his arguments on a dialectics of the historical situation.

(c) Lonergan moves his argument further on with an explanation of the relations between the intellect and the human act. This important argument points to his "analysis of history." (144) Again he introduces another important argument, namely "a change in all the flow of operations follows from the emergence of one new idea." Lonergan describes this changing process, "a purely logical dialectic." Once again he introduces two important concepts namely, "abstract thought" and "concrete thought," correlating them with the "mathematical terminology" of "differential."[235] (144) Lonergan links "abstract thought" with the "second differential" of human operations, and "concrete thought" with the "first differential." (144)

(d) Building on the first and second differentials, Lonergan devised a "third differential." (144) The third differential, "the form of human thought" which emanated from St. Thomas, "is a progress from potency to perfect act (perfect science from every viewpoint) through a series of incomplete acts."[236] (144)

(e) Lonergan continues stating "that this progress from potency through incomplete act to perfect act is to be predicated not of the individual but of humanity." (144) He sums up this argument by emphasizing "a development of a higher synthesis of the old" by the evidence found exposed by the "solidarity of human thought." (144) These include: "the achievements and the errors of the past live on into the present and form the basis of the guidance intellect gives to will." (144) In other words this is an explanation of progress, the recurrence from intellect to will, and to human act.

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[235] This mathematical concept *differential* is an important notion Lonergan will apply in his future triple dialectic of history: progress, decline, and renaissance. Lonergan sometimes called these three dialectics vectors, or differentials or approximations. See G. Whelan, *Redeeming History: Social Concerns in Bernard Lonergan and Robert Doran*, 36.

[236] Again, Lonergan's reference links the beginning of his essay to *ST* 1, q. 85, a. 3, c.

(f) Lonergan's argument gradually moves to the explanation of the formation of human institutions. He singles out the intelligibility of matter. The role matter plays is not isolated. Far from the "unity of the species" it stands for "a higher unity" in natural development, particularly for "higher organization of men" found in "the family or tribe." (145) Lonergan's key point aims at developing his social philosophy combined with the treatise on social anthropology. He continues with his argument that "the organization gives rise to the need of political and juridical forms of society…necessary for the pursuit of culture." The foundation of his argument is "the development of the higher faculties of men." (145) This is an explanation about the notion of a new order Lonergan will have seen in a community achieved by the intellect.

(g) What is achieved by the intellect has to be "unity in truth." (145) Lonergan's discussion on order pertains to stability and peace. In pursuing his idea of order, Lonergan employs an Augustinian concept to establish his argument: 'order with tranquility.'[237] By contrast, he employs a German concept, "the *Zersplitterung*"[238] (145) to introduce an argument that opposes peace. Though he does not name it, this is perhaps perceived to be the origin of Lonergan's idea of *decline*.[239] At this stage *zersplitterung* best stands to explain "the atomization of humanity." (145) It "follows from error and sin, and the false substitutes of national self-idolatry…" (145)

(h) At this stage Lonergan's idea of a dialectic of history can be seen to take some preliminary form. As such, he introduces "in the natural order a threefold dialectic in the historic progress of intellect." (145) Hence, he identifies them as: (1) "a dialectic of fact," (2) "a dialectic of sin," and (3) "a dialectic of thought." A dialectic of fact is an "objective

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[237] Lonergan's reference is to Augustine, *The City of God,* Book 19, ch.13. Lonergan is taken up with Augustine's discussion, in the phase of "the ends of the two cities."

[238] The German-English dictionary gives various meanings as fragmentation, dismemberment (fig.), dissipation, spit-up, and comminution.

[239] Lonergan only preludes this concept in this essay but articulates fully in the next essay to be studied in chapter four of this thesis. See B. Lonergan, ACH (2), 20-4.

situation" that "gives a phantasm," which "is an incomplete act of intellect." (145) A dialectic of sin is where "false situations may be created" which do not accommodate "intellect at all." (145) A dialectic of thought "is a development of the perennial philosophy as new phantasms make a greater distinctness and precision possible." (145)

### 2.1 The Notion of liberty

In his ninth and final point, Lonergan notes that "the potential character of intellect results through ignorance in an internal and external disharmony called concupiscence." (145) Externally, "the low *enérgeia* of the intellect leads men to believe that the sensible is the real, that is, the particular concrete object which if accepted without qualification as the real leaves William of Ockham the 'unconquerable doctor'."[240] (145-6). Lonergan points out that the "potential character" in human concupiscence develops first so that only gradually reason is to be used. Thus internally, "the subconscious development" lacks dynamic living and so "later interferes with human autonomy over the flesh." (146) In his conclusion, Lonergan suggests that concupiscence leads to "the blunders and the sins of men…that should never exist and that easily become intolerable." (146) What results from this is "the microcosmic tragedies of passion and cruelty and suicide or the more terrible fruits of so-called economic and political forces." (146) This is perhaps Lonergan's view on social welfare and distribution of resources in which the socio-political and economic surface within the social index.

[240] Lonergan mentions William of Ockham, the English Franciscan scholar of fourteenth century philosophy as a case in point. The editors noted that "though there is no evidence he was an Ockhamist, Lonergan says of his student days, 'I thought of myself as a nominalist,' *A Second Collection*, 263, but also 'My nominalism had been an opposition, not to intelligence or understanding, but to the central role ascribed to universal concepts' (Ibid., 264), this phrase 'vanished when I read J. A Stewart's *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*' (ibid.) which was a year or two before he wrote this essay. But nominalism persists in his memory, and he comes back to it later in this same paper."

The discussions on these two principles: ‘liberty as a disjunctive determination’ and ‘the historical determination of intellect,’ were basically to clarify the origin of Lonergan’s idea of history pertaining to its metaphysical conception. It is an argument framed primarily to understand the operations of an individual person through the lens of a philosophical analysis: that the intellect and reason contribute to the will to act reasonably. The will operates with reasonableness in the delivery of liberty. Human liberty can be influenced by historical factors. These historical factors are largely determined by an emerging idea known to be a phantasm, which can operate either objectively or subjectively. Thus historical determination deals with the consequences of the deliberations of the intellect and the subsequent acts of the will.

Lonergan’s arguments on these two first principles are systematically structured. The reader is orientated to view the context of the individual person. The life of a person is shrouded by acts of other persons, circumstances and events both past and future that influence one’s freedom to choose for the present. Lonergan’s aim is to understand the composition of a person. His is an approach from a philosophical standpoint. It begins with an understanding of the rudimentary principle of potency, where matter and form meet, where will, intellect, and reason operate. The reader is drawn further to grasp the understanding regarding the arguments on progress from potency to intellect by reasonable acts, or the reverse, where it is incomplete or declines by an unreasonable act. Lonergan clearly works within the principles of dialectics. Therefore, the overall arguments pertain to Lonergan’s main focus in his theory of a dialectic of history and consequently, the determinate causes and effects of these events. It is the act of the person and persons, reasonably or unreasonably, that affects other persons, circumstances, events, history and society. The first two topics of discussion are incremental as the arguments flow on from the role of intellect and its significance to the next subtopic: “The Unity of Human Operation.”

### 3. The Unity of Human Operation

Key to this discussion is unity. Significantly, intellect remains, in Lonergan's discussion, the unifying principle in human operations. The role of intellect in unifying human operations connotes an idea of historical continuity. Lonergan explains: "The individual's intellectual pattern is determined by phantasms which come from objective situations containing both a tradition of past intellectual achievement and the data for future development." (146) Any new idea is not a present attainment but evidence of significant achievements "gestated by the situation of successive centuries." (146) Lonergan points out by way of example that "a first-year theologian today can solve the problem of baptism by heretics that left Cyprian and the early church utterly at a loss." (146) Likewise Newman took "fifteen years of very slow progress to arrive at the truth of Catholicism." (146)

Lonergan makes a plea to the reader to note the significance of progression in the intellectual development that persisted down the lane of *history* and warns against the present day ignorance of "the all-pervasive power of traditional mentality." (146) The danger lamented in Lonergan's protestation is "not a burst of originality but the decay of intellect, the *zerspitterung,* that results from men being out of touch with a tradition." (146) The consequences will be grave, Lonergan warns, when the "intellect has ceased to be a principle of unity among men." (146) He notes that some of these consequences include "the mass propaganda of national education, national newspaper, national morality, and the peace that comes of police, armaments, and forced military service." (146) Lonergan warns against "the cult of shoddy 'originality'..." evident in "the nineteenth century's romantic liberalism" (146-7) that results from lack of sustained intellectual engagement over time. Summing up his arguments, Lonergan claims that, "modern men have to think in development of previous thought if they are to think at all." (147)

Lonergan continued to expand his philosophical discussion in his idea of the unity found between free will and the intellect. “The unity of intellect, that follows from its potential character and the need of specification by phantasm, results in an effective uniformity of will.” (147) What does occur with *free will* is its state of homogeneity. “Free will is but the choice between following the dictates of intellect and not attempting to control by reason the mere impulses of blind nature: it is a choice between two determinate orders.” (147) Lonergan claims that whatever happens in its operation “there is a uniformity in this choosing.” (147) This argument is basic to Lonergan’s particular reference to “moral certitude” as being the difference between “the future free acts of men, and…the heroic virtue and inhuman vice.” (147) Lonergan’s summary argument on the uniformity of will is that “though the will is not determined, …there is a statistical uniformity to the operations of will.” (147) To clarify this point of discussion he makes a comparison with “mankind as a machine of low efficiency that receives from the objective situation specifications of intellect and promotions but turns out operations that only in a certain percentage are according to intellect.” (147)

In the final paragraph, Lonergan concludes this section, “by putting the thought in the form of an argument.” (147) The argument to which Lonergan alluded is presented in three forms. That (1) “men either think as they are taught or (2) they think for themselves…” (147) that is “they either bring forth ideas that are real advances in the field of intellect or (3) they merely add to the atomization of humanity by proposing as true what is merely incomplete and false.” (147) These “three cases …may be called an objective *Geist,*[241] the common

[241] ‘Objective *Geist’* is a notion peculiar to Georg Hegel’s philosophy of the dialectical unfolding of history. *Geist* in German can be translated to English to mean spirit or mind. ‘Objective Geist’ can be viewed in the context of Hegel’s main idea of the Absolute spirit. The ‘Absolute spirit’ is the pure knowledge of itself. As it utters itself in Nature there is a process of an appropriation. Here is Hegel’s definition of the ‘Absolute spirit’ in mediation between the ‘Subjective spirit’ and ‘Objective spirit:’ “An act divides spirit into spiritual substance on the one side, and consciousness of the substance on the other; and divides the substance as well as consciousness. The substance appears in the shape of a universal inner nature and purpose standing in contrast to itself *qua* individualized reality.” G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Translated with an introduction and notes by J.B. Baillie (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 462. Hegel’s concepts cannot be

mind of man."[242] (147) Lonergan continues with the other categories such as "the traditionalist is merely another who thinks the same way;" while, "the true originator is but the instrument for the advance of the objective *Geist*," (147) whereas "the false originator is equally an instrument, not for advance but for destruction." (147) Just before concluding this section Lonergan introduces two more concepts: the notion of *good will* and *evil will*. In his deliberation, he says "the good will that follows intellect does nothing but make the actions of man an instrument for fulfilling the practical aims of the *objective Geist;* on the other hand, the evil will makes human operations an instrument for the sub-intellectual determinate order. In either case, man is simply an instrument." (147-8)

### 4. The Synthesis of Human Operation

Lonergan introduces two new concepts in his attempt to deal with the fourth topic "the synthesis of human operations," namely, basis and succession. He argues that there is an

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adequately translated into English nor can the concepts mean a specific element, but imply a compound of relevant elements and realities. There is a good explanation between these pages, 456 and 465. Within the dialectical discourse of the unfolding history, Hegel points to the relationship between the 'concrete Universals' and the 'concrete Particulars' which proceeds by a mutual mediation between 'Particular' and 'Universal,' so that the individual is an instance of the 'Subjective Spirit' and the historical-cultural context is the 'Objective Spirit.' Lonergan takes Hegel's notion of 'Objective *Geist'* to mean the products specific to the human world, namely, civilization, religion, history, culture, literature, art, language, natural and human sciences. These are the objects of the human concrete world on which he has elaborated in his discussion of the *Pantôn* so far. He adds the (spirit) interpretation of the object to the products of the human world to discover beyond that object. Lonergan translates the Hegelian worldview to his own to discover unity between the mediation processes, the events of the historical-cultural context and the experiences of the one who is experiencing, enquiring, deliberating and deciding. For instance, what would civilization represent if one is studying the details of a particular civilization, its significance in an epoch of particular relevance to the present experiences and how future events would be approached? In such introspection, 'spirit value' is transported beyond the structures of the external world. *Geist* may also be interpreted in the context of the subject and its subjectivity. Years later in his masterpiece, *Insight,* Lonergan will have a comprehensive expansion with his own input when he discusses the notion of intersubjectivity. See B. Lonergan, *Insight,* chapter 7.

[242] In this part of the *Pantôn* we can clearly spot Georg Hegel's influence on Lonergan's early thoughts and writings. Lonergan has no direct references to Hegel except for using this notable Hegelian phrase; *objective Geist,* in subsequent passages. It can be presumed that Lonergan is relying on Hegel to modify his idea of the dialectics of history. The Hegelian phrase *objective Geist* is found in the discussions towards the end of the third topic **'**The Unity of Human Operation,' throughout the fourth topic, **'**The Synthesis of Human Operation,' in the fifth topic, **'**The Unity of Man in the Ontological Ground of His Being,' and in the sixth topic *'Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis.*'

*extrinsic basis* and an *intrinsic basis* in human operations. These two bases correspond to four operations of successions. They are,

(i) "the succession of nonhuman world events,"

(ii) "the succession of individuals,"

(iii) "the succession of human acts," and

(iv) "the succession of human thoughts." (148)

Only the first succession operates from "the extrinsic basis" while the rest are operations of "the intrinsic basis." "As intrinsic basis there is the succession of individuals being born, begetting others, dying." (148) Lonergan attributed to "the succession of human thoughts, the development of the *objective Geist*." (148) The fourth succession is reached by the lower three successions: the succession of nonhuman world events, the succession of individuals, the succession of human acts, through "controlling them, and being modified by them." (148) This is an important discussion at this point, because in later years Lonergan went further to expand and develop a compelling worldview that threw a considerably new light onto his idea of history.[243]

The significant aspect of this discussion is the "development of the *objective Geist.*" To give more clarity to it, Lonergan draws on Augustine's teaching with a reference made by Eugene Portalie.[244] The main point Lonergan wants to draw from Potalie's commentary is "the Augustinian explanation of grace to be the psychological fact that man has not the initiation of his thoughts." (148) Combining Augustine's argument with a complementary

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[243] The references to these discussions are in B. Lonergan, *Insight,*145-162, & 232-269. His discussion moves from statistical laws to classical laws in the schemes of recurrence in emergent probability. There is further integration of functions, highly unified so that the preceding schemes are superseded by more advanced schemes of recurrence. These events are then governed by a single, higher set of laws, an intelligibility that Lonergan alludes to as the Thomist and Augustinian idea of the succession attributed to *originator* or the *prime mover.*

[244] Lonergan made this reference to the commentary of Augustine by Eugene Portalie, 'Augustin (Saint). Vie, oeuvres et doctrine.' *Dictionnaire de theologie catholique*, tome ½ (Paris: Letouzey, 1931), cols. 2268-2472. (The reference may be to col. 2389). See the translation by Ralph J. Regenery, *A Guide to the Thought of St. Augustine* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 199. "St Augustine noted this truth of universal experience that man is not master of his first thoughts."

Thomist explanation, Lonergan commented. “To a Thomist, this truth is self-evident.” (148) Supplementing that statement, Lonergan quotes this phrase from the *Summa*: “Whatever is moved is moved by something else.”[245] Hence, Aquinas provides the significant bedrock for what Lonergan wanted to put forward in his main argument. “Will has to be premoved by intellect; intellect has to be premoved by phantasm; phantasm has to be premoved by an objective situation and environment; finally, the objective situation and environment is partly the determinate work of nature, partly the accumulated work of mankind acting now according to its limited knowledge and now against this knowledge.” (148)

Lonergan moves further to broaden his philosophical argument. He does that by presenting empirical data and comparing it with a technique for determining which logical conclusions the data set. At the same time Lonergan intends to simplify his abstract treatise with concrete examples such as this: “Clearly, to a scientist with some highly refined mathematical calculus able to contemplate not only the multitudinous data of the problem but also the response of free wills to the precise intellectual forms that would arise from this complex scene, the whole course of history would be as simple and intelligible as is the course of the earth round the sun to a modern astronomer.” (148) One has to convince the scientist “that the principal cause of every event was the designer, creator and first mover of the universe.” (148) Thus Lonergan continues, the designer “made the potencies what they are, set them in their intrinsic relations to one another, gave them their initial positions and their initial premotion, foresaw and intended the modification of position and of motion that would result as this premotion was transferred from one potency to another.” (148)

The discussion advances, leading Lonergan to eventually introduce a new concept: *instrumental causality.* What Lonergan infers here is that “what can operate only as the result of a premotion and only according to pre-established laws is simply an instrument, a

[245] *ST* 1, q. 2, a. 3, c.

machine." (148) Yet "it does not cease to have a merely instrumental causality because of the freedom of selecting between the determinate order of an objective *Geist* and the determinate order of sub-intellectual operation." (148) Lonergan demonstrates his point with several illustrations "that the 'first agent' uses human instruments to transfer his premotion and his predetermination." (149) He takes his first example from the Gospel passage of the sower casting the seed among various soils, and "is surprised when he reaps no harvest there!" (149) Then the second example is a comparison of two printers: one "who hires men who use handpresses," and the other one "who buys more elaborate machinery and hires fewer men." (149) The resultant "is as much the principal cause of what is printed." (149) The third illustration is Lonergan's explanation of someone's autobiography. The point of this autobiography is the "number of influences from accidents of time and place and from other persons; now the lives of these influencing persons are similarly the product of previous influences; and so on till one gets back to the first man." (149) These illustrations add to Lonergan's conclusion: "God is the principal cause of all operation insofar as he gave initial premotion and predetermination, and infallibly knew and deliberately intended all that would follow therefrom." (149) Thus Lonergan continues, "the human instruments that transfer this premotion and predetermination differ from the physical or mere biological transference and instrumentality." (149)

Advancing his argument further, Lonergan draws on a philosophical discussion on the instrumentality and transference of sin within the successions of human operations. "For men by sin can make the motion to be transferred weaker, they can muddy the stream that descends to posterity. Man makes man."[246] (149) What Lonergan wanted to convey is that

[246] This short sentence: "Man making man," has a commentary from the editors. The editors say "over twenty years later, in his lectures on existentialism and elsewhere, Lonergan will pursue the idea sketched so briefly here (and later in his essay) in the context of human solidarity; See *Understanding and Being*: *The Halifax Lecturers on INSIGHT* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 422, in note b to lecture 10." There can be a distinction as the editors pointed out. This phrase is to be interpreted in reference to human solidarity, whereas in his later writings, the phrase will have to be interpreted in the context of the subject.

"human operation is one operation, one successive transference of one premotion and one predetermination." (149) In that single human operation what is passed on may be "of righteousness or of sin." "Man… may pass on to others what he has received or he may pass on less; but he can do nothing else." (149)

In the final exposition, Lonergan consolidates his arguments with a Thomist contribution. "It is to be recalled that sin does not make man a principal cause of anything; sin is non-act, non-ens; it is not a motion or a causality but a failure to move and to cause; it is not a principal causality but an instrumental non-causality." (149) Lonergan's understanding of successive human operations is perhaps the introduction to explaining his notion of *decline*. This explanation seeks to locate sin in human operations. Thus this argument develops in a significant way. It begins to underscore Lonergan's ongoing development of his idea of history:

> When man does not sin, it is not because he is doing something of himself: the intellectual form was given him; the power of willing was given him; the act of will in response to the premotion of intellect is simply the spontaneous activity of the will in virtue of its natural inclination. (149)

Lonergan's idea of history now takes a profound shift as he claims that "man does not add anything to the natural inclination to make it go into act; he simply allows nature to take its course, does all that is required of him and remains an unprofitable servant (Luke 17:10)." (149) Lonergan knows he is breaking new ground in this particular exposition so he points out openly that "the reader may be unsatisfied with this." (150) He wonders whether "there must be some act making the difference between the act of will and the no-act of will, some choice prior to both that is the true act of will."[247] (150) Again Lonergan begs the reader to

[247] The editors stated that, "the difference between the act of will and the non-act of will: in his doctoral dissertation Lonergan will insist on the Thomist doctrine 'that the objective difference between posse *agere and actu agere* is attained without any change emerging in the cause as such,' and will comment: 'To later scholastics this seemed impossible *a priori*: they held that "Peter not acting" must be really different from "Peter acting." They refused to believe that St. Thomas could disagree with them on this; in fact, St. Thomas disagreed' (*Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas* [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1971] 69). The present point is the obverse of that made in the dissertation: there the

consider his suggestion which "is the fundamental blunder of the whole question." That is "the non-act of will is against reason." (150) The explanation he attempts to present is rather unusual. Here he makes reference to the reader; "you try to make a contradiction intelligible; sin is the unintelligible, because it is against reason." (150) Lonergan assures the reader that "the explanation of the unintelligible is critical …and that the explanation is intrinsically impossible." (150) However, "do not confuse this with mystery: mystery is intelligible in relation to itself not in relation to us." (150) Likewise, "sin is intelligible neither in relation to itself nor in relation to us. Hence the good act is explained by the premotion from intellect and the natural inclination." (150) Summing it up, he insists that "the evil act is unintelligible," and "if sin had a reason or a cause, it would not be sin."

In conclusion, Lonergan notes that he speaks exclusively of natural order. "If man is merely an instrument in the natural order, *a fortiori* he is merely an instrument in the supernatural." (150) But Lonergan claims that he is not speaking of the supernatural order instead he is speaking "as a psychologist of the school of St Augustine and St Thomas."[248] (150)

### 5. The Unity of Man in the Ontological Ground of His Being

In his fifth topic Lonergan focuses on elaborating "the basis of the unity of human operations." (150) Taking a marginally different approach to what he did earlier, Lonergan raises a series of questions prior to discussing the main topic. These questions are wide ranging: from economics to politics, to social concerns, to hierarchical structures and

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explanation of a cause acting, here the explanation of a cause not acting, in both the principle that causation does not involve any real change in the cause as cause (*Grace and Freedom* 68)." See *S T* 1, q.54, aa. 1-3 for the original reference.

[248] The editors noted that Lonergan already identified himself as a Thomist before he suggested that he was speaking as "a psychologist of the school of St Augustine and St Thomas." In later years Lonergan would go deeper into working out the psychological analogy of the Trinity in both St. Augustine and St Thomas's thoughts.

reformers, to theology and metaphysics. “Why are there economic forces, making it impossible for industrialists to pay workmen a wage and for workmen to raise a family? Why are there political forces holding the world in the unstable equilibrium of a balance of power secured by *Realpolitik?*[249] Why are the sins of the monarchs and antipopes and reformers and enlighteners and Marxians visited upon the twentieth century in a measure so terrible that men refuse to face the plain facts of the situation? What is Adam to us that we should bear the penalty of original sin? What is the metaphysical principle of redemption?” (150) Before answering these questions, Lonergan claims that, in fact “it is all one question, and it would seem to merit an answer.” (150)

“The answer,” Lonergan continues, “is that man is not *simply* an individual...”[250] (151) This short initial answer is in contrast to the second phrase in the same sentence: “angels are individuals; man is never more than a member of a species; he is not in his operation as we have already demonstrated; he is not in the ontological ground of his being.” (151) The whole sentence sets an interesting tone to the rest of the discourse. They are many factors and these factors need specific sciences to deal with the task of identifying the differences between angels and human beings. As the arguments encompass the realms of ontological and existential features, how is one to grasp the essential aspects considered to be part of the definition of a human person? It is a complex task. Yet Lonergan prepares to take it on in order to answer his question. Having established his philosophical arguments, especially the Thomist exposition, Lonergan prepares to probe his main point of discussion by answering his question under two categories: philosophical and theological.

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[249] It is interesting to read in the original text that Lonergan typed initially the phrase: *unscrupulous diplomacy*. Then he crossed out the typed phrase substituting it by hand with this phrase: *Realpolitik* and adding a question mark along with it. Perhaps it was an indication that he was to revisit and refine further, but he unfortunately never returned to the text.

[250] As is indicated in the original text, Lonergan inserted the word *simply* later, handwritten into the original typed text.

"Philosophically," Lonergan says, "man is one universal nature *in regard to* ***what*** *he is*;"[251] (151) and "man is many merely in virtue of the modality of his being, *in regard to* ***the way*** *he is*."[252] (151) He explains that "man is one in virtue of his form, and he is many merely in virtue of matter, the principle of individuation of universal forms." (151) Placing his focus primarily on the notion of individuation, Lonergan explains: "The individual man really is an individual: undivided in himself and divided from any other being; but that reality is not pure reality but a compound of pure reality." (151)

There is a shift in his argument as Lonergan proceeds to probe further into explaining the ways the individual human person participates within the "divine essence." (151) His purpose here is to spell out the notion of individuality in relation to divine essence. To help clarify his argument, Lonergan situates the notion of contingence and materiality within the potency of human reality, the basic universal form. He argues that neither of these two, namely, contingence and materiality,

> are in the divine essence, nor imitations of the divine essence, nor participations of the divine essence, but conditions of there being any imitation or participation of the divine essence besides the full possession enjoyed by the divine persons. (151)

The argument advances as Lonergan expands his philosophical presuppositions. "Man as these many particulars is contingence and materiality; man as a universal nature is an intelligible essence and a limited aspect of the divine essence." (151) In other words what Lonergan intends to clarify is that human beings are products of material substance and exist by contingency, but this is not so in their total representativeness: "Now as potency is because of act, it follows that the laws of mankind, that what is right and just for mankind, should proceed from the universal nature and be in terms of the universal nature and be

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[251] In the original text Lonergan typed the phrase in italics in Latin. It was translated into English by the editors in the published version.

[252] Again, in the original text Lonergan typed the phrase in italics in Latin. It was translated into English by the editors in the published version.

irrespective of material difference." (151) Human beings are of material substance, and contingent, yet they are conditioned to obtain and participate in the divine essence. This argument thus flows into his theological discussion.

"Theologically," Lonergan continues, "we may arrive at the same conclusion: man is made in the image and likeness of God." (151) He attempts to clarify further his expanded explanation of this traditional teaching of humanity created in the image and likeness of God by introducing the theological concept: consubstantiation. "The Father and Son are consubstantial; therefore, men are consubstantial, not indeed in the same way as the Father and the Son but in the image and likeness of that consubstantiality." (151) The use of this theological concept is to find some common ground to incorporate his argument that points to interpreting the notion of unity, not so much in degree but in kind. "Men are not strictly consubstantial but analogically so; they are different substances not by reason of the essence but also by reason of quantitatively designated matter." (151)

This argument presents an important perspective in the understanding of our human existence. Our human frailties neither make humans less human nor make humans fall short of the created reality intended in the act of creation: the potentials of what makes humans as humans exist substantially: the capacity to understand, to will and to act. The potentials of intentionality analysis and the gift of free will are essential, universal, and integral to the form that makes one a human person. Lonergan's contribution in explaining the traditional teaching of human existence is revolutionary. He presupposes that the "members of the 'unconquered school of nominalists'" perhaps may be shocked, "but let us hear their arguments!" (151) "Meanwhile," Lonergan says, "let us push further the analogy between the human and the divine." (151) The analogy Lonergan attempts to draw into exploring the notion of (man) humanity has four identified sectors of explanations.

Lonergan attempts, “First to distinguish between individuality and personality.” (152) But he qualifies this by adding, “I do not say between the individual and person, since, by reason of the *supposit*, these two are identical.” (152) In the first part of his answer Lonergan indicates that he will “inquire into the difference between the formal aspects, individuality and personality.” (152) So he begins by asking, what is a person? Answering his own question, he says a person is “an individual with intellect and will.” (152) If this is the definition of a person, then, he further enquires, “What is a personality?” (152) Again Lonergan proceeds to answer his own question. This question-answer session subsequently forms the main part of this discussion.

Additionally, Lonergan clarifies that, “the individuality results from matter, the principle of individuation; but matter is for the sake of some higher form; therefore personality is the individuating form that can be brought forth in a material individuality by intellect and will.” (152) He continues with this explanation. “But what intellect and will bring forth in the way of an individuating form is a given – personal, as we say – orientation in life.”[253] (152) His key notion of *unity* continues to remain the focus of the argument. Hence what is significant here is that matter is the underlying principle of unity; matter is the intelligibility capable of integrating higher viewpoints, which includes sublating higher integration of even complex but unified operations of the will and intellect. “Therefore,”

[253] The notion of *life* here pertains to both Aristotelian and Thomistic idea of *soul* or *animation*. This philosophical meaning includes “a unitive co-ordination of a whole with a complex organization of parts.” T. Daly, “Consciousness and the Human Spirit”, *Journal of Clinical Neuroscience*. 3 (2) (1996): 144. It is explained that a living being is something that can be understood as a concrete whole with many aspects, all of which can be understood as a very rich unity. There are levels of life that can be discerned according to the degree of unity. This notion has reference to Lonergan’s reflection on Aquinas’ idea of the *hierarchy of perfection*. See for instance T. Aquinas, *Disputed Question on the Soul* [QDA] a. 1; *ST* Ia. q. 75, a.1; and *ST* Ia. q. 76, a.1. Thomas is appropriating Aristotle’s idea of the *soul*. See for instance in Aristotle, Bk. I Ch. 3 & 4, *On the Soul*, 407a, 408a &b, pp544-548 ff. See also Bk. VI: Ch.1, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139 c:2, 20, p. 1023. In Aquinas the soul is the animation of substantial forms of elements that emerged in matter. At the elementary level is the existence of non-living matter, yet composed of various organizational structures. Whilst at the advanced level are existences of living matter that range from the simplest form of organism to the complex of plants and animals. This anima enables what all living things ought to do: to move, grow, nourish, reproduce and respond to sense data. Beyond the sensible world is the next degree of emergent properties of operations in human faculties such as understanding and willing.

Lonergan continues, "actual personality is the ultimate difference of intellectual pattern and habit[254] of will called character[255] that results from the operation of intellect and will in a material individual." (152) The clear distinction Lonergan makes between personality and individuality is the freedom the individual has, and the potentials that are available to a person to be determined in an act of an individual. Qualifying his distinctions, Lonergan continues; "on the other hand, potential personality is mere individuality with unactuated[256] intellect and will." (152) Succinctly, "we distinguish persons as majors and minors; on the analogy of an orientation of intellect and will in the individual, we speak of moral persons." (152)

### 5.1 Becoming and Unity in Historical Consciousness

Lonergan proceeds in the second discourse to "discover the reason for the continuous variety of the objective *Geist*, its differentiations in time as one idea is complemented by another, its differentiations in space as each individual arrives at a viewpoint that is the integral of the influences exerted upon him." (152) The second point has reference to the Hegelian features of the objective *Geist*. It is interesting to see how Lonergan finds the Hegelian views compatible with the Thomistic and Augustinian ones. The Hegelian notion of the unfolding of the historical dialectics is the mutual mediation between the world historical-cultural context (the objective spirit) and the subject as the person of experience (the subjective spirit). "Lonergan says that in autobiography a person narrates the unfolding of

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[254] The notion, *habit* has an origin in both Aristotle and Aquinas's discussion on human virtues. Lonergan draws on this notion in his own work. The background of this notion can be seen for instance in *ST* IaIIae. q. 57, a. 1, & *ST* IaIIae. q. 55, a, Thomas explains habits in relation to human virtues. There are various powers human beings possess, including the rational powers of intellect and will. In his discussion on human virtues Thomas draws on the difference between *concupiscible* power and the *irascible* power that subsequently results in moral virtues, which automatically confer the right use of a *habit*.

[255] What Lonergan calls character has an Aristotelian reference. Character according to Aristotle is the virtue that results between practical wisdom and philosophical wisdom, which has equal reference to *moral virtue*. See especially Aristotle, Bk. VI: Ch.1, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1143:12, 30, 35 & 1144: 5, 10, 15, & 20. p. 1033.

[256] The *Latin* meaning: reduced to action.

his/her life story. In the shift to biography the life of the subject being written about is locating within the unfolding of his/her times, namely his/her historical context, which is what is meant by objective spirit."[257] This is a mutual mediation as Hegel points out, that brings Lonergan to explain "that individual subjective spirits are massively conditioned by the meanings and values of historical objective spirit into which they are born and raised, and by which their horizons are shaped not only by reason of their inquiring, reflecting, and deliberating, but overwhelmingly by the way of beliefs and mores."[258]

In his third point Lonergan continues to "discover a moral personality emerging from the flux of birth and death and change, the moral personality of humanity, of the human race, the 'one and many.'" (152) This phrase may represent a shift in Lonergan's thoughts as he puts these notes together. His starting point is *a* human person; that each of us is a history-maker as we hear, speak, learn, choose, and create anew from the heritage which we have inherited.[259] We then mediate that heritage to be the legacy to our current children and for the coming generations. And when our children grow up and live their adult lives, they too will mediate the heritage to be the legacy to their children, and so down the generations. What Lonergan manifests is perhaps that history is the experimental project of us human beings discovering and actualizing who we are in this universe, with its origin and end, with its sublating redemption in the kingship of Christ. This is a key point in this essay. Succinctly therefore, history is the human making of humans.[260]

Lonergan moves from Aquinas' idea of philosophical physics on the nature of change in a person and the individuality of matter, motion and time, to find in Augustine, the moral

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[257] F. Lawrence, "Brief explanation on Hegel's Objective Spirit," *Private Notes.* Fred Lawrence notes that Hegel's idea of the absolute spirit and objective spirit is a theme that Lonergan has drawn on significantly in his *Pantôn* notes, adding the fact that philosophy was indispensable to human history was to challenge the Hegelian influence. The Hegelian world view was that "the key to the dialectical unfolding of History is a set of relationships between concrete Universal and concrete Particulars."

[258] F. Lawrence, "Brief explanation on Hegel's Objective Spirit."

[259] B. Lonergan, "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," *A Third Collection*, (1985), 170.

[260] B. Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980: *CWL* 17. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2004), 358-59.

person in the individual's choice of future events.[261] Lonergan moves to appropriate Augustine's works on the idea of historical continuity, namely that past events and circumstances will also have an influential impact in shaping a person's individuality. Lonergan points out in Augustine's teaching that each human person as an individual is endowed with the gift of liberty. Augustine teaches that future events cannot be controlled since one is free to create history, meaning that past events are interpreted in how each subject exercises their freedom. Hence, the gift of freedom has the contents of human intelligence to care, love, create, heal and cooperate with each other to progress to a higher world order. What Lonergan gained from Hegel's input is essentially that there is a dialectical recourse: the reversal, the conflict, the regress, and the decline.

Lonergan continues in his exposition that "the personality arrived at by each individual is the product of previous personalities and the producer of future personalities: man makes man what he is, even though he does so as instrumental cause that now acts and now fails to act." (152) Lonergan's discussion clarifies historical consciousness with a distinct move from individual self-determinism to personal choices sought after in human freedom regarding common good. "Thus there is in all men a responsibility and a debt to all men; no person is self-determined; no person fails to make things better or worse for the emergence of the future personalities. This orientation of all men to all men is a moral personality." (152)

Lonergan implies that an individual person's path is not always smooth sailing in life. Intently, he leans towards Hegel's notion of the objective spirit to apply the predomination over the subjective spirit in terms of growth and progress. There are events to be faced, with turns and twists, ups and downs in one's personal life that can subsequently affect the society

[261] In later years Lonergan will develop a comprehensive analysis of the teachings of St Augustine's argument on grace, free will, justice and mercy of God in his doctoral work. See B. Lonergan, *GF*, 6-7. Lonergan's particular references to St Augustine's works, *On Grace and Free Will (De Gratia et Libero Abitrio).*

as a community. Once obstacles are overcome and hindrance to progress is recognized, the mutual correlations of the subjective spirit and the objective spirit have created something new out of the old. This is the authenticity of person, whose history Lonergan articulates in the (re) cycle of development, where common good is both desired and pursued by the subject and the community.

### 5.2 A Notion of a Higher Synthesis

In his fourth and final point, Lonergan brings a completion to his discussion with an "analogy to the Blessed Trinity." (152) "As the Trinity of persons are subsistent relations in the eternal and equilibrated dynamism or *enérgeia*[262] of unlimited intellect and will, so upon the transient dynamism of physical and biological nature emerge the physical personalities that should be the adoptive sons of God and the moral personality that should be the spirit of love for all men." (153) There are two outstanding points in this exposition. First, Lonergan's theological discussion on grace emerges significantly. Second, there is a significant shift in his exposition from a theological standpoint to an anthropological one. The result is a summary of three categories of human personalities: (1) "the fleshly men,"[263] (2) "the psychic man, the good, and the beautiful;[264] and (3) the spiritual man."[265] (153) These three points are centered mainly in expounding his teaching on the virtue of charity.

Lonergan continues to make pointed reference to the three categories. Again he has a question-answer session to stimulate more discussion:

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[262] From the English/Greek dictionary: "Actuality is often used to translate both energeia (ενέργεια) and entelecheia (ἐντελέχεια) (sometimes rendered in English as "entelechy")."Actuality" comes from Latin actualitas and is a traditional translation, but its normal meaning in Latin is "anything which is currently happening".

[263] In the original text it reads: "the *ánthrōpos* sarkikós who is orientated towards sensible satisfaction."

[264] In the original text it reads: "the *ánthrōpos* psykhikós who is orientated towards the True, the Good and the Beautiful."

[265] In the original text it reads: "the *ánthrōpos* pneumatikós who is orientated towards God in his transcendence of the transcendentals and as he is known only by faith through revelation."

> Why are not all men in the last category? It is the fault of men. Why are graces sufficient, but not efficacious? It is the fault of the human instruments whose duty it is to transfer to others the motion they receive. Why does God draw some and not others?" (153) And the answer is "because he made man to his own image and likeness, one in nature and in operation, because he uses instruments to draw man according to the law. (153)

The next answer is a repeated quote from Aquinas. 'Whatever is moved is moved by something else.'[266] The answer drawn from Aquinas triggers a scriptural interpretation. That is, "because, finally," Lonergan continues, "the instruments will not be even unprofitable servants (Luke 17.10), will not live exclusively for his Truth, and so cannot love as does his Love, will not love reason, and image of the word, and so cannot love man as did the word." (153)

In summing up this particular treatise, Lonergan returns to several of the original themes, including: "the divine plan of man in God's own image and likeness remains: persons that in an orientation of filial subordination to our Father in heaven constitute a moral personality of love for all men that all may be orientated to the Father of all." (153) In this section we find Lonergan's anthropology emerges in a significant way. It incorporates the integrated formation of his arguments gained from Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and Hegel. Lonergan had submerged himself in the works of some of these great thinkers and appropriated their teachings accordingly. Given the approaches Lonergan had initiated, one begins to see how the history of any one person becomes central after all. He integrated his own understanding of human nature and freedom, sin and grace, and God's providence in the context of the study of a theological anthropology. Hence, Lonergan's attempt to devise a 'metaphysics of history' had limitations. Perhaps philosophy is not a suitable starting point to analyze critical history.

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[266] *ST* 1, q. 2, a. 3, c.

## III. The *'Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis'*

The sixth and the final topic of discussion contains a succinct summary of the overall arguments presented in the first five topics of this essay. Clearly, Lonergan is repetitious in many areas as he attempts to consolidate his concluding arguments. Throughout the essay he has consistently maintained his goal, i.e. to reach the main theme of this essay: "the *pantôn anakephalaiôsis*, the Pauline conception of the role of Christ in creation." (153) I think he does achieve that result. Yet what he intends to accomplish as a study of social philosophy turns out to be a Pauline Christology.[267]

Lonergan continues in this final section to summarize his basic argument that "man's operation is necessarily an instrumental operation, (but) there is a particular significance to leadership, to being the first agent in human history." (153) Not only is his idea of a dialectic of history exhibited in "the fundamental antitheses of the first and second Adam" (153) but also in that Christ is understood to be first of all Creation and the head of humanity. As we probe the concluding discussions of the PA (1) essay we begin to identify an emerging theology within the whole study. What he achieved in the process of a Pauline Christology has now become a bedrock of an emerging 'theology of history.'[268]

### 1. Towards the Development of the Absolute *Geist*

Lonergan's narrative of a metaphysical redemption in the 'theology of history' begins to take form as he approaches the interpretation of the Pauline Christology especially the texts that are devoted to the figures of Adam, Eve, and the serpent analogy. Using metaphysics as his bedrock, namely the Aristotelian-Thomist notion of historical causation

[267] See F. E Crowe, *CH*, 31.

[268] It is my claim after studying the *Pantôn* essay that an emerging theology of history is on the horizon. I think there are other areas that evoke certain interests, especially the different and vast scientific areas of specialization that Lonergan hinted at in his arguments. Mine is a consolidated effort geared towards the area of a pastoral or a contextual theology. CF. F.E Crowe, BLPT, 451-70.

Lonergan maps out his peculiar narrative. He explains this particular approach with the intended interpretations in four points. (a) “Adam, premoved by Eve, premoved by the serpent, set up the reign of sin (Romans 5.12).” (153) The Aristotelian notion of causation has the notion of cause to be material, formal, efficient and final.[269] There is an agency in which a process is set in motion. This natural process is where the first is partly responsible for the second, and the second is partly dependent on the first. Lonergan extends his interpretation of the metaphysical redemption in order to point to the origin of the prime and incidental causes and effects. He does so as to link his idea of redemptive history with a Christological argument even though they are still in their initial stages of discussion. There is however a possibility that there can be discerned an historical trace to the ideas of human nature, sin, and grace. (b) “Adam communicates human nature to his progeny; parents are quasi instruments in the communication of Adam’s sin, for they communicate nature that no longer has something it would have had if Adam had not sinned.” (154) Lonergan may imply in this discussion a moral decline in which Adam is responsible to the rest of humanity. What is transmitted from Adam to the rest of humanity is passed on through the instrumentality of generational passages. (c) “Adam and his progeny die the death that is the penalty for sin.” (154) Lonergan adheres to the idea of historical continuity, in that sin is prevalent in human nature. Likewise, “Christ communicates the divine adoption by regeneration of water and the Holy Ghost; the church and parents are instrumental causes of this communication.” (154)

[269] See for instance in Aristotle, Bk. II Ch. 10, *Metaphysics*, 993b, 994a, and 9946. Aristotle teaches that causality is defined by change. Causality technically means a change or movement. Aristotle classified cause into four main types: (1) Matter or material change; that is the change or movement determined by material things, (2) Form, or formal cause; that is the change caused by arrangements, shape or appearance. (3) Agent or efficient cause; that is a change that consists of things apart from the thing being changed, and (4) purpose or the final cause; that is a change explained for the sake of which a thing is or what it is. Lonergan adapts the traditional explanation of causality found in Aristotle to explain his notion of change. Examples are found in his interpretation of the Pauline texts especially, the theological themes attributed to Adam, and Christ the second Adam.

Equally, Lonergan draws on the paschal events as the source of the salvific events of grace, a pointer to Christ's charity embedded in his passion, death and resurrection. "Christ transmutes death into the rite of sacrifice – greater love than this no man hath (John 15: 13) – and makes of death the seed of resurrection for he is 'the first-born from the dead' (Colossians 1.18)." (154)

## 2. A Notion of a Metaphysical Redemption

In his fourth point Lonergan again buys into Hegel's principles to appropriate his theological standpoint. His theological view is largely anthropological.

> (d) Adam by his forfeiture of the gift of infused knowledge reversed the course of history and set up the tradition of concupiscence. He reversed the course of history, for man had to develop from the mere potency of intellect, had to progress under the leadership of phantasms specifying intellect as chance offered them, became unable to plan progress but had to proceed in a series of more or less blind leaps of incomplete acts of intellect. (154)

The discussion becomes more technically advanced as Lonergan attempts to combine metaphysics with the theological narrative of redemptive praxis. This attempt can be explained as a beginning of a process towards the development of Lonergan's own creation of a theology of redemptive history.[270] "Christ restored the harmony of man by the grace of dogma, an absolute *Geist* above the wandering objective *Geist* of humanity." (154) Lonergan has already dealt in the earlier part of this essay with the Hegelian notion of the absolute spirit and objective spirit. He absorbed this theme to create something new. In other words, Lonergan 'baptizes' the Hegelian idea of the absolute spirit and objective spirt to formulate his own narrative of an evolving praxis. The Hegelian world view was that "the key to a dialectical unfolding of History is a set of relationships between "concrete Universal" and "concrete Particulars."[271] Thus, Lonergan has four points to clarify how he translate Hegel's

[270] The theological exposition will be fully explored in chapter five. Cf. F. E Crowe, *CH*, 12.
[271] F. Lawrence, *Brief explanation on Hegel's Objective Spirit*. Notes provided to the writer.

two notions namely, absolute *Geist* and objective *Geist,* into his own new theory: a metaphysics of history.

### 2.1 Towards the Dogma of Praxis

Lonergan proposes that, "First the coming of Christ coincides with the breakdown of philosophy and its recognized impotence to solve the problem of intellectual unity." (154) Lonergan continues, "Philosophy had to be discovered before Christ, else the Christian dogmas could not be expressed: pre-philosophic symbolism led necessarily to idolatry." (154) What is Lonergan trying to convey in this first point? There are certainly many points gathered together in these two sentences. In fact, Lonergan acknowledges the long and rich history of the Greek philosophy and its influential contribution in the Christian tradition. Yet in a radical utterance Lonergan puts it bluntly: Christ is responsible, for in Christ's coming is the cause of the collapse of philosophy. Perhaps Lonergan is referring to St Thomas' contribution in mediating a philosophical synthesis of the Aristotelian tradition. Aristotle still remained an important figure in the Thomist tradition.[272]

Lonergan, however, goes on to deal with the traditionally dominant influence of philosophy, which includes Hegel's dialectic of history, (so much as to say history is to be eternally completed in philosophy, or rather to be completed in Hegel himself).[273] But this is a mistaken view which Lonergan counteracts here. That is why Lonergan says, "philosophy had to be bankrupt before Christ to make plain to man his impotence without Christ: even the philosopher emperors stooped to apotheosis."[274] (154) Introducing Christ as the Lord of

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[272] W.T. Jones, *The Medieval Mind,* Second Edition, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc, 1969) 169

[273] See for instance the translator's introduction, G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind,* 64.

[274] As is noted elsewhere, the *Pantôn* was not meant to be published. Thus what we are studying still remains Lonergan's private working notes. These notes were still in the making, neither edited nor bearing explicit referencing. One piece of evidence to suggest this is that, at the margins along the length of this particular paragraph, Lonergan has a handwriting phrase: "cf Pauline impotence of the law." The fact is that Lonergan never got around to reworking these notes.

philosophy, Lonergan by contrast attempts to clarify the positive role of philosophy in his second point.

"Second," Lonergan continues, "the supernatural revelation to which Christ was a witness is not only a content but premoves a living and developing mind: the mind of the mystical body."[275] (155) He supports his thesis with a Pauline text: 'we have the mind of Christ.' (1 Corinthians 2.16) Hence, Lonergan remains critical of the role of philosophy in cases where it was traditionally overemphasized, or used as disproportionately superior, such as the Hegelian supposition that history was to be completed in Hegel himself. Lonergan however, suggests that philosophy is to be a medium of the interpretative content of history. His suggestion has certain backings, cited from important instances, such as the evolutionary role of philosophy in the formulation of Christian doctrines in the early Church. Lonergan cites the example of when "the bishops at Nicea who in the name of traditional mentality objected to defining the consubstantiality of the son (but) were overruled." (155) But it took a leap "in scholasticism, which did not fear to reason about anything and which so enriched ordinary Catholic thought that the early Church with its misty conceptions on many points seems strange to us." (155)

Furthermore, Lonergan favors the scientific contribution of philosophy. It becomes evident in this part of the discussion that philosophy matters. Philosophy not only enriches the contents of Christian heritage but clarifies the scientific significance of what is carried on from the past to the present, and adds to the future. Among other accomplishments was the huge leap initiated "by the audacity of St. Thomas of Aquin, who based his thought on Aristotle ('s) precisely because Aristotle's was the most scientific." (155) Combining Aquinas and Aristotle's scientific approach to point to philosophy's significantly positive

[275] The editors' notes; "mystical body: a central doctrine for Lonergan in these years and long after; see *Understanding and Being* 423-24, note 1 to lecture 4."

influence was Pope Leo XIII's encyclical, *Aeterni Patris.*[276] This particular encyclical added a new breakthrough in Lonergan's engagement with philosophy. It gave Lonergan a new dimension in appropriating philosophy, as he sums up in his second point: "Finally, the bull, *Aeterni Patris,*[277] was the official recognition of the social need of a philosophy, the necessity for human society that in some sense the philosopher be king, have a *dictature*[278] over lesser minds and the *Zeitgeist*."[279] (155) This encyclical can also be seen as an importantly resourced document for Lonergan in working toward his social theory of philosophy: the *summa sociologica.* This theory will inevitably contribute enormously to what Lonergan sought out in devising his social narrative of the dogma of praxis.[280]

[276] Pope Leo XIII, *Aeterni Patris: Of the Eternal Father,* August, 1879. The Pope retrieved scholastic philosophy in this particular encyclical. Perhaps it spurred Lonergan into pondering seriously the idea of mapping out his metaphysics of history.

[277] The editors' notes; "Leo XIII, 1879—on Christian Philosophy according to Thomas Aquinas in Catholic Schools."

[278] Lonergan chooses to use the French term in this sentence.

[279] Lonergan chooses to use the German word which has the similar characteristics of the other German term: *Geist.* The literal meaning in German is time spirit or it can also mean ghost. Whereas the technical meaning is a general trend of a specific time or period (the spirit of the time) which has a dominant set of ideals as is reflected in literature, in philosophy, etc. These ideals or beliefs can motivate the actions of the members of a society in that particular milieu at a particular period in time.

[280] Pope Leo XIII, *Aeterni Patris,* n. 10 -12 discusses the importance of a history of philosophy. This perhaps may have prompted Lonergan to ponder along those lines in mapping out his own idea of a metaphysic of history.

## IV. *Summa Sociologica*

Having praised philosophy and its positive influence in history Lonergan moves on to discuss the contribution dogma had made. As dogma is distinct from philosophy in its contribution, this is a pertinent point, since "the revelation as such: that is a contradiction in terms, for the pure dogma is above reason. However, we may see in this development what the development of man's intellect would have been, had Adam not sinned." (155) Lonergan continues with his argument,

> The development through dogma is not by the acceptance of incomplete acts of intellect and their factual refutation when put in practice (for example, economic science creating a world crisis); it is by the selection of what is true in the incomplete acts of intellect of the objective *Geist*;[281] and this selection takes place in virtue of the light of the supernatural truth. (155)

The enlightenment gained from the scientific and intellectual pursuit of objective *Geist* cannot be achieved alone: there is also revelation, "in virtue of the illumination that proceeds from the light of the world, the divine word. What the progeny of Adam would have done through infused knowledge, we do through Christ our Lord." (155)

In his fourth point, Lonergan locates the blind spot: "the intellectual benefit of the absolute *Geist* is something that man, fallen man with his fatal tendency to sensism and nominalism, easily overlooks." (155) Hence, Lonergan speaks of

> the endless intransigence of the church against heretics from the Gnostics to the modernists is incomprehensible; they prize moral goodness; they constantly forget that no man is better than he knows how; above all, they overlook the impotence of the traditional mentality (as opposed to the philosophic with its defined abstractions) to make issue with the expanding objective *Geist*. (155-6)

[281] Lonergan's third point is a reference to the introductory section of his sixth topic in "the development of the absolute *Geist* through dogma." The editors' note, footnote 39. 'N.B. The development *of* dogma is the developed Absolute *Geist* turning back upon the content of revelation and seeing more there than was seen before.' This marginal note, handwritten along the length of the paragraph, is probably to be attached to the phrase 'through dogma' in order to emphasize the contrast: twice' through dogma' is substituted by hand 'of dogma'.

He cites other examples: "the breakup of Protestantism and the insolvency of the Orientals who call a dead tradition orthodoxy to demonstrate which view is right.[282] But there is more than this to the intellectualist position of the Church."(156) There is also "reason and the Thomistic canon, (that) the human good consists (in living) according to reason" (156) that contribute to "a Catholicity that overrides the petty differences of nationality and other tribal instincts."[283] (156) In order to reverse the ill-conceived philosophies against unity, Lonergan thinks that there should be a program that promotes positive thinking. He identifies two of them.

### 1. The Significance of 'Catholic Action'

First, Lonergan proposes a theoretical program: a "*Summa Sociologica*."[284] (156) This experimental program would involve dealing with "any reflection on modern history and its consequent 'Crisis in the West'."[285] (156) Lonergan thinks that, "A metaphysic of history is not only imperative for the church to meet the attack of the Marxian materialist conception of history and its realization in apostolic Bolshevism….to solve the modern politico-economic entanglement"[286] (156) but a process that is geared towards achieving fundamentally a new

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[282] Interfaith dialogue got the Catholic Church involved in the process much later, perhaps some thirty years on from the 1930's when Lonergan had already captured a heightening viewpoint in finding some value in the 'other,' considered somewhat a 'lower' minority. See reference to *Gaudium et Spes* [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in Modern World], Vatican II Council, Rome, IT: Vatican, December, 7th 1965.

[283] Lonergan's emphasis on the notion of *unity* has considerable significance in the whole discourse of the *Pantôn* paper. From the philosophical meaning to this section, particularly, the sociological concerns, in which Lonergan saw in the division of classes, of races, nations, languages, cultures, and peoples, a dangerous trend of advancement in human development.

[284] The editors' notes on '*Summa Sociologica*': "a phrase that almost epitomizes Lonergan's interest at this time; to track this interest through his later writings would be a valuable piece of research."

[285] The editors' notes on 'Crisis in the West': "Lonergan seems to have a specific reference in mind—to what? Possibly Spengler, who is mentioned in 'Analytic Concept of History,' possibly the world economic crisis, mentioned earlier in the paper. We are similarly in the dark with regard to *Zersplitterung*, which occurs three times in the *Pantôn* paper, and also in 'Analytic Concept of History.' A few years later Lonergan will refer to Toynbee's long account of disintegration: 'On bipolar disintegration in the general historical field, cf. A. J Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Oxford, 1939), V, 376-VI, 132; but his own term in *Insight* will be 'breakdown.'"

[286] The editors' noted: "'Had Hitler had something better than Gobinau [sic] and Chamberlain in the restoration of Germany, for instance!' [This marginal phrase, handwritten along the length of the paragraph, is attached by an arrow to the line 'A metaphysic of history is … imperative for the church to meet the attack…

restored social order. What Lonergan may have implied in his handwritten phrase on the margin of the paragraph is that the political turmoil in Europe with the fall of democracy, and the rise of Nazism is the result of the neglect of "cultural values and all the achievement of the past." (156) The dangerous widespread existence of evil ideologies held by the examples of Joseph Arthur Gobineau (1816-82), and Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855-1927) may be the cause that "men refuse to be reasonable enough to take the League of Nations seriously." (156)

Lonergan suggests a solution, emphasizing that "the only possible unity of men is dogma." (156) This, however, cannot necessarily be found in ill-conceived dogmas: thus "the dogma of communism unites by terrorism to destroy; the dogma of race unites to protect, it is meaningless as a principle of advance…it is a nostrum that increases the malady." (156) For Lonergan; "There remains only the dogma of Christ." (156) Subsequently, Lonergan went on to formulate his idea of dogma within the framework that Pope Pius XI had proclaimed.

> We have here the significance of Pius XI's proclamation of Christ as King, King as the rallying point for all men of good will, King of the historic process. We have here the significance of Pope Pius XI's proclamation of Catholic Action, for Catholics are leaven that leaveneth the whole mass.[287] (156)

Lonergan's perceived solution is centered on the dogma of Christ. This is clearly seen as the influence coming from Pope Pius XI's programmatic theme on social reconstruction, backed by several of his social encyclicals.[288]

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Joseph Arthur Gobineau (1816-82), French diplomat and man of letters, taught the inequality of humankind, only the white race being creative of culture. Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855-1927), British-born political philosopher, who owed much to Gobineau, regarded 'Germanism as source of all that is best in European culture, was an influence on Hitler. —With thanks to Jacques Monet for these notes.]"

[287] The editors' inserted these scripture texts (Matthew 13.33, 1 Corinthians 5.6, Galatians 5.9) at the end of this sentence… "for Catholics are leaven that leaveneth the whole mass."

[288] Pope Pius XI's social encyclical *Quadragesimo anno, On Reconstruction of the Social Order*, 1931 was to commemorate the forty years of Pope Leo XIII's peerless encyclical *Rerum Novarum, On the Conditions of Workers*, 1891. This was an outstanding one, out of the thirty-one encyclicals issued in Pope Pius XI's entire pontificate. Eighteen of these are pointed out by scholars as his encyclicals of social reconstruction which addressed the global socio-economic and political crises of his time. See Pope Pius XI, *Social Wellsprings: Eighteen Encyclicals of Social Reconstruction* II prefaced, annotated and arranged by J. Husslein, SJ

### 1.1 A Vision of a New World Order

What is central to Lonergan's *summa sociologica* is a vision of a new world order. This new world order, if it is to achieve some progress, will have to begin with some basic reforms. Lonergan emphasizes Pope Pius XI's challenge to seminary formation. "Finally, we have here the significance of Pope Pius XI's command that 'all candidates for the sacred priesthood must be adequately prepared…by intense study of social matters.'[289] Lonergan views that the origin of major reforms is with the official structure of the Church. So he challenges the mainstream Church organization to prepare future pastors of the Church for the daunting tasks they will encounter in dealing with the emerging social issues. But it seems Lonergan is disappointed that the much needed reforms are not present, and if they are, they are slow to be implemented. "This command has not yet been put into effect, nor can it

(Milwaukee, WI: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1942 & 3). Twelve others were devoted to Catholic spirituality including one, *On His Priestly Jubilee, Quinquagesimo anno,* 1929. Social concern, was a theme that so resonated in Pope Leo XIII's pontificate that Pope Pius XI deliberately carried it on in his reign. In 1925 Pope Pius XI took an important step in initiating a new Feast in the Catholic Church: The Feast of Christ the King. Pope Pius XI gave instructions towards instituting the devotional and liturgical force to erect the Feast of Christ the King, an annual observance. He offered biblical and theological exposition of Christ the King and formulated pastoral programs. He made it clear that this call was not only to individuals and Church alone but to all of society and its rulers: "When once men recognize that both in private and in public life, that Christ is King, society will at last receive the great blessing of real liberty, well-ordered discipline, peace, and harmony." The new feast would be a yearly reminder of the root cause of modern evils. See J. A. Komonchak, LEERH, 166. This, of course was followed by several other encyclicals on social reconstruction that added more impact: *Quadragesimo anno, On Reconstruction of the Social Order*, 15th May,1931, *Non abbiamo bisogno, Catholic Action in Italy*, 29th June 1931, and, *Nova impendet, On the Economic Crisis*, 25th December, 1931. What Pope Pius XI set out to institute in this particular liturgical focus was clearly a calculated counter position to the experiences of a waning society where Communism and totalitarian regimes had wielded political power over democracy. Clearly, there was a political vacuum in key governing bodies in those societies especially the Western world. Perhaps the underlying factor may have been a lacuna in leadership. What was significantly crucial to notice at the core of human existence is not only a secular lacuna in leadership but an absence of spiritual focus. Pope Pius XI seemed to provide that leadership by filling in the political vacuum; at the same time pointing to a new renewal, a spiritual renewal in the kingship of Christ that will bring everlasting peace.

[289]The editors' notes: "Pope Pius XI, *Quadragesimo anno*, (1931), London: Catholic truth Society, n. 67. [Denzinger-Schonmetzer, *Enchiridion symbolorum*, 3725, has excerpts, but for Lonergan's point see Acta Apostolicae Sedis 23 (1931) 226, on the difficult role of priests, 'ad quam obeundam acri de re sociali studio rite parandi sunt quicumque in spem Ecclesiae adolescent.'] The translation Pope Pius XI, *Quadragesimo anno*, (1931), is used in this study. See the reference Lonergan makes in *Quadragesimo anno*, n. 142. http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno.html accessed 11 September 2017.

be till there is a *Summa Sociologica:* without that we would only flounder in the blundering and false science that created the problem." (156-7)

Lonergan believes that this "false science" is a negation that militates against achieving a *Summa Sociologica*. Hence he discusses the problems created by the false science in his second point. The first intellectual benefit mentioned pertains to human shortcomings of "sensism and nominalism," while the "second benefit (is) of the absolute *Geist* as an intellectualism." (157) Sensism, nominalism, and intellectualism are examples of consequential procedures that may lead to evil choices. Lonergan points out that "the natural means for man to overcome the evils consequent upon the low *enérgeia* of intellect," is to pay particular attention to "the internal and external disharmony called concupiscence." (157) This whole discussion resonates with the discussion Lonergan took up early in the ninth point of the second subsection of this paper, "The historical determination of intellect," particularly what is explored in pages 145-6. Lonergan's emphasis is on the integrity of the unity discovered in authentic reasonableness within the intellectual development.

In the following six bullet points Lonergan gives a summary overview of a program envisaged with his theory of *Summa Sociologica*:

- "First, it would seem that the sacraments are not intended to exorcise the evil;
- second, it would seem that concupiscence, being the extrinsic privation of an instrumental means to an end, can be overcome by Christ;
- third it is evident that wise laws wisely administered and adapted do much to mitigate the external disharmony;
- fourth, it is evident that intellectual culture does much to blunt the crudity of passion;

- fifth, there is reason to believe that an intelligently ruled economic and the continued advance of science will give man much more leisure for the development of his higher faculties in the future than in the past;
- sixth, we are beginning to understand more of human physiology and of the subconscious activity of the soul on the organism so that a development of educational theory may enable man to solve problems he now views with all the scientific penetration of a Mongolian herdsman." (157)

These six points reveal what Lonergan intended to explore within his theory of *Summa Sociologica:* the sciences of law, biology, physics, history, economics, psychology, behavioral psychology, and anthropology were all to be incorporated within philosophy and theology that would pave the way for a new theory for a new social order. Lonergan's work in later years would be examined by others in various fields of categorical sciences.[290]

## 2. Christ – the Absolute *Geist*

One of the familiar elements in the opening words of the *Pantôn* is Lonergan's use of St. Paul's metaphorical image of a body. Lonergan used this image to demonstrate his philosophical notion of unity. As he gradually moves to wind up the discussion on his metaphysic of history, Lonergan's arguments are centered on the cause of the disintegration of this unity and on who is going to restore unity and how it is to be done. The focus is clearly geared towards the role of Christ in history, who alone can restore again the unity of the created world. "It is in this sphere of the role of the absolute *Geist* that Christ most luminously appears as the *pantôn anakephalaiôsis*." (157)

[290] Mark Miller for instance, explored in his study two important disciplines in modern Lonergan scholarship: Lonergan's anthropology and his soteriology. They are presented in his *Pantôn* as a single point of departure in working out his metaphysic of history. Clearly, we can see here the origin of some of his later major work beginning to take shape. See M. T Miller, *Why the Passion? Bernard Lonergan on the Cross as Communication.* (Boston: Boston College University Libraries, Electronic thesis) 2008.

Lonergan points to Adam's sin as the main cause of the human fall, and the subsequent disintegration of the unity. "By one man sin entered into the world, and in virtue of that one entry sin reigned. Now the reign of sin is a progressive atomization of humanity." (157) The philosophical explanation of the 'fall' and the 'restoration' of unity are key themes in Lonergan's discussion. "The idea is the principle of unity, but sin, acting contrary to reason, destroys the unity; the idea is a formal cause…(which) must be joined with the effective causality of will to give effective unity." (157-8)

While expanding his philosophical arguments on dialectics, namely, the fall and restoration, Lonergan shifts his arguments. That is, he moves from his ontological interpretation of Christology[291] to a soteriology in which the idea of eternal salvation becomes prominent. As was noted earlier, Lonergan's Christology was primarily Pauline from the outset and it remained so throughout the *Pantôn*. Building further onto the Pauline foundations, Lonergan moves to his next line of thought:

> Christ as the new head of humanity, as the reunification and reintegration of what is torn asunder by sin, is the originator of the absolute *Geist* of dogma, is the absolute of intellect in which participates the church, the *kononia* [1 Corinthians 1: 9, 10, 16, etc.] the communion. (158)

There is significant evidence here to suggest that Lonergan does work toward a narrative of a theology of redemptive praxis.

These two concepts: "absolute *Geist* of dogma" and the "absolute intellect" appear again in this final part of the essay, as a way of concluding remarks. For Lonergan, "The absolute *Geist* of dogma that progresses without ever falling back; it is the light of the world that selects the pure element of truth in the incomplete acts of the *objective* Geist." Equally, the "intellect is the principle of human operations in unity; it is the principle of peace." (158) Lonergan takes the next few lines to expand his explanation of peace. He does that by citing

[291] In the beginning of his book, Fredrick Crowe had made an attempt to trace the *Pantôn* essays to see if there was the evolution of Lonergan's Christology. F. E Crowe, *CH*, 30-7.

the examples of peace found in "the Messianic prophecies, …the angels hymn at Bethlehem, ... the discourse of the Last Supper…(and) the texts in St Paul on the *anakephalaiôsis*." (158) In these biblical references, "we always find the work of Christ described as the work of peace, the peace of a universal king." (158) That peace emanating from Christ according to Lonergan is what "the world of sin with its balance of power and its economic imperialism cannot give." (158)

Lonergan further cites direct Pauline references to bring home his interpretation of peace. Two prominent texts stand out: (Colossians 1:19, 20; and Ephesians 1:9, 10). Singling out the concept of *mystery* from St. Paul's letter to the Ephesians 1:9, Lonergan takes a new venture into setting a new paradigm shift within the ancient Greek social philosophy. "It is then the 'mystery' (Ephesians 1:9) of the *anakephalaiôsis* that Christ is Plato's philosopher king.[292] Plato saw the social necessity of philosophy, and before he died he renounced philosophy to play the ancient sage that gave men wise laws.[293] But what Plato dreamt of, Christ would realize."[294] (158) Peace lies in the mystery of the salvific work of Christ. This has to be discovered in Christ.

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[292] The phrase *philosopher-king* was originally coined and used by Plato in the dialogues of Socrates that appear in Plato's *Republic*, beginning with references to Book (s) I, all the way to Book X. Socrates discusses at length the tyrannical constitution of a city, especially in Book VIII which lays out the detailed argument of the phrase itself. Book VIII contains Socrates' discussions regarding the four unjust constitutions: timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. Socrates argues that the ideal government will begin with aristocracy because it is ruled by a 'philosopher-king' whose regime is a just government guided principally by the wisdom-loving elements. What happens next according to Socrates is that a society will decay and pass through each of the four governments in succession, from timocracy, to oligarchy, and on to democracy, and eventually becoming a tyranny, the most unjust regime of all. Lonergan coins the phrase, "Christ is Plato's philosopher-king" to make references to his reading of Socrates' ideal city. My understanding is that Lonergan is hopeful to find some relevance to a new order restored by the promised Kingship of Christ, even beyond the abstract notion of what Plato taught through the dialogues of Socrates' ideal city.

[293] Editor's notes: "Plato saw the social necessity of philosophy: over forty years later Lonergan had forgotten this insight of his youth and will say he learned it from Voegelin: 'I had always been given the impression that Plato's dialogues were concerned with pure intellect until I read Dr. Voegelin and learned that they were concerned with social decline, the break-up of the Greek city-states. It was human reasonableness trying to deal with an objective social, political mess' (in E. Cahn and C. Going [eds.], *The Question as commitment: A Symposium* (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1977), 119."

[294] I would assume that Lonergan found in Socrates' discussions in Plato, especially in the *Republic* Bk IV, 426-435, and further reference to *Protagoras*, 330b, some compatibility of Plato's scheme of virtues, which are to have parallel value to the theological and cardinal virtues. Lonergan made an attempt to incorporate those two combinations into his Christology.

Consolidating compatible, yet distinct contributions, from both Plato and Christ in reaching to the ideals of peace, Lonergan turns his attention immediately to challenging the role of the Church.

> The Church holds in check false speculation by anathemas; the church prevents the rationalization of making out that what is sin is no sin by imposing the obligation of auricular confession; the Church gives the human will the support of grace that flows though the sacraments; the church teaches the distinctive doctrine of Christ, which is charity, the only means of overcoming evil of error and sin.[295] (158-9)

Lonergan has a radical view contrary to the Church's existing role. He suggests "the only alternative to a dialectic of sin which takes objective evil as a premise and elaborates false principles as laws for the greater misery of mankind" (159) is to devise a radically new paradigm within the Church and its principle role in applying the theological virtues.[296]

### 3. The Concept of Human Solidarity

Before circumnavigating his main discussion points in this essay Lonergan returns to his familiar theme once more: "Christ is the *anakephalaiôsis* of humanity as the light of the world, the principle of human unity, the prince of peace." (159) While emphasizing this familiar theme Lonergan introduces a concept which appears for the first time in this essay. Hence, he introduces Christ as the divine word, a concept which may add a significant contribution to his central point of discussion: "Christ is the *anakephalaiôsis* of humanity." Later he adds: "the divine word is not only a source of intellectual light but also the object for the love of the will; for the will is a 'natural inclination that follows the form of intellect.' (159)

[295] Here I have a doubt whether Lonergan saw the Church as the perfect society or as representing the ideals of an aristocratic regime. I am happy to be advised!

[296] We shall wait until we reach the study of the next essay ACH (2) to see a clear reference to Lonergan's articulation of his theological virtues. See B. Lonergan, ACH (2), 22 & 25.

Supplementing his interpretation of peace and unity, Lonergan brings the theological virtue of charity into the forum of discussion. “From Christ by the sending of the Holy Ghost proceeds the active spiration in the human image of the Trinity; and in response to the active influences is the passive supernatural love of man, the theological virtue of charity.” (159) To clarify his point especially in expanding the interpretation of charity, Lonergan cites St Paul’s letter to the Romans 8:35-18. While running his commentaries on this text concerning charity, Lonergan brings home two concepts that he had maintained all along throughout the entire essay: unity and human solidarity. “In this love Christ is the center of the love which all men must have for all men in the unity of human nature and the solidarity of human operation.” (159) Placing charity central to his discussion Lonergan draws additional scriptural support from Matthew 25:37-39.

That the virtue of charity exists at the heart of a human society is Lonergan’s idea of a supernatural order of things. “This is true not only of the supernatural order of attaining the beatific vision. It is equally true of the social order; all things must be restored in Christ or there can be no restoration.” (159) Yet this will remain ideal as Lonergan goes on to identify some of these challenges. These are namely, that the “twofold problem of intellectual unity and effective will is beyond the reach of man. Man is not willing to take himself as no more than an instrument. It is hard for him to see the truth of the alternative set him by St Paul.” (159) Lonergan does offer some suggestions to clarify his argument with the support of resources drawn again from the Pauline texts, mainly, Romans 6:12-13.

Analyzing St. Paul’s texts regarding moral virtues, Lonergan applies dialectics to enhance his theological argument. “Man can choose only between the service of reason and of passion, only between the service of God or of sin, only between the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of Satan.” (160) Pertaining to human freedom, Lonergan pursues his argument as he focuses on the virtue of selfless giving. Laying down one’s life for others in

the name of a good cause is attainable towards his idea of social order. “Man has to live as one alive from the dead, in perpetual rite of sacrifice. Sacrifice, the shedding of blood, that is the whole meaning of life; and in this eternal oblation Christ is the first agent.” (160) Finally Lonergan comments: “Let us close this aspect of our question with a citation from Donoso Cortes.”[297]

> The city of God and the city of the world stand in sharpest contrast, not really because blood is spilt in the one but not in the other, but because in the one love spills blood, in the other hate.[298]

At this point Lonergan signals he is drawing towards a conclusion. “We now come to the final antithesis between the first and second Adam; this is at the same time the final synthesis of history, Christ as the formal cause and through the Holy Spirit the efficient cause of the end of all creation, the manifestation of divine wisdom in heaven as well as on earth.” (160) This sentence best sums up Lonergan’s dialectic of history, and introduces his Christology, which will then be integrated into his theology of redeeming history. While still pursuing his discussions on dialectics, Lonergan turns his attention to the questions that deal with creation, human freedom, good and evil, sin and grace. “First, we must ask why God did not create a universe in which there would be no sin, for obviously he could have created such a universe, and that irrespective of the liberty of creatures and the temptations they were subjected to. God has created those creatures that would sin. We ask why?” (160) Finally, Lonergan goes on to answer the series of questions he raises. “The answer is well known: the divine wisdom in its transcendence of mystery and grace is better revealed when there are

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[297] Editor’s notes: “(cited by Erich Przywara *in Stimmen der Zwit,* p. 14, April 1935).’ (A slight inaccuracy in the quotation (omission of dots between ‘Welt’ and ‘Stehen’) has been corrected. Przywara’s article, Dionysisches und christlinches opfer,’ vol. 129, pp. 11-24, studied Nietzsche and Donoso Cortes as representatives and prophets of the two ways of thinking indicated in the title. A few years later, reviving Caryll Houselander’s *This War is the Passion*, Lonergan will write… “the question is not whether one chooses. A neglected philosopher of the 19th-century Spain was right in summing up the vast long scroll of mankind in a single phrase: “Blood must flow; the only question is whether it flow in hatred or in love.”” (*The Canadian Register,* April 11, 1942, p.5) Donoso is quoted also in ‘Analytic Concept of History’ in File 713.)

[298] This is the English translation by Kathleen Williams from the original German text.

some creatures that actually do sin; and it is not in the manifestation of divine justice by the punishment of sinners that this greater manifestation arises for any penalty is a privation, and God does not reveal himself by negations, however terrible; the greater manifestation of divine wisdom lies in the need for grace that is created by sin."[299] (160)

### 4. The Supernatural Order

Lonergan makes two points to clarify the answer he provides in the previous discussion. These two points then form the key framework in his theological argument, more specifically on his emerging narrative of a theology of grace. "In the first place, there must be such a need: for God is intelligent and so cannot do things unnecessarily. In the second place, sin creates such a need." (160) Intelligence and necessity are key concepts in this essay that play an important role in his argument. In this present discussion these two concepts are to explain the availability and the operations of grace. Thus he continues; "But this need is specifically different, as it were, in the sin of the angels and in the sin of man."[300] (160) Lonergan argues that the sin of angels is strictly individual whereas with humans, it "is not confined to the potential individual but, through the metaphysical unity that makes the many potential individuals one in nature and in operation, extends from the one potential individual to the nature and the operation of all the potential individuals." (160-1) This argument paves the way for the discussions that he takes up in dealing with dialectics: the existence of original sin and the operations of grace.

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[299] In the early part of this essay Lonergan had hinted at the discussions concerning nature, sin and grace. He is returning to these discussions once more. Again this is a working paper, not a comprehensive study of the notion of grace itself. We wait many years later until we see in his doctoral work, *Grace and Freedom*, when Lonergan's thorough investigation gets to the original discussions in the historical development and its significance of the theology of grace.

[300] This sentence that Lonergan uses may have emanated from the letter of St Peter, (*2 Pet* 2:4), yet the discussions he takes on are radical. What Lonergan intends to do is to analyze, Part One, Section two, paragraph 7, #193, #192 and #193, of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p1s2c1p7.htm accessed 15 October 2017, in order to open his philosophical quest into discussing the issue of historical sin, and its subsequent effects.

> Thus the sin of Adam is, as it were, an anomaly: for in virtue of what man actually is (one nature potentially many individuals) reason requires that all sin in Adam; but in virtue of what man potentially is (many intelligibly distinct individuals proceeding from one nature) reason would require that not all sin in Adam. (161)

Applying his metaphysical analogy of redemption, Lonergan presents his case as to why Adam's sin would be considered original. In Lonergan's view, reason would best explain the narrative of the original sin; as he claims,

> I say: 'Reason would require it.' The condition implied is that reason would require it if the many potential individuals were not merely potential individuals; thus the condition is really an impossibility, a contradiction, for the many men can be intelligibly distinct only through their potentiality in the one human nature. (161)

While reason is Lonergan's fundamental concept needed for explaining sin in Adam's fall, what remains an underlying factor is his dialectical discourse developed within his metaphysics of history.[301] In this particular discussion, the idea of a dialectical discourse explains the "antithesis" and the "synthesis of history" (160) that becomes "the basis of this quasi anomaly that divine mercy finds an opportunity to intervene and bring forth the 'new creation' (2 Corinthians 5:17; Galatians 6:15) through Christ Jesus." (161) Reaching a synthesis is the "metaphysical principle of redemption." (150) This is the central theme that Lonergan had sought all along in the *Pantôn*. Hence, he concludes that this is "a creation that in its transcendence of mystery and grace reveals the Word by the Word in a way that no single creation could achieve: to reveal the infinite there must be an infinite to be made issue with; infinite wisdom conquers the infinity of sin." (161)

[301] It is my assumption that what Lonergan deals with here will be used posthumously in more comprehensive study with his "scissors action" analogy to explain the dialectics by historical, structural and institutional concepts, which are constitutive aspects to the notion of sin. See B. Lonergan, *Insight*, 87, 114-15, 337-38, 486, 546, 554, 600-1, 603 & 609.

In these few lines, Lonergan has gathered together a volume of theological concepts. Among them is his theological narrative of revelation. In his phrase, 'reveals the Word by the Word,' Lonergan points to the activity of God's descending will in *the* theology of Revelation. Earlier he alluded to God's revelation: in God's sharing, or communicating His divine goodness to humanity. This time Lonergan emphasizes that the Incarnation is God's highest form of revelation.

> Hence as matter is for form so, in some analogous way, the sin of the first Adam is for the mystery of faith in Christ Jesus. But the savior is not merely the supernatural pendent to Adam's infranatural sin: his significance is cosmic; he restores all things whether on earth or in heaven. Now this restoration of all things must be the final settling of accounts with sin. How is it such? (161)

In revelation there is a reciprocal gesture: in the act of faith we reach out to accept God's offer in the gift of grace. God's offer of life and love is experienced and accepted in faith. Both revelation and faith are then reciprocal acts explored in a mutual relationship. But it is God who takes the first step in (Revelation) Christ by offering God's very self, God's very mystery to humanity. This premises becomes Lonergan's key theological narrative as he concludes the essay.

### 5. The Universal Kingship of Christ

The dialectical disposition that exists between Christ and history takes us to the final part of this discussion. Clearly, Lonergan is still working his way through to a concluding synopsis but found himself to be repetitious. As he moves between the different categories of theological disciplines, the clustered material becomes ambiguous. Yet, Lonergan maintains firmly focused to his key argument: the significant role of Christ in history.

"First... the unity of human nature and operation –a unity that unfolds through a material to an intelligible plurality –is the connatural instrument for a victory over sin: for in this one nature and operation sin is not an isolated and instantaneous emergence of evil."

(161) Lonergan's compelling worldview is an order presented by a dialectical existence of unity and sin. The act of sin is not an isolated event. Clearly, evil is part of the created order. In the cycle and re-cycle of the cosmic events, unity "dilutes itself in time and spreads out into a reign of sin till sin culminates in monstrosity and topples over from its own enormity." (161) Lonergan makes reference to the fact that "the antinomy of church and state, in modern times, through a dialectic of sin, became first the heresies, then the liberal states, and finally Bolshevik Russia[302] where sin in its pure form is organized by error, rules by terrorism, and attains security by the perversion of youth." (161) Hence, he remains critical of the Bolshevik movement within the Marxist sect:

> for Bolshevism is the social consequent of liberalism, and liberalism is the social consequent of heresy, and heresy is the social consequent of the opposition of church and state, and the opposition of Church and state is inevitable as long as men are children of Adam—a predication that neither churchmen nor statesmen can avoid. (162)

Interestingly, Lonergan concludes his first point posing this question: "Is then the situation hopeless?" (162) Answering his question, Lonergan affirms, "Certainly, unless we settle down, face the facts, and think on the abstract level of modern history." (162)

In his second point, Lonergan gradually shifts his discussion to a higher narrative of a theological content. "Second, we note the solidarity between the sin of the angels and the sin of man." (162) Again here, for the last time, Lonergan goes back to his Thomist analogy to demonstrate this point.

> On the principle of 'whatever is moved is moved by something else' it would have been impossible for Adam to think of sinning unless the serpent had intervened to tempt him through Eve. Adam was not as we are; he was not ignorant; he was not weak; he suffered no premotion contrary to his nature; the premotion to sin had to have an extrinsic origin. Thus the reign of sin on earth takes its origin in the father of lies; Adam by sin made himself the instrument of

[302] This can be the reference to Lonergan's view of the decline of unity, and its subsequent disintegration that evolves over time, part of a structural and constitutive aspect of modern history. See for instance this analysis of Bolshevism by Wil Englund, "Red Century," https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/world/100-years-of-communism/?utm_term=.8cd2a2e5ec9c accessed 26 October 2017.

> Satan's premotion; the reign of sin is the reign of Satan and a terrestrial repercussion of the sin of the angels. (162)

Lonergan makes it clear that what is detrimental are the external factors that contribute to the decline in history. These are symbolized by the act of the first Adam. Christ, in the second Adam, however, has restored the natural order of creation. Therefore, Christ is the culmination of a restored history. This is a point Lonergan labors to consolidate in his evolving concept of a metaphysical redemption. Hence, he concludes:

> the kingdom of God, Christ, the Messianic King, the Prince of Peace, the eternal High Priest and Victim, the Light of the world and the 'First Agent' of the reillumination of man, through the 'fullness' [Ephesians 1: 23, 3:19, 4:13; Colossians 1:19, 2:9] of the achievement in his first advent, shall in his second advent finally settle all accounts with sin whether on heaven or on earth. (162)

As can be expected, Lonergan ends his essay with the achievement of Christ in the cosmic order. History culminates in Christ, "the Omega point." Christ is not just a synthesis, but "is the *anakephalaiôsis* of humanity." (159) Indeed,

> He is the head of the body, the Church; he is the beginning, the first-born from the dead, that in everything he might be *preeminent*. For in him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, *making peace* by the *blood* of his cross (Colossians 1:18-20).[303]

The theme that takes us to the end of this essay is the papal teaching of Pope Pius IX. Indeed, Lonergan took Pope Pius IX's devotion to the feast of Christ the King very seriously. The experience of a waning decline in political leadership globally, especially the lack of confidence given to secular governments with so many wars escalating across the face of the earth led Lonergan to a profound reflection. The solution, in his view was to bring back a figure central to restoring peace and well-being to humanity. This figure was to be found in

[303] Consequently, Lonergan sums up his PA (1) with this quote from St. Paul's letter to the Colossians 1:18-20. The word or phrase that Lonergan emphasized in his essay are in italics.

Christ the King. Hence, the overall discussion of the *Pantôn* is pointed towards the central role of the promised Kingship of Christ.

## Conclusion

The study in this chapter is taken up with the exposition of two key themes of the essay: restoration and human solidarity. Lonergan draws on the Thomist synthesis to prepare a solid philosophical foundation so as to devise his idea of history. At the same time, he draws on the Pauline doctrine so that the same principle of unity discovered in Christ can also be equally grounded in the scriptures. Hence, the Pauline scriptural themes of unity, restoration and the mystical body find a new dialogue with the ancient philosophical notion of matter, body, spirit and soul in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. In a momentous way, the manuscript has provided original sources to reveal a programmatic plan Lonergan had envisaged in his formative years. This scheme points towards an expression of Lonergan's early intention to devise a theology of history. Though the essay was still in the infant stages of its development it reveals an important part of Lonergan's elementary work in launching a narrative of a theology of redeeming history.

Overall, the aim of the essay according to this study was to discover a sociological praxis to interpret St. Paul's Christology. Some of the issues that remain at the heart of the *Pantôn* are unity, human solidarity, restoration, peace and above all the grace of the salvific redemption received in the kingship of Christ. Yet, the key message that resonates deeply at the background of the Pauline theology of unity is Lonergan's early concerns regarding "a decadent state of Catholic thought"[304] that needs serious renewal, a critical reformation and a complete transformation of the Church and society at large. Lonergan ended the *Pantôn* with

[304] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134. Editors' Preface.

a theme of restoration. Succinctly, the whole essay is about restoration: the *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*.

# Chapter Three: An 'Analytic Concept of History'

The previous chapter examined the main idea in Lonergan's dialectic of history through a careful study of the *Pantôn* papers, a significant manuscript from Lonergan's historical File 713.[305] This essay covered the rudimentary part of Lonergan's very early interest in his study of history. Although the essay provided us with an introduction into Lonergan's study of history it did not portray him as an historian nor did it focus on Lonergan's role as an historian.[306] Yet, as Frederick Crowe points out later:

> Lonergan in 1935 was deep into matters of empirical history: Marxism, racism, continental Liberalism, the role of philosophy in human affairs, and so on, matters from which more mature reflection may have led him to withdraw, leaving the field to the historians.[307]

The aim of this chapter is to draw on Lonergan's primary interest in appropriating the study of social history. To do so, this chapter will initiate a study of another principal essay, namely the 'Analytic Concept of History.' This manuscript is also part of the collection of "papers from that most intriguing file which he numbered 713 and named simply "history.""[308] Hence, this item is now found in Michael Shute's Batch B collection of the listed manuscripts of File 713.[309]

Two basic tasks shall be achieved in this chapter. The first will be to expand the investigation already initiated by the previous chapter through the study of the *Pantôn* papers, given that some significant themes which are found in the previous essay are also discussed in the second one. This chapter shall assess the given data to explore the possibility of an early expression of Lonergan's intention to devise a theory of a dialectic of history. The

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[305] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134-172.

[306] B. Lonergan, *MIT*, 197-203. What Lonergan aimed to do with history was to set critical study in history as a bedrock for further theological development. See also Crowe, *CH*, 177-8.

[307] F. E Crowe, *CH*, 37.

[308] Editors notes. B. Lonergan, ACH (2), 1.

[309] See Appendix A.

roadmap which he had initiated in the study of the previous essay shall now be carried on in the present task. Hence, this chapter shall be a clear sequel to the preceding one.

The second task is specific to the study of the PA (2) itself, namely to examine the method Lonergan devises to study his idea of a dialectic of history. The essay is composed within a well set out structure; in fact, Lonergan begins the essay by constructing the framework. Using this coherent structure, he proceeds to spell out the details of his intended topic, history. First, he presents a definition of the concept of history. Second, he discusses the philosophical principles that contribute towards a clear understanding that underscores the meaning of dialectic. This discussion then opens up the fundamental task of the analytic method of evaluating the concept of history. It proceeds to use the consistent framework of a dialectic of history to develop a theology.

Hence, these two main themes: a dialectic of history and a praxis of redemptive history are condensed in this single essay. Accordingly, to adequately cover the essential areas of the essay, this thesis has spread the study of ACH (2) over two chapters: chapters three and four. The theological analysis will be part of the investigation into this manuscript, but it shall be fully explored in the next chapter.

## I. The Structural Composition of the Essay

The published version of the essay, "Analytic Concept of History" is one of the three companion papers, originally clustered but discrete manuscripts found in File 713. These are: (1) 'Outline of an Analytic Concept of History,' OACH, (2) 'Analytic concept of History in Blurred Outline,' ACH (1) and (3) 'Analytic Concept of History' ACH (2).[310] In the given outline, the three original essays would appear with this pattern.[311]

1. Analytic Concept of History. ACH (2)
2. Outline of an Analytic Concept of History. OACH
3. Analytic concept of History in Blurred Outline. ACH (1)

Michael Shute added a fourth manuscript: 'A Theory of History,' [TH] which he thought was closely tied to these three sheaves. In rearranging the accepted eight manuscripts into chronological order, Shute placed this essay together with these three sheaves, thus completing his batch B category.[312] Shute was of the opinion that these four items found in batch B category were the final papers of Lonergan's work in history.[313] He concluded that the essay [TH] may have preceded the three sheaves chronologically and so decided to locate it first in his batch B listing. Hence, Shute claimed that the tentative chronological ordering of these four essays is sourced from Lonergan's own later writings.[314]

The original manual typescripts of these four essays in Shute's batch B categorization reveal not only the richly developed contents of these early essays, but also the stamina and

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[310] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 175. Abbreviations provided in the appendix. See Appendix A.

[311] I follow the order which the editors presented in B. Lonergan, PA (2). The editors noted the reverse order of the manuscripts, namely that the published essay is the last of the three sheaves. "For one thing, it has the notation on the title page '(Return to Father Lonergan),' an indication that this is the paper he would lend to those who wished to study his views on history. That would account for its being on top of the others, and tend to justify the 'reverse order' for the location of this item at least." Editorial Notes.

[312] Shute's division and Order of the manuscripts. See the appendix A

[313] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 122. Shute formed an opinion that these three discrete manuscripts which are similar in topic presentation and layout were thought to originate from a single working paper and therefore were located in Batch B with probable dating between 1937 and 1938.

[314] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 72-3 & 5.

the determination of the author. Noted earlier in the study of the *Pantôn* essays, Lonergan's hand written corrections within the pages and in the margins tell us how he had thought through these issues and put his efforts not only into formulating his idea of history but also into clarifying the ideas already drafted through these working papers.[315] A careful assessment of these essays reveals that [TH] contains nine pages, ACH (2) has seventeen pages, ACH (1) has eighteen pages, and [OACH] has nineteen pages. [TH] is a short, but dense paper. Its layout, and the style of writing resemble PA (1) and PA (2) essays. Though there is some similarity in the content it is yet to be fully developed. It could appear that this essay is a continuation of the discussions in the *Pantôn* essays but as will be shown later in this study, Shute argues successfully that this is not the case.

The three sheaves have their commonalities but they also have features that differentiate them. For instance, two of them, ACH (2) and ACH (1) are almost identical. Their outlines run concurrently; only the use of an alternative word or phrase seems to differentiate them. This is reflected also in their respective contents. The disadvantage perhaps is to view these two virtually identical essays as repetitious of each other. It can be considered that the ACH (1) was a preparatory draft that later became ACH (2) in its final corrected version. Meanwhile the essay [OACH] is quite unique in its style and formation. It differs from these two virtually identical essays in style but retains some similarity to their contents. Some of its features, particularly the outline bear a resemblance to the fourth essay, [TH]. Shute added more clarity to the formation of these four essays in his batch B category.

> The manuscripts are more in the nature of sketches than essays. They are, however, very suggestive, rich in content, and indicate clearly the basic elements and structure of his theory. They show a marked development beyond the manuscripts of batch A with regard to the question of a dialectic of history. "A Theory of History," on the other hand, is somewhat less developed and so would have been written earlier. It does not refer to the "analytic concept of history," though the fundamental elements of the theory are present. It marks an

[315] We are told that Lonergan never reverted to these notes in his mature years; fortunately, they have survived to be studied after his death.

> intermediary stage between the work in the first set of manuscripts and those explicitly dealing with the "analytic concept of history."[316]

While proceeding to compare the ACH (2) essay with the other sets of the companion essays in his batch B category, Shute came to the conclusion that the arguments found in this essay seemed to have developed beyond Lonergan's previous thoughts.[317] There is however, no evidence to suggest that the *Pantôn* papers may be considered to be a continuum. Yet, Crowe and Doran accepted Shute's inference that the ACH (2) was the last of the "three sheaves with similar titles in File 713,"[318] and that it "was Lonergan's final effort in this early period to work out a theory of history, and the last in chronology of the eight sheaves he kept together in File 713."[319] They also concurred with Shute that the ACH (2) was the most developed essay among the four, and therefore preferred to publish it after the *Pantôn* papers.[320] Furthermore, they have enhanced this essay with fine editing, included additional editorial notes, translated Latin texts, improved the outline settings, and furnished the essay with pertinent resources in somewhat the same way as they did for the PA (1) and PA (2) essays.

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[316] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 73.

[317] Michael Shute presents the evidence of dating these items in his thorough study of file 713. See M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 72-8.

[318] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), 30. footnote # 1.

[319] Ibid., 2. Editorial Notes.

[320] Given its rich content and supplemented by additional editorial notes, I chose to study the essay in this chapter. For consistency, I shall use the page numbers of the published version within the sentences throughout the chapter. This shall be done with the aid of Lonergan's original manual typed copy.

## 1. An Outline of the Major Topics

The published essay, ACH (2), reveals elements of its composition. It has eight main headings. In his draft, Lonergan had these eight main topics laid out systematically. We shall begin now to analyze the essay.[321]

(1) Analytic concepts
(2) History
(3) A dialectic
(4) The three categories
(5) The Ideal Line of History
(6) Decline
(7) Renaissance, and
(8) The Multiple Dialectic.

The preliminary notes in this essay were Lonergan's private notes. Therefore, it is not easy to ascertain the message of the introductory words of this first section. What we can establish within these notes, however, is that Lonergan had attempted to clarify the three concepts that became the title of this essay. These are namely, (i) analytic, (ii) concept, and (iii) history. The opening part of this essay deals with the first two notions: 'analytic,' and 'concept,' while the rest deals with the discussion on the notion of 'history.' Judging from the given title, 'analytic,' and 'concept' are clearly used in this section as the prefix to the third notion, 'history,' thereby forming a preface to the essay. Ultimately, these two terms remain explanatory notes to 'history.'[322]

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[321] Somewhat similar to what I did in chapter two in dealing with the study of the *Pantôn* papers, in this study I have also added considerable references from my own research into the contents of the ACH (2). In most cases I relied on the expanded resources Crowe and Doran provided in their editorial notes; in other places, I have attempted to draw out the original resources I thought Lonergan may have used. Again this experience had enriched me with the originality of Lonergan's own sources. It has given me rare access to Lonergan's original copy of the manual-typed manuscript and his own handwritten notes included in the margins.

[322] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), 30, footnote #2. "Concepts of apprehension and concepts of understanding are related to the nominal and essential (or explanatory) definitions of later writing; see *Collection, CWL* 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) pp. 93-98 and 272 (note c to ch. 6); likewise *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, CWL* 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 781, note g to ch. 1. But there has been a significant change in the interval: the later Lonergan would not set knowing 'what it is' apart from understanding."

Although his preliminary notes are sketchily brief, the basic message can be communicated. What Lonergan managed to communicate was the process of analyzing the key historical data. This process would include how data is to be collected, marshalled and interpreted. Lonergan's deep concern was that the concrete data be logically and accurately presented, so that it could be better understood. To do this required a method. The method in his search is basically analytical. In its investigative role it shall provide reliable information to clarify how history is relevant to concrete human living. Lonergan has six key points in which he attempted to expand his proceedings.

1. "When the act of understanding is the unification of abstract terms, these terms may be a logical or a real multiplicity." (7)

2. "The essential definition of man, 'rational animal,' is a logical multiplicity, genus and difference." (8)

3. "The following analytic concepts are based upon real analysis." (8)

4. "The metaphysical concept of material reality as a compound of existence and essence, accident and substance, matter and form." (8)

5. "The chemist's concept of material things as compounds of elements." (8)

6. "The Newtonian analysis of planetary motion as a straight line modified by accelerations towards the sun and the other planets."[323] (8)

Of the six points, the first four are clearly reminiscent of the metaphysical arguments found in the *Pantôn* papers. These were the notions of potency, form and act as well as existence and essence, accident and substance. They were to constitute a unity found within a single understanding of the domain of the proportionate being.[324] These concepts were key to

[323] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), footnote # 8 "The analogy with Newton's laws of planetary motion is drawn again thirty-five years later; See *A Second Collection* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 271-72, in the 1973 paper "Insight Revisited."

[324] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134-172. What is outlined here can be considered a shorthand summary, a preliminary to a comprehensive exposition in later years dealing with what he termed as 'the elements of metaphysics' in *Insight*. See B. Lonergan, *Insight*, 456-476.

clarifying Lonergan's arguments on human solidarity, harmony and unity. By introducing these four points again, it is possible that Lonergan had intended to develop them further. The fifth and the sixth ones are rather new points; clearly a later inclusion that is peculiar to the ACH (2) essay.[325]

Very little can be said about the fifth point as there is no further reference. What can be said about the fifth point would be done in the context of the sixth point. The sixth point is crystal clear: Lonergan aligned himself firmly with Isaac Newton's planetary theory. This is an interestingly new approach to pursuing his study of critical history. In the previous study of the *Pantôn* we discovered that the Thomistic notion of a metaphysics of history namely, 'historical causation' became so central to his study of history. There is, however, a notably significant shift in this manuscript. Lonergan makes a clear move towards accommodating Isaac Newton's 'ideal construct.'[326] This becomes a useful resource for Lonergan to devise his new structural plan which will then enhance his idea of history. Undoubtedly, the attempt to integrate his previous Aristotelian-Thomist and the Hegelian idea of a dialectics of history with Isaac Newton's laws of movement adds a potentially new direction.[327]

## 2. Science and Philosophy

This essay begins to disclose a considerable interest Lonergan had towards Isaac Newtown's planetary theory. Newton's mathematical calculus on the gravity of movement was to become a salient part of Lonergan's working apparatus. Thus, the fifth point does matter, having been reached prior to his sixth point in which he was to introduce Newton's planetary theory of motion. Lonergan had already accommodated in this essay other various

[325] There are no concrete facts to suggest that the ACH (2) is a continuation of the *Pantôn* papers.

[326] Gerald Whelan asserted in his study that Lonergan had positioned himself in relation to Isaac Newton's 'ideal construct.' See G. Whelan, *DLNDH*, 50.

[327] B. Lonergan, IR, 271.

thought-processes such as those of Newman and Euclid,[328] and he had also engaged with Thompson's[329] scientific theory. Though these were minor and perhaps merely background contributing factors yet they were equally influential. They would have provided the bases for him to develop his philosophical "concept of material things as compounds of elements." (8) The unifying factor will be significant, as Lonergan attempts to establish the relationship between science and philosophy.

What Lonergan had discovered from Newton's laws of motion was both scientific and philosophical. Newton's statistical laws on movements had helped Lonergan to frame a pattern of historical events in the knowledge of a cyclical rotation. The idea of cycles in the process of history best suited Lonergan's goal to envisage a fitting model in his three-fold structure of a dialectic of history: progress, decline and renaissance. These three approximations represent a metaphoric illustration of Newton's calculus of the graph of a curve that advances, declines, and recovers, and so is able to characterize suitably the dynamics of human history in the cycle of social progress, decline and recovery.

From Newton's theoretical structure, Lonergan devised his theory of history in a three-fold dialectic. This structure is then to be integrated into a larger frame work when the Platonic-Hegelian philosophical principles of thesis, antithesis and synthesis are to be included in the process. Further still, this model will cater for a theological integration of the Augustinian-Thomist tradition of nature, sin and grace.[330] Overall, this frame work is what he foresaw as a 'metaphysics of history.' Hence, the development of the three approximations of progress, decline and renaissance/redemption is to be technically represented in a model of an

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[328] B. Lonergan, ACH (2). These footnote: # 27, 33, 36, & 39 have references to the Heythrop College journal, the *Blandyke Papers*.

[329] B. Lonergan, ACH (2). Footnote #3. "Lonergan surely had in mind Thompson's *Science and Common Sense: An Aristotelian Excursion* (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1937), which speaks of induction that goes from the particular to the general as an ascension, and of its reversal as a descending induction (p.32); neither form of argument can avoid uncertainty, even though the *descending induction* is put into deductive form. For Lonergan's 'begging of the question' Thompson had 'a surreptitious assumption' (p. 33)."

[330] See B. Lonergan, *GF*, 2000 3-20.

analytical operation of various pertinent principles that underscore his neo-Thomistic theme of a *summa sociologica*.[331]

Additionally, Isaac Newton's laws of "the cyclical and statistical role of the intellect in social process"[332] not only helped Lonergan to formulate his three-fold-dialectics in his theory of a dialectic of history but also expanded his view on the evolutionary processes of science. This approach will alter significantly his understanding of the philosophy of history. Hence, it shall contribute considerably to the expansion of the later interpretation of his study of history and historicity, the shift from a classicist worldview to historical consciousness.[333]

These developments would have been triggered by the enormous change in the later nineteenth century idea of progress.[334] The resurgence of scientific scholarship that had sparked a wave of revivals in scriptural, patristic, ecclesial, sacramental, and dogmatic studies, including the reforms needed for seminary studies, had all contributed to a whole range of other renewals.[335] Part of this renewal would have added to the emerging scholarship in the modern approach to the study of a philosophy of history. It can be gleaned from this manuscript that Lonergan was probably aware of that particular development as he pressed on to map out his theory of a metaphysics of history.[336]

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[331] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 156.
[332] W. A Mathews, *LQ*, 74.
[333] B. Lonergan, "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness." *A Third Collection* (1985), 169-183.
[334] W. A Mathews, *LQ*, 74.
[335] See J. A. Komonchak, LEERH, 159-179.
[336] As was noted earlier in this study, we are reading Lonergan of the 1930's. He is dealing with the idea of history made available by the scholarship of that time. By the 1960's his views on the philosophy of history were shaped by the enormous development in modern scholarship. See for instance, R. C. Miner, "Collingwood and Lonergan on Historical Knowledge," *LW*, 19 (2006): 197-209. The English historian, Robin George Collingwood is a case in point. His main historical work, most probably an important work in philosophy known as the "doctrine of re-enactment," is an idea that persisted throughout all his other works. This theory, a summary of Collingwood's idea of history, helped Collingwood to answer fundamentally the crucial questions of the authenticity of history. According to Collingwood not only the historian judges the historical situation from an external standpoint, but also the reader should draw from his mind the thoughts that were taking place in the principal actors involved in historical events. R.G Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946) 137-138. In later years Lonergan drew from Collingwood's philosophical understanding to appropriate his idea of history. See B. Lonergan, *MIT*, 166.

This evolving trend within the study of the philosophy of history brought in several issues to be considered: the historian, the recorded events, the 'actors' found in the recorded events, and the reader at the end of the line. These factors would subsequently bring to light the complicated task of the historian. If history was to be accurate, authentically presented with the genuineness of the specific 'actors' and the 'events' of history, how competent was the study of history itself? What was the intellectual competency of the historian? [337] Lonergan's argument on essential history shall go as far as relating to the validity of the past events which are recounted in the reader's present view. How does the reader establish the facts and then interpret the circumstances? These events shall not be regarded as purely accidental or sporadic but are to be translated into the positive engagement in constructive thought. This was to point to the real shape of history itself. Hence, Newton's 'ideal construct' was to be considered a criterion on which Lonergan was to rely. It was to contribute convincingly to his philosophy of history, because it was relevant to his topical themes: 'analytic' and 'concept,' so that they may articulate Lonergan's primary project: an approach to the *analytic concept* of events in history.[338]

### 2.1 A Synopsis of 'Analytic' and 'Concept'

At the conclusion of this first section of the essay, Lonergan had attempted to sum up the introductory topic by spelling out the meaning of the two main themes: 'analytic' and 'concept.' As he reaches the concluding phase, he completes the formulation with the third

[337] It was probable that while Lonergan was drafting his notes, (c.1937-8) Arnold Toynbee was engaged in his comprehensive study on the history of civilization, *A Study of History* (1934-61). We are told that Lonergan had later kept his notes on Arnold Toynbee's work along with the essay we are studying in the same folder: File 713. See F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, 24. It was also probable that Lonergan sighted Oswald Spengler's massive study, *The Decline of the West* (1918-22) with its pessimistic view of the future. See J. A. Komonchak, LEERH. In contrast, Lonergan developed a more positive idea of history. His evolving idea of a redemptive history was being worked out as he was brainstorming in his notes on dialectic. See also "History as a process of dialectical change: Hegel and Marx," Philosophy of history in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, https://www.britannica.com/ accessed, 11 October 2018.

[338] "Philosophy of History," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online*, s.v. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/Philosophy of history/index.html accessed 28 October 28 2018.

theme namely, history: "The analytic concept of history." The intention at the center of his work was to outline his scheme of things in a clear structure. By articulating these three main themes in a framework we can glean a logical order. "First we understand things diagrammatically, in outline; we get the main point, the basic point of view; then we fill in the details." (8) So Lonergan's main point was an overall strategic structuring of his metaphysics of history. This programmatic schema was to proceed analytically.

An illustration provided by Lonergan can better explain the structure. Consider, for instance, a particular tradesman such as a carpenter on a small scale, or an engineer in a larger and more complex sphere. Both of them need to draw a plan, and design a model that would help them to construct an appropriate structure. In the sketch or the outline design, statistical laws are necessary to demonstrate the conceptual structure and to clarify the relationship between each part that makes a whole design.[339] Interpreting these notes, we can infer that Lonergan had a grand strategic plan. He attempted to convey that to his provincial superior: he was going to devise a 'metaphysics of history.'[340]

Clearly, Lonergan was building his thesis on a logical structure. The foundational setting was sequential: first *analytical*, then *concept*, and finally, *history*, completing the whole structural design. This sentence may sum up well what Lonergan is attempting to achieve. "Understanding progresses from the more general to the more particular; it progresses through incomplete acts to the perfected act."[341] (8) What will however be significant are the

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[339] In his mature years Lonergan's moving viewpoints in his three stages of meaning moved *progressively* from description in the realm of common sense to the realm of theory, and on to the realm of interiority. We can catch some glimpse of its origins in the exposition in the section of this text. See B. Lonergan, ACH (2). Footnote # 27.

[340] In the 1935 letter, Lonergan discussed with his Provincial his envisaged plan in devising a theory for 'Catholic Action.' A few lines into his letter, Lonergan remarks that his projected essay: "will throw Hegel and Marx, despite the enormity of their influence on this very account, into the shade….It takes the 'objective and inevitable laws of economics, of psychology (environment, traditions) and of progress (material, intellectual; automatic up to a point, then either deliberate and planned or the end of a civilization) to find the higher synthesis of these laws in the mystical body."(p.6)

[341] Lonergan coined this particular sentence in Latin in the original copy: "Intellectus procedit a maius generali ad maius particulare, procedit per actus incompletos ad actum perfectum." The editors have included in the published version an English translation. B. Lonergan, 'An Analytic Concept of History,' 8. footnote # 9.

steps involved in his design of this framework. This will include how Lonergan interweaves his new structure within the parameters of a dialectic of history, and how that understanding will relate to the overall workings of his intended notion of a metaphysic of history.

Finally, Lonergan has two phrases to elaborate further these three topical issues: *analytical*, *concept*, and, *history*. The first phrase is a statement of fact, while the other is a question. He used the four subsequent statements to provide some sort of an answer. Lonergan began by stating as well as asking. "It is an act of understanding: knowing why history is what it is." (8) First, he answers, "It is based upon analysis not synthesis: it does not proceed from historical fact to theory, but from abstract terms to the categories of any historical event." (8) Already in the opening pages, Lonergan had introduced to his readers the contrasting and related analogies of notions such as: from generality to particular categories, from abstract to concrete details, from theory to data of senses etc. Lonergan's main aim is to explain 'knowing' through a process from a wide range of resources. This process is to be concrete so that 'knowing' will lead to a refined understanding, to further affirming, which then leads one to deciding and doing.

Though these four sentence-statements may be considered some form of an answer, they in turn raise further questions that link to other areas of scientific research. The temptation is to be carried away with these various interests yet it is safe to remain within the scope of our search: how Lonergan combines the many sciences in designing his philosophical argument in which the outcome will be to conclude his thesis: 'the analytic concept of history.'[342] The four

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"The second half of this sentence is reminiscent of the motto Lonergan put at the head of his *"Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis":* (See METHOD: *Journal of Lonergan Studies* 9/2 [October 1991]:139-72); he took it from Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 85, a. 3; see also note 21 below."

[342] We are told that Lonergan was sent to Loyola College, Montreal after his years of philosophy at Heythrop College, London for his field exposure. See F. E Crowe, *Lonergan*, 17. It was during this time away from formal studies that Lonergan had read Christopher Dawson's *The Age of Gods.* Some twenty years later Lonergan admitted it was the most important work that had shifted him away from his nominalism. B. Lonergan, IR, 264. Another influential book was J. A. Stewart's, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas.* This book impelled Lonergan to move away from his hitherto normative or classicist notions. See F. Crowe, *Lonergan*, 18. Lonergan acknowledged that Stewart guided him to read Plato critically, and later Augustine's early dialogues. He conceded that through Stewart he "learnt that Plato was a methodologist, that his ideas were what the scientist seeks to discover, that the

statements can be resolved as Lonergan's main outline to introduce the reader to these three terms: *analytical*, *concept*, and, *history*.

scientific or philosophic process towards discovery was one of question and answer." B. Lonergan, IR, 264. These two notable influences were crucial and were to remain the bedrock. In his attempt to verify the significance of knowing and of understanding, Lonergan was seriously searching for an appropriate framework. It is revealed in this manuscript that Lonergan was thinking seriously about the whole project and was struggling in his long search. It was still early days in his attempt to map out a scheme.

## II. History

In the previous part of his notes Lonergan had explained the individual roles each of these three key notions: analytic, concept and history was to play. He now turns his attention to history itself, in particular. Under the heading, history and historiography, Lonergan has just a single sentence. He writes, "Distinguish [a] history that is written, history books; call it historiography; [b] history that is written about."[343]

Frederick Crowe noted in his study that Lonergan had a long struggle to make his way to settle on a distinct idea of history.[344] By 1953, after a somewhat arduous twenty years of thinking, Lonergan had gradually arrived at his position. "There is the history that is written, and the history that is written about."[345] In retrospect, what was it that Lonergan had in mind in ACH (2)? Crowe and Doran conceded in their editorial notes that, "It is only the history that *happens*, that concerns him at this early stage..."[346] Hence, the search for unearthing the meaning of history will be a consistent quest for Lonergan till the end. What matters in this study is what he has discovered so far in the essay: sufficient evidence that is crucially established from ACH (2) that points to the fact that here it is history that *happens* that most concerns Lonergan. In his later contributions Lonergan does come back to deal with both these two important phrases: "[a] history that is written, history books; [b] history that is written about,"[347] in detail.

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[343] B. Lonergan, ACH (2). Footnote # 11. "Although the distinction is already clear to Lonergan, it is only the history that *happens* that concerns him at this early stage; he will never lose that concern, but it is the history that is *written* that is the focus of chapters 8 and 9 of *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), and this surely is the history he had especially in mind when late in life he said, "All my work has been introducing history into Catholic theology" (J. Martin O'Hara, ed., *Curiosity at the Center of One's Life: Statements and Questions of R. Eric O'Connor* [Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1984], p. 427, in "Bernard Lonergan in Conversation," March 28, 1980 [pp.414-38])."

[344] F. E Crowe, "History that is Written: A Note on Patrick Brown's 'System and History,'" in the *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis,* 2 (2002): 115-124 http://www.mun.ca/jmda/vol3/brown.pdf accessed 12 December 2015.

[345] Ibid., 115.

[346] B. Lonergan, ACH (2). Footnote # 11.

[347] B. Lonergan, "Mediation of Christ in prayer," 160-82, in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964*, ed. R. C. Croken, F. E. Crowe, and R. M. Doran. *CWL* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,1996).

Succinctly, what Lonergan means by the first instance is history, as a specialized science, and the second is, history as a science of anthropology.[348] Lonergan's focus in this essay is on the second point. Consequently, Dawson's influence among others is prominent.[349]

Lonergan introduces two key concepts in his next discussion. He will analyze them to pursue his arguments in the following discussion on "material and formal objects of history." (9) Lonergan commences the discussion with the interpretation of the first concept. "The material object of history is the aggregate of human thoughts, words and deeds." (9) This idea of material object may connate several factors.

Firstly, it has reference to the line of succession, that any one person may not have the choice to inherit a tradition or be part of a generation. One is born into a family, a tribe or a society by way of the line of succession. Second, history is an experimental project. It has spatial and temporal implications of a beginning and an end. Any one person who is a history-maker inherits a tradition from a previous generation, lives out a complete one of its own and then passes it on to the next generation.

Third, it implies the question of how evil is inherited in the created world. God's creation was good but certain irresponsible human actions cause evil. Through the effort of human intellect progress can be made, but lack of it is an experience of decline that is worse off than becoming better. The supernatural gift of grace is offered to aid human acts to recover. This is what the idea of renaissance entails in Lonergan's narrative of a redemptive praxis: a restoration of the good, the harmony, the unity and the order of creation. [350]

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[348] B. Lonergan, "Mediation of Christ in prayer," 160-82. "Further, there is reciprocal influence: every history that is written is also ipso facto a new event in the history that happens. Still further: we would not know a great deal of what happens unless written history in at least some rudimentary form brought it to our attention." (Date of lecture, September 1963).

[349] W. A Mathews, *LQ*, 50-1. Also see footnote 370 below.

[350] In a neat summary Anne Carpenter articulates Lonergan's attempt to get to the meaning of history. See A. M Carpenter, "Lonergan on a World on Fire," https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/lonergan-on-a-world-on-fire/ accessed 25 June 2020.

## 1. Pure History[351] and the Historian

In this discussion, Lonergan draws up three areas to be classified in order to communicate his concept of history in an analytical process. To do so, he first analyses the role of the historian. Next he analyses the method used by the historian in narrating the events. Thirdly, he examines the technical interpretation of specific causes found within the compound of historical events: the human actions, namely the occurrences that were caused by this particular person or other persons. These three facts are presented to clarify the concept of 'pure history' so that the historian and the method used by the historian for the interpretation of history can be separately identified as two key entities. Lonergan commences,

> The formal object of history is this aggregate placed in a perspective by the historian's principle of selection. Now this principle of selection is that 'an event *is historic* in the measure it influences human action.' Hence we may simply say that history is the aggregate of human actions in their causes. As such it is a science. (9)

In this discussion, Lonergan's attempts to reflect on what the historian had recorded. While analyzing the historian's narration, Lonergan intends to clarify his reference to 'the formal object of history.' What Lonergan actually seeks to establish in his argument is to view the event apart from the human action. The historian may select which of the events are historical and which are not. Events may only be viewed as historical in relation to human acts. Other events outside of human actions do not matter in Lonergan's assessment. This is the gist of the discourse embedded in articulating analytically the "formal object of history." Lonergan continues with his argument by drawing on the challenging role of the historian.

> But it is to be noted, that the historian considers the aggregate only by considering the parts, that he finds his causes principally not without but within

[351] It took Lonergan five decades to settle on his refined position on his idea of history. In later years Lonergan had come up with two distinct categories of history: "There is history (1) that is written about, and there is history (2) that is written." B. Lonergan, *MIT*, 175. 'Pure history' is my own terminology; I use it to refer to what Lonergan meant in his second category: "history that is written." In this essay, these two basic categories were already present but it is unclear to interpret from within his notes, how he conceived his ideas as he was still working on them.

> the aggregate, and finally that effect is only a different aspect of cause so that asking what are the effects of given actions is tantamount to asking the cause of subsequent ones. (9)

The principal role specific to the historian in interpreting the details of the event is paramount. Basically, what the historian does is to collate events and record them. Subsequently, however, the role of the historian shifts in how the historian marshals and records the events. That is, how does the historian tell the story? What kind of method does the historian use to tell the story and how useful is the method? Why does the historian choose to tell this and not that story, or choose not to tell the other story? How do the event and the actor relate to the historian and to his/her readers? All of these factors are to be considered when clarifying the role of the historian as the interpreter. Lonergan then formulates a long set of treatises which are grouped into four parts. In these four parts, Lonergan critically examines what he meant by the 'formal object of history.'

Hence he continues: "The formal object of the analytic concept of history is to be obtained by removing from the formal object of history all that is not subject to *a priori* determination, so far as our knowledge goes."[352] (9) The historian is tasked to evaluate the events as distinct from the actors. This analysis would also include the events of the past that held some bearing that influenced the subject and the subsequent human actions of the present, and that envisaged the control of human actions in the future. Thus Lonergan points out, "The formal object of history is the aggregate of human actions in their causes (of effects)." (9) In the following discussion, he examines several elements in a material object in order to reach his definition of 'the formal object of history.'

[352] In the original copy Lonergan added a Latin phrase *quoad nos.* See B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 12. "'so far as our knowledge goes:' Lonergan's *'quoad nos'* freely rendered."

## 2. The Elements of Order

Lonergan intends to devise an analytical concept of history that can put into precision his idea of history. He approaches that process by identifying the two layers of the idea of history in the elements of order, the material object of history and the formal object of history. In order to obtain the formal object of the analytic concept of history, Lonergan argues that certain elements had to be removed.

The first stage is to remove the person or persons who are the 'actors/players' in historical events. These persons may have some influential roles in the cause of an event or events, yet their details are irrelevant. What matters is: "What is done?" (9); and not, "Who did it?" (9) The evidence is narrated to build up an account of history, whereas by contrast, those who initiated the cause of events are not to be counted. For instance, in the case of the events of the French Revolution, only the events of the French Revolution are relevant, while, for example, Napoleon is irrelevant.

Secondly, an element that Lonergan considers requiring to be eliminated in this instance is the First Cause. The reason for its elimination is that "the action of the First Cause though more excellent in itself is less known to us… This will not exclude a hypothetical consideration of the supernatural virtues and the conditions of their emergence in history," (10) yet they are not accounted as historical events. What Lonergan is attempting to clarify is that God's acts are not part of human history, and therefore they are not to be accounted for. In other words, only human actions are historical, not God's acts. Thus, "we shall confine ourselves to the secondary causes." (10)

The third element to be eliminated is some of the secondary causes, namely accidental causes. Lonergan explains that "among the secondary causes, we must distinguish essential and accidental, to omit the latter." (10) The reason he considers that accidental causes are to be eliminated is because: "Among the accidental causes are acts of a human person that do

not involve the human element[353] and 'acts of God' such as plagues, famines, earthquakes, floods." (10) Those elements that are considered the 'acts of God' are not historical events. Historical events are essential causes because they are driven from deliberate intentions by the human will.

There are, however other human acts that are not intentionally driven. Hence Lonergan goes on to clarify: "The essential causes of history are human wills, not in their immanent merits or demerits, but in their effective transience by which they influence others both directly and indirectly." (10) The essential causes that retain the key elements of order are classified directly or indirectly. Lonergan explains further that,

> By direct influence, we mean the influence exerted by one man upon others, indoctrinating with falsehood, conspiring to evil, or adding to all these the necessary use of force. By indirect influence we mean the influence of the manmade environment, for instance, that of being born and brought up in Mayfair or in the jungle; also, the influence of the historical situation which past action created and present action has to face. (10)

The final element to be eliminated is found among the essential causes. Lonergan says,

> Fourth, in the essential causes of history we distinguish between those of formal and those of material import, that is, between vectors which give the magnitude and direction of forces and mere friction. The former is will exerted upon the manner of life; the latter is the will to live and to propagate. (10)

So, while the actions that guarantee the continuation of the human race, namely procreation are essential, materially, they are not a formal cause of history. History is what we make of ourselves. It is intentionally driven by the human wills that influence human acts. The distinction made between direct and indirect, and between formal and material import are foundational principles which Lonergan clarifies, in order to establish his arguments pertaining to an analytical concept of history. An important factor which emerges from the

[353] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 13. "'acts of a human …element': free rendering of the '*actus hominis'* of the MS, a technical phrase in scholasticism that needs a sentence in translation."

direct and indirect influence and between material and informal import in essential causes is Lonergan's idea of education. It is an emerging theme that underpins a significant notion. The fourth point shall take us to examine Lonergan's idea of education.

### 3. The idea of Education

'History maker' is a theme that featured prominently in Lonergan's previous discussions. He argued that the material object of history consists of elements that influence and to some extent determine one's character. Hence, any individual subject will have a history which pertains to the character formation of the subject, and which in turn, influences the way in which a person operates. Accordingly, the human will, intellect, reason are relevant to the fact that by deciding upon an action and acting it out, individuals can create what eventually becomes an historical event. The point he makes is that the interpretation of the objective data contributes significantly to influence the responsible decision of a subject.

Hence, the third and fourth elements of elimination do matter in this discussion. A child is born and raised in a particular social niche: in a family, and community, tribe, and society. Learning commences as the child grows up. He/she begins to develop his/her skills about the patterns of life, and thus engages him/herself with others within the given environment. Each social niche would have its own influence on the child's growth. These social influences would teach the child certain systems peculiar to a society. For instance, someone who would grow up in the Sahara Desert would be influenced differently in his/her development from someone who would grow up in the rugged tropical mountain region of New Guinea, or in Mayfair, the robust, affluent district of the modern city of London. Each setting will teach the child a variety of lessons in life about arts and skills etc. As the child grows and matures into adulthood, he/she would experience various aspects of events within the environment. There would be periods of regression and waning, but there would also be

periods of recovery in invention, creativity, growth and progress. All of these modes of education would subsequently contribute to the character formation of the basic identity of one, who in Lonergan's terms, is a history-maker.

Though not explicitly mentioned, one can discover evidence within the text that Lonergan's work is guided towards a dialectic of history. This topic began to take some visible form in the third and fourth points. Meanwhile, he sums up his four thesis points with this sentence. "Briefly, the formal object of the analytic concept of history is the MAKING AND UNMAKING OF MAN BY MAN." (10) This is Lonergan's overall summary of the second main topic of this manuscript. What he emphasized in upper case is the gist of his trajectory, history. We make ourselves out of who we are. The question is, how does his idea of history contribute to someone becoming genuinely *human*?

What Lonergan explores in "the formal object of the analytic concept of history" is the notion that gives rise to history as an experimental project. This is a persistent argument that runs throughout the whole manuscript. For the individual history has a beginning and an ending and it takes place in one's life. Any one person who is a history-maker has a long inherited pattern of life that comprises language, culture, traditions, symbols, skills, art, etc. much of which eventually is handed to the next generation. Proceeding further, Lonergan introduces two concepts to expand his idea of education, namely, direct and indirect influences. Direct influence deals with the role of the intellect. Every person has an intellect that informs the human will to direct the actions. This is essentially part of the created nature of humanity. Thus, direct influence deals with the gift of freedom, in which one has to use responsibly in making choices. Secondly, indirect influence refers to a supernatural gift, the gift that enhances a person's dealing with the created nature of their human freedom.

## III. A Dialectic

Lonergan enters a significant part of his work in this discussion: the theme of *dialectic*.[354] This theme is integral to his entire work on history. It also occupies a central place in this essay. Lonergan splits his discussion on dialectic into five categories. These are:

(i) the nature of a dialectic,

(ii) the existence of a dialectic

(iii) the subject of a dialectic,

(iv) the form of a dialectic, and

(v) the rates of a dialectic.[355]

Lonergan initiates the discussion by spelling out the nature of dialectic. "By dialectic we do not mean Plato's orderly conversation, nor Hegel's expansion of concepts, nor Marx's fiction of an alternative to mechanical materialism." (11) A careful look into this statement discloses that Plato, Hegel and Marx were key resources that Lonergan relied on to establish his own theory. Hence, these were the core resources that aided him to devise his theory of a dialectic of history.

Aristotle was perhaps the first to present an order of precedence in coining the idea of dialectic. His idea of dialectic was to discuss clues to truth by reviewing and scrutinizing the opinion of others.[356] Plato used this notion to clarify the logical process in which a thesis and its opposite, an antithesis could be combined in their proceedings to produce a synthesis.[357] Hegel took Plato's notion to explain the philosophically decisive cultural shift in Germany's

[354] Crowe asserted that dialectic was a dominant theme in Lonergan's life work which was referred to as the "scissors action" of history; when the upper blade meets the lower blade, the data, the opposing principle thus forms an overarching idea. See F. E Crowe, *CH*, 12.

[355] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 14. "The fourth heading was written in by hand at this point, but appears at the beginning of the essay in the full table of contents. The fifth heading does not appear either at this point or in the full table of contents, but is found in the body of the text below."

[356] Aristotle, "Analytica Priora," Bk II, chapters 16, 17, 26 & 27.

[357] R. H. Popkin, *Philosophy Made Simple* (London: Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1972), 82.

historical period of enlightenment. He supplemented dialectic with his notion of sublation to explain the counter-position of destruction and preservation of nations.[358] Expanding Hegel's notion of sublation even further, Marx came up with his own theory of a dialectical materialism.[359]

Lonergan owed both Hegel and Marx their particular contributions, yet he was on a mission to developing something beyond what they had crafted. Explicitly stating his own course of action in his letter to his new provincial superior, Lonergan declared that he was working on a draft in a theory of a dialectic of history that would supersede both Hegel and Marx.[360] What Lonergan intended to do was to re-orientate Hegel and Marx's versions of dialectic, and encompass Aristotle and Aquinas's versions so that his own interpretations would give a complete meaning. Nevertheless, Lonergan intended to extend beyond the paradigm case of Thomistic metaphysics. Hence, Lonergan's own study was to devise a theory to be known as a "*summa sociologica*."[361]

What then was to be Lonergan's notion of a "*summa sociologica*?" As he plainly cited, it was neither the Hegelian notion of sublation nor the Marxist notion of mechanical materialism.[362] Thus, Lonergan explained:

> We do mean something like a series of experiments, a process of trial and error; yet not the formal experiment of the laboratory, for man is not so master of his fate; rather an inverted experiment, in which *objective reality molds the mind of man into conformity with itself by imposing upon him the penalty of ignorance, error, sin and at the same time offering the rewards of knowledge, truth, righteousness*.[363] Suffice to note that objective reality does not mean merely material reality: it means all reality and especially Reality itself. (11)

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[358] Hegel believed that in the end, this process would lead to perfection, which he named the Spirit. See "Hegel's Dialectics," https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel-dialectics/ assessed 4 July 2019.

[359] Marxist dialectical materialism is a social philosophy which uses economical capital a source of distribution of wealth that underscores its political system, namely social communism. See K. Marx, "Notebook IV," *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*. Translated with a Forward by M. Nicolaus. (New York: Vintage Books), 1973. Esp. pp. 401-443.

[360] See Appendix B.

[361] See B. Lonergan, PA (1), 157.

[362] See, J. Jamieson Carswell Smart, "Materialism: Philosophy, *The Encyclopedia Britannica*, https://www.britannica.com/topic/materialism-philosophy accessed 24 July 2019.

[363] The original sentence is underlined.

Denouncing Marx's dialectical materialism, Lonergan intended to draw on Aquinas' principles of progress of the human intellect as a good starting point. In Lonergan's view, the human intellect is key to generating a harmonious unity in cosmic order. Once human solidarity has been established it shall provide a social philosophy that explores a new order. Lonergan's effort, however was to integrate both the opposing and the complementary principles of dialectic into a collaborative task.

In summing up the discussion, Lonergan states: "The illustration of the process is to be had from the microcosm: as the individual learns and develops so does mankind." (11) The effort to understand the situation requires attention to appropriately concrete data, knowledge of understanding and its function in human life, and decision as to how to go about it here and now. These acts of attention, understanding, knowledge and decision are minders of that act of understanding, and so the order for the future can be analyzed with considerable care. Hence, Lonergan seeks to explain a framework that encourages us to study how the linked but opposed principles of change can work together. It also allows us to study the tension and the interference and possible destruction that might eventuate. This will enable us to facilitate the collaboration and creativity required to gain rich insights into discovering and addressing real problems in concrete situations. Briefly, what Lonergan wanted to achieve in his own study was to reflect on the given tensions that exist in living situations and consider how to deal with them.

## 1. The Existence of Dialectic

The traditional principle of dialectic was a discourse of two opposing sides, possibly two disagreeing camps, which might even be polemic. What Lonergan attempted to achieve in this discussion was to integrate both unity and dialectic, and to knit together a unique relationship between them. The irony of this is, how does dialectic exists within this context:

the co-existence of polarization and intelligible unity in integrated human living? What we began to discover in Lonergan's argument is that dialectic is not at odds with unity. Dialectic is not even a conflict of two opposites. Instead dialectic mitigates the aggregate counter-positions in the material object and thus produces the possibilities of further intellectual development that seek higher unity. This process can be acknowledged in culture, more practically in domestic, social, geo-political and juridical forms of society.

In Lonergan's view dialectic *has* to exist within the realm of human solidarity. Clearly, this exceptional path underscores the significant value of unity. Thus Lonergan explains: "The material object is an aggregate: if it is simply a many without any intelligible unity, there is no possibility of there being a dialectic. If there is some unity, then at least a dialectic is possible. That a dialectic is possible follows from the solidarity of man." (11) Advancing his argument, Lonergan inquires: "What is this Solidarity?" (11) Without giving a direct answer he presents a general pointer.

> Apart from the obvious biological fact, it may be summed up in the phrase: We make ourselves not out of ourselves but out of our environment (where environment has the universality of the Ignatian 'other things'[364]). We make ourselves, for the will is free. (11)

Integrated in his idea of 'the universality of the Ignatian 'other things' are a number of issues Lonergan wanted to address. Explicit among them is his idea of education. Thus, Lonergan attempts to clarify his idea of education within the framework of a dialectic of history. And so he does in the next line of his discussion. "We do not make ourselves out of ourselves: "Anything that is moved is moved by something else"[365] "The motion of action comes from outside us; the specification of action come from outside us, though we may

[364]B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 15. "In *Latin 'reliqua*.' The reference is to the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius Loyola, where in the 'Principle and Foundation' he speaks of God's purpose in creating humankind, and then of the purpose of the 'other things on the face of the earth' (§23)."

[365]B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 16. "In Latin, *'quidquid movetur ab alio movetur'*; a familiar tag in scholasticism – T. Aquinas, *ST,* 1, q. 2, a. 3."

choose this specification in preference to that, or refuse any." (11-12) Lonergan continues to expand this treatise.

> We make ourselves out of our environment: the physical environment that makes the geographical differentiations of men and manners and cultures; the social environment of the family and education, the race and traditions, the state and law.[366] (12)

Lonergan's treatise of harmony and human solidarity progresses the discussion into the interchangeability of persons and subjectivity. While dialectic may ordinarily appear contrary to human progress and development, there is a consolation that fosters a higher understanding. When dialectic is possible, growth is inevitable.

Apart from the essential component of biological identity, each person has the freedom to develop his/her human potentials to the full: of feelings, of relationships, of language, of imaging; the full social character of a person can be not only be enhanced, but all integral aspects of humanity in a person can be developed. Hence Lonergan's idea of education is principally the holistic development of a genuine human person. It underscores the subjectivity of the person i.e., to speak of each person in terms of full growth of human capacities, both individually and corporately in terms of relationships. Thus, the social dimension of a person's education is broadly relational.

In summary, the following can be established from this passage. First, Lonergan is seeking to identify the possible areas where dialectic does exist and to clarify that it is possible for dialectic to exist. Next he seeks to contrast and compare the various kinds of unity that exist in the natural order of the universe; namely, what guides natural order? Thirdly, he wishes to distinguish natural order from social order, and perhaps disorder. Hence, he seeks to clarify the relationship between the laws that govern the natural order of

[366] In his mature years Lonergan will have reflected deeply and consolidated his ideas on effective freedom and high integration of organizational schemes of recurrent operations. For a comprehensive analysis see the end of his discussion on the possibility of ethics. B. Lonergan, *Insight*, 653-56. Arnold Toynbee's *Study of History* was a later contribution that is a frequent reference in this section of *Insight*.

the universe and to ascertain how relevant they are to social order in human societies. What seems to remain at the core of his argument is the integration of both the natural and social order within a dialectical discourse.

Finally, Lonergan comes back to answer his own question. "Solidarity makes dialectic possible. Is it actual?" (12) Lonergan claims in his subsequent response.

> The question is already answered. Man's freedom is limited. The will follows the intellect in truth, or obscures it to error, or deserts it to leave man an animal. The last is either sporadic and accidental and so of no concern to essential history, or it is based upon the second, the obscuration of the intellect. (12)

The role of the intellect in the idea of education in Lonergan's dialectic of history is a persistent theme. As he discussed earlier in PA (1), so also he does in this essay. The human person will grow in freedom if he/she uses the intellect progressively in truth. This shall enrich the will to enhance the potentials offered in the supernatural gift of grace.

## 2. A Dialectical Discourse and the Goal of Common Good.

Lonergan's next point of discussion is to examine how dialectic exists in human relationships. Archaeological studies can provide detailed resources to support Lonergan's argument. Early New Guinea settlers can be a case in point. Until the advent of agriculture, they engaged in a mixed economy of collecting plant food, as well as hunting and scavenging for meat, all of which were traded with other groups to ensure individual independence and greater economic security.[367] Individuals could both contribute to and take from the group's collective efforts, each individual being more effective in these tasks than by acting alone. Sociologically, they were an egalitarian cluster of mobile families without any broader stable social, political or economic structures. This resulted in an absence of either a class system or a central authority.[368]

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[367] P. Swading, *Papua New Guinea's Prehistory: An Introduction*, 8.
[368] E. Mantovani, "Comparative Analysis of Cultures and Religions," *Point*: 6 (1984): 49-86

Food shortages, the incessant growth of population, and above all, the move towards cultivation gradually led to the cessation of nomadic life and allowed for the development of permanent settlements. Hence, the first humans in primitive societies depended largely on their immediate relations' specific kind of affinity.[369] The point that underpins this argument is the attainment of a clear common good. Thus Lonergan asserts: "Strictly the subject of a dialectic is any group united in time and place that think alike." (12) What Lonergan is seen to emphasize is that societal relationships are fundamental human needs.[370]

A group is defined by the nature of its networks. Basically, it is made up of individuals who have common characteristics, interests, goals, and ultimately those who pursue a clearly common good of a community. Lonergan continues,

> Practically, we may consider as the subject of a dialectic the social unit of tribe or state. The tribe or state creates a channel of mutual influence and within it men both tend to agree and, when not so inclined, are forced to agree, at least to the extent of acting as though they did. (12)

Though there can be polarization of opinion within the group, yet overall social goals are attainable for a common purpose. Ultimately, the goal to achieve is geared towards the well-being of a community.[371] Lonergan continues to clarify his argument:

> But the ideas have no frontiers. Thus above a dialectic of single social units we may discern a 'multi dialectic' whose subject is humanity. It is constituted by the many dialectics of the different social units, in their interactions and their transferences from one unit to another. (12-3)

Since a dialectic of the community deals with the dynamics of change, any progress would require codes of behavior, past recollection of inherited human values such as sharing, achieving corporate goals and participating in common activities that entails common good.

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[369] See G. Clark, *The Stone Age Hunters*, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1969), 15.

[370] This is what Lonergan noted some five decades later in B. Lonergan, *MIT*, 52. "The human good then is at once individual and social. Individuals do not just operate to meet their needs but cooperate to meet one another's needs. As the community develops its institutions to facilitate cooperation, so individuals develop skills to fulfill the roles and perform the tasks set by the institutional framework..."

[371] For example, See C. Lamb, "The Pope to preside over largest act of Christian worship in the Arab World when in UAE," *The Tablet*. https://www.thetablet.co.uk/news/11305/pope-to-preside-over-largest-act-of-christian-worship-in-the-arab-world-when-in-uae- accessed 30 January 2019. *The Tablet* presents a modern but good example of what Lonergan is alluding to in his argument on the subject of the dialectic.

Lessons from ancient community-living can inform contemporary generations on how principles of communal values have evolved over time. Further still, Lonergan's discussion on the theme of dialectic needed an analysis within the study of antiquity, archaeology, and anthropology. These notable sciences matter, and other relevant sciences are streamlined into viewing human existence in entirety,[372] in solidarity, harmony and ordered in unity according to the various operations.

Hence, Lonergan recognizes that concrete living situations in human societal settings present complex challenges. Some of these factors in human living constitute many dialectics of various kinds. "Because the unity of a dialectic is the unity of thought that goes into action, it follows that this thought produces the social situation with its problems. If the thought is good, the problems will be small and few; thus the situation will require but slight modifications of previous thought and leave man opportunity to advance and develop." (13) This, of course is to happen in due course.

### 3. The Illogicality of Dialectic

Lonergan's subsequent argument maintains that we live in the midst of dialectic. What is important to us is to be attentive to its existence, and know how to respond to the challenges in given situations. "Roughly we may distinguish three rates of dialectic: normal, sluggish, and feverish." (13) He continues to explain,

> Normal defines itself. Sluggish would be the lack of response to evils in the objective situation, whether this be from lack of intelligence or from fatalistic resignation or from the imprisonment of the individual in a straightjacket social

[372] For Lonergan's original reference see C. Dawson, *The Age of the Gods: A Study in the Origins of Culture in Prehistoric Europe and the Ancient East*, (London: Sheed & Ward, 1934), 3-18. For extensive overview see W. A Mathews, *LQ*, 50-1. Mathews shows how Christopher Dawson's, *The Age of the Gods: A Study in the Origins of Culture in Prehistoric Europe and the Ancient East* has had a dominant influence on Lonergan. Dawson's study, though dated now to some extent, was a watershed in Lonergan's days: a history of human civilization, being a careful study of the evolution of cultures from prehistoric era to the development of advanced art and technology that triggered a new stage in civilization. All these movements foster new evolutionary periods in what can be considered *modern*, from the ancient East and the sophisticated era of the formation of diverse socio-economic, cultural and political dimensions that contribute to the formation of contemporary societies.

> scheme. Feverish would be the excessive activity and this from the intolerable pressure of objective evil or from unbalanced optimism or from the breakup of society. (13)

Tensions evolve in a society as feelings can turn sour when widely held values in the group are contested. Polarized factions can interrupt the normalcy of a tribal or state community. This can lead to further misunderstanding and bias[373] and even onto possible disorder. "Because the unity of a dialectic is the unity of thought that goes into action, it follows that this thought produces the social situation with its problems. If the thought is good, the problems will be small and few; thus the situation will require but slight modifications of previous thought and leave man opportunity to advance and develop." (13)

Lonergan's notion of dialectic is a process to establish facts in one's life within a dynamic livelihood of a community. In fact, the governance in complex human living is always dialectical. On the one hand, the concrete situation gives us the insights to assess the richness of gifts and rewards. Unintelligible insights on the other hand, provide the tensions, the interference and possible destruction. Given the dire situations, humans are capable of exploring new ideas to test their insights and to find practical solutions. Better ways of improving standards of living in a society can then be explored. Lonergan sums up his argument by noting:

> Taking the matter more largely, we may say that the dominant thought at any time arose from preceding situations; that its tendency is to transform the actual situation either by correction or by development; that the transformed situation will give rise to new thought and this not merely to suggest it but to impose it by the threat of suffering or the promise of well-being. (13)

[373] We wait until we reach the discussion in his sixth topic in this essay ACH (2) regarding decline where Lonergan introduces the term "bias" as a negative consequence to the genuine living of human communities.

### 4. The Three Categories of Dialectic[374]

This segment is Lonergan's final part of his discussion on dialectic. Whilst, in doing so, he divides this discussion into are three main headings. They are namely,

(i) "Human actions fall into three categories,

(ii) This division is metaphysically ultimate, (and)

(iii) Higher synthesis is impossible." (14)

Under the first topic Lonergan has only two sentences. They read: "Man acts according to nature, contrary to nature, above nature. The three categories are nature, sin, grace." (14) Though these two sentences can be interpreted as two different premises, they deliver a single message, namely that nature is good. In other words, what Lonergan wants to convey is that, when we live according to our nature, we progress. But this can only happen if we use our intellect wisely.

Clearly, Lonergan had advanced his argument beyond his early thoughts to place human reason, will and act in created nature. The gift of grace is there only to enable human nature to attain its complete capacity. In fact, the supernatural gift of grace can sublate our created nature to the highest intended capacity of being completely human. Hence, Lonergan realizes the significance of the conclusions he has reached. That is: "Action contrary to nature is unintelligible. Action above nature is too intelligible for man. But the intelligible, unintelligible and too intelligible are metaphysical ultimate categories: they stand on the confines of our intelligence itself." (14)

[374] It is interesting that in page eight of the original manuscript, is found another (second) piece of the same title: "The Three Categories." The editors of the published version somehow *ignored* a passage in this duplicated manual typed page of ACH (2). Under this title, Lonergan had this clause to add. "Hitherto we have been setting the stage, asking what is an analytic concept, what is history, what is the unity of history. We have now to attack the problem, which is the analysis of the dialectic." These two sentences reveal at the heart of Lonergan's programmatic project a strong thrust towards achieving his intended goal. B. Lonergan, ACH (2), *The Original Unpublished Manuscript*, p. 8. (There is a duplication of page 8).

These premises can be considered a summary to his metaphysical discourse. This could be the parallel reference to the discussions found in chapter two of this thesis. That is, Lonergan's metaphysical development of St Augustine's and St Thomas' theological theories pertain to the concepts of nature, sin, and grace.[375] Comparing this part of ACH (2) and the parallel reference to the *Pantôn* we find a significantly developed argument on nature, sin and grace. Lonergan proceeds to explain the metaphysically ultimate categories he has proposed:

> By stating that action contrary to nature is unintelligible, we do not mean that it is unknowable. Sin is a possible object of the judgment; it is not a possible object of the understanding. For the understanding is the power by which we know why a thing is what it is: but sin of its very nature has no 'why it is what it is'. Sin admits no explanation: it is a desertion of reason and so has no reason than is more than a pretense. (14)

Lonergan's metaphysical explanation points to the fact that intellect, reason, and will need to be engaged in order to clarify how an act or a non-act is either intelligent or unintelligent. In the end Lonergan provides a certain explanation: sin is a lack of reasonable use of the intelligence. "We do not say that God had not excellent reasons for permitting sin: so we do not evacuate the 'mystery of lawlessness'; indeed, we add another mystery which however is not a mystery from excess of intelligibility but from lack of it." (14)

In summing up his main treatise about the mystery of the existence of sin, Lonergan quotes Augustine to support his argument. "Hence, let no one try to learn from me what I know I do not know; unless perhaps he learns not to know what should be known as something that cannot be known" (Augustine, The City of God 12, 7)."[376] (14) Lonergan's reference to Augustine is the beginning of an important step: an early expression of his theological discourse. This shall inevitably encompass his narrative of a theology of history.

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[375] See B. Lonergan, PA (1), 150.

[376] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 17. "Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 12, 7 (PL 41, 355), quoted by Lonergan in Latin, *"Nemo ex me scire quaerat, quod me nescire scio; nisi forte ut nescire discat, quod sciri non posse sciendum est*'; I have corrected his '*ut scire discat'* to '*ut nescire iscat*.' The 'mystery of lawlessness,' found in the text just before the quotation from Augustine, is the NRSV rendering of the Vulgate Latin, '*mysterium iniquitatis*,' that Lonergan quoted; see 2 Thessalonians 2:17."

Reaching his conclusion, Lonergan speaks exclusively of a higher synthesis. "To posit a higher synthesis there must be the possibility of setting an antithesis against the thesis." This is a shift from the Hegelian dialectics: that a "higher synthesis is impossible." (15) In the opening passages of his discussion on dialectic, Lonergan had criticized the repercussions emanating from the dialectics Hegel and Marx had generated, yet he did not depart from their basic theories. Evidently, his language here is predominantly Hegelian. "But our thesis includes the intelligible to man, the simply unintelligible, and the too intelligible for man." (15) Still retaining the Hegelian language of dialectic, Lonergan is offering his alternative theory of 'a higher synthesis.' What he does is to propose his mega vision of a new synthesis in a "metaphysical principle of redemption?"[377] Thus the last sentence sums it up neatly. It speaks volumes at the heart of his noble version of a higher synthesis. "Outside these categories there is nothing, and so an antithesis is impossible." (15)

From his previous discussions in the *Pantôn* papers Lonergan pointed to "the promised kingship of Christ through Catholic Action," a culmination not only in achieving natural order but the apex of redemptive history. Contrasting this reference to the ACH (2) essay, it is evident that Lonergan had developed his Christology extensively.[378] This transition, however, is an exploration of a profound theological narrative of redemption that is achieved in the present essay. In other words, what Lonergan wanted to clarify is that, if we are a redeemed people, there is no need for an antithesis since the gift of grace is already present among us. Perhaps he wanted to suggest that sin is not to be identified with antithesis. The antithesis is theologically an opportune time for grace. Simply, it is a moment of *Emmanuel*: 'God with us' which implies that the presence of the risen Christ is fully alive and active in our daily living.

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[377] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 150.

[378] Lonergan's Christology will have been comprehensively developed in the later years. For a good elaboration see B. Lonergan, *De Verbo Incarnato*. Ad usum privatum (Rome: Gregorian University, 1960).

## Conclusion

We have successfully explored the first part of the ACH (2) essay. Our research reveals that the task of first part of the essay was to deal with the basic structure of the essay itself. This structure is founded on a framework of the three thematic topics namely, 'analytic,' 'concept' and 'history.' Hence they form the analytical method of the study of history. This analytical method deals with Lonergan's social philosophy, which is deeply rooted in the Hegelian-Marxist dialectics. Clearly, working from issues pertaining to sociological concerns, Lonergan moves on to devise a compelling worldview of a new order. What is fascinating is how dialectic has become a vital tool for Lonergan to proceed towards devising a theology of history. This is an important step that helps to open up the discussion dealing with the theological development: how does that shift make a smooth transition from a deeply embedded social philosophy to an effectively emerging theology of praxis?

The second part of the analysis shall examine how Lonergan applied his analytical method to explore the development of a threefold dialectic of history. It is in this development that the second part of the essay discloses the shift wherein Lonergan leans towards devising a theology of history. Thus, a significant contribution of this analysis is to suggest that this essay, the ACH (2) is the first paper to disclose Lonergan's programmatic plan of a three-fold dialectic.

# PART TWO: A THEOLOGY OF REDEEMING HISTORY

# Chapter Four: An Evolving Narrative of a Theology of Redemption

The analysis in the previous chapter has dealt with the investigation of the origin of the development of Lonergan's dialectic of history. This chapter shall carry forward the previous discussion, and in doing so, shall utilize it as the bedrock of the analysis of the second part of the thesis. The second of part of the thesis shall introduce the discussion of Lonergan's transitional phase: a focus on the shift from a narrative of a dialectic of history towards the development of a theology of redemptive history. In order to achieve this significant shift, this chapter shall put into perspective the complete reading of the whole essay.

Five tasks shall be achieved in this chapter. First, the aim is to expand and enhance the investigation developed in the previous chapter. Next, is to carefully examine each of the three approximations: progress, decline and renaissance. In doing so, the chapter shall begin to identify and to articulate Lonergan's theological narrative of a redemptive praxis through the appropriation of these three approximations. Third, particular attention is to be paid to the theological role of the third approximation: *renaissance/redemption.* The fourth objective is to disclose Lonergan's narrative of the gift of grace in the dispensation of the theological virtues: faith, hope and charity. Accordingly, this chapter shall unveil Lonergan's solid blueprint for a theological manifesto. Finally, we shall analyze Lonergan's theological program to be appropriated within a school of missiology.

## I. The Ideal Line [of History][379]

Lonergan has so far established successfully the preliminary arguments underpinning the analytical concept of a dialectic of history, as shown in the previous chapter. In this part of his exploration, Lonergan proceeds to spell out the subsequent details of the threefold dialectics: progress, decline and renaissance. He does that under the heading, "The Ideal Line [of History]," with seven subtitles:

(i) "What is meant by an ideal line,

(ii) What is the ideal line of history,

(iii) What is the earthly task of man,

(iv) That there is progress,

(v) That the progress may be determined from the nature of mind,

(vi) The nature of the mind of man, insofar as concerns us,

(and) (vii) The three periods of history and their characteristics." (15)

Lonergan begins his discussion by clarifying the meaning of the topic statement, namely the 'ideal line.' He does that by aligning it with Newton's first law in mechanics. Lonergan says,

> In mechanics, the ideal line is drawn by Newton's first law: That a body continues to move in a straight line with uniform speed as long as no extrinsic force intervenes. It is the first approximation in the determination of every mechanical motion. And its value is undiminished by the fact that in this world of ours, the first law is absolutely impossible of actual verification. (15)

In so far as his analytical concept of history is concerned, Lonergan was not interested in the technicality of Newton's statistical calculations. What was useful to him was that the analytical principle of the approximation of movement of a straight line in Newton's calculation of speed was relevant to an ideal line of history measuring the possible course of

[379] The phrase 'of history' is added to the prefix to the main topic by the editors. It does not appear in the original text.

human history. “Hence,” he continues, “by an ideal line of history we mean the determination of the course of events that supplies the first approximation to any possible course of human history.” (15) Newton’s first approximation aligns with the first concept in Lonergan’s idea of a dialectics of history, namely progress.

This analogy might seem absurd to the reader, yet what Lonergan ultimately reveals is compelling. Perhaps it was Newton’s three approximations of movements that amplified his structural schema of a three-fold dialectic; the laws of movements regulating speed gave Lonergan the idea of the three components of a dialectic of history in progress, decline and recovery. What began as a small project inspired by Pope Pius XI’s [380] theme on ‘Catholic Action’ has resulted in a broad vision with significant and far ranging implications.[381] Clearly, the original project has shifted to higher and larger domains through the influence of various theories, including those of Newton. Succinctly, it was the Newtonian analogy that had helped him to improve his new narrative of a three-fold dialectic. Lonergan affirms this in his later writing.

> It was about 1937-38 that I became interested in a theoretical analysis of history. I worked out an analysis on the model of a threefold approximation. Newton’s planetary theory had a first approximation in the first law of motion: bodies move in a straight line with constant velocity unless some force intervenes. There was a second approximation when the addition of the law of gravity between the sun and the planet yielded an elliptical orbit for the planet. A third approximation was reached when the influence of the gravity of the planets on one another is taken into account to reveal the perturbed ellipses in which the planets actually move.[382]

### 1. Lonergan’s First Approximation: Progress

Lonergan’s clear grasp of Newtonian physics was a significant development. In this discussion, Lonergan adapts the Newtonian schema to introduce the first approximation: progress. He deliberates on it to initiate his theological discussion. “The ideal line of history,”

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[380] Pope Pius XI, *Quas Primas, On the Feast of Christ the King*, 1925.
[381] J. A. Komonchak, LEERH, 164.
[382] B. Lonergan, IR, 271.

Lonergan argues, "is the history that would arise did all men under all conditions in all thoughts, words, and deeds obey the natural laws, and this without the aid of grace." (15) This statement discloses another dramatic shift. In fact, it presents a theological statement embodying the articulation of his idea of progress.

Having netted effectively Newton's first approximation, the ideal line of history, to his own purview, progress, Lonergan then appropriated it to find a new theological narrative. This novel narrative is to be used in a new context. Importantly, it will become a valuable contribution to enhance his theological scheme. This newly adapted narrative of the notion of progress is to combine a wide range of other theological concepts including: creation, nature, revelation, and grace. Hence, the fundamentals of Lonergan's theory of a dialectic of history would proceed in this equation: progress shall be understood in relation to nature (created human being); decline shall be understood in the fact of sin; and likewise, renaissance shall be understood in the interpretation of grace.[383] This equation is in fact a transitional line that combines his triple dialectic of history to a three-fold theological process that progresses his work towards a redemptive praxis.

Hence, Lonergan adds. "It (progress) envisages, then, a state of pure nature, in which men as a matter of fact do not sin, though they are not destined to a supernatural end and do not need the 'healing grace' that counteracts the wounds of original sin." (16) Lonergan's reference here may be linked to a letter Augustine initially sent to Evodius in AD 415 on his defense on grace in opposition to nature. What Lonergan intended to clarify was a misunderstanding theologians had of Augustine's use of the term "nature" and "freewill" in the subsequent discussions centuries later. When Augustine says that human nature is

[383] This new theological platform is to integrate the Aristotelian-Thomist as well as the Hegelian dialectics so that now Lonergan can coin his own special definition in his theory of a dialectic of history. What he envisaged producing in a metaphysics of history is the resultant of this process. Yet it is a new development. Lonergan perhaps did not anticipate the move he would make towards Newton's theory. The evidence from the study of PA (1) shows that it was written in 1935. The ACH (2) is believed to be written in 1937-8. We may conclude that Newton is a later inclusion in this programmatic project of devising a metaphysics of history.

"wounded, hurt, destroyed by disobedience of sin" he does not imply that free will is conditioned.[384] Briefly, Lonergan wanted to clarify what Augustine meant when he applied the concept "nature' to infer one is "to be born" bearing in them the stain of a moral seal. Augustine's explanation would imply an impediment to the gift of grace "that which belongs to a being's condition." The clarity of this theological understanding is key to Lonergan's new theological narrative. These two important theological concepts namely, 'healing grace' and 'original sin' underscore Lonergan's own emerging scheme: his new narrative of a redemptive praxis.

Integrating Augustine's teaching into his own interpretation, Lonergan proceeds to clarify a line of thought intended for redemption. That is, as frail humanity, we are prone to fall, and human nature is inclined to sin, yet the love of God restores to us his grace. This theological narrative encompasses the next line of discussion as Lonergan goes on to raise an ontological question: "What is the earthly task of man?" (16) This questioning attitude is in contrast to his previous discussions in PA (1), where Lonergan had followed the traditional theology of classification: creation, fall and redemption are to be viewed as three separate events, while in ACH (2) he improves on this standpoint.

The answer Lonergan gives to his own question demonstrates that he had advanced in his approach from his preceding standpoint. "The proximate end of man is the making of man: giving him his body, the conditions of his life, the premotions to which he will respond in the fashioning of his soul." (16) This theological nuance calls to mind an Augustinian reference: we offend our creator in sin, repentance pleases God, yet death deems punishment to humanity at God's wrath.[385] Briefly however, these three: creation, fall and redemption are not purely separate entities categorized in three different stages. These events encompass the

[384] St Augustine of Hippo, *Natura et Gratia,* 53. 62.

[385] See St Augustine of Hippo, *The City of God,* Bk XIII, Chapters. 1-16. Lonergan may have relied on these texts to articulate his theological readings.

whole fabric of human living: social, historical, structural and institutional circumstances which underlie concretely humanity's entire existence. Moreover, these three aspects, nature, sin and grace operate concomitantly at different times, places and generations. The next sentence sums up succinctly the position Lonergan has reached at this point: "Essentially history is the making and unmaking and remaking of man: in the ideal line we consider only the making of man by man." (16)

As noted earlier in this segment that Lonergan's narrative of an ideal line of history features the development of his theology of redemption in a significant way. Essentially, what forms the bedrock of his theological narrative is the experience of the concrete social events. These social events encompass largely the charter of his theory of a triple dialectic: history's pattern of progress (nature), decline (or sin) and renewal (or redemptive grace). In applying his analytical principles, Lonergan takes Newton's analogy of a cyclical rotation to throw light on this pattern of recycled occurrences in concrete human living. Recycled occurrences of events point to a need for a decisive process that can provide insights that seek to correct abuses of the past, and to build a new social order in the present; this also projects a potentially controlled future.

### 2. The Notion of Progress in the Ideal Stages of Intellectual History

Lonergan's discussion regarding the notion of progress enters a pertinent point. This, perhaps, is what his subtitle 'the ideal line of history' entailed. Having engineered successfully a new theological discourse in the previous discussion, Lonergan aims next at expanding the notion within the realms of dynamic human living. What he attempts to do in subsequent discussions is to categorize analytically the ideal stages of intellectual history. Clearly, he returns to his original themes set forth in the beginning of this essay. Retrieving these themes, Lonergan intends to integrate them within the operations of the first

approximation. He shall engage a dialogue with various sciences especially history and philosophy, so that the first approximation can be clarified.

Lonergan begins his discourse by stating: "The earthly task of man is not a routine but a progress." (16) This argument is guided by a good logical sequence. "Understanding progresses through incomplete acts to the perfected act."[386] In supplementing Aquinas' treatise, Lonergan complements this when he says:

> But this gradual actuation of man's intellectual potency is the achievement not of the individual, nor of a few generations, but of mankind in all places and through all time. What the angel, a species to himself, attains instantaneously in an eon[387] – an indefinitely distended point, that man achieves in time, the whole time of his earthly existence.[388]

This is a significant assertion. Lonergan perceived that progress is essentially *historical.* The process towards obtaining a highest form of human living is attained through time and matured through ages. Hence, he affirms positively "that the course of the human progress may be determined from the nature of the human mind." (16) This statement can be supported by his discussions years later, in which Lonergan continued to maintain his previous position to suggest that progress results from the natural development of human intelligence.[389]

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[386] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), *The Original Unpublished Manuscript*, p. 9. Lonergan wrote this line in Latin. It reads: "Homo est in genere intelligibilium ut potentia; intellectus procedit per actus incompletos ad actum perfectum." His quote is taken from *ST* 1-2, q.85, a. 3. Perhaps he wanted to make a point so he chose only this sentence from Aquinas' full quotation which he used earlier in his *Pantôn*. See B. Lonergan, PA (1), 142.

[387] B. Lonergan, PA (2), editorial footnote, # 22. "In the MS, 'aevum'; scholasticism distinguished eternity in God, *aevum* in angels, and time in human beings (see Thomas Aquinas, *ST*, 1, q. 10, a. 5)."

[388] Clearly, there is no specific reference to St Augustine in this particular statement. I, however have a strong feeling that Lonergan may have drawn on St Augustine's insights. See for instance, St. Augustine of Hippo, *The City of God*, Bk XI, Part III, Chapters. 1-34. These chapters' deal with the theological idea of the 'the origin of the two cities.' It is a theological principle in which Lonergan will very much rely on Augustine rather than Aquinas to help him map out his theology of history.

[389] B. Lonergan, *Insight*, 8. "Thus, insight into insight brings to light the cumulative process of progress. For concrete situations give rise to insights which issue into policies and courses of action. Action transforms the existing situation to give rise to further insights, better policies, more effective course of action. It follows that if insight occurs, it keeps recurring; and at each recurrence knowledge develops, action increases its scope, and situations improve."

Accordingly, in ACH (2) Lonergan is clear in his approach. What had triggered successive rates of progress throughout the course of human existence - such as the breakthrough in numerous evolutionary sciences, multiple shifts in ancient civilizations, ideological advancement, technological innovations, socio-cultural, and politico-economical governances of societies - are instances of progress that emanate essentially from the human mind. These evolutionary events were successive through generations from the ancient past. Lonergan sums it up beautifully: "The instrument of human progress is the mind of man. If then the mind of man is such that some things must be known first and others later, an analysis of mind will reveal the outlines of progress." (16) What features penetratingly in Lonergan's argument is the power of the human mind. Progress in intellectual education is largely to be recognized as a positive aspect in human life. However, he utters cautious reservations.

Lonergan is concerned about the rise of 'false sciences' and 'dangerous philosophies.'[390] It was a similar sort of concern Lonergan had regarding "a decadent state of Catholic thought"[391] within the Church. Yet at this point Lonergan is concerned with the development of an educational model in the secular world. He is questioning the authenticity of secular philosophies and sciences that promote misconceived elements of progress. He feared that what he judged to be the unconstructive trend of progress in intellectual development, especially in what the secular world and their secular philosophies were offering to the civil societies, was detrimental to the present and future generations.

Authentic progress has to have a criterion. Otherwise, how would progress retain its legitimacy in the succession of ideas? In other words, how genuine was historical progress in successive ideas of the wisdom of the past? What kind of values did the human mind hand on

[390] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 150-7.
[391] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134. Editors' Preface.

from the past to the present, and how will these values be transferred to the future? One of the many suggestions Lonergan wanted to offer, was to reinvigorate the authenticity of progress advocated by unpretentious philosophy of the past. In order to achieve that, Lonergan intended to reach the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas and above all, in the teaching of Christ.[392]According to Lonergan, what is discovered in the philosophies of the ancient wisdom are the fruits of invaluable source of education. Throughout the course of human history, they advocate human values and continue to promote the foundations of integral human development.

### 2.1 The Categorization in the Layers of Intelligence and Periods of History

The alteration in historic human living emanates from new ideas, that is from the power of the mind. This is key to the argument that is advanced in subsequent discussions. Lonergan points out that the dynamisms of progress are achieved in creative intelligence. He, however, comes up with a fundamental obstacle: "The human intellect is a conscious potency conditioned by sense." (16) Ruling against the possibility of false sciences and dangerous philosophies, Lonergan sets out to map "adequate foundations for understanding dynamic theoretical systems."[393] In doing so he proposes "two types of intellectual operations." (16) They are: "spontaneous and reflex." Lonergan's two intellectual operations according to Michael Shute's study, are two stages or periods in history. These two stages or periods in history are basically two different fields of knowledge, namely, the philosophic and, the scientific.

[392] Lonergan discusses the … "authenticity of the gospels because it is the only possible explanation of the facts…in keeping with contemporary Catholic philosophy, and indeed, a very profound judgement upon modern philosophy, from that view-point…" in his letter to his religious superior, Rev. Henry Keane, dated January 22, 1935, p.5.

[393] M. Shute, "Functional Collaboration as the Implementation of 'Lonergan's Method' Part 2: How Might We Implement Functional Collaborations?" *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis*, 8 (2015): 67-92 accessed 22 February 2019.

Regarding the "philosophic field," Lonergan explains that the "thought depends upon the mere fact of experience (general metaphysic) or upon its broad and manifest characters (cosmology, rational psychology, ethics)." (17) By contrast, in the scientific field Lonergan found that "thought depends not upon experience in general nor upon its generalities but upon details of experience observed with the greatest care and accuracy." (17) Lonergan then moves on to propose "two manners or two methods of thought." (17) These "two methods of thought" basically operate under their specific expertise in two fields: "deductive from the general to the particular; inductive from the particular to the general." (17)

Lonergan notes that: "Deductive thought proceeds in a straight line, for its progress is simply a matter of greater refinement and accuracy," while "inductive thought proceeds by thesis, antithesis and higher synthesis." (17) Comparing as well as contrasting these two methods of thought, Lonergan concluded that "deductive thought does suffer revolutionary progress" while "inductive thought proceeds in a series of revolutions from theses through antitheses to higher syntheses."[394] Lonergan sources his main reference in Hegel's dialectic, yet in an interesting turn, Lonergan draws Newman into the discussion. "Thus, there are two ways of being certain of one's understanding: the first is philosophic and excludes the possibility of higher synthesis; the second is full knowledge of the fact, Newman's real apprehension."[395] Newman's 'real apprehension' is a significant understanding that Lonergan applies to clarify the role of his three approximations. Hence, the role of progress within the structure of his metaphysic of history has to be simplified so that concrete instances of the next two approximations can be communicated.

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[394] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 25. "In a letter to his religious superior, Rev. Henry Keane, dated January 22, 1935, Lonergan had spoken of the great influence Hegel and Marx had had on his own 'metaphysics of history' (p. 5); we have an example of it here. The recurring triadic structure appears also in the introductory pages of his doctoral dissertations; see METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 3/2 (October 1985): 9-47."

[395] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 27. "Lonergan during his philosophy studies some ten years earlier had written an essay on *Newman's Grammar of Assent*, taking up the question of real and notional apprehension: "True Judgment and Science," *Blandyke Papers* (Student journal, handwritten, Heythrop College, Oxon,) No. 291 (February 1929), pp. 195-216."

What Lonergan is aiming to achieve at the conclusion of this discussion is to nurture a criterion that analyzes the historical stages of intellectual development. So far Lonergan had relied on Aquinas to construct his theory of a metaphysics of history. Perhaps in Aquinas, Lonergan found Thomas' conceptualist approach inadequate to meet his criteria of reaching an analytical conclusion. Lonergan then moved to accommodate Newman who offered him what was "far higher, wider, more certain, subtle, than logical inference."[396] Hegel too, may have provided Lonergan a sufficient working base: the objective *Geist,* a revolutionized model of a higher synthesis.[397] Newton also offered Lonergan the 'ideal construct' of an investigative principle critical of the general analysis of the philosophy of history. Both Augustine and Aquinas provided the theological foundations. Lonergan netted the appropriation of three-fold dialectic of history and transferred it to a threefold theological manifesto. Overall, Lonergan may have benefited from Augustine and Newman, in particular from the motif found within their personal conversions.[398] These various influences may have collectively enriched the creation of his new schema. Each offer found in the great thinkers he followed provided him with a platform. Hence, the progress he advocated within his metaphysics of history is to be both genuine and authentic.

### 3. The Three Periods of History and their Characteristics

Lonergan's final offering regarding the discussion of an ideal line of history contains a number of condensed layers of ordering. Up to this point, he maps out three particular phases of history which he names 'periods.' In these three periods he noted some characteristics that can work well within the given category. "First, from the distinction of spontaneous and reflex thought, we have three periods of history: (a) spontaneous history and

[396] B. Lonergan, "True Judgement and Science," *Shorter Papers*, ed. F.E. Crowe and R. M Doran, Vol 20 *CWL* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 41.
[397] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 152.
[398] See R. M Liddy, *TL*, 40.

spontaneous thought; (b) spontaneous history and reflex thought; (c) reflex history and reflex thought." (18)

In sorting out the specific categories, Lonergan makes a proposition.

> The first period is from the beginning to the discoveries of philosophy and science. The second period is from these discoveries to the social application of philosophy and science to human life in its essential task: the making of man. The third is society dominated by the consciousness of its historic mission: the making or unmaking of man.[399]

This is an enormous task, to classify the geographically vast and virtually distinct civilizations of the world within just three phases of history. Perhaps it is important to note here that this is Lonergan's personal standpoint: these proposed phases of historical stages may neither be commonly held in the public arena nor be found in standard historical text books. Lonergan's overall target was to study analytically the process in progress delivered by human intelligence. The analysis of categories into specific periods of history is a procedure towards devising his own novel theory of history.

Lonergan moves on to give a certain ironic emphasis to the second period.

> We would note that the second period does not end with the writing of Plato's *Republic*, nor even with the medieval application of philosophy to society, but rather with the social passion for an ideal republic that marked the French Revolution, the nineteenth-century liberals, and the modern communists, and the promised Kingship of Christ through Catholic Action and missiology. The 'class consciousness' advocated by the communists is perhaps the clearest expression of the transition from reflex thought to reflex history.[400]

Lonergan does not add any further comment of clarity to the first period. Given the noted clues, a conclusion can be drawn that his proposition of the first period may refer to the achievements of ancient civilizations. The key source of his thoughts is noted as being from

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[399] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 28. "File 713 has what was probably an earlier essay in which Lonergan distinguished two periods of history, each divided into two parts. "…two phases in human progress: the automatic state…the philosophic stage…" The actual course of events gives the subdivisions: "the world prior to the discovery of philosophy … failure of philosophy to fulfil its social mission…cultural expansion following upon the Dark Age …The future" ("Philosophy of History," pp. 101-102 of the MS).

[400] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 29. "The 'promised Kingship of Christ' was a major theme in Lonergan's 1935 essay, "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*" (see note 9 above). Catholic Action appears there linked with the focal topic title, and p. 156). Lonergan has now added a special reference to missiology; see note 56 below."

his study of Dawson's historical work.[401] Critically, Lonergan's demarcated phase of the first period can however evoke other relevant questions. A case in point is the risk it may pose for generalizing such vastly heterogeneous areas of the globe. Furthermore, it would complicate the technicality of detailed data. Thus, Lonergan just noted: "from the beginning to the discoveries of philosophy and science."[402] (18)

In the second period of history, Lonergan however expanded his narrative with some interestingly key events that demarcated the phases between the end of the first period and the inauguration of the second period. Again he bundles a whole range of topics, together with significant events of modern history, and also certain technical factors: the era from Plato's book, the *Republic*, to the epoch of the French Revolution, the nineteenth-century liberals, and the era of the modern communists. Interestingly enough, Lonergan integrates these eventful epochs of social history with the theological blending of the promised Kingship of Christ.[403] This theological theme was evoked by Pope Pius XI's encyclical that gave a call for Catholic Action. Some of these significant events formed part of Lonergan's own experience. Those noted events were a backdrop triggered by the imminent decline of western civilization.[404]

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[401] See C. Dawson, *The Age of the Gods*.

[402] Lonergan's noted reference "would be reflected, historically, in the achievements of Mesopotamia and Egypt in the ancient world with their development of practical arts and political organization." See M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 141, footnote # 563. We would conclude that the key resource Lonergan would be relying heavily upon would be from Christopher Dawson's *The Age of the Gods*. Scientific and DNA clinical samplings from laboratory science were not available in his days of the 1930's, to enable Lonergan to go beyond Dawson to speak of other ancient civilizations and developments in other parts of the world. A case in point will be the New Guinea peoples as well as the Australian Aboriginal peoples and their complex history of civilizations. Though Dawson has a good chapter on the Australian Aboriginal peoples, that was not apparent in Lonergan as he was brainstorming in his notes. For a good background resource see J.F. O'Connell, J. Allen, "Dating the Colonization of Sahul (Pleistocenet Australia – New Guinea)," in *The Journal of Archaeological Science* (Salt Lake City and Bundoora: Department of Anthropology, University of Utah, & Archaeology Program, School of Historical and European Studies, La Trobe University, 2004, 31) 835-853. http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jas accessed 14 November 2015.

[403] See J. A. Komonchak, LEERH, 161. The second period may well point to the increasing signs of political uncertainty in Europe triggered by the collapse of an economic order generally in the Western world.

[404] See Pope Pius XI, *Quas Primas, On the Feast of Christ the King*, 1925. Pope Pius XI's encyclical centered on the promised Kingship of Christ for reinvigorating the crisis in the West. This papal encyclical triggered the Catholic Action movement. The promised Kingship of Christ was a major theme in Lonergan's 1935 essay, *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis.*" See B. Lonergan, PA (1), 156-7. This is closely linked to 'Catholic

Although 'the promised Kingship of Christ' and 'Catholic Action' were recurring topics carried on from the previous discussion found in the *Pantôn* papers, Lonergan added another special reference at the very end of his statement: missiology. It is difficult to ascertain whether missiology is a totally new concept, or if it is an added subject related to his new programmatic vision of new world order: a "*Summa Sociologica*."[405] These suggestions remain unclear.

Lonergan's third period is presented in a peculiar manner. Unlike the first two periods Lonergan preferred to call the third phase a society rather than a period.[406] His favorite, also key phrase, which underscores his work on a dialectic of history, "the making or unmaking of man" is given great emphasis. The first two periods were to understand the past while the third period is a future-oriented plan. Lonergan's thoughts in this working plan are clearly emphasized in his second point of discussion.

Lonergan carries the momentum of his discussion to his next point. "Second, from the distinction of philosophic and scientific, deductive and inductive thought, we may distinguish two levels of thought in each of the three periods."[407] In his second point of discussion he has a table of contents. In this table he arranges in an orderly way some examples under each of the two levels of thought: deductive and inductive. Hence, in the first period of "spontaneous thought and history," Lonergan has the examples of "popular religion and morality." (19)

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Action' as Lonergan paid special attention to Pius XI's devotion to the feast of Christ the King. Again see J. A. Komonchak, LEERH, 161.

[405] See B. Lonergan, PA (1), 156. Since the ACH (2) is assumed to be a more developed essay from that of the *Pantôn*, perhaps what Lonergan noted was actually what he was intending to expand in his new vision towards a theology of mission.

[406] What was intended in this reference may be linked to his emerging theme of a mission theology. This will be an important discussion he will have contributed regarding the study of culture and theology. It is difficult to ascertain whether his initial thinking in dealing with mission theology was a trend he had maintained especially in the area of culture and theology: that theology may have fallen behind the times and that it had failed to meet contemporary issues? See B. Lonergan, TNC, 55.

[407] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 30. "Inserted by hand in the line of space after 'Thus,' and referring perhaps to the three-part schema that follows in the text, is this notation: 'Note: thesis not wrong but incomplete; perhaps wrong fundamentally. *Spiritual harm*.'" It was pointed out earlier that these were his private notes, and so what is noted is handwritten, inserted to his manual typed page. This can be clearly seen in B. Lonergan, ACH (2), *The Original Unpublished Manuscript*, p. 11.

These examples fall under the "deductive field;" whereas, under the "inductive field" he cites the examples of "agriculture, mechanical arts, economic and political structures, fine art, humanism, discovery of philosophy and science." (19)

In the second period of "reflex thought but spontaneous history, Lonergan gives the examples of "religion and morality on philosophic basis." (19) These examples fall within the category of the deductive field, while "applied science, international law (universal law) enlightenment, theories of history" (19) are examples grouped under the "inductive field." Finally, in the third period of "reflex thought and history," Lonergan cites the example as "the 'general line' of history philosophically determined (compare Stalin's general line)"[408] (19) which he grouped under the deductive field, whilst the "edification of world state" (19) is noted as an example in the inductive field.

After clarifying his three levels with a table of contents and also providing specific examples, Lonergan says "certain general norms" (19) can be added to the given table. He proposes five general norms:

> "(a) Progress is from the spontaneous social unit of tribe or race to the reflex social unit of the state.
>
> (b) The development of humanistic culture presupposes large-scale agriculture, its universalization presupposes applied science: priority of the economic as a condition.
>
> (c) The tendency of progress is to remove man from his dependence upon nature to dependence upon the social structure, to substitute state for kinship.
>
> (d) The greater the progress, the greater [also is] the differentiation of occupation, the more complex the social structure, and the wider its extent: for man

[408] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 32. "Michael Shute, *The Origins of Lonergan's Notion of a Dialectic of History* (note 1 above), p. 262, note 80, refers here to Robert C. Tucker, "Stalinism and Transformation," in T. H. Rigby, ed., *Stalin* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 58-67."

progresses by intellect's domination over matter; but this domination is that of the universal over the many: its exploitation, hierarchy.[409] (progress as intellectual)[410]

(e) Man must not permit himself to be led by the nose by this progress: the result would be wonderfully intelligible, but not human. Man has an intellect, but he is not an intellect. Virtue is in the man, even the virtue of progress." (19-20)

These five points sum up neatly Lonergan's discussion of the recurrent theme of progress. Generally, what he aimed to achieve was that progress would be used as a yardstick to an analytical interpretation of a process. Indeed, progress is a process. This process was responsible for "making and remaking" of humanity. The significant theme in the whole discourse of the ideal line is the influential role of the human intellect that triggers progress. Briefly, as Shute clarifies: "A study of the structure of intellectual development would indicate not only a cycle of new ideas leading to new situations, but also a series of distinct stages."[411]

It is clear that Lonergan had pondered the principle of the law of motion. The pattern of ideas calculating speed in charting the laws of gravity is itself historical. Ideas have been handed on from generations through passages spanning back to Aristotle (384-322 BC) then to Galileo (1609 AD), and onto Descartes (1644 AD). It is now Newton in (1686) that consolidates and devises his three approximations to explain the laws of gravity.[412]

Finally, in analyzing Lonergan's overall arguments on an ideal line of history, there is an outstanding point that has to be spelt out: Lonergan's adaptation of Isaac Newton's law of

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[409] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 33. "Lonergan added the last three words by hand; their meaning, somewhat cryptic here, is revealed in the companion essay, "Analytic Concept of History, in Blurred Outline": "The power of intellect is the domination of the universal over the material many: its exploitation is hierarchy" (p. 9 of the MS)."

[410] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 34. "'Progress as intellectual' is a marginal notation to paragraph *d*, and 'As human' a similar notation to paragraph *e*; in each case the reference seems to be to the whole paragraph."

[411] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 140.

[412] I. Newton, *The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, translated by B. Cohen and A. Whiteman, assisted by J. Budenz (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), Editor's preface, pp.31-45.

motion. One wonders why it was so important for Lonergan to rely on Newton's laws of mechanics, or rather why Newton's ideal line was crucial to Lonergan? The answer to that question goes beyond common reasoning. Lonergan sensed that human living is not mechanical. A speed in a straight line does not work out in social progress. "No less than the motions of the planets, human history is a complex, concrete and dynamic process…"[413] Thus, social progress could be perfect if there was no interference in the speed of the ideal line. It is possible that humans had the capacity through created nature to reach their full potential in the making or remaking of humanity. Hence, progress does not reach the intended target. Put simply, the speed of an ideal line of the human mind encounters hindrances and social interferences. It is important to point out that the progress of humanity, given the powers of human intellect, has to work out its dialectic in the decline. Lonergan proceeds to discuss the essential arguments of decline that the human intelligence has to deal with, on account of the interferences, if there were to be any progress at all. According to Lonergan, succinctly, progress is ultimately, the power of mind.

[413] M.T Miller, *Why the Passion? Bernard Lonergan on the Cross as Communication*, 22.

## II. Decline

Progress was identified in the previous discussion as the first approximation. Clearly, that discussion was key to setting off the forthcoming discussions concerning the next two approximations. We shall now move on to examine Lonergan's second approximation, decline. Under this topic Lonergan has an outline of six subtopics to discuss this subject. They are:

(1) The nature of decline,

(2) The goal of decline,

(3) The three forms of decline,

(4) Minor decline,

(5) Major decline, and finally

(6) Compound decline.

Lonergan commences his discussion by first providing a definition. "We defined the ideal line as the constant and complete observance of the natural law. Decline is the deviation from the ideal line that is consequent to non-observance." (20) This definition underscores the contrast that exists between the first two approximations: progress and decline. Lonergan continues: "It is noted that we deal not with a new line but with a deviation from the line already established." (20) It is clear that Lonergan again aligned with Newton's second law in mechanics to devise his own second approximation.

Clearly, Isaac Newton's complex theory of a calculus governing the laws of mechanics[414] is predominantly the next major source Lonergan adapts in this analogy to appropriate his second approximation, decline. "Though in this outline we merely indicate the abstract form of decline, it is not to be inferred that we have left over a problem of

[414] I. Newton, *The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, Bk II, Section 8, pp. 408-424.

relating decline with the ideal line but only of making the theory of decline more full and detailed." (20)

### 1. The Goal of Decline

After providing a brief outline of his second approximation, Lonergan articulates its intention. "The goal of decline is contained in its principle, sin." (20) Lonergan's aim is to name its underlying cause and he does so pointedly. "Sin is the repudiation of reason in a particular act." (20) Traditionally, sin has a religious connotation; namely an act or non-act of human will contrary to the principles of good. In previous discussions, Lonergan applied this concept to explain the nature of transgression of the divine law, citing the example of the sin of Adam. As he turns to focus his discussion more on decline, Lonergan uses the concept frequently and firmly. In his subsequent arguments, Lonergan's occasional use of sin underscores the richer narrative of decline.

What Lonergan intends to address in this discussion is the fact that decline is an interfering line that deviates from communal interests and tasks. Thus he explains: "Decline is the social rule of sin, its gradual domination of a dialectic and the minds of men dependent upon this dialectic because of their solidarity." (20) Lonergan is even more descriptive as he continues to articulate the core function of decline. "Thus the goal of decline is the unchaining of the animal with intellect, so far from being master, that it is the slave of instinct and passion." (20) In spelling out the cause of decline in allegorical language, Lonergan points out how reason, will and act fall away into a pit of destruction. Hence, human intelligence ceases to be operative or is otherwise absent in these acts.

Sin is not only an act committed contrary to natural law that promotes the ideal line, but a negation of its purpose. In other words, the intellect informs the will to act reasonably. The end resultant of disregarding this act of the intellect is a bad consequence for human

living and the subsequent degradation of the common good.[415] Lonergan proceeds to narrate the effects of decline in deplorable historical circumstances, giving examples of some of the worst scenarios. “Plainly this triumph of the beast differs in the three periods: the degenerate savage, Nero, and the New Paganism of Germany differ vastly; but they would seem to be triumphs of the beast on different levels of history.” (20) The description of sin in what Lonergan portrays in this context is not only a negation of performing a reasonable act but an act below human reasoning, to that of an animal.

Furthermore, Lonergan expands his explanation by dividing the role of decline into three forms of sin, namely minor, major and compound. These divisions would clarify and subsequently, provide the basic goal of decline. Thus, Lonergan classifies them in these following groupings:

> “Minor is the effect of sin in the inductive field of thought.
>
> Major is the effect of sin in the deductive field of thought.
>
> Compound is the combination and interaction of both together.” (21)

## 2. Minor Decline

In his categorization of intellectual development in history, Lonergan grouped minor decline within the purview of the inductive field. By inductive field, Lonergan meant a scheme that operates from below upward. Thus, Lonergan explains:

> Practical progress or social improvement proceeds by the laws of inductive thought: its theses indeed are not simply false, else they could hardly begin to function; but they are incomplete, as classical education is incomplete and so finds an antithesis in the modern side.[416]

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[415] Later in *Insight*, Lonergan brought greater clarity to his discussions by pointing out the destructive tensions in a “flight from understanding” in concrete problems. This may be a result of lack of consultation which subsequently leads to egoistic motivations due to “an interference of spontaneity with the development of intelligence.” B. Lonergan, *Insight*, 244-5.

[416] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 35. “As Lonergan remembered it thirty years later, reading Dawson’s *The Age of the Gods* had started “the correction of my hitherto normative or classicist notion” of culture (*A Second Collection*, p.264). The correction continues here, but reaches its full sweep only much later; for example in the 1965 paper “Dimensions of Meaning” (See *Collection, CWL* 4, p. 238).”

The starting point in dealing with minor decline is a social setting. Each event is concrete and reveals a vibrant society: the vast potentialities of human practical intelligence, already present in created nature, can stimulate reasonable progress. However, the progressive application of the intellect is conditioned by the reality of the limitation of created nature. Thus, there is an interference. Lonergan clarifies what this interference may cause.

> "Now the new syntheses of progressive understanding have three disadvantages:
>
> (a) it is not clear that they offer the better, for concrete issues are complex;
>
> (b) it is certain they threaten the liquidation of what is tried and established, and they meet with the inevitable bias[417] and opposition of the vested interests;
>
> (c) in most cases they contain an element of risk and demand the spirit that contemns the sheltered life- insured from tip to toe – and so meet with the condemnation of all whose wisdom is more lack of courage than penetration of intellect." (21)

These three points sum up well the key challenges to social change in a modern society. A civilization or culture for instance, would be impelled to be transferred from a federated living of a closed-in-tribal society to an experience of an amalgamation of several federated units of tribes or groupings to form a national-state society. Each of these three arguments points to the basic reality of a dynamic human society at crisis point. "Thus," Lonergan adds, "the mere fact of progress produces social tension, and every little boy or girl is born liberal or conservative. But minor decline begins with sin." (21)

Lonergan's point here is clear: The interference of minor decline can create divisions among the members of a flourishing community, yet the fact of that matter is, as it stands, it

[417] It would be years later that Lonergan compressively expanded his idea of 'bias' in a dialectic of history in his most accomplished work, *Insight*, chapter 7 when he discusses 'common sense as object.'

is sin. Lonergan is explicit in his argument: minor decline is profoundly personal. Sin can be communal but the origin of it remains personal. To place the focus on personal sin, Lonergan begins by making a scriptural reference. "For the love of money is a root of all kinds of evil."[418] Hence, he attempts to get to the depth of the issue of personal sin. "Self-interest is never enlightened because it is never objective: it sees the universe with the 'ego' at the center, but the 'ego' of the individual or the class or the nation is not the center." [419] (21) In his earlier discussion on the topic of dialectic, Lonergan spoke of "objective evil." This time there is change in the course of his argument. Minor decline is found in the discussion of "subjective evil." (13)[420] In other words, subjective evil originates from the motivation of personal greed. It is a sin that is deeply personal. Thus, minor decline is rooted chiefly in the sin of greed.

### 2.1 Subjective Evil to Objective Evil

In this section of the essay, Lonergan examines the effects of minor decline in a flourishing society. Social change operates from the concrete living of ordinary life. The system in the modern side of society[421] that catered for even distribution of resources

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[418] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 36. "Thus, NRSV, 1 Timothy 6:0. In Lonergan's Latin, "Radix omnium malorum cupiditas"; quoted perhaps from memory, it differs slightly from the Vulgate."

[419] In his discussions on the idea of 'bias' in a dialectic of history in *Insight*, chapter 7, 'ego' is a key theme that he later expands to articulate his arguments on decline. Here is perhaps the origin of what was to be elaborated years later.

[420] His later work in theology, Lonergan described self-centered ego as such: "Egoists find loop-holes in social arrangements, and they exploit them to enlarge their own share and diminish the share of others in current instances of the particular good." B. Lonergan, *MIT*, 360.

[421] Thus, anthropologically speaking, in the case of social structure Lonergan's argument poses some limitations. Some social structures in primitive societies are egalitarian, others are aristocratic. The modern side of a society removes some of traditional roles. In many cases some of these societal structures can pose an obstacle to social change. Hence, Lonergan makes little reference here to social structures and their specified roles. What he aims to do is to recognize the contribution of minor decline to the foundation of a society. He therefore groups minor decline into the inductive field. Furthermore, Lonergan proceeds to clarify that the evil intention of personal (sin) greed found in minor decline reduces the prospects of sharing equally the wealth owned communally. In ancient societies for instance, designated functions were allotted for each person, especially within the different sexes. Male roles would differ from those of the female, while the fundamentals would remain the same: each one will have an obligation to work towards the welfare of every member of the society. Cf. E. Mantovani, "Comparative Analysis of Cultures and Religions," 49-86

amongst the members of the community is interfered with by those who are placed in charge of it. “This bias of practical thought transforms the distinction of those who govern and those who are governed into a distinction between the privileged and the depressed. The latter distinction in time becomes an abyss:” (21) between what is commonly known as the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots.’ Lonergan reveals the corrosion of the system: those who use the system to enrich themselves and those who miss out from the common purse.

Lonergan points to personal sin as a cause. It can influence the mishandling of the system if the motivation of any one working for the system is reduced to what is effectively subjective evil. To give more clarity, Lonergan presents a graphic description:

> Insensibly the privileged find the solution to the antithesis of their own well-being and progress. Too easily they pronounce non-existent or insoluble the antitheses that militate against the well-being of the depressed. (21-2)

Subjective evil is then transported onto corporate or institutional sin. This sin is identified within an operation of objective evil:

> Thus it is that with the course of time, the privileged enjoy a rapid but narrowly extended expansion of progress, and meanwhile the depressed are not merely left behind but more or less degraded by the set of palliatives invented and applied to prevent their envy bursting into the flame of anger and revolution. (22)

Lonergan graphically describes the situation of decline. “The total result is an objective disorder: both the progress of the few and the backwardness of the many are distorted; the former by its unnatural exclusiveness, the latter by the senseless palliatives.” (22) Continuing his argument, the consequences of objective evil that he presents are again graphic. “And this distortion is not merely some abstract grievance waiting on mere good will and polite words to be set right: it is the concrete and almost irradicable form of achievements, institutions, habits, customs, mentalities, characters.” (22) In brief, what is central in the arguments regarding minor decline is personal sin. Once that personal greed is

not acknowledged as evil, the norm of irresponsibility can be commonly accepted, and to such an extent that obscurity damages ultimately the mores of the community. Consequently, moral norms begin to decay. This distortion becomes a philosophy in which the moral impropriety cannot tell the difference between what is good and what is evil. Hence, this argument is extended to find its place in Lonergan's next discussion of major decline.

### 3. Major Decline

Lonergan groups major decline under the deductive field of thought in the categorization of intellectual development of history. Ideally, governance in a deductive field of thought has a decentralized principle. The ideas that flow from above down can deal with the shortcomings of concrete challenges and thus aid the autonomous proceedings working from below up. Lonergan's discussion on major decline shifts the discussion. Hence, he does not discuss the issues that accentuate a decadent society, rather points out a certain philosophy that wears away good governance. He inferred this in his concluding remarks while discussing the ideologies found in minor decline. This philosophy permeates significantly "institutions, habits, customs, mentalities, characters" (22) that eventually corrode the principles of integrity. Lonergan is explicit as he points out: "The essence of major decline is sin on principle." (22)

He further clarifies his key point:

> When men sin against their consciences; their sins are exceptions to a rule that is recognized and real. When they deform their consciences, sin from being the exception to the law becomes the law itself. This erection of sin into a law of action is the essence of major decline. (22)

In his previous discussion on dialectic he rated a society as 'feverish' if the underlying principle leads to a moral decay. This society ends up in a morally catastrophic situation. Thus, major decline is an unscrupulous philosophy that produces a decadent society. What forms this key philosophical argument is clearly a matter of conscience.

Lonergan calls this philosophy: the "deformation of conscience." (22) The problem regarding the deformation of conscience however, is that this distorted ideology becomes a standard norm. In the following discourse, Lonergan attempts to clarify major decline by introducing "three elements in the deformation of conscience." (22)

"First, there is the tendency to self-justification." This principle is an attempt to provide convincing reason in defense of one's behavior when the actions are inconsistent with standard norms and beliefs. Lonergan's first element in his argument of deformed conscience is firmly scriptural. He found the Prophet Isaiah's wisdom convincingly appropriate to resource the core of his argument. "The consciousness of man seeks the harmony of unity and consistency:[422] by his actions man is sinful; therefore he will either reform his actions by doing penance or he will reform his conscience by denying sin to be sin."[423] (22)

"Second, there is objective foundation that gives" (22) a perverse denial to the heart of truth.[424] This argument clearly flows on from the first element of the deformation of conscience. Lonergan further clarifies:

> Men sin, and their effects of their sins are concrete and real and objective. They set a dilemma to the just man: for if he acknowledges the *fait accompli* he cooperates with injustice; and if he refuses to acknowledge it, then he lives in an imaginary world and cannot cope with the real one. But to the unjust, such situations are but proof that justice is injustice, that good is evil and evil good, that right is wrong and wrong right. (22)

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[422] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 37. "Consistency between knowing and doing continues to be the ethical norm in *Insight*, (1992), pp. 581-82, 622-23, 650-53 (1957, pp. 558, 599-600, 627-30)."

[423] B. Lonergan, PA (2), editorial footnote, # 38. "Isaiah 5:20-22, in NRSV: "Ah, you who call evil good and good evil, who put darkness for light and light for darkness, who put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter! Ah, you who are wise in your own eyes, and shrewd in your own slight! Ah, you who are heroes in drinking wine and valiant at mixing drink, who acquit the guilty for a bribe, and deprive the innocent of their rights!""

[424] Lonergan's arguments can have some references to the Donald Trump era of perhaps the modern political correctness of the "fake news syndrome." See W. Davies, "The Age of Post-Truth Politics, *The New York Times*, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/opinion/campaign-stops/the-age-of-post-truth-politics.html?_r=0, assessed 15 September 2019.

The second element of the deformation of conscience suggests some features of a dictatorial regime. Ironically, these features are practiced by heinous Governments that contradict the course of justice, and subsequently suppress truth. Usually there is an open secret among the populace who are powerless to protest against these appalling practices.

"Third, as a combination and generalization of the preceding two: there is the discrediting of deductive knowledge." (23) Lonergan's third element, deformation of conscience, draws on the power of speech. He says that when "philosophy turns from the contemplation of truth to the problem," (23) the wisdom found in speech is extinguished. He proceeds to raise this question: "Why are all the philosophers wrong?" [425] (23) Within the text Lonergan cites this quote: "Socrates can demonstrate to his heart's content: it is obvious he is wrong and that's all (there is) about it (Gorgias)."

Lonergan makes reference to Plato's writings on Socrates' dialogue: *Gorgias*[426] to bring home the clarity of political persuasion in rhetoric which can be detrimental to the truth. Lonergan believed that what Socrates and Gorgias argued, featured in Plato's famous dialogue, is an example of political rhetoric. In that ancient dialogue, Socrates argues that philosophy is indispensable and that it enhances the significance of rhetoric. Hence, rhetoric without philosophy is divorced from the truth, and outside of philosophy, rhetoric can be abused for personal gain. "Thus the major decline is the gradual procession, from sins to sins on principle, and from sins on principle to the dethronement of reason and the emancipation of the beast."[427] (23) Such diabolic features drawn from the scriptural reference sum up Lonergan's third element with a fear-provoking future.

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[425] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 39. "The reference does not seem to be to any particular exchange in the *Gorgias* but to the general difficulty Socrates has in dialogue with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles."

[426] Plato, *Gorgias,* A revised text, with introduction and commentary, ed. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

[427] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 40. "The first reference may be to Daniel 4:33, where it is said of Nebuchadnezzar: "He was driven away from human society, ate grass like oxen, and his body was bathed with the dew of heaven, until his hair grew as long as eagles' feathers and his nails became like birds' claws" (NRSV). The second reference may be to Revelation 13:2: "And the beast that I saw was like a leopard,

In the next line of argument Lonergan moves away from a pessimistic view of the future. Thus he comments:

> But major decline may be viewed from another standpoint: that of the understanding. The yielding of deductive thought is marked by an invasion of understanding into the deductive field. The inertia of a culture makes for the preservation of all the good that can be saved at each stage of the wrecking process. Thus we have a series of *lower syntheses*.[428]

By this conclusion, Lonergan recognizes the extremely compelling forces of decline in the midst of huge leaps in progress.[429] This trend of development may have challenged Lonergan to seek profound answers to his soul-searching questions of a new world order.

Consequently, these three elements identified in the contribution of the deformation of conscience summed up Lonergan's discussion on major decline. Thus Lonergan remarks: "In the spontaneous period this is expressed by the gradual corruption of the gods. In the reflex period we have: Christendom, Protestantism, rationalism, liberalism, naturalism, communism, nationalism."[430] Although categorically, the listing Lonergan provides for the gradual corruption of the gods reverts to the contents grouped in intellectual development, yet overall, they underpin Lonergan's primary themes in the formation of his theory of a dialectic of history: unity, harmony, human solidarity, restoration and peace.

It is clear from these concluding notes that Lonergan wavered in his thoughts. While Lonergan posited that there was a huge leap in progress, he was also wary of the

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its feet were like a bear's, and its mouth was like a lion's mouth. And the dragon gave it his power and his throne and great authority." (NRSV)"

[428] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 41. "This series of 'lower syntheses' occurs over and over in Lonergan. For example, in *Collection*, p. 110 (in the 1951 paper, "The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World"); likewise in *Insight* (1992), p. 256 (1957, p. 231)."

[429] This must be a serious reflection for Lonergan! What was going on in his mind as he was composing these notes? Perhaps question such as: why do humans take two steps backward once they had leaped forward in one step of radical progress? In later years Lonergan would speak of 'ambiguity of change' and 'world crisis' in reference to the spontaneous disruption to economic, socio-political developments in the paradox of progress-decline interplay. See B. Lonergan, "The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World," *Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F Lonergan*. (1967): 108-122.

[430] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 42. "There is written by hand below this paragraph: "Each its 'mysticism' propaganda persecution (you would think Protestants never used the torture chamber nor liberals the guillotine).""

domineering influence of decline. In other words, peace, harmony and unity have been shattered, so much so that hostility, resentment, division, corruption, and consequently wars and antagonism have corroded human progress. Some notable evidence gleaned from another unpublished article, namely the "Philosophy of History," a companion essay within File 713, reveals Lonergan's frustrations, and shows that his concerns became rather personally frustrating, in his asking almost desperately "Why the twentieth century is in such a mess?"[431] Lonergan came close to losing confidence in any of the political systems of his time.[432] He concluded that none of them might adequately stand as a long-term guide to progress.[433]

### 4. Compound Decline

This segment is Lonergan's final part of his six-part series of discussion on the second approximation: decline. Compound decline is the third series of decline, and the discussion of it brings to conclusion the discussions of the first two named declines: minor and major. Before proceeding with his articulation of the role of compound decline, Lonergan highlights the roles of the first two declines: "Both the major accelerates the minor and vice versa." (23)

Given the summary functions of both minor and major decline, compound decline finds its specific role. "It deprives science – notably, economics[434] – and practical thought of the guidance of the first principles of religion and morality.[435] Of itself the minor tends to disorder; coupled with the major its goal is an unintelligible chaos." (23) Succinctly, their

[431] B. Lonergan, PH, page numbers not given.
[432] Cf. J. A. Komonchak, LEERH, 160.
[433] M.T Miller, *Why the Passion? Bernard Lonergan on the Cross as Communication*, 7-8.
[434] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 43. "'notably, economics' is typed in between the lines, without clear indication of its point of insertion."
[435] There is evidence to suggest that Lonergan devoted a considerable amount of time to studying economics but never proceeded to getting his economic theory published. The inserted term: 'economics' might be a hint to his work in economics. See M. Shute, *LEER* 3-13.

combined effort (both minor and major) thus produce chaotic effects that eventually become the product of compound decline. Lonergan explains compound decline:

> For sin is unintelligible: action guided by sin results in the unintelligible – no mere antithesis to be easily swallowed by some higher synthesis, but an indigestible morsel refractory to all intellect, that can be solved only by liquidation. (23)

This argument clearly projects a trend in what Lonergan reportedly told his superior in his letter, that he was to transcend Hegelian dialectics. Besides, his use of the concept 'sin' connotes a theological narrative. This narrative shall feature predominately in the next lot of discussions. Lonergan continues,

> On the other hand, the minor accelerates the major, inasmuch as it supplies the real mechanism for the imposition of the successive lower syntheses. The tension between liberal and conservative, the opposition between privileged and depressed take on a philosophic significance when the disputes engendered by the major decline are made the sponsors of slogans for rival cupidities and hatreds. (23)

Lonergan thus specifies what underscores the functions attributed to compound decline. When personal greed pervades in minor decline, it subsequently corrodes good principles set out in the discussions spelt out by the theme of major decline, and so triggers the extinguishing of common good in compound decline. Thus he continues: "The goddess, Reason, is enthroned amidst blasphemy and bloodshed. Liberalism gains the fascination of a snake by its polite contempt for religion. The proletariat attains consciousness by militant atheism." (24)

The concluding part of this discussion gives Lonergan's outlook a grim hopelessness, a reality beyond repair. This, however is not how Lonergan intended to end his discussion. Instead, he attributes the function of compound decline to a positive end. "Nor are we to overlook, in the combination of major and minor decline, a third element that is prior to both: progress." (24) In the midst of such drastic pessimism Lonergan, paradoxically, sounds positive. He does so by identifying the positive developments that emerge from historical

events when, in fact, their outcomes were most likely to be filled with misery, mayhem and ruin. "The French Revolution," (24) he says "rid the world of feudal survivals. The liberal revolution was founded upon an amazing industrial advance. Communism not only excites rabid nationalism but does so because it would transcend the tribes."[436]

The paradox in Lonergan's concluding treatise of compound decline is that it intends to achieve a new outlook. Compound decline draws on a new order: there is a cessation of an old order and a rebirth or a re-emergence of a new one. This evolution however, is not only spontaneous. In the natural process of life itself, there is a dying, a painful process in which some aspects die out so as to combine to form a new one, or other aspects are forcefully phased out so that there is a new gain: new forms of life. What persists in Lonergan's thoughts are his recurring themes found in his previous essay, in PA (1): order, restoration, harmony, unity and peace. The conclusion reached in compound decline is basically to seek a hypothesis of restoration: under the rubbles of ruins and destructions emerges a new birth. It is a rebirth to an alternative development. This new development nurtures a 'new' order.

[436] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 44. "This remarkable list of positive points in movements Lonergan so strenuously opposed does not include anything positive on Protestantism, though the companion essay, "Outline of an Analytic Concept of History," does so by implication (p.13 of the MS). Of course the lists are not meant to be complete."

## III. Renaissance[437]

Lonergan reaches his third approximation in the final stage of his discussion in this manuscript. Treating the first two approximations early in the piece, Lonergan was deep into the discussion on dialectics. As Lonergan approaches the third and final approximation, he sums up the whole proceedings of a dialectic of history noting: "Progress is the thesis of nature; decline the antithesis of sin; the higher synthesis of these two necessarily lies beyond the confines of this world and the intellect of man."[438] (24) Succinctly, what he intends to sum up is that the interplay of the ideal line of history with the line of interference creates the space for the third approximation to complete a dialectical process. Thus, the basic working of renaissance is a higher synthesis that advances from the lower synthesis to the next higher and more superior domain.

Lonergan takes the third approximation to the next level of discussion, suggesting that while, renaissance completes a dialectical process in its cyclical role, it still has an even higher role to play. This higher role integrates and sublates what lower synthesis offers in a dialectical discourse. Conversely, Lonergan elaborates:

> It is not the mind of man that can make issue with the unintelligibility of sin and the distortion and dethronement of the mind itself. Hence the essential character of renaissance is that it presupposes a transcendence of humanity, the emergence of a 'new' order. (Compare truth and error in Trotskyist 'continual revolution.'[439]

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[437] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 45. "'Redemption' (or grace) is Lonergan's regular term for the third 'moment' in the structure of history. His purpose in using 'renaissance' here may be to remain within the confines of reason while pointing beyond them, as in chapter 20 of *Insight*; in fact, there are multiple links between that chapter and this section §7."

[438] In contrast to his previous dealings with the first two approximations Lonergan does not align his third approximation with Isaac Newton's laws of gravity. Instead he aligns with Hegel's dialectics.

[439] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 46. "There is a longer passage on 'continual revolution' in "Outline of an Analytic Concept of History:" "The Trotskyist doctrine of 'continuous revolution' is meaningless on the level of man: for though it have its palpable premise in the surds of the social situation, surds never completely eliminated, it can have no realization there. For the 'revolution' to succeed, capturing a society, is its betrayal: for if it holds its prey, it stabilizes itself in the old frame with bureaucrats supplanting bourgeois; and if it lets its prey go, then what has it done? The real truth of the continuous revolution can be found only on a higher level; the level of a self-renunciation that is a new birth into a higher order" (p. 14; spelling adapted to Collected Works usage). This critique, somewhat shorter, made its way into print in the little essay, "Secondary Patrons of Canada," *The Montreal Beacon,* January 3, 1941, p.3."

The concept of the Trotskyist 'continual revolution'[440] is a notable, yet a radical example, of Lonergan's innovation of a higher synthesis in the deliberation of his third approximation. Lonergan appropriates the "truth and error in Trotskyist 'continual revolution" (25) as a platform to demonstrate the analytical principle of a higher synthesis. The 'Trotskyist continual revolution' however, is in itself an inadequate model because it is limited to the socio-economic and political programs. Though it may have some merits in offering higher principles in economic reforms, and perhaps good governance may need socio-economic and political reforms, it remains merely a manifesto. What Lonergan seeks to do is to use this model to expand his treatise so that it shall transcend the 'lower synthesis.'

Hence, the key notion that features in this section is a 'new' order. To clarify this theme even further Lonergan outlines four characteristics. They are:

> *First*, the new order transcends man: therefore it would be to man mystery; it would be to understanding as his understanding is to the brute; 'things beyond.'[441] *Second*, the new order would be knowable: man knows being and outside being there is nothing. But because of the lack of understanding, this knowledge would be as the scientist's of empirical laws.[442] *Third*, man could not raise himself into the new order: nothing can transcend itself. *Fourth*, in the new order, man's nature would not be negated but included in a higher synthesis. This, on analogy: man transcends but does not negate the orders beneath him; as a mass of matter, he is subject to the laws of mechanics; as living, he is subject to the laws of cellular development and decay; as sentient, he has the perceptions and appetites of the brute. (25)

These four characteristics are in Lonergan's rationalization of the superior synthesis pertaining to the proportionate being. Succinctly, the first point denotes mystery, the second knowledge, the third, transcendence and the fourth, sublation. They encompass the human capacities of the intellect, the will and reason. Lonergan offers these four characteristics to

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[440] The concept commonly used in the Trotskyist ideology is "permanent revolution." See "Trotskyism," https://www.britannica.com/topic/Trotskyism accessed 25April 2019. Lonergan brings in a new breaking definition: 'continual revolution.' He does that to coin his own theory of renaissance in a new way that will carry his meaning of a 'new' order.

[441] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 47. "*ta epekeina*: literally, the things beyond; geographically, the parts beyond, the hinterland; but the term is used here for grades of being."

[442] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 48. "'not completely so –----' is inserted by hand at the end of this paragraph, presumably qualifying the analogy of a scientist' knowledge."

consider mitigating minor and major decline in human nature, so that the progress of the intellect can foster the will to a new rediscovery of the potential paths towards a 'making and remaking of humanity.'

"Hence," Lonergan contends that "in the new order we would still have life under social conditions to an individualist end; the acceptance of the new order and life in it would be rational, and so be rationally acceptable (miracles) and humanly livable (authority)."[443] Succinctly, what Lonergan also offers in renaissance is not only the achievement of the new order horizontally in the created nature of humanity, but also vertically toward the recognition of the supernatural order. Renaissance offers God's possibilities to help restore human potentialities. It would restore fallen nature and also enhance the human will to live humanity to its full potential. Hence, it is the work of the supernatural gifts that complete the whole process.

### 1. Consequences of Renaissance

The principle of a new order continues its features more prominently in the subsequent proceedings. "We have envisaged the new order," says Lonergan, "as the higher synthesis of progress and decline. Hence it will restore progress and offset decline. To offset decline, the new order must attack major decline at is root: against self-justification it will set penance, again the objective unintelligibility and chaos it will set justice-transcending charity, against the discrediting of reason it will set faith."[444] In a dramatic shift Lonergan brings

[443] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 49. "The companion essay, "Analytic Concept of History, in Blurred Outline," sheds some light here. On Miracles (p. 14 of the MS): "acceptance of the new order must be rational, and so evidence of its emergence must be provided (miracles)." On authority (p. 15): "against the successive ambiguities of the dialectic…the new order will set a living authority providentially infallible…against the dethronement of reason the new order will present its own rigorous and all–embracing rationalism under the higher synthesis of faith and authority."

[444] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 50. "It remained a favorite strategy of Lonergan to set the forces of grace, one by one, against the forces of decline. Most often in regard to the three theological virtues; for example, in the following passage on their 'profound social significance.'"

"Against the perpetuation of explosive tensions that would result from the strict application of retributive justice, there is the power of charity to wipe out old grievances and make a fresh start possible.

major decline in direct confrontation with the theological virtues. The new order will attack the root cause, that is, the "deformation of conscience" (22) found in institutional, historical and social structures of sin. Thus, this new order becomes a revolutionary weapon. In order to win the battle, the new order shall be armed with the theological virtues: faith, hope and charity. To translate the theme of a new order to fight the cause for a structural reform, Lonergan's focus radically shifts renaissance's proceedings to a transcendental order of a higher integration.[445] He proposes that the theological virtues shall aid in the battle of human nature. Hence, the theological virtues are commonly attributed to be the fruits of the gift of grace.

Furthermore, similar to what he suggested earlier for a theological revolt against major decline, Lonergan also proposes another offset to minor decline. "Again, against minor decline," Lonergan continues, "the new order must introduce what will compensate for the unbalance and bias of egoism: against cupidity, poverty of spirit; against revolution, obedience; against the beast, chastity." (25) Thus, Lonergan offers the evangelical counsels of chastity, poverty and obedience to "compensate for the unbalance and bias of egoism." (25) The evangelical counsels are associated with the religious life of commitment of those who choose to live a radical life of the Gospel. What underscores that commitment is self-discipline to counterbalance minor decline. Lonergan adapts the basic principles of that calling to any one person who vows to live a life of unworldliness through the offering of the three specific commitments of chastity, poverty and obedience. If minor decline is about a personal sin of selfishness and egoism rooted in subjective evil, then what is needed

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Against the economic determinism that would result were egoistic practicality given free rein, there is the liberation power of hope that seeks first the kingdom of God. Against a dialectic discernible in the history of philosophy and in the development-and-decline of civil and cultural communities, there is the liberation of human reason through divine faith…" (*Collection*, p.112, in "The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World." See also *A Second Collection*, p. 8 in "The transition from a classicist World-view to Historical-mindedness."

[445] See D. A Nordquest, "Cosmopolis: Bourget's and Lonergan's:" *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 11.1 (1993) 37-50.

according to Lonergan is a personal transformation. It is a radical commitment that Lonergan offers to the general public, not just to those who vow to live religious life. Hence, Lonergan believes that the offer of the evangelical counsels can work towards containing minor decline.

The theological virtues speak of the gift of grace; whilst the evangelical counsels speak of human self-will. Combined, these two sets of movements are: one from below upward (pertaining to human endeavour); the other one from above downward (the offer of grace). Hence, Lonergan proposes a cooperative effort between a dialectical discourse of human history and the reception of the supernatural gifts. However, it is a process of spontaneity within the procedures of the new order:

> To restore progress the new order must restore ordered freedom: the order which holds the balance between the fields of reason and understanding, philosophy and science; the freedom that is the *auto-liberazione* of the self-renouncing will; the ordered freedom in which all individuals find their own place of themselves, and all conspire for that infinitely nuanced 'better' that is the goal of progress, but can be known only by the work of all intelligences each in its own field, that can be attained only by individuals bearing the risks that each advance involves. Etc., etc. (25)

Self-will against unworldliness is a challenge to human freedom but advances the possibilities of attaining a higher order. Hence, the decision to choose the evangelical counsels is enhanced by the theological virtues. The object of the consequence of renaissance is to facilitate the human intellect and will. They will then drive the human acts towards achieving the intended purpose in human life: 'we make ourselves by ourselves' out of our own freewill. What Lonergan does in this discussion is feature prominently the self-giving commitment motivated through the evangelical counsels.

Lonergan's final analytical model of a 'new order' is a philosophical anthropology aimed at magnifying the role of renaissance. The role of renaissance will be translated to a theological discourse, the notion of a new order, namely *redemption*. Hence, the work of redemption is primarily the gift of the supernatural order bestowed on humanity. What

Lonergan intends to do is to generate in the subsequent discourse a new role for renaissance (in redemption), which in turn will redefine the roles of the first two approximations: progress and decline. This process in Lonergan's arguments takes place within the scope of a method in an analytic concept of history.

## IV. The Final Discourse of the Three Approximations

As Lonergan wraps up the discussion of his main topic, his intention to shift the final discourse to a theological venture begins to materialize. He initiates the process by assembling two main concluding premises: (i) a single dialectic and, (ii) a multiple dialectic. Lonergan explains:

> The single dialectic is, as we have seen, the succession of situation, thought, action, new situation, new thought, etc., within the social unit. The multiple dialectic, is the synthetic unity of the aggregate of single dialectics: it is this aggregate in their solidarity and differences, and their transferences and reactions. (26)

After giving clarity to each of these two premises, Lonergan proceeds to examine single dialectic in detail. First he takes a look at single dialectic without grace. Next, he examines dialectic with grace.

Lonergan proceeds to explain in brief. "Progress is of nature. Decline is the cumulative effect of sin. Hence it follows that the course of the history of the social unit, influenced by grace, is an initial progress that gradually is submerged in the mounting flood of sin." (26) A dialectical shift from single dialectic without grace to a single dialectic with grace begins to occur through the cycle of an ideal line of development. As he proceeds in this line of argument, Lonergan reverts to use Newton's language:

… this curve – first ascending, then descending – is accentuated by the priority of the economic over the cultural: to labor for economic improvement is easy; to sacrifice for the impalpable benefits of culture is difficult. Thus the course of the history of the social unit in the case we are considering is: first, economic development; second, a certain measure of cultural advance; third, the animalization of man on the higher level of his achievement. (compare Spengler's theory.)[446]

[446] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 51. "Analytic Concept of History, in Blurred Outline" (p. 16 of MS) sheds some little light on the reference to Spengler: "…this corresponds to Spengler's analogy of organic growth and decay." Skimming the sections suggested by the index to Spengler's *The Decline of the West* did not reveal a specific locus of the analogy. The reference may be general to the relationship of the animal and human (see in volume 2 chapters 1-3 on origin and landscape, and chapters 4-6 on cities and peoples), or to the relation between economics and culture (chapters 13-14 and passim)."

Both Newton and Dawson remained Lonergan's vital sources to translate his highly philosophical stance into a social apparatus. Besides, adding Oswald Spengler's work on social history to the principles of economic development within the context of the Industrial Revolution[447] Lonergan went on to highlight many other issues of special significance particularly, the unjust socio-economic and political systems of the western world.[448] Hence, Lonergan's three topics point to the status quo, namely (i) "priority of the economic over the cultural, (ii) to labor for economic improvement, and (iii) benefits of culture economic improvement." (26) These three nominated concerns were clearly the effects of the Industrial Revolution. While recognizing this exceptionally significant phase, Lonergan used Spengler to design a particular social unit.[449]

### 1. Single Dialectic with Grace

Lonergan now aims to illuminate the making of a new order. First, he clarifies the principal role of the new order in major decline. "The 'new order' eliminates the possibility of major decline within its own frontiers." (26) Secondly, Lonergan continues to explain the principal role of the new order in minor decline. "In the measure in which the evangelical counsels are embraced by an elite and their spirit observed by all, the 'new order' excludes the possibility of minor decline." (27)

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[447] O. Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, translated with notes by C. F Atkinso (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1922), 469-507, esp., 497.

[448] One of the hints to make a link between Lonergan's social concerns and the period of Industrial Revolution is his reference to Pope Pius XI's social encyclical *Quadragesimo anno, On Reconstruction of the Social Order*. See J. A. Komonchak, LEERH, 159-177. This particular encyclical that Pope Pius XI issued in 1931 was to commemorate the forty years of Pope Leo XIII's peerless encyclical *Rerum Novarum, On the Conditions of Workers*, 1891. This was an outstanding encyclical, out of the thirty-one issued in his entire pontificate. Eighteen of these are pointed out by scholars as Pope Pius XI's encyclicals of social reconstruction which addressed the global socio-economic and political crises of his time. Twelve others were devoted to Catholic spirituality including one, *On His Priestly Jubilee, Quinquagesimo anno*, 1929. See J. Husslein, *Eighteen Encyclicals of Social Reconstruction by Pius XI*, Social Wellsprings II (1942). The key themes in Pope Leo XIII's pontificate that Pope Pius XI carried on in his reign were the socio-economic and political concerns. Lonergan is seen to be influenced by the address of Pope Pius XI's focused on 'Catholic Action.'

[449] Lonergan was most probably influenced by Spengler at some point to be tainted with a pessimistic view of the radical shift in modern civilization. Thus, he is seen to be saying: "Why the twentieth century is in such a mess?" See. B. Lonergan PH. He may have changed his position as presented at the end of ACH (2).

There is a stark contrast, and also a considerable similarity in how the new order operates in both the major decline, and the minor decline. What aids the new order in its dealings with minor decline is the inclusion of the evangelical counsels. In Lonergan's view, obedience, poverty and chastity can be lived by all, and not only by those who profess them. The self-giving commitment that stems from observing the evangelical counsels can empower the new order. "But adherence to the new order is a matter of free individual choice: hence the insertion of grace into a dialectic tends in the long run to disrupt the social unit." (27) In the interplay of human self-will and the gifts of supernatural grace, the path is never an ideal line of history, neither straight nor smooth. Seeing disruption as inescapable in this new order is indicative of a remarkable shift in understanding.

The gist of this theme is, however, an interruptive new order which lies in the collaborative interactions of the evangelical counsels and the theological virtues. After all, it is God's doing that remains a mystery. Lonergan is attempting to clarify the grey area of this collaborative effort: between human freedom and the supernatural gift of grace. What does take place is that the evangelical counsels offer the human will the service of self-giving. Henceforth, the offer of grace is always present yet the experience of that grace can be perceived in various ways. Some of these experiences would be common, others may be strangely expressed or even contrary to ordinary, daily living experiences. Still others are offered in chaotic and disruptive forms.

Lonergan proceeds to clarify this interruptive form of grace. He does that with the support of several scriptural references:

> I have come on earth to bring not peace but the sword [Matthew 10:34]. In a word, the 'vessels of wrath' [Romans 9:22] will find in the constraints of the new order not the guarantee of the stability of their initial progress, but a hindrance to its expansion; they will find in the disproportion between the profession and the practice of the counsels, an occasion for rebellion and so open the door to major decline; and in major decline, the successive lower syntheses will be all the more violently asserted and vigorously brought into execution because of the presence of opposition. (27)

The shift from a single dialectic with grace to a multiple dialectic without grace produces an interruptive stance. This sounds rather dramatic. The gift of peace and unity in the new order is disruptive. As a result, this new order is distorted. Lonergan expresses that discreetly. “The disruption that follows from grace must be distinguished from the atomization, the *Zersplitterung*,[450] that follows from decline. Grace divides society into two opposing camps in vital conflict: it is the Socratic gadfly.”[451] The Socratic gadfly is a particular reference to Socrates mischievous character at his trial[452] yet draws out an important consequence that shall shape Lonergan’s next line of argument. Hence, Lonergan adapts the Socratic theme to foster a particular argument.

[450] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 52. “*Zersplitterung* occurs three times in “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*,” pp. 4, 6, 20, (see note 9 above), without reference to its source.”

[451] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 53. “Plato, *Apology* 30e”

[452] Plato, *Plato in Twelve Volumes, vol.* 1 translated by H. N. Flower; Introduction by W.R.M. Lamb (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London: Heinenmann 5th reprint 1984) (1926), 1966.

## V. Grace Interrupts History[453]

Lonergan inserts Plato's account of Socrates' defense speech in this context to make a significant point. Socrates is reported to have upset the serenity of the Greek society. He is subsequently punished for two main offences. First, Socrates is accused of introducing new gods to complicate the veneration of the known Greek gods.[454] Second, he is accused of corrupting the minds of the youths of Athens with his new ideas.[455] What, however, underscores the status quo is Socrates' speech. This speech enlightens the public not only about his trial and consequently his imminent death, but about what has determined his death.

The Socratic gadfly epitomizes a social disruption. Besides, Socrates' trial has brought further controversy and fear into the Greek society. Yet there is a truth that lies beneath in all of the confusion and misunderstanding. By and large there emerges an interruptive discourse. That means something new has transpired from this chaotic scene. This is what Lonergan is attempting to present in appropriating the idea of the Socratic gadfly. It is a fascinating analogy that Lonergan utilizes to consolidate his idea of a multiple dialectic without grace: taking the Socratic gadfly to frame his version of a disruptive order.

Lonergan proceeds to elaborate on his next line of thought. "Decline reduces man to the animal level, the stagnation of the sluggish dialectic. All the anti-Catholic synthesis and 'mysticisms' of the modern world have their significance and their force in their anti-Catholicism ultimately." (27) Again, Lonergan inserts another note to further his discussion,

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[453] The term interruption or interruptive grace is my own appropriation of Lonergan's text. I was inspired by reading L. Boeve, *God Interrupts History: Theology in a Time of Upheaval* (New York: Continuum, 2007). Lonergan had that notion of context and theology, in which Boeve neatly expands the thoughts of continuity and discontinuity of application of theology in the midst of contexts of upheaval.

[454] Plato, *Euthypphro,7E-9A* in *The Last Days of Socrates*, translated and with an Introduction by H. Tredennick (New York: Penguin Books, (1954) reprint 1969),

[455] Plato, *Apology,34D-42A* in *The Last Days of Socrates*, translated and with an Introduction by H. Tredennick (New York: Penguin Books, (1954) reprint 1969),

"(Compare Donoso Cortes: Blood must flow: the only question is whether it flows in love or hatred.)" [456] (27)

Lonergan's adaptation of Juan Donoso Cortes' famous catchphrase is to broaden this argument. Donoso Cortes is believed to have devised his philosophy of history from the traumatic experiences of the post Spanish Revolution era.[457] Colossal changes had taken place during and after the Spanish Revolution. Prominent among them was the cessation of absolute monarchy rule. Privileges of the aristocratic class and the affluent clerical institutions were rescinded. Wealth was to be redistributed equally among the working class and the poor of the society. The pillars of government were to be replaced by the structures of liberal democracies. Consequently, the post Spanish Revolution movements have triggered aristocratic and bourgeois reform movements across the continent such as the Bolsheviks movement of the Marxist Revolution in Russia.

Despite its success story, the Revolution itself was chaotic. There were cruel revolts. Ugly events resulted in atrocious persecutions, massive destructions, widespread poverty, economic decline and political turmoil. The experiences of such turbulent times had Donoso Cortes resist the movement. He proceeded to devise a dialectical theory of history, known as 'Catholic civilization.'[458] This philosophy was to pursue a path of 'restoration;' returning to the former system of governance. Thus, his idea of restoration favoured a hierarchical social order. Donoso Cortes accordingly advocated a just violence to restore and maintain the traditional authority within a hierarchical jurisdiction. He believed that the absolute

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[456] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 54. "Donoso appears in the *Pantôn* article with reference to the same theme (blood must flow); see our note 53, METHOD: *Journal of Lonergan Studies* 9/2 (October, 1991): p. 169, on Lonergan's source, and on a later reference he made to Donoso. An interesting sidelight: at the opening of the Gregorian University academic year, 1937-38, Peterus Leturia delivered a lecture "De Atheismi communistici praevisione acrefutatione in postremis scriptis Ioannis Donoso Cortes 1848-1853" (*liber Annualis*, Gregorian University, 1938, pp. 99-116. Leturia was offering a course on the philosophy of history during these years, but there is no evidence that Lonergan followed it."

[457] See more on the "French Revolution." New World Encyclopedia. https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/French_Revolution accessed 12 June 2019.

[458] "Juan Donoso Cortes (1848-1853)." *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* https://www.iep.utm.edu/donoso/ assessed 10 June 2019.

dependency of humanity upon the Catholic Church and restoration of its hierarchical order would attain both social and political salvation. Lonergan translates Donoso Cortes' idea of a 'Catholic civilization' to devise his own paradoxical notion of an interruptive grace. This is the new order that divides society in vital conflicts, clouded in a sense of obscurity of progress.

## 1. Multiple Dialectic without Grace

Lonergan's idea of a multiple dialectic without grace is an egregious divide of a new order. It is an inverted worldview that he presents in this section of his argument. What however, underscores the argument is the subsequent acts of the antecedent events. Lonergan believed that each specific bygone produces a circumstance that triggers a search for an answer. Thus, he proceeds to explain how an answer is sought: "The transition from the single dialectics to the multiple may best be made by considering transference and reaction." (27)

In what follows, Lonergan will use these two conceptions, 'transference and reaction,' to articulate the effects of the interruptive grace. Both transference and reaction have their own functional specialties. Lonergan proceeds to detail the function of his first notion. "Transference," he says, "is the importation by a social unit of the achievements or the miseries of another.[459] It is spatial when the units are contemporary; it is temporal when one unit inherits from another now in decay." (27) Two supplementary concepts found in the companion essay, ACH (1),[460] further enhance its meaning. First, Lonergan says transference

[459] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 55. "In the space at the end of this line Lonergan wrote 'Formal Real (migration; conquest)'. Again "Analytic Concept of History, in Blurred Outline" come to our aid, with the following remark: "Transference is real or formal: real in the cases of migration and conquest; formal in the case of imitation-importation of ideas" (p. 16 of the MS)."

[460] B. Lonergan, ACH (1), 16-7. In this companion essay Lonergan spells out the significance of both 'transference' and 'reaction.'

is "real in the cases of migration and conquest."[461] Second, he states that transference is formal in cases of imitation –importation of ideas."[462] Accompanying the two notions are five general laws of transference. These are not found in ACH (2) but are rather found in the companion essay ACH (1). They are: first, "Improvements in the material order are easily transferred." second, "The disorder of minor decline is essentially a domestic product;" Third, "An intense national spirit resists everything that is not demonstrably superior to its own achievement;" fourth, "Sound philosophic or scientific thought is incompatible with major decline;" fifth, "It is impossible to transfer the thought without transferring the decline."[463] The five general norms are global as well as local resources.

The five general norms are essentially Lonergan's prophetic claim. What anyone personally or collectively experiences in each society of our world today can be reflected in these notions of transference and reaction. Each present event or ideology may be carried on from an historic circumstance: detrimental ideologies. An emergence of a certain ideology or a specific theory may have some blend of originality, perhaps the transferred possibility in the importation or migration of material things and ideas. Essentially, it was this proposition that drove Lonergan into devising a peculiar trajectory to find an explanation adequate to the renewal of society and the Church. The task of renewal, for him, was to develop his idea of a dialectic of history.

Given the significance of 'transference' and its relevance to his present discussion Lonergan then proceeds to define his second notion: "Reaction commonly denotes opposition to progress or decline with the social unit: here we use it to denote opposition to importation. We distinguish healthy and unhealthy reaction: healthy is opposition to the importation of foreign decadence; unhealthy is opposition to the importation of foreign progress." (27-8)

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[461] B. Lonergan, ACH (1),16.
[462] Bid., 16.
[463] Ibid., 16-7.

Spengler's grim analysis of western civilization presented on a grand scale of pessimism is an example of both 'healthy' and 'unhealthy reaction' cases. Yet his "importation of foreign decadence" will subsequently be met by disruptive grace. This example is incorporated in Lonergan's exposition to demonstrate his key argument in the shift of a single dialectic with grace to a multiple dialectic without grace.

Similarity, an eruption of grace expressed in a particular ideology such as that of Donoso Cortes' 'Catholic civilization' can be classified as a sequence of a 'reaction.' It can also be taken as a subsequent development of a 'transference.' Furthermore, the upsurge of radical philosophies such as the case of Spengler's pessimism of the decline of the West, and the Socratic gadfly can be explained within the context of either a transference or a reaction. They can also be deemed to be in both categories. It is Lonergan's attempt to explain the origin of certain scientific and philosophical theories in the midst of chaotic contexts. Thus, this is how each of any of these ideologies may have bourgeoned.

On the other hand, Lonergan was enriched by the shifting perspective Donoso Cortes had initiated in his approach to the traditional ideas. Donoso Cortes' resistance to the spirit of the revolution and his insistence on resorting to the principles of aristocracy and the hierarchical system of governments, produced a dialogism between disillusionment and reality. Moving from a single dialectic to a multiple dialectic, Lonergan returns to the topic of the final discussion:

> The synthetic unity of the multiple dialectic without brace is: transference with healthy reaction results in the continuity of human progress, despite the fact that each progressive social unity in turn succumbs to decline. Transference without healthy reaction universalizes decline: it makes the backward people 'bruler l'ètapè in the downward course of decline. Russia under the Soviets expiates the sins of the West. Native tribes learn the sins without emulating the achievements of the modern world. (Wars, conquest, white man's burden.) (28)

The procedural shift from a multiple dialectic without grace to a multiple dialectic with grace can be considered as the disfigured order in its absurdity. Hence, the social unit

that Lonergan had referenced in several of these particularities is in relevance to modern cultural change that can be clearly identified from these two key points: transference and reaction. Lonergan's imagination of a new order has to face both decline and progress in such non-systematic proceedings as death, violence, the disintegration of systems within good governance, and a collapse of a civilization. This is obvious in the midst of an absence of good which best describes Lonergan's paradox of a disruptive grace that: "the existence of grace slows the process of decline."[464] Spengler's pessimism of western civilization was an example of a reaction to be considered a disruptive order. Yet Lonergan engages Spengler's negative idealism to communicate well his notion of an interruptive order. Hence, Lonergan neatly projects an interruptive form of grace that paves the way for a proposition of a higher synthesis.

## 2. Multiple Dialectic with Grace

This is the final discussion before Lonergan ends this manuscript. Hence, this section can be considered as a synopsis of his third approximation. Bringing the essay to its conclusion, Lonergan remarks, "First consider the single dialectics with grace. These will be either in the initial stages of progress or the latest stage of disruption." (28) Lonergan proceeds to observe:

> In the former case, the different social units will be united in a superstate, [as in] Christendom, and will act as one, more or less, against what is alien to the [as in the] Crusades. Again as long as major decline is avoided, then no matter what the minor decline in any unit, there will remain the seeds of renaissance, of a second spring: [as in] the vitality of the West, rising out of the ruins of the Roman Empire and despite continual lapses into minor decline steadily advancing to achievement hitherto unattained. (28)

Lonergan's final version of his summary notes can be translated to contemporary language in terms of geo-politics and global economic order. The success story of the

[464] M. Shute, *OLNDH*, 154.

extensively well-established social and political structures of Western civilization originates from the rise and fall of the Roman Empire.[465] Importantly, these ideologies survived, were transported on into history, and subsequently became pillars of modern movements. These ideologies would subsequently inspire major socio-economic and political reforms in Western civilization.

As Lonergan moves towards the conclusion of his main argument it is interesting to note the final phase where he deliberately reintroduces the two ideas: transference and reaction. These two concepts add significantly to his next major step of development: towards a theological phase. Hence, Lonergan ends with this remark: "If on the other hand, the social units are tending to disruption we would seem threatened with the persecutions and wars of the Apocalypse. Finally, the relations between a dialectics with grace and those without form the subject matter of missiology."[466]

Hence, Lonergan utilizes the principles of real and formal transference to relate the experiences of the past to identify the challenges of the present and to foresee the planned future with a positive outlook. Borrowed ideas and transferred structures from one area or era to another would have to be applied in the present context, given its own meaningful significance. Past events do provide a particular context where turns and twists, up and downward spiral turns are experienced. So, Lonergan's interpretation of his distinctive approach to doing theology is set in motion: a transition from a dialectic of history to the

[465] See background to Lonergan's note on the ancient Roman Empire. "Ancient Roman Empire." *Ancient History Encyclopedia.* https://www.ancient.eu/Roman_Empire/Ancienthistoryencyclopediaonline accessed 19 June 2019.

[466] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 56. "On missiology see also note 29 above. In the companion essay, "Analytic Concept of History, in Blurred Outline," Lonergan gives us a little more on the subject matter of missiology: "…the questions of transference and reaction here, belong to the science of Missiology, where Missiology is considered not as the concrete problems of the apostolate in particular countries but the larger questions of distributing and directing missionary effort over the globe" (p. 18 of the MS). Worth noting: the Faculty of Missiology and its courses first appear in the *Kalendaria* of the Gregorian University for the year 1932-33 (pp.83-88), though courses on missiology had been given earlier and listed in the Faculty of Theology (See the *Kalendarium* for 1931-32, p. 56)."

theology of mission, embodied within his idea of a Mystical Body.[467] It is Lonergan's intention that, in subsequent discourse, his social philosophy of renaissance culminates in a redeeming history that points to a theological realm. This is to be achieved through the supernatural role of Christ.[468] It is a dominant theme captured in PA (1) which is set to be the bedrock into the study of the ACH (2) manuscript. Thus, ACH (2) began to reveal that Lonergan had the intention of developing "a theory of human solidarity relevant to the theology of the Mystical Body of Christ."[469]

Finally, the possible reason for Lonergan to align the notions of transference and reaction with Spengler, Socrates and Juan Donoso Cortes is that these are examples of extreme case scenarios. In such cases, the application needed a praxis method. The Socratic method is perhaps a good example of a missiological context. Hence, Lonergan appropriates an ideological transfer of the past events that carry forward towards a radical shaping of a new order. He then explains how it is the case that present socio-economic or political circumstances are a reaction to past events. The future events can also be predicted either as the transference of or the reaction to the past.

### 3. A Synopsis on Dialectic and Grace

The overall aim of this thesis was to answer the recurring question: did Lonergan intend to devise a theology of history? In his final remark Lonergan provides a neat synopsis to answer it: "The meaning of history" he says, "is the relation of its three elements, progress, sin, and grace to the First Cause and the Last end." (28) This is indeed the overarching theme in the overall output of this thesis. Lonergan's utmost aim was to produce a theology of history, and he does so in these summary notes.

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[467] B. Lonergan, *Divinarum Personarum Conceptionem Analogican* (Rome: Gregorian University, 1959), 196-240.

[468] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 154-5.

[469] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 72.

The progress towards the "making and unmaking of humanity" is not only a hope for some future interventions but to recognize the gifts already present in us. Utilizing the gifts of intellect, will and reason through the evangelical counsels, we can live fully the nature of humanity. Thus Lonergan affirms: "Progress expresses the goodness of God – to whom all glory from all the multitudinous golden hearts in the world." (28) This will in due course give rise to Lonergan's enlarged, new order in which progress, decline and redemption are represented in *nature, sin* and *grace.* He spelt it out in this way. "Sin is the wickedness of man, and decline "that no flesh should glory in his sight" [1 Corinthians 1:29]. Grace is the higher synthesis of both in God's transcendence: on earth it is the cross, for Christ lived only till he was big enough to be crucified, and the rest of history is but a dilution of that expression of the value of man; but in heaven it is an exceeding weight of glory [2 Corinthians 4:17]." (29) In hindsight Lonergan was up to this point:

> In my rather theological analysis of human history, my first approximation was the assumption that men always do what is intelligent and reasonable, and its implication was an ever increasing progress. The second approximation was the radical inverse insight that men can be biased, and so unintelligent and unreasonable in their choices and decisions. The third approximation was the redemptive process resulting from God's gift of his grace to individuals and from the manifestation of his love in Christ Jesus.[470]

Succinctly, the dynamics of human history is to be complemented with, and completed by the intervention of the transcendental gift of divine grace. This is made possible through the inclusiveness of the operations of the theological virtues. In his later writings Lonergan makes it quite explicit: "if human historical process is such a compound of progress and decline, redemption would be effected by faith, hope, and charity."[471] Weaving the operations of faith, hope and charity into the workings of the evangelical counsels, the third moment of history, namely redemption, introduces a new theological narrative.

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[470] B. Lonergan, IR, 272.

[471] B. Lonergan, "The Transition from a Classicist World-view to Historical-Mindedness." *A Second Collection* (1967), 8. Lonergan's later study expounding the roles specific to each of the triple 'moments' has an informative elaboration in this discussion.

## Conclusion

The complete study of ACH (2) spread over these two chapters has taken this thesis on an incredible expedition through stretches of fascinating passages of various discourses. On the one hand the study has been mind-blurring and tedious. On the other hand, it has been rewarding and stimulating. Overall, the whole study has been deeply enlightening. What has been discovered by this research in its entirety is highlighted in chapter three and also in the present chapter: a comprehensive assessment of Lonergan's overarching blueprint. Lonergan had knitted together a multitude of diverse topics as well as elements of various scientific and philosophical discourses to craft a constructive analysis of history. In order to achieve his goal, he devised a roadmap based on the appropriation of his three-fold dialectics: progress, decline and renaissance.

Ultimately, this chapter has completed the tracing of the evolution of Lonergan's theory of history and has subsequently introduced the development of Lonergan's theological manifesto. The theological exposition undertaken in this chapter is substantially a preparatory step that shall be enriched by the succeeding chapter. Thus, this chapter has enhanced the appropriation of the three approximations: progress, decline and renaissance/redemption to clearly produce a theological blueprint namely, a praxis narrative of redemptive history. Though Lonergan never used the term 'redemption' explicitly, either in this manuscript or in the previous one, it is evident that he was keenly working towards developing a theology of redemption. This was ultimately his key aim and he has achieved it in this essay. Accordingly, the next chapter shall clarify the key theological blueprint that emerges in the analysis of these two manuscripts namely, a missiological component interwoven within praxis theology. As is now apparent, they are indeed Lonergan's very early theological documents.

# Chapter Five: Towards a Theology of Redemptive Praxis

The tasks of the first four chapters have clearly demonstrated that Lonergan had begun to map out a theology that was deeply rooted in a philosophy of history. These chapters have helped unpack Lonergan's imaginative strategy into redesigning his idea of history from an analytical process. This schema clearly reflects the contents of a deeply thought-out theology. Equally important in what these chapters provided, is the tracing of the origin and the subsequent development of Lonergan's study of a dialectic of history. Hence, the four prior chapters reveal that Lonergan's idea of a dialectic of history was not an end in itself but a means to an end. As such this study was tasked to trace two important phases of development: the first is a study of a dialectic of history; the second is a study of a theology of redemptive history.

These two key developments can be located in each individual chapter of this thesis. Collectively, chapters one, two and three were tasked to trace the origin and also to appropriate the development of the first phase. Chapter four, while maintaining the task of the first three chapters in completing the first phase of development, also had its own specific role: to enhance the process by exposing more fully the contents of the second phase of development. What chapter four does is translate the developments of the preceding chapters so that the next development can be seen to supersede the previous one. In this crucial role, chapter four marshals the resources gleaned from the study of the dialectic of history and subsequently re-orientates its recurring development. In other words, what chapter four does is to translate the philosophical discourse into a theological narrative. Succinctly, the tasks found in chapters one, two and three are integrated so that they can enable chapter four to introduce a theological forum, a forum which chapter five shall be charged with exploiting.

Hence, the task of this chapter shall be an expansion and integration of the first four chapters. What it will do is affirm the operations of the preceding chapters by spelling out clearly what Lonergan had intended to formulate from his study of a dialectic of history. In order to do so, this chapter will appropriate the relevant resources gleaned from the study of the two manuscripts: the *Pantôn* and the ACH (2). It will then encompass the operations of the three approximations: progress, decline and renaissance, thus modifying them into a consolidated theological structure. The analytical proceedings which began from the study of the dialectic of history can then be adapted to spell out the development of a narrative of a redemptive praxis. Hence, the two early manuscripts are exploited in order to reveal that new development.

The final goal of this study is to locate Lonergan's narrative of a theology of redemptive history. Clearly, Lonergan inherited a "theology with Scholasticism solidly entrenched in church teaching, and he contributed his own impetus to the place of Aquinas in theology."[472] This chapter intends to show that Lonergan grounded his evolutionary narrative of a theology of a redeeming history on a reputable tradition drawing on sound philosophical sources. Furthermore, his theological narrative is arrived at from his deep reflections on the Pauline doctrinal texts. Others, including Saint Augustine, John Henry Newman and Isaac Newton, have contributed considerably to the amplification of his key theological foundations. This study shall show how these thinkers have contributed to what Lonergan envisaged in his theological impetus towards a redemptive praxis. It is on this basis that this thesis shall begin to identify what Lonergan had differentiated in his various categories in his later works in which he penned so clearly what he meant by history, dialectic, and redemption. Hence, the task of the final chapter is to bring to center stage Lonergan's main theological narrative.

[472] F. E Crowe, *CH*, 177.

## I. The Two Main Definitions of History

This study has determined that history was of significant concern to Lonergan. Even more importantly to this study is to affirm that history was directly central to the origin of Lonergan's formulation of a theology of redemption. The study of the first part of ACH (2) as presented in chapter three of this thesis reveals that Lonergan's definition of history had two distinct notions: first, the history that is made/written, namely the history presented to us by historians; second, is the understanding of "the history that happens."[473]

The history that happens is specified as the culmination of Lonergan's thoughtful reflection on what it is to be a human person. He made great efforts to combine the technical meaning of human living provided by scientific research, and the meaning that is shared or emerges from the experiences of ordinary, daily happenings in any one's life. The combination of these two perspectives was then to become Lonergan's substantial project in his study of history.[474] By the time Lonergan had published his highly acclaimed works of *Insight* (1957) and subsequently *Method in Theology* (1975), he had finally settled on a satisfactory definition of history.[475]

If, in hindsight, Lonergan were to revert to the unpublished manuscripts kept in File 713, would he come up with a different result? Probably not. Yet the profundity of the resourced insights excavated from these manuscripts has provided us with an invaluable and comprehensive meaning of his notion of the history that happens. The unpublished manuscripts reveal to us an immeasurably rich part of Lonergan's original thinking. Hence, the study of these two manuscripts has provided substantial resources that take a huge leap back, from the present into the depth of his original idea of history.

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[473] Ibid., 166.

[474] Lonergan admitted later that his early study of history turned out to be a study of human understanding. See B. Lonergan, *Insight*, 763-64, & 768-69, 802 – the editorial note *r* to chapter 17. Crowe claimed that chapter 20 of *Insight* was originally called 'The Structure of History.' See F. E Crowe, *CH*, 178.

[475] F. E Crowe, *CH*, 174-180.

Spending a substantial amount of time studying carefully the different attributes given to Lonergan by Lonergan scholars, in his areas of expertise such as philosophy, economics, method, theology, grace etc., Crowe came to the conclusion that the study of history, particularly the notion of *the history that happens,* was perhaps the most valued Lonergan enterprise. Hence he summed it up in a phrase, "Essential Lonergan,"[476] namely *the Lonergan thing* as he rearticulated it, to emphasize the specific importance Lonergan placed on the discussion of the history that happens. Crowe further clarified his use of this infrequent phrase, "Essential Lonergan," to sum up his own final scholarship based on Lonergan's entire academic career. He stressed that "the need to understand history, basic history, the history that happens, is the chief dynamic element in his academic work: not insight, not method, not economics, not emergent probability, but history."[477]

What Crowe attempts to clarify is that the history that happens is *the* most valued of Lonergan's work compared to the rest of his contributions. Crowe's synopsis reaffirms the contention in this thesis that what Lonergan had achieved already in his student days was highly significant. What Lonergan jotted down in the initial stages of his studies were, in hindsight not just some inconsequential student notes, but rather ideas that remained foundational to the "Essential Lonergan" project. These notes are now to be considered the bedrock of what was to follow in his later contributions to the study of philosophy, dialectics, history, method, systematics, emergent probability, and subsequently, praxis theology.

[476] F. E Crowe, *CH* 168. Crowe invented this phrase to encapsulate the importance Lonergan placed on the study of history.

[477] F. E Crowe, *CH,* 168.

## 1. The History that Happens

It was years later in his *Method in Theology* that Lonergan had finally settled on an essentially comprehensive definition of history. This definition is divided into three distinct categories: basic, special and general.[478] 'Basic history' recounts places, dates, periods and peoples. "It makes as specific and precise as possible the more easily recognized and acknowledged gestures of human activities in their geographical distribution and temporal succession."[479] 'Special history' maps out the movements of human culture in art and language literature and religion, in institutions; and in doctrines. It marks the threshold of human developments and portrays their historical continuity. Since the third category of history is a massive task near to impossible, Lonergan says, "'General history' is, perhaps, just an ideal."[480] No one would imagine they could complete general history. 'General history' Lonergan explains "would express the historian's information, understanding, judgment, and evaluation with regard to the sum of cultural, institutional, and doctrinal movements in their concrete setting."[481]

In hindsight, what we now acknowledge to be his final definition of history is the appropriation of the two notions Lonergan developed in his early study of history: the *history that is written/made* and the *history that happens*. Long before Lonergan worked out the threefold definition of history in *Insight,* the notion of the *history that happens* predominated in the discussion found in File 713. This study reveals that what Lonergan navigated in his study of the history that happens, in both the *Pantôn* papers and the ACH (2), drew his focused research deeper into the study of philosophical anthropology. Hence paradoxically, the path towards reaching the heart of Lonergan's study of the *history that happens*

[478] B. Lonergan, *MIT,* 128.
[479] Ibid., 128
[480] Ibid., 128
[481] Ibid., 128.

ultimately supersedes the parameters of the human sciences. It denotes human choices in which Lonergan turns his attention to the dialectical principles of history.[482] It is on this basis that this study classifies Lonergan's study of history that happens as a study equivalent to his idea of education.

## 2. The Characteristics of Lonergan's Idea of Education

Lonergan's idea of education is a vital part of the discussions in chapters two, three and four of this thesis. While it is an important discussion, the significant part of the deliberation takes place particularly in chapter three. This discussion centers intently on the meaning of a history-maker. Basically, the underpinning value regarding the notion of a history-maker is about any one of us, who we are, and what we make of ourselves. Each one of us is born into a family, a tribe, a community, ultimately a society at any given time. Each one of us, as a person individually, and corporately as a community, together make history. We receive from the past our inheritance, live the present, and hand on as a legacy to the future generation what we have inherited and developed.

Briefly, the characterization of Lonergan's idea of education consists of multiple complexities of diverse contributing factors that seek to unearth the meaning of the life of a human person. They include firstly, the recorded data of events made known by sciences of various specializations. These specialized sciences seek not only to explain the existence and nature of human life, but also to provide the essential information needed to understand who we are as humans in the past, the present and what we shall become in the future. Secondly, the information that these specialized sciences discover may be useful for the future. Most of these investigations dwell on the study of past human experiences, which are carried forward for further analysis. They can then be appropriated so as to improve the data of common

[482] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 41-2.

sense experience. Thirdly, the theoretical information gleaned from specialized researches will inevitably come into conflict with data of common sense experience. Fourthly, the tension arises because every individual person has the free will to navigate his or her own individual history. Whatever information the scientific researchers offer may not be compatible with the given time of the concrete situation. The fifth factor is a theological component that comes as an external aid from the supernatural gift of grace.

Throughout the study of these two manuscripts, it became clear that Lonergan wrestled with his idea of education to develop an adequate argument, one seeking clarity on how the human will and the supernatural gift of grace can work together. However, what is essentially basic to Lonergan's idea of education is primarily about you and me: about the human person who is free to choose, and who through these choices creates history. No one of us however, controls the future, since each one of us is either free to choose or free not to choose. What Lonergan discovers is that there are certain human aspects that do not require scientific explanation. Similarly, there are other aspects of human dealings that do not require common sense to clarify certain human acts. Because of the tension between scientific research and practical commonsense experience, the lacuna created does invite a third player, namely *the other*. Hence it is, that wonder and mystery are essential components towards filling the lacuna. That mystery cannot be located, either within the specialized sciences or in the concreteness of common sense experience. For this reason, Lonergan in a painstaking way, attempts in composing the manuscripts to name it, and to bring to light the theological component, which is the concrete dynamism of history.[483]

This study has resolved to assess Lonergan's idea of education and navigate the way in which Lonergan integrated these complexities to pursue his discussion on his idea of the dialectic of history. What is significant to this discussion is that any human action that creates

[483] See a good exposition in M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 49.

history is a choice. Hence, Lonergan's idea of education represents a threshold of human development. It embodies a change in what may be found that is more than the sciences of the psychologically-anthropological and sociological study of the human person could provide. Furthermore, Lonergan's idea of education inherits the Aristotelian-Thomist view that evolution is a free event that occurs in the created universe. The human threshold however, is like a wheel that revolves around in time through various human civilizations of the world. The analogy of a wheel consists of a cycle and re-cycle of events just like the rest of the events that occur in our universe.[484]

Important too, is the dynamism of history that happens in a life of any one person who experiences the order of the created goodness of creation. This order is degenerated by the misuse of human choice. As such, any one of us who makes history also experiences the disorder, the evil that exists in the world. In chapter four of this thesis, we saw the grim picture Lonergan presented on the evil status of humanity that is deeply imbedded in conflict, violence, war, in society, in culture, in social institutions, in almost every aspect of human living. Mitigating his argument to find a positive solution, Lonergan reasoned that human intellect is a vital element that is needed to overcome the erosion of goodness in human life. In fact, humans are more intelligent than the rest of creation. If only human beings were able to use intelligently the power of the intellect, they could change the diabolic state of affairs into a new created order.

Hence, the dynamism of history that happens entails the development of any one person who is conscious of the power of the intellect. Naturally, this can be achieved when

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[484] B. Lonergan, *Insight,*145-162, & 232-269. In later years Lonergan developed a theory known as 'emergent probability.' Emergent probability is Lonergan's compelling worldview: a philosophical theory he devised that provides a complex scientific explanation of a dynamic cosmos. In evolutionary science it can be discovered that the universe proceeds in the hierarchical cycles of occurrences, series of events, schemes of recurrence, insights, probabilities, and possibilities. These events, probabilities, schemes, and insights occur and reoccur in ways that may, when rightly chosen with authenticity, lead to advancement and creativity. But there is the dialectical recourse: the reversal, the conflict, the regress, and the decline. See also a good expansion of Lonergan's notion of 'emergent probability' in C. S. W. Crysdale, "Revisioning Natural Law: From the Classist Paradigm to Emergent Probability," *Theological Studies* 56 (Spring 1995): 464-484.

the human intellect appropriates reason and will, so that any of us who is a history-maker can potentially live a life to the highest possible human threshold. Lonergan insists that using the gift of freedom in intelligently directing the process of the world order, the human person can master his or her own history. This is ultimately, the summation of Lonergan's idea of education.[485]

### 3. Human Solidarity

Although the *history that is written/made*, was appropriately acknowledged in the previous discussions, the primary focus in these two essays was on his treatise on the *history that happens*. Specifically, Lonergan commences the discussion in the *Pantôn* under the major topic of 'human solidarity.' To understand the complexities of a human person's well-being and each person's capacity to respond to the recurring patterns of history that happens, Lonergan sought help from the Thomistic-Aristotelian sources. In doing so he pressed himself into building a metaphysical foundation for his theory of history. It is apparent that the arguments that underscore the elementary stages of Lonergan's idea of education are inherited substantially from St. Thomas' theory of historical causality. Hence, the discussion pertaining to the theory of historical causality encompasses the principle of a proportionate being, which deals mainly with a notion of a whole. This 'whole' consists of a central form that governs the unity in the totality of many diverse aspects, which are coordinated by a

[485] Here I apply a local concept to interpret Lonergan's idea of education. This application is taken from an anthropological research done in my own local society. An Italian anthropologist, Ennio Mantonvani, studied in detail the Melanesian societies, as having specific application to their self-understanding as communities. He discovered from his research in the lingua franca of the Melanesian people, a term: *gutpela sindaun,* used to describe a central value within the Melanesian societies that meant life that is truly experienced in a tribal community. This term means literally, fullness of life. Mantovani notes that when the people had good health, wealth in abundance, well-being, good relationships, security, prestige, and any good that is preserved in a community, they actually reach the peak of a fullness of life. Mantovani concluded that if the opposite happened, such as losing a tribal warfare, bad harvest, natural disasters, deaths experienced both of domestic animals and of humans, then there was an absence of the fullness of life. All these aspects can be a synopsis of what Lonergan envisaged in his idea of education. See E. Mantovani, "Traditional and Present Day Melanesian Values and Ethics," *Occasional Papers of the Melanesian Institute,* 7 (1989):163-181.

single understanding. In other words, it is suggestive of a historical movement of recurrence.[486] The studies in chapter two, three and four of this thesis have pointed out this significant development.

Chapter two presented the beginning of a significant part of Lonergan's emerging framework of a redemptive discourse. Analytically, the narrative of this embryonic program studied primarily from the *Pantôn* essay can be engaged in two parts: (1) Human Solidarity and (2) Restoration. This study resolves that Lonergan appropriated St. Thomas' concept of historical causality in order to reinvent his own new meaning: human solidarity. Lonergan incorporated his concept of human solidarity with the Hegelian-Marxist concept of dialectic to explain the existential unity of the human intellect progressing towards reason and will. Among the core components of the notion of a whole in Lonergan's two essays studied in chapters two, three and four, 'human solidarity' is revealed as a key concept. Succinctly, this concept is a compound of Lonergan's philosophy of education. As presented in chapter two, human solidarity is seen to be a central dynamism in Lonergan's proposed idea of a metaphysic of history. This is significantly central especially in the *Pantôn* essay. Chapter two discussed in detail how Lonergan appropriates this main philosophical theory within the dialectical rigidity of scientific research, revealing the tension that exists with and in relation to concrete realism.

Throughout the study of these chapters, and especially in chapter two, Lonergan is seen not only inheriting other theories but also using them to invent his own theory. What he does here in this particular case is to integrate St Thomas' theory of historical causality with St Paul's doctrine of a mystical body to formulate his own theory of human solidarity. Hence, human solidarity can be defined as the "multiple field of sciences: theological, philosophic,

[486] B. Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," *Collection* (1967), 223.

historical, social, political, even economic,"[487] which is to justify a synthetic view in revealing "the metaphysical convergence of all things on Christ Jesus our Lord."[488] In the 1935 letter to his Provincial superior, Lonergan clarifies the definition of human solidarity with a nuance of "the structure of human choice."[489] There, Lonergan had proposed that the 'historical determination of intellect' that shall appropriate the Thomist synthesis will in turn introduce the threefold dialectic in the historic progress, of namely "the dialectic of fact," "the dialectic of sin," and lastly "the dialectic of thought."[490] Hence, Lonergan amplifies his theory of education through his reading of Aquinas's notion of historical causality and also through the scriptural texts from the Pauline doctrine of a mystical body.

What Lonergan intends to do is to enhance the key role of unity discovered in the redemptive tension of a whole. He does that by reconstructing Hegel's dialectics: drawing out a 'higher synthesis' in Hegel's idea of dialectics. Thus, there is a new concept as Lonergan assembles a unique process of integrating the Hegelian-Marxian dialectics with the Thomist metaphysics. Evidently, there is a significant shift as this process takes place. Human solidarity shall therefore transcend a metaphysical scheme. This scheme is better understood in Lonergan's later works that involve an inquiry into the historically conditioned subject: the one who is experiencing, inquiring, judging, deliberating, and is in love and is asking existentially: "What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it?"[491]

In fact, Lonergan places the concrete dynamism on the history maker who plays the roles of both the object and the subject. This historical self-awareness of the subject is richly

[487] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 140.
[488] Ibid., 140.
[489] See M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 43.
[490] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 146.
[491] B. Lonergan, *MIT*, 83.

amplified by the explanatory contributions of the cognitional structure.[492] The operations of human knowing and doing in the "appropriation of one's own interiority, one's subjectivity, one's operations, their structure, their norms, their potentialities"[493] are key concepts towards understanding Lonergan's earlier notion of human solidarity. Hence, the unity which is found in human solidarity, according to the study of the *Pantôn* papers, is not destroyed but is preserved. Furthermore, it is sublated as it is carried on in the higher domain of the redemptive tension of reason and will. This unity according to the study of the *Pantôn* manuscripts is ultimately operative in the theological realm where the gift of grace is offered. Lonergan's argument subsequently shifts towards a narrative of a theological discourse in which his notion of a whole underscores St. Paul's analogy of the Mystical Body of Christ. Clearly, Lonergan intends to achieve an even higher discourse concerning the principle of human solidarity so that a theological content is center stage within the "metaphysical principle of redemption."[494]

### 4. Restoration

Restoration is predominantly a biblical theme. Sources can be pinned as far back as the Old Testament.[495] However, Lonergan's solid New Testament references were significant too. Most of them were derived from Saint Paul's writings. Among the most dominant discussions Lonergan engages in, to bring in the concept of restoration, is one centered on the theme of creation and the fall. Through the fall of the first Adam the unity of the mystical body was disintegrated. Again through the second Adam unity shall be restored. A vital passage that Lonergan relies on to affirm his treatise is found in St. Paul's letter to the

[492] T. V. Daly, "Rediscovering Philosophies through Cognitional Models," *Australian Lonergan Workshop* (Lanham, MD: Catholic University Press of America, 1993), 141-167.

[493] B. Lonergan, *MIT*, 83.

[494] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 150.

[495] Lonergan was particularly insightful in his use of scriptural references. Among particularly pertinent references are those to the prophet Isaiah, especially 49:8.

Ephesians; the "Pauline conception of our blessed Lord as the *anakephalaiôsis* of all things."[496] It is a key reference that eventually provided the title for the essay: The *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*.[497] This specific reference is from St. Paul's letter to the Ephesians, 1:10. From the English translation in *The Revised Standard Version,* the whole sentence in verses nine and ten reads:[498]

> (v.9) For he has made known to us in all wisdom and insight the mystery of his will, according to his purpose which he set forth in Christ (v.10) as a plan for the fullness of time, to unite all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth.

These two verses are vital references in introducing the emerging trend of the Pauline concept of restoration. The relevant phrase from verse ten flows intentionally from the previous verse and completes it, thus opening a reflection on the mystery towards restoring order, peace, harmony and ultimately unity. Fredrick Crowe enunciates this particular text in great detail, revealing how Lonergan intended to use the Pauline doctrine of restoration to open up his own theological narrative. He points out two main ideas in his articulation. The first one, found in chapter one, towards verse ten, is the phrase in Greek that is so fundamental to the *Pantôn* essay: *anakephalaiôsas- thai ta panta en toi Christo* (τηαι τα ραντα εν τοι Χριστο).[499] St. Paul's key doctrine found here is that all things in heaven and on earth shall be brought into unity in Christ. The second significant point is found in chapter four. What is underscored in that chapter is a theme of 'a restoration of all things in Christ.'[500]

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[496] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 140.

[497] M. Shute, ONLDH, 104. Shute presents a comprehensive analysis of Lonergan's choice of this particular phrase "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis"* which turns out to be the title of his text that originally comes from the scriptural text of St. Paul's letter to the Ephesians (1:10).

[498] F. E Crowe and R. Doran's Editors' Preface in B. Lonergan, PA (1), 136. "When he (Lonergan) quotes scripture in English we leave it the way he wrote it; when he quotes scripture in Latin, we substitute the *Revised Standard Version* in the text, and give his Latin in the endnotes."

[499] F. E Crowe, *CH*, 17.

[500] B. Lonergan, PA (1), editors' footnotes # 2: "The title is based on Ephesians 1.10, with a noun substituted for Paul's verb form: 'restoration of' instead of 'to restore.' 'Restoration' is not the perfect translation, but it is close to the Vulgate 'instaurare' and the Douay 'to re-establish,' both of which would be familiar to Lonergan; the *Revised Standard Version* has 'to unite,' which would suggest 'unification.' He himself used various terms: synthesis, reunification and redintegration, as well as restoration."

The second Pauline passage which is almost as significant as the first one is found in the Letter to the Romans. It is St. Paul's metaphorical image of a body (Romans 12:5). The letter to the Romans presents St. Paul's image of individual members bound into a single body by the gift of grace coming from Christ. The theme of a mystical body in the letter to the Romans complements the themes of restoring unity as found in the letter to the Ephesians. Both passages remain significant in the development of Lonergan's emerging theological narrative of a redemptive praxis.

It is seen in this study that the concept of restoration has heralded the birth of a theological narrative of Lonergan's idea of a redemptive praxis. This is clearly revealed through the influence of the Pauline doctrine. Given Lonergan's philosophical use of the term, restoration may also come to light from other sources. One example Lonergan offers in the *Pantôn* is a reference to the Spanish philosopher, Juan Donoso Cortes. Though Lonergan makes only a minute mention of him yet it appears to be influential.[501] Cortes devised a critical philosophy called 'restoration.' His desperation to restore the Spanish aristocracy to its former glory in the post Spanish Revolution era is a peculiar case in point.[502] It can be seen in this study that Lonergan may have aligned Cortes with the Hegelian-Marxist ideology of social liberalism to devise a new meaning of the concept, restoration. These background notes may provide some clues to see how the meaning of restoration had been transcended so as to give a new interpretation to the scriptural use. While drawing on all the given sources, Lonergan will have reinvented a new meaning. These various influences will have contributed towards the reconstruction of the theological concept of namely, redemptive praxis.[503] Hence, this concept, restoration consists of a combination of a plurality of other

[501] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 160.
[502] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), 27.
[503] See C. Davis, "Lonergan's Appropriation of the Concept of Praxis," *New Blackfriars.* 62 (1981): 114-126.

contributing factors. This multiplicity of factors may have transformed the original meaning to articulate something new, which is of course, of a greater significance.

In the new consolidated meaning, restoration may mean existentially a reunification or reintegration of a disintegrated cosmological order. Furthermore, this new development of the concept is technically analytical. It includes a composite of intentionality analysis: the knowing, the doing, the judging, and the acting. This is what praxis entails in the notion of redemptive history, where progress, decline and redemption become the essential ingredient of his understanding of restoration.

Consequently, the analytical method that Lonergan offered in the study of these two manuscripts provides us with a clear hint that Lonergan began his path to formulating his theological narrative of a redemptive praxis with a philosophical roadmap. It was Michael Shute's firm assessment that

> Lonergan himself viewed the project of understanding the dialectic of history as a matter of developing a higher synthesis of liberalism and Marxism. This higher synthesis counters the alienation of secular ideologies of history with the fact of the Mystical Body of Christ. Accordingly, he understands his own view of the dialectic of history as fundamentally orientated towards the implementation of redemptive praxis.[504]

This study therefore, endorses Shute's claim that Lonergan's novel standpoint of a dialectic of history had a theological nuance.

Although the embryonic stage of its development is technically philosophical, the theological development of the concept, human solidarity, is obviously reflected in equal reference to the scriptural sources. Clearly, the Pauline texts are influential and substantial in the theological development. Among the several scriptural references Lonergan derives from St. Paul's letters, an outstanding one is the letter to the Romans 12: 5.[505] Lonergan uses this

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[504] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 21.

[505] The specific text in Romans 12: 5… "so we, who are many, are one body in Christ, and individually we are members one of another."

specific text to seize on a coherent meaning that runs parallel to his metaphysical idea of a whole.[506] St Paul's metaphorical usage of a body, namely Christ the center one with many parts is a significant passage that fits in neatly with his interpretation of his theory of human solidarity. At the heart of the notions of both human solidarity and restoration emerges an underlying principle of a dialectical unity in the 'mystical body of Christ.' This is a perennial theme found to be peculiar to the studies found in both essays.

## 5. From Renaissance to Redemption

The previous discussions attempt to clarify the use and origin of the concept of restoration as it appears in the *Pantôn* papers. As the reflections and discussions surrounding the theological concept of restoration take a new leap, there emerges an intimate link between restoration and Lonergan's third approximation, renaissance. Hence, this discussion takes us to the peak of this study. It reveals how Lonergan had navigated his thought processes through each of the essays, and how each of the manuscripts represents a particular theme. From the *Pantôn* papers, restoration appears the key concept; whereas the ACH (2) projects renaissance as the most valued concept. As the third vector within the threefold dialectics, renaissance does depend largely on the operations of the first two vectors, progress and decline. However, this study, and particularly the detailed study provided by chapter four, gives us sufficient information to explore the concept of renaissance with a different lens. As the third approximation, renaissance plays a critical role as a proxy, or a preamble to the concept, redemption. What it does is to mediate between the dialectic of history and a theology of redemptive history. As a concept within its own operations in conjunction with the operations of progress and decline, it links equivalently to the concept of restoration. This study demonstrates that these two concepts namely, restoration and renaissance, are

[506] For an in-depth reading see B. Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," 221-239.

homogeneously parallel to the foundational formulation of the theological concept, *redemption.* In other words, these two concepts are key preludes to Lonergan's creation of his theological concept of a redemptive praxis.

Apparently, nowhere in the *Pantôn* had Lonergan made an explicit mention of the term 'redemption.' Neither had he done so in his1935 letter to his new Provincial superior, nor in the other companion manuscript, ACH (2). This study asserts that both concepts, namely restoration in the *Pantôn* and renaissance in the ACH (2), prefigure the synopsis of Lonergan's overall intention to devise a theology of *redemption.* In other words, this study suggests that a direct reference to a doctrinal clarification of Lonergan's theology of redemption is decidedly absent. As such, the evolution of Lonergan's theology of redemption is aptly sequential. Hence, Lonergan had established his philosophical argument primarily with the intention of formulating a theology of redemption. It is only in his later studies that we gain full clarity, through insight into the theological interpretation of his idea of *redemption.*[507]

[507] See B. Lonergan, "Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964:" *CWL* 6. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1996), 3-28.

## II. Redemptive Praxis

We have been following a critical shift within Lonergan's design of a theology of redemptive history from a study of a dialectic of history. The whole process began when Lonergan initiated the shift by merging the scriptural notion of restoration with the science of metaphysics. What happens in the process of amalgamation is that the concept of restoration is sublated; it absorbs other strategic concepts into aligning with namely, order, harmony, peace and unity. Hence, the concept of restoration is significantly transformed as Lonergan blends the philosophical notion of historical causality with the Pauline doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ. As a result, Lonergan had brought about a completely new thrust into the concept of restoration itself. Evidently, the new composition will have layers of meaning and can also be discerned in a higher domain of development. Thus, the conceptual meaning of restoration will be augmented significantly, and consequently shall be read in alignment with the theological concept of renaissance. Ultimately, it incorporates the essential requirements earmarked for *redemption*.

Hence, Lonergan's emerging notion of a *redemptive praxis* is understood to have a notable beginning in the setting of the *Pantôn* essays.[508] This perception however has a significant modification with the inclusion of one of Michael Shute's latest discoveries.[509] Shute suggested more recently that the evolution of Lonergan's conception of a *redemptive praxis* had an origin in his study of economics, given that Lonergan had originally thought seriously about offering an alternative economic model to the mainstream economic principles. According to Shute, unless the economic benefits were improved, the social, political and religious indicators remained unchanged.[510] This study concurs with Shute to

[508] See M. Shute, ONLDH, 67.

[509] M. Shute, "Economic Analysis within Redemptive Praxis: An Achievement of Lonergan's Third Decade," https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303417844 assessed 12 December 2019.

[510] Shute got his evidence from one of the companion manuscripts, namely "The Essay in Fundamental Sociology." He was convinced that the concept he coined, namely the 'redemptive praxis' had an economic

suggest that whether it was economics, politics or social apprehensions, Lonergan's concern was the status quo; that was what mattered most. Hence, the original development of his concept, 'praxis' can be measured within the context of social objectivity; that is precisely the elevation of human integrity in improving the standard of living.

If Lonergan's emerging premise of a redemptive praxis had an economic origin, this concept will inevitably have an initial relationship with the Marxist political theory.[511] It is possible because what has been discovered through the study of the *Pantôn* papers and the ACH (2) discloses a merging of two economic policies. Hence, Lonergan managed to appropriate a careful mitigation of the political theories between the conventionally Marxist socialism and the progressively liberal capitalism. The synthesis Lonergan succeeded in crafting together resulted in a creation of his new theory: a 'metaphysic of history' namely, a *summa sociologica.*[512] Concomitantly, he selectively adapted various other theoretical views, omitting the unessential parts, such as either the extreme Marxist views of dialectical materialism or the ultra-progressive free-market capitalism, so that an adequate economic policy could be formulated.

## 1. A New Order

The study of the *Pantôn* papers and the ACH (2) can be concluded as the genesis of Lonergan's narration towards formulating a middle ground consensus. This proposed middle ground consensus is a composite of the diversity of coordinated scientific viewpoints as well as reflective concrete experiences, which Lonergan adapted to develop his own philosophy of history. In fact, the two essays have revealed that Lonergan produced an imaginative choir,

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origin. The reason is simply that the "Philosophy of History," might have been drafted between 1933 &4, whilst the *Pantôn* was drafted in 1935. See appendix A.

[511] See C. Davis, "Lonergan's Appropriation of the Concept of Praxis," 114-126.

[512] M. Shute, "Economic Analysis within Redemptive Praxis: An Achievement of Lonergan's Third Decade," Online edition.

composed of St Thomas, St Paul, St Augustine, Newman, Hegel, Marx[513] and eventually Newton,[514] all somewhat singing from the same song sheet. Merging all these various contributions, Lonergan proceeds to devise his theory of what is now deemed "a redemptive praxis."[515] Actually this concept was not from Lonergan himself. Rather, it was a phrase coined by Michael Shute, who first discovered the key working concept in studying Lonergan's manuscripts of File 713.[516] Lonergan, however, improved the reading of it in his later study. He did present a good clarity of the notion of 'praxis' by reverting carefully to a rich Aristotelian source; a leading theme to seek an elaborative analysis of his new found meaning.[517]

This study concludes that Lonergan's idea of a redemptive praxis evolved from previous ideological frameworks. Between the two manuscripts there is clear representation of prominence. On the one hand, Hegel and Marx's history of dialectic occupies a fair dominance in the *Pantôn* papers, while on the other hand, Newton occupies a prominent space in the ACH (2) paper. Combining the working frameworks offered by both Hegel and Newton, Lonergan reformulates a symbolically transformative structure that captures a transcendental ordering. This synthesis is not so much a structure as such but a revitalization of the conceptual novelty of what the Hegelian and Newtonian traditions could offer. This new framework is considered a higher synthesis which shall be superseded by what he named as 'a supernatural order.'

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[513] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 139. The second outline of topics in the PA (1) gives us a hint of the order of his argument. After the topic on "a metaphysic for the interpretation of St. Paul," was the topic of "a theology for the social order." The next two topics are "Catholic Action, and the Kingship of Christ."

[514] B. Lonergan, IR, 271.

[515] This important stage can be seen as the inauguration of his future philosophical notion towards the theory of interiority analysis.

[516] See M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 68.

[517] See B. Lonergan, "Theology and Praxis*." A Third Collection.* (1985): 184-201. Henceforth, TP followed by page reference.

Strictly speaking, the supernatural order is a theological dispositioning, a purview of a significant synthetic viewpoint. Though it remains basically symbolic, what this synthetic viewpoint shall achieve will still follow a programmatic framework. In his later studies, especially in the book *Insight*, Lonergan shall call this procedure, 'a moving viewpoint.'[518] Michael Shute subsequently affirmed this viewpoint suggesting that what Lonergan had intended to achieve was an enlarged vision of a higher synthesis, which will ultimately become a *new order.* In essence, this new order is "a theory of human solidarity relevant to the theology of the Mystical Body of Christ"[519] in which a synthetic blend of namely, 'a metaphysical redemption' shall transpire. The formation of a metaphysical redemption implies what Lonergan had directed his concluding premise to be. That direction is aimed towards the role of the Kingship of Christ in history. This has a definitive reference to the culmination of history in a noble idea of a highly theological perception of a supernatural order. Hypothetically, it is within this context of restoration that the concept of a redemptive praxis is unwaveringly conceived.

## 2. A Theology for the Social Order

At the heart of this study is the contemporaneous discussion of the two manuscripts along with their particular themes: The *Pantôn*, with its theme of restoration and, the ACH (2), with its theme of renaissance. Both of these themes are pivotal in this conjuncture: integrating both the principles of social liberalism and the theological disposition of redemption. Lonergan's narrative of redemptive praxis is an analytical history that transcends the structure of certain ideologies that underpin these themes within its working framework. Hence, what is carried forward from these analogies are namely, the significant concepts of

[518] See for instance in B. Lonergan, *Insight*,17-19, 587-91 & 590, 613, 658-59, & 761-53.
[519] M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 72.

restoration, renaissance and a new order which can now be sublated and orientated towards the Supernatural Order. In order to augment his argument on the principle of a supernatural order in his theological discourse, Lonergan draws on St Augustine's idea of 'concupiscence.'[520] Lonergan found the shift of focus in St Thomas' interpretation of St Augustine's teaching of original sin[521] to be a significant point of reference to underscore his dialectical narrative.

It is clear that Lonergan intended to draw on the comprehensive teaching of both theologians and their complex work in the interpretation of original sin. Distancing himself from the actual argument St. Thomas clarifies from that of St Augustine,[522] Lonergan is keen to draw out St Thomas' essential dialectical principle in reference to the transmission of the nature of sin by origin. He found that St Thomas emphasized the 'nature' of original sin to Adam's posterity transmitted to the members of the body having being moved by the will.[523] Lonergan avoided discussing in this essay the lengthy teaching on the notion of '*will*' in St. Augustine's works;[524] he was interested in the distinct interpretation of the 'will' as he reflected on St Augustine's teaching in St. Thomas' treatise on the subject. He found in these two theologians a common position: that the disordered 'will' "born of Adam is voluntary,"[525] yet the two differ in their interpretation of the method as to how the 'will' is understood in locating the prime subject of original sin. What is essentially significant in Lonergan's treatise on the theological underpinning of St Augustine and St Thomas becomes the subject of the *Pantôn*, especially his discussion of his topic regarding 'a theory of human solidarity.'[526] Lonergan was interested to devise his idea of the dialectic of history by way of

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[520] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 146.

[521] *ST* 1aIIae.81.3. New Advent. (1999). See http://www.newadvent.org/summa accessed September 18, 2019.

[522] Lonergan shies away from supporting Augustine in explaining the essence of the original sin as being transmitted to Adam's posterity.

[523] *ST* 1aIIae.81.3.

[524] St. Augustine, *City of God,* XIV. 6, also in *Fathers of the Church,* XIV. 4, 11, XIV. 13.

[525] *ST* 1aIIae.81.3.

[526] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 142-150.

relocating will as distinct from reason and the intellect. The arguments that he carried on from these two theologians are central to his theological narrative, which shall be a distinct view in order to exploit a method towards devising a program for a redemptive praxis.

Lonergan's analytical process begins to advance as he incorporates both Augustine and Aquinas' theological arguments within the interpretation of the Pauline doctrines. The Thomist principles of historical causality institute an analytical framework adherent to the Pauline narrative of the body, namely this once unified whole is now disintegrated in Adam's fall. The antithesis is the second Adam, who is to be engaged with the restoration process. This lengthy philosophical discourse in conjunction with the scriptural interpretation of the idea of 'disintegration' and 'restoration' extends the discussion into accomplishing a higher synthesis of supernatural order whereby the grace of God through the outpouring of the Spirit shall consequently triumph towards a theological disposition of a redemptive praxis.[527]

To complete his discussion on the development of a theology for social order Lonergan sought out the scriptural sources for resourceful backing. Once again his scriptural support comes from Saint Paul's two Letters: [Galatians 2:20] and [Romans 12: 5 & 6] which provide the basis of Lonergan's dialectical reference to a new Christology.[528] Hence, Lonergan's use of the Pauline texts to formulate his Christological narrative of a redeeming praxis shall entail the inclusion of the theological virtues: faith, hope and charity. The articulation of the theological virtues has an interweaving link to the theology of redemption. Clearly, that is the next significant development found in the study of the ACH (2) essay which chapters three and four have articulated in detail.

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[527] In subsequent discussions in *MIT* is Lonergan's notion of self-transcendence in which the gift of grace transcends oneself to reach the gifts of the Holy Spirit. See B. Lonergan, *MIT,* 101-124. In presenting the gifts of the Spirit, Lonergan's narration of the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity is appropriated within his notion of redemptive praxis.

[528] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 141.

In essence, creation, sin and redemption are events deemed historical, personal, institutional and structural. Because sin involves human act, informed by reason and the will, this study goes on to show that Lonergan's theological aim of a higher synthesis shall be achieved in exploiting the concept of a redemptive praxis to a fuller extent. As such, redemptive praxis shall be defined as "the multiple differentiation of consciousness,"[529] which has the possibility to transform the metaphysically scripture based framework of historical causality to become an act of "a theology for social order."[530]

### 3. A New Focus on 'Catholic Action'

The discussions in chapter one articulate some of the most notable developments during the reign of Pope Pius XI. Some of the key ones are worth mentioning again. They point out the conceivable developments that may have triggered the expansion of Lonergan's narrative of a theology of redemptive praxis. First, there was the formidable recognition of the papacy's standing on the world stage. More than just issuing decrees on the ethics of social reconstruction, the papacy itself became the focus of a potential power-broker. The skillfulness of Pope Pius XI's leadership injected a distinctive flare into his global role. When European governments together with other states within the League of Nations failed to consolidate their authority in the midst of imminent wars and the devastating socio-economic situation, doors were opened for the papacy to increase its ascendency. Hence, the crisis had boosted the leadership of Pius XI to exert an extraordinary authority over the affairs of the secular society globally.

Secondly, while taking advantage of his impressive role in his global leadership Pope Pius XI addressed the large-scale crisis of the global affairs using the Church's own internal

[529] B. Lonergan, TP, 197.
[530] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 139.

forum. The study in chapter one discloses that Pope Pius XI addressed the issues of global significance by issuing a number of encyclicals. The outstanding one among them was *Quadragesimo anno, On Reconstruction of the Social Order.* This particular encyclical had tremendous influence on Lonergan, and generated a new interest in working towards a praxis theology.[531] Before long, Lonergan knew he was well into the depth of Pope Pius XI's programmatic scheme. Henceforth, he was advocating the themes of social reconstruction through his intended topics of 'a theology for the social order,' 'Catholic Action,' and 'Christ the King.' These topics have subsequently become part of Lonergan's leading thesis in the *Pantôn* essay.

Thirdly, the encyclical, *Quadragesimo anno* had triggered an internal evolution within the liturgical and organizational structure of the Church. In a rare but significant move the Pope, while officially inaugurating the Feast of Christ the King, incorporated the festival into the liturgical calendar. This newly introduced Feast was then to become permanently an annual liturgical celebration. Interestingly enough, it was to become a preparative event giving significance to the dawn of the Advent season, transferring momentum from the liturgical celebration of the Feast of Christ the King over to the Advent Season, and subsequently onto the Christmas themes of the Child-Christ-King.

Basically, the Advent Season is effectively a graced period in the liturgical calendar that depicts the awaited hope in the coming of Christ. This theological theme of an awaited hope would run parallel to the concept of a broken world eclipsed by the power of darkness which needs repair. Logically, it was so fitting to capture the theological implications of the underlying concepts of reconstruction. Hence, the dominant theological premise of the restored grace in the Christ's coming shall be absorbed into the new theological scheme. So the Feast of Christ the King will also be aligned with the eschatological themes that shall

[531] See F.E Crowe, BLPT, 451-70.

absorb Pope Pius XI's agendas of social reforms. All of them were to be incorporated into Lonergan's interpretation of the concepts of restoration, a new order, and the reconstruction of the social order. Essentially, these liturgical themes will then be translated into the central concept of Lonergan's emerging narrative of a theology of redemptive praxis.

Fourthly, the highly complex amalgamation of the socio-liturgical platforms had impelled Lonergan to further evoke the Pope's reform agenda. This movement in turn shall also trigger Lonergan's reform itinerary.[532] Clearly, this achievement was deemed a 'Catholic Action' in its own making. Internally, it may have been just a Church matter; externally, the social reform movements in the secular world were largely enriched by the Pope's influence on the global stage. Lonergan is seen to have benefited from the Pope's reform agenda. In turn Lonergan helped elevate Pope Pius XI's social and liturgical theme to a new height. All of these shifts shall contribute towards the subsequent theological springtime of a new seasonal thinking in Lonergan's redemptive schema.

Finally, the itinerary on the Pope's reform package had a theological stimulus. As Lonergan went on to invent a new possibility in interpreting the concept of social reconstruction, he did so intentionally in order to include the highly theological discourses of the First and the Second Adam(s). Given Lonergan's theological reflections, the discussions on social reconstruction went further towards enabling him to broaden the premise about a new cosmological order. Consequently, this shift draws us deeply into the study of theological anthropology, essentially intensifying his discussion on the themes dealing with Original Sin: creation, fall and redemption. The bedrock of the whole premise is fundamentally, restoration. Hence, restoration shall now include social reconstruction of humanity collectively.

[532] Cf. B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134.

### 4. The Role of Christ in History

Towards the end of his lengthy treatise in the PA (1) essay, Lonergan finally wraps up his discussion with this topic: 'The Kingship of Christ.' Lonergan erects the archetype of the Kingship of Christ to complete his theological program of a redemptive praxis. First, through this archetype model Lonergan may have pursued the Pauline theology of the baptismal discourse of the mission dimension: the one who is immersed in the waters of baptism and anointed with the oil of Christ's kingly (servant) bearing, accommodates the symbolic concept of an eminent figure who comes to redeem the world.[533] This figurative image of the Kingship of Christ is strikingly associated with Lonergan's Christology, salvific redemption. Hence, the discussion of the *Pantôn* papers is very much associated with Lonergan's 'Advent theme,' the awaited one who will bring salvation to the whole of creation. What begins to evolve is the appropriation of a suitable lexicon to the theological concept of salvation. It seems that Lonergan is weaving between the concepts of the 'Second Adam' and the 'Kingship of Christ.' Both are Pauline doctrines and are essential theological concepts aligned with the theology of redemption. Perhaps, what becomes a relatively modern lexicon to be appropriated with Pope Pius XI's notion of social reconstruction falls within the paradigm of a kingly role.[534]

Second, it is supposedly noted that Lonergan's "theology for the social order" is homogenous to Plato's 'ideal city' in the 'philosopher-king' concept. Technically, Lonergan appropriates the Socrates dialogue so that he could draw out an adequate concept equivalent to a narrative of redemptive praxis. Plato, in his allegory of the King-philosopher narrative has a strong political theory of good governance, equal distribution of wealth, and adds a clear vision of the social health for a society. And so Plato's political philosophy aligns with

[533] Cf. CCC, n. 436.

[534] This interpretation may have a strong link to the baptismal discourse in which kingly role shall be a reference to a servant model. Theologically, the anointed one is the king who would triumph over sin and death.

a similar Christian interpretation of Christ the liberator, the one who shall restore social order by the promised Kingship of Christ. Equally relevant to this discussion is a reference to the conversation Lonergan had about the 'perennial philosophy' in the development of new phantasms[535] found in Socrates dialogues. Plato's 'cave analogy' is a useful concept that sets a paradigm shift. Lonergan executes this analogy in the *Pantôn* to translate Plato's 'ideal city' to Pope Pius IX's practical solution: a social reconstruction through 'a metaphysic of Catholic Action.'

Thirdly, Lonergan's use of Plato's figurative notion of phantasm is perhaps a creative symbolic narrative. It embraces Socrates' dialogue: "Christ is Plato's philosopher-king,"[536] and the theme of Christ the King in Pius IX's social teaching. Clearly, Lonergan had shifted his positioning from a socio-economic and political platform into a theological realm. In this way Lonergan paves a well-defined path towards achieving his program of a narrative of an emerging Christology. Hence, Lonergan's intention to use the term, 'a new order' within the context of Christ's Kingship is not seen particularly as Christological but essentially discursive, sufficient enough to become symbolically redemptive. Even then, Lonergan's ingenious narrative may have Plato's philosophical influence, yet his use of the ideals of a new order intentionally anchors a richer implication.

Finally, by drawing out the figure of the Kingship of Christ, Lonergan's desire was to focus on the ultimate role of Christ in the universe. That, in the end, all shall be achieved in the restoration of the whole universe through Christ's Kingship. This interpretation transcends the world order, including Socrates's 'ideal city.' Hence, in the final analysis, the hypothesis of an 'ideal city' is a history culminating in the universal Kingship of Christ.

[535] Ibid., 145.
[536] Ibid., 158.

## III. Lonergan's Christology

As noted in chapter one, there were three topics that captured Lonergan's early interest. They were Christology, history, and economics. Each one of them had been pivotal in Lonergan's early draft of his manuscripts. Importantly however, history turned out to be the prevalent topic. Yet, the other two topics were not discarded. They were an integral part of the development of his narrative of a redemptive praxis. What Lonergan basically envisaged was a conceptual view of a new order to be drawn from the synopsis of these three topics. Having discussed at length the topic of history, let us now turn our attention to Lonergan's Christology.

Lonergan's early works in Christology go back as far as his student papers can reveal. Among the prominent ones is the *Pantôn* essays. Fredrick Crowe had rare access to some of Lonergan's invaluable notes, some of which he had compiled for his Christology classes to be taught at the Christ the King Seminary, Toronto in 1948-9,[537] though some of those undocumented notes may date back to the early 1930's. Overall, most of the notes Crowe was uncovering in detailing Lonergan's Christology would be dated between 1935 and 1980. It is through the meticulous work of Crowe's methodical study of these notes that we may be able to sight some of these rich resources. Through his thorough study of the *Pantôn* papers Crowe has brought to light a significant part of the evolution of Lonergan's Christology.

While paying attention to the invaluable insight gained from the *Pantôn* papers, Crowe went further to make a remarkable discovery. He noted that the *Pantôn* is more than a sketchy collection of material evidence of Lonergan's Christological notes. Rather he suggested that: "The *Pantôn* paper is a Christology and, as the phrase 'Kingship of Christ' indicates, historical causality enters the very title."[538] This important discovery is a valued

[537] F. E Crowe, *CH*, 51.
[538] Ibid., 31.

reference that remains symbolically rich as, in our own study, we enter into the heart of the *Pantôn* essays itself to incorporate the mission of the Kingship of Christ with "the Pauline conception of the role of Christ in creation."[539] Both of these highly significant theological concepts reinforce the development of Lonergan's narrative of a theology of redeeming history.

## 1. The Notion of Causality in Lonergan's Christology

Nothing in the universe emerges in a vacuum! There has to be a cause, and there has to be an effect. The result of an effect is a reaction to a primary cause. It can evolve into a new entity, and can pose a chain of further actions and interactions. What follows subsequently is an interplay of a cause-effect relationship. In brief, this description is a modest synopsis of the Thomist concept of 'historical causality.' The opening pages of this chapter articulated in great detail the underpinning arguments pertaining to Aquinas's concept of historical causality. This study purports that Lonergan's idea of a dialectic of history is deeply rooted in the Thomist notion of historical causality.

If we argue that the principle of causality had subsequently translated to the methodology Lonergan used in exploiting his Christology, then this dialectical method must have an origin.[540] Indeed, Lonergan was schooled in the traditional theories of dialectics that had long been associated with the social philosophies imbued in the Aristotelian school of habits,[541] the Thomist school of virtues,[542] the Augustinian tale of the two cities[543] and the

[539] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 153.

[540] A clear case of a dialectical discourse found in Lonergan's work can be seen in Lonergan's class notes devised to be delivered in the theology of sacrament course 1940-1, and mostly probably in the next three years. See F. E Crowe, *CHCBL*, 38-50, esp. 42. Crowe points out that Lonergan applied his dialectical method to devise the notes compiled in preparation for teaching the course on sacraments.

[541] Aristotle, Bk. VI: Ch.1, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1143:12, 30, 35 & 1144: 5, 10, 15, & 20. p. 1033.

[542] *ST* I aIIae. q. 57, a. 1, & *ST* IaIIae. q. 55, a.

[543] Augustine, *City of God*, BK XIV, Chapter 3-6.

Hegelian-Marxian school of dialectics.[544] These traditional schools have had an influential impact on Lonergan's intellectual development. It is safe to claim, therefore, that Lonergan's approach to doing Christology underscores a historically dialectical principle.

In order to demonstrate that Lonergan's Christology was substantially dialectical this study adapted a striking trajectory offered by Frederick Crowe. This trajectory however, is broadly Lonergan's own allegorical illustration known as the "scissors action" analogy.[545] Lonergan's "scissors action" analogy consists of two different acts from the two ends of a pair of scissors: an upper blade and a lower blade. The meeting of these two blades generates a new entity. Crowe advanced the use of the "scissors action" analogy to explain the "conceptual unity in Lonergan's Christology: the upper blade of the scissors is history, a dominant theme in Lonergan's life work; when it meets the lower blade, the data, the overarching idea is created."[546] The interpretation of the historical agent is identified as Christ "in conflict with alien historical agents. It was the first of Lonergan's efforts to put it all together…all history is brought to unity in Christ."[547] Crowe noted that the tension that exists between Christ and the "alien historical agents" is a healthy one; this conflict will ultimately give rise to a higher synthesis. Moreover, Crowe noted that the tension that reemerges within the notion of the dialectical unity is essentially salient to Lonergan's idea of historical causality.[548] This metaphorical conflict will enable us to articulate Lonergan's specific contribution to the development of his Christology.

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[544] See K. Marx, *Early Writings*, Introduction by L. Colletti, Translated by R. Livingstone and G. Benton (New York: Vintage Books) 1973.

[545] The 'scissors action' analogy is widely used in Lonergan's exposition of his heuristic method found predominantly in the following pages. B. Lonergan, *Insight*, 87, 114-15, 337-38, 486, 546, 554, 600-1, 603 & 609.

[546] F. E Crowe, *CH*, 12. The exact wording is from the back page review but the references are found in the given page.

[547] F. E Crowe, *CH*, 172. Crowe analyzed one of Lonergan's metaphors to illustrate how dialectic within his idea of history existed in the very early days in the "*Pantôn.*"

[548] It is interesting to note that Crowe does not use Michael's Shute's recent phrase: "redemptive praxis." Crowe, rather preferred to remain with Lonergan's 1930's Christological phrase: "historical causality." See F. E Crowe, *CH*, 18.

Ironically enough, Lonergan's 'scissors analogy' is seen to be equally applicable to Newton's laws of gravity.[549] History, in the upper blade, is the speed found in the ideal line that advances, while the decline in the lower blade is the interference effected by gravitational forces of other bodies. The speed that begins to recover around the curve is used as a metaphor for the overarching idea that revolves around Christ as a unifying whole with many diverse parts of its operations. Lonergan draws on the Newtonian metaphor to demonstrate that the conceptual unity not only represents what goes on *within* the operations of three approximations but also *over them* so that speed can be measured. Hence, history that happens encompasses the alien historical agents that rotate around the parameters of human lives and the tension that exists in its relationship to Christ. The progress and decline in human affairs are drawn towards Christ, who is present at the center of this redeeming unity.

Succinctly, this study proposes that what comes to light in this trajectory is Lonergan's highly conceptual theology of redemptive praxis found in the study of these two manuscripts. The *Pantôn* had initiated the process. Subsequently, this process shall now feature the integration of the three-fold approximations which are highly developed in his later paper, the ACH (2). Thus, a dialectic of history that Lonergan sought out in the *Pantôn* papers is reached in the supernatural order, ultimately found in Christ, the one who restores order by the instrument of his eternal peace. This is a Christological account that underscores a significant theological interpretation that largely shapes Lonergan's narrative of a redemptive praxis.[550]

[549] See M. Shute, *ONLDH*, 50.

[550] F. E Crowe, *CH*, 25-7. According to Crowe, Lonergan made a shift from a scholastic Christology (1930's views) to post-Scholastic Christology in the 1940's.

## 2. The Glory of the Cross

The theology of the Cross does not appear prominent in the study of these two manuscripts.[551] Only in the *Pantôn* essay do we find a significantly measured segment of Lonergan's Christological exposition, but it does not extend to the articulation of the theology of the Cross as such. Hence, the discussion of the Cross in relation to his leading premise of redemption remains low key within this text. What, however, has been learnt from the study of these two essays is that Lonergan drew his theological foundations extensively from the Pauline traditions. As such, Lonergan's basic theological concept of redemption is derived primarily from St. Paul's teaching. Perhaps, Lonergan had observed St. Paul's teaching on the theology of Cross, but seemed to have relied on St. Augustine's interpretation on the subject. Let us now highlight a tiny but significant part of St. Augustine's teaching on the theology of the Cross that progressed through the medieval era of the theological development which eventually emerged in Lonergan's Christology.

The successive theological development throughout the centuries on the subject involved some of the major debates. St. Augustine initially interpreted St Paul's theology of redemption as a compensation package that enabled grace to be restored after the fall of Adam.[552] St. Anselm of Canterbury pursued this line of thought developed from St. Augustine, but moved on further to emphasize the sacrifice of the Cross as a ransom for the sin of Adam.[553] St. Anselm's main theological teaching on 'Incarnation' and 'Atonement'

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[551] Again, we need to remind ourselves that Lonergan's unpublished transcripts at the center of this study are sketchy notes not meant for publication. As working notes, we are not expected to find the full disclosure of something comprehensive in each particular branch of either philosophy or theology. Hence, the emphasis in this study is to establish that Lonergan focused on the exposition of a theology of redemptive history.

[552] Augustine, *The Trinity.* Translated by E. Hill. Part I, Volume 5 of *The Works of Saint Augustine*: a Translation for the 21st Century (New York: New City Press, 1991), 13. 16. Augustine taught that the Cross came to be a remedy for the disorder in which Adam had placed the whole human race: the power of debt. The Cross according to Augustine is a ransom for the debt, a release from being in the power of Satan.

[553] Anselm. "*Cur Deus Homo?*" In *Basic Writings*, Translated by S.N. Deane (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1998), 191-302. Anselm's work, *Cur Deus Homo* (1094 -1098), developed centuries later from St. Augustine.

taught that the cross is the symbolism of the sacrifice in the restitution for humanity's sins. The main teaching that both St Augustine and St. Anselm had developed in articulating the purpose of the Cross was a principle of justice. St. Thomas retrieved both St. Augustine and St. Anselm's central teachings on the virtue of justice, and went on to develop a comprehensive argument on the subject.

Developing his own Christology, St. Thomas took the argument further by suggesting that the Cross has a concept of a just offering of Christ's life. Representing the whole of humanity, Christ himself stands in the mystery of his humanity and divinity, and thus becomes a perfect mediator (Cf. Col 1:20; 2:14). Offering sacrifice to God is part of the order of things,[554] and thus does not necessitate a settlement for salvation. The order of things is a concept that St. Thomas retrieved from the Augustinian tradition: the Cross becomes a weapon of a just war, wrestling power against Satan.[555] Inevitably, the power of the Cross becomes the symbol of supreme love (Cf. Philippians 2:3; 3:8). St. Thomas viewed that St. Paul's teachings on the theological virtue of charity are to be interpreted from the aspect of reparation for sins through the sacrifice of the Cross, thus leading to the argument that grace is bequeathed on human nature (Rom 5:12).[556]

St. Thomas' appropriation of the theological virtue of charity within the interpretation of the theology of the Cross provides sufficient clarity to the subsequent development of the subject. St. Thomas found that the mysterious meaning of charity is friendship. This friendship is the human face of God. Through this friendship Jesus, the human person of God, effects reconciliation by way of the Cross, thus uniting us to God.[557] The origin of St. Thomas' understanding of the theology of the Cross is rooted in the post narrative of St. Augustine's incarnational Christology. Basically, what St. Thomas developed from St.

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[554] *ST* IIaIIae, 85, 1 resp.
[555] Augustine, *The Trinity*, 13. 16.
[556] *ST* IIaIIae, 26.
[557] Ibid., 26.2.

Augustine was the traditional doctrine which teaches that love reigns supreme in the saving works of Christ. Hence, the post-Augustinian-Thomist tradition claims that through the supreme act of love, God shares God's life with humanity through the outpouring of the divine gifts. Having emphasized the theology of grace, (especially in the study of ACH (2)) Lonergan intended to shift the discussion from the notion of reparation and atonement towards the gifts of the Spirit. In essence, the Cross stands as the symbol of the love of God that is freely bestowed on humanity in the gift of grace, not as a ransom for sin. Ironically enough, Lonergan's dogmatic disposition may have undercut the common theological features attributed to the theology of the Cross.[558]

Lonergan's own Christological development of the theology of the Cross, however, is basically derived from St. Thomas' Christological discourse.[559] One of the underlying arguments that is essential in this discussion is St. Thomas' clear development of the theological virtue of charity.[560] Subsequent reflection on the "law of the Cross" can shed new light on the significant concept of justice which St. Augustine and St. Anselm had proposed in their theological expositions.[561] St. Thomas' contributions on the concepts of charity and justice would have provided the presupposition to Lonergan's leading premise in the two essays on the concepts of restoration and renaissance. Hence, Lonergan's theology of the Cross can be viewed posthumously to clarify his basic theme of developing his narrative of a redemptive praxis.[562] Clearly, the articulation of the Christological effect is absorbed within Lonergan's highly theological notion of a metaphysical redemption.[563]

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[558] See B. Lonergan, ACH (2), 28.

[559] This study suggests that Lonergan's in-depth study of the theology of the Cross comes decades later See B. Lonergan, *De Verbo Incarnto*, Part V. "The Law of the Cross." *The Incarnate Word*. (Thesis 17), (Rome, 1964) translated by Charles Hefling. Unpublished paper, (1992-3):1-32.

[560] *ST* IIaIIae, 23-7.

[561] F. E Crowe, *CH*, 86-88.

[562] See B. Lonergan, *De Verbo Incarnto*, Part V. "The Law of the Cross." *The Incarnate Word*. (Thesis 17).

[563] B. Lonergan, PA (1),159.

### 3. The Dialectic of the Cross

This study resolves that Lonergan neither inherited St. Paul's primitive concept of redemption nor aligned himself with St Anselm's concept of 'incarnational atonement.' Instead he positioned himself firmly in the post-Augustinian and Thomistic understanding of their incarnational Christology. This theological position occupies a considerable part of his discussion found towards the end of the ACH (2). Moreover, in his subsequent reflections on the "law of the Cross"[564] years later, Lonergan may perhaps have disclosed an incubation of the original rich idea centered on the dialectical principles discovered in his theory of a 'metaphysic of history.' Law, according to Lonergan, is counter-productive to the Cross yet there is the emerging tension of a higher synthesis in the supernatural order.[565] The theological analysis of the concept of law stands (so to say) in conflict with the cross. Thus, the counter-position of the cross in no way deflects from the law of the new order founded in Christ. It is the co-existence of a dialectical unity which only Christ can enact: the role of being in conflict with the "alien historical agents" while at the same time restoring a shattered natural order. Thus, the *restoration* of that unity in the entire universe solely in Christ denotes Lonergan's significantly theological narrative of the supernatural order.

Lonergan's theological reflections on his idea of supernatural order made an equally significant contribution towards enhancing the interpretation of a redemptive praxis. Hence, appropriating further Isaac Newton's three approximations (the calculations of the laws of gravity) into his theological narrative, Lonergan has made a significant breakthrough in devising an analytical method in doing theology relevant to the context. Hence, the praxis of it is a progress, a decline and a redemption. They are the basic theological principles founded in the law of the Cross: life, death and resurrection. Lonergan's new synthetic view in his

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[564] B. Lonergan, *De Verbo Incarnto*, Part V. "The Law of the Cross."

[565] See M. Gerhart, "Bernard Lonergan's "Law of the Cross": Transforming the Sources and Effects of Violence," *Theological Studies.* 77: 1 (2016): 77-95.

mature Christology emerges in a new theological blending toward devising his narrative of a redemptive praxis. Hence, Lonergan's three-fold dialectics can be symbolized in Christ's life, death, and resurrection.[566]

The synopsis of the successive discussion regarding the dialectical discourse in Lonergan's Christology concludes with significant features in Lonergan's explanatory genre of a redemptive praxis. These substantive arguments are then developed to advance his theological foundations through the appropriation of the threefold dialectics devised and articulated in ACH (2). Lonergan's notion of a redemptive praxis deals concretely with the tensions in the conceptual unity that exists between the "alien historical agents" and Christ. The implication of this discussion is centered on the reflection essentially on the community that experiences the redemptive gifts of grace. The dialectics of the community is already graced in Christ, through his life, death and resurrection. Christ is alive (at the center of unity) and gives the recognition of the outpouring gifts of the Spirit to a redeemed people. In other words, the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity are seen in this context, the products of the redemptive activity within the community of believers.

Hence, the arguments obtained from the study of ACH (2) underscore not only the Christological, but an expanded theological narration towards the development of his theology of grace. This is seen to be a significant shift. The introduction of a theology of mission at the conclusion of ACH (2) is a major injection towards exploiting the gifts of the Spirit. Though the themes found in the articulation of the theology of the Cross are implicitly present in two of the manuscripts at study, the operations of the three approximations into developing a networking with the theological virtues can enhance the interpretation of inter-

[566] See M. Gerhart, "Bernard Lonergan's "Law of the Cross": Transforming the Sources and Effects of Violence."

subjectivity and the operations of the gift of God's Grace. Accordingly, the dominant part of the study of the ACH (2) is devoted to the theology of grace.

## IV. Lonergan's Concept of a Theology of Mission

The discussion dealing with Lonergan's theology of mission is rather brief, appearing as a brief footnote in the unpublished manuscripts of file 713. And more oddly still, among the two manuscripts studied in this thesis, reference to a theology of mission is contained in only a single sentence in ACH (2).[567] The sentence reads: "Finally, the relations between dialectics and grace and those without, form the subject matter of missiology."[568] The companion essay, namely ACH (1), on the other hand provides a rather expanded narrative.[569] It points out that Lonergan basically said: "…the questions of transference and reaction here, belong to the science of Missiology, where Missiology is considered not as the concrete problems of the apostolate in particular countries but the larger questions of distributing and directing missionary effort over the globe"[570] The brief appearance of the concept missiology, in both ACH (1) and particularly at the very end of ACH (2), implies a disruption, seemingly noting a missing link.

While the discussion appears to be inconsistent and seemingly a distraction from the main discussion, it is not so much so in Lonergan's view.[571] An in-depth reading of these lines reveals one thing for sure: this particular sentence in ACH (2) gives self-assurance to Lonergan's thematic discussion. A relevant source that can support this assertion is a clue cited from Crowe's study of the *Pantôn*. Crowe made a remark that refers to the final sixth topic of the *Pantôn*:[572] "The punctuation shows that the phrase 'A Theology for…' governs

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[567] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 56. The editors point to another reference to the other companion essay: ACH (1).

[568] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), 28.

[569] B. Lonergan, ACH (1). pp. 16-7. In this companion essay Lonergan has a more expanded discussion on missiology than in ACH (2).

[570] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 56.

[571] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 56. The editors seemed to affirm that there was a missing link.

[572] In his detailed study of the *Pantôn* Frederick Crowe points out that the first title: *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis,* is actually the overall topic, and so from the outline of its seven titles, the *Pantôn* essay has a clustered combination of six other essays. They are (1) A Theory of Human Solidarity, (2) A Metaphysic for the Interpretation of St. Paul, (3) A Theology for the Social Order, (4) Catholic Action, (5) And the Kingship of

grammatically the next three lines so that the final subtitle is understood as 'A Theology for the Kingship of Christ;' this little point of grammar is of some importance for the drift of the whole essay."[573] This phrase, '*the drift of the whole essay,'* seems to draw attention to the sequential flow of the potential development of what Lonergan had in mind for the future,[574] and Lonergan's sixth topic itself gives us a clue that there is more development to follow. Thematically, this study contends that this is fully developed in the companion essay of ACH (2). Perhaps paradoxically, Lonergan's choice to include a theology of mission at the end of his ACH (2) essay is by no means a surprise move. It was indeed well intended.

## 1. The Prospects of a Mission Theology

Lonergan's biography informs us that as part of his Church history classes in Rome, he was introduced to some courses that "dealt with political questions such as the relation of the Church to revolution, liberalism, nationalism, socialism and Bolshevism. It also dealt with the Church in America, Latin America, and Asia."[575] This proposition provides good background evidence to suggest that provisions were made within the mainstream theological subjects to cater for new developments. As the newly introduced subjects in Church history classes began to find their place in text books and also in the curriculum of university faculties, it was highly likely that the science of Missiology was just coming to light.[576] This development was taking place at a time of critical expansions of the Church missionary's activity in many parts of the world.[577] It would seem likely that, as a student Lonergan was

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Christ, (6) *In incipient outline*. Each of the six topics is part of the larger essay, contained in PA (1) and according to Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran's assessments, they flow on into PA (2).

[573] F. E Crowe, *CH,* 31.

[574] The sixth topic, "In incipient outline," draws our attention to an unfinished business, which in this study has reference to the theology of mission.

[575] R. M Liddy, *TL*, 85.

[576] See B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 56. The editorial note suggests that the faculty of missiology had its course listed in the handbook of the Gregorian University, the 1932-3 academic year. We presume Lonergan may have enrolled for a course in that faculty. See R. M Liddy, *TL,* 85.

[577] S. B. Bevans/R. P. Schroeder, *Constants in Context: A Theology of Mission for Today* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004), 240-255. Bevans and Schroeder provide detailed information to the significant shifts

monitoring closely the shifting paradigms amidst the dramatic socio-economic and geo-political dynamics.

The discussion in the first chapter in this thesis informed us that some of the effects of the large-scale socio-economic and political crisis of the1930's had confronted the Church with the need to search for new ways to address the challenges of evangelization. Some of these developments had provoked the mainstream theology to appropriate theological relevance to these newly emerging contexts. Such developments were urgent. Yet, the ecclesial expansion and the development of missionary activity towards societies outside of the Western world would have impelled the task of evangelization to seek new paradigms. This challenge would have invited the Church to revise its conventional position to allow various theological narratives to be explored.

These historic developments were really instructive to Lonergan, especially as a young student in formation. In exploring these emerging experiences in Church history courses, Lonergan enlarged his interest beyond the known boundaries or what he himself will later name '*horizons*.'[578] These vast horizons which Lonergan would, in later studies, explore and expand on, are at this stage in their infancy. For now, they are fundamentally imperative, contributing to Lonergan's entire study of critical history. As is clearly documented, Lonergan was already "committed to the task of its renewal,"[579] not just concerning "the

in the study of mission theology. Apart from the1930's economic depression and the subsequent developments of the two wars (World War I & II) that left Europe almost in ruins, there were significant political developments around the world. The era of European colonization was coming to an end as colonized states in Latin America, Africa and Asia moved towards political independence. All of these factors have contributed to redirection of Church's attention from the West to the East. Bevans and Schroeder also noted that this was an era of significant development within the Church too, with a new attitude of missionary consciousness. This era saw the founding of religious congregations intended for missions in the previously uncontacted regions of the world. The rise of Protestant missionary movements also took a dramatic turn as they too, looked towards missionary activity to uncontacted areas outside of Europe. These developments were huge shifts, happening at the time Lonergan was introduced to the newly developed courses in Church history. He may have been challenged to a new way of thinking, especially regarding the emerging themes in missiological studies. Hence, Lonergan perhaps was contemplating as a student with a youthful vigor the emerging questions of missionary activity. These were truly amazing times as Lonergan faced the world of significant ecclesial change.

[578] B. Lonergan, *MIT*, 235-266. Chapter ten deals with the theme of horizon under the topic of dialectic.

[579] F. E Crowe, *CH*, 30.

decadent state of Catholic thought"[580] in the established institutions and regions such as Europe and North America, but beyond these demarcations. Examples of emerging issues, such as the topics of revolution, liberalism, nationalism, socialism and Bolshevism posed ever more critical challenges. Basically, they were part of the evolving challenges concretely relevant to human civilization in vast and diverse areas geographically.

The posthumous reading into Lonergan's missiological theme suggests that the challenges posed by these various circumstances have triggered strategic planning in devising new programs for theology[581] The wealth of knowledge Lonergan had accumulated from the newly introduced courses in Church history would have helped him to seek diversity of multiple viewpoints that would be truly relevant to concrete situations.[582] This study claimed that the conclusive statement of ACH (2) in which Lonergan said, (The) "science of Missiology… is considered not as the concrete problems of the apostolate in particular countries but the larger questions of distributing and directing missionary effort over the globe"[583] pointed towards a development of a theology of praxis. Such a scenario would have influenced the cutting edge of a significant development. Noble skills and technical expertise were needed to deal with these particular cases. With hindsight we can say that Lonergan sounded utterly prophetic as he prepared to face a new emerging world of contrast.

## 2. Towards a Methodology of Praxis Theology

The world of the twentieth century had a wealth of experiences of various missionary drives, given the increasingly accelerating phase of ecclesial expansion geographically.[584] Major adjustments had to be accommodated for a genuine process of evangelization to take

[580] B. Lonergan, PA (2), 134.
[581] B. Lonergan, TNC, 55-67.
[582] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 56.
[583] Ibid.
[584] S. B. Bevans/R. P. Schroeder, *Constants in Context*, 275-280.

place. The pressing challenge at hand was how to translate the established theological concepts to find relevance in these new emerging contexts such as in the cases of revolution, liberalism, nationalism, socialism and Bolshevism.[585] For instance, how will the Gospel message, which had been processed in a long tradition of theological uniformity, developed predominantly from a particular culture and time, be relevantly and effectively communicated universally to vastly distributed and very different contexts? Inversely however, would pluralism and relevance be permitted to participate in the universality of Catholic theology?[586] In other words, can the permanent, and always considered universal categories serve particular needs in these new concrete situations? These developing issues ultimately would trigger a new movement.

This study asserted that Lonergan was part of this movement as he participated in the evolving discussions concerning the consideration of a missiological discourse. The more Lonergan participated, the more he was challenged to search for appropriate answers to the emerging needs. We know from Lonergan's early commitment that he was obligated to the task of a renewal program for the cause of "the decadent state of Catholic thought."[587] The changing paradigms in the dramatic development of missiological discourses took the task of Lonergan's praxis engagement onto a new peak. This study purported that Lonergan, after having reflected long enough, returned to meet the original commitment to the task of renewal, but now on a different plateau. This time Lonergan's major concern was the crisis of faith in modern times.[588] Hence, Lonergan found in his later narrative that the faith-crisis agenda had to be confronted with a clear-cut method.[589]

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[585] W. A Mathews, *LQ*, 67-9.

[586] See the background developments in Lonergan's thoughts in B. Lonergan, "Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation." *A Third Collection*. (1985): 35-54.

[587] B. Lonergan, PA (1), 134.

[588] B. Lonergan, TNC, 55-67.

[589] W R. Burrows, TMCT, 242-255.

In fact, what Lonergan did was to attempt to frame a cultural matrix that would deal with the faith-crisis agenda. The framework that Lonergan devised was basically a method with considerable openness to tolerance. This approach would include valuing other peoples' beliefs, cultures, contexts, challenges etc., and acquiring a moderate understanding of acceptance. Nevertheless, this method itself, as he perceived it, was neither going to be a scientific discipline nor a programmatic procedure. Rather, it was to be a framework that would outline a number of operations which would help anyone, namely a history maker, to discover his or her tasks in different contexts.[590] Lonergan affirmed this point in his later exposition of the method he devised: "A contemporary method would conceive those tasks in the context of modern science, modern scholarship, modern philosophy, of historicity, collective practicality and co-responsibility."[591]

The clues provided by the companion manuscript, ACH (1) and the brief notes on missiology discovered at the end of ACH (2), not only give us the suggestion intended to direct Lonergan's discussions towards a missiological discourse but they in turn point to the beginning of what was to be developed for the future effort for evangelization.[592] The subsequent development that Lonergan discovered in modern missiological discourses was to be decisive. This was an evolving method aimed at appropriating praxis theology. Clearly, what Lonergan intended to achieve was to devise an adequate method intended for doing theology in context. Such development would enhance evangelical discourse, enabling it to be lucid and coherent. Consequently, a praxis approach to making theology relevant to different contexts would be a task not only imperative in modern times but also a task allotted to contemporary theologians. Hence, a narrative of a redemptive praxis adds to the drift of the

[590] W R. Burrows, TMCT, 242-255.
[591] B. Lonergan, *MIT*, xi.
[592] B. Lonergan, ACH (1), 16-7. This companion essay was not studied in this thesis but was found to discuss more than ACH (2) on these two concepts 'transference' and 'reaction.' These two concepts underscore Lonergan's idea of missiology.

unfolding understanding that Lonergan's programmatic schema was an emerging theology in context. The understanding may be incorporated in the narrative of the evolutionary stages of Lonergan's theology of redemptive history.

### 3. The Theological Virtues in the Context of Missiology

The dynamism of the theological virtues in the study of these two manuscripts is pivotal. Yet surprisingly, the direct references to the theological virtues are minimal within the texts of the unpublished papers. Somewhat similar to the approach Lonergan had whilst discussing the subject of missiology, the theological virtues are barely mentioned in the *Pantôn* papers;[593] while only sketchily in ACH (2).[594] To be more precise, there is only one place in ACH (2) where they are found, and even there only two of the theological virtues are mentioned: faith and charity. Hope was completely left out.[595] Beyond that, there are no further clarifications on the theological virtues, either individually or collectively. We may have to read into the text to seek an interpretation. As this chapter concludes the last segment on the arguments on Lonergan's narrative of an emerging theology of praxis we are left in a grey area wondering how he got to clarify the exposition of the theological virtues in relation to his narrative of a theology of redemptive history. Lonergan's intentions in this context, however, can be gleaned through further painstaking interpretation.

For some clarity let us revisit the final part of chapter four of this thesis. In that segment we are drawn to Lonergan's discussions on the theological virtues which are then accompanied by the operations of the evangelical counsels (chastity, poverty and obedience). Without providing a narrative to each of the theological virtues (faith, hope and charity) Lonergan employs their collective efforts to formulate his main theological argument.

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[593] It is perhaps early days for Lonergan to articulate his idea of the theological virtues. Here is only a minor reference to it. See B. Lonergan, PA (1), 159.

[594] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 50.

[595] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), 25.

Formulated in allegorical language, Lonergan interpreted the role of the theological virtues (faith, hope and charity) as weaponry instruments; armed with the supernatural gifts of grace one is able to battle the causes of the "deformation of conscience."[596] This battle is to be fought in the field of human nature. Lonergan believed that the major decline in the deformation of conscience weakens the gift of human freedom i.e. irresponsible use of freedom has resulted in casualties, found basically in historical, institutional and structural forms of sin. To win the battle is to empower human nature with the potencies discovered in the evangelical counsels (chastity, poverty and obedience). The empowerment of human nature can be fully enhanced only if there is a major employment of the human intellect. This has been a key argument in the overall treatise.

What we might expect to gain from reading ACH (2) regarding a clear narrative about the authentic role of the theological virtues is in fact, quite limited.[597] However, there is an insightful suggestion from Tad Dunne's study that reassures us that there are some hidden treasures yet to be explored, if only we were to dig deeper into what Lonergan left behind. Dunn says:

> Before offering my definitions of charity and hope, I would like to clarify a common misunderstanding of Lonergan's view in *Insight*. Because he gave a merely heuristic understanding of the needed forms of redemption, we can get the impression that faith, charity, and hope are elements which most cultures have to wait for, and that only Christianity or the highest religions enjoy such divine gifts. But Lonergan has always compared this analysis to the method of successive approximations by which empirical scientists determine the actual state of affairs. In other words, faith, charity, and hope already exist in human consciousness. The task is not to put them there. Rather the task is to discover where they are and to cooperate with them intelligently. So we are invited to examine our own spirits to see whether there are indeed three distinguishable movements aptly called faith, charity, and hope.[598]

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[596] Ibid., 22.

[597] We are reminded again to take note that this is an unpublished essay. Issues that we now know well could not be thoroughly elaborated from what were, after all, just notes.

[598] T. Dunne, "Faith, Charity, Hope," 50. Tad Dunne argues in his own study that Lonergan had not fully explored each of the theological virtues. He claims that only faith has been thoroughly explored in *Insight*. The other two, hope and charity, have not been adequately explored in *MIT*. Dunne is at liberty to form his own opinion. As far as this study is concerned, Lonergan had comprehensively exploited all of the theological virtues

Though Dunn's point is a reference solely to be sought out in Lonergan's study in *Insight,* this study believes that this clue can be relevant proportionately to the study of the manuscripts. The insights that Dunne discovered in clarifying Lonergan's concept of the theological virtues is highly rewarding. It articulates the clarity of the key point raised in this thesis. In fact, Dunne affirms what we've been attempting to achieve all along in this thesis. Even, Lonergan himself in later years added more clarity to Dunne's view, something he could not have done in his early years with his initial draft.

> My book, *Insight*, is an account of human understanding. As a book, it is an outer socio-cultural factor providing expression and interpretation of events named insights. But at the same time it is inviting the reader to self-discovery, to performing in and for himself the illustrative insights set forth in the chapters, to adverting to what happens in himself when the insights occur, and no less, to what is missing when they do not occur, until eventually as is hoped he will be as familiar with his own intelligence in act as he is with his ocular vision.[599]

Our attempt in this study has been to discover in us where faith, hope and charity exist in our concrete history, and within us as history makers. In essence, this is what redemptive history entails: we have received from the past, live in the present and will pass on to the next generation what we have inherited and developed. In all of this is the telling revelation that we move, and live and have our being within hope, with faith, and with love. The task in this thesis is to own Lonergan's concept of the 'ideal line of history.' When the task becomes one's own entity, namely one's own being, in living and in doing, then one can claim one's own history-making: by participating in the doing, we can eventually bring about change.

Our task is a praxis itself: to read the situation and discover for ourselves the specific roles. The role of renaissance/redemption is important to the missiological discourse as Lonergan clarified years later when he said: "If human historical process is such a compound

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in *MIT*. Lonergan's work, *Insight* is thought to be an incomplete project because his intention was to produce a comprehensive study on method. This intention was then finally completed in *MIT*. If faith was comprehensively explored in *Insight,* then we can assume that love and hope are completed in *MIT*. No doubt *MIT* is a work that invites us to love, and thus calls us to believe in hope.

[599] B. Lonergan, "Prolegomena to the Study of the Emerging Religious Consciousness of Our Time," 58.

of progress and decline, redemption would be effected by faith, hope, and charity."[600] Hence, the interweaving operations of faith, hope and charity in the role of redemption can be discovered in the dynamics of human history. The significance of a theology of missiology is seen in the context of history: an inclusively extended relationship with the role of renaissance. What renaissance does is to appropriate the idea of mission towards the process of reaching a new order. This process is made possible by the transcendental intervention of the gift of the divine grace.

Hence, this study discloses that this process of redemptive praxis is itself transformative. So, by carefully identifying faith, hope and charity in us as history makers, we discover the role of Lonergan's third approximation (redemption) as a pivotal moment.[601] Where faith, hope and charity are found in the world order, that is where the task of implementing a theology of redemptive praxis lies. What happens in this process is clearly a modification of an attitude: from a philosophical discourse (dialectic) to a theological one (redemption). This alteration is not accidental but rather intentional. Logically, it is a movement from one worldview to another, from a human phase to the Divine (the other), a graced phase.

Lonergan's narrative of redemptive praxis in this study is an emerging theological method that significantly embodies the massive areas of the theological discourses of nature, sin and grace. Hence, it can be seen that Lonergan encompasses the creation narrative that is

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[600] B. Lonergan, "The Transition from a Classicist World-view to Historical-Mindedness," 8.

[601] See B. Lonergan, ACH (2), 33. Editorial notes, footnote, # 45. What is beginning to emerge in this essay is the evolutionary work of Lonergan's reflection on the three "moments" of human history. These three "moments," or "approximations," or "variables," or "differentials" or "vectors: progress, decline and renaissance are fundamental to Lonergan's worldview. It can be understood as the basis of Lonergan's philosophical anthropology that in later years he will develop into his compelling worldview to be known as 'emergent probability.' (See B. Lonergan, *Insight,*145-162, & 232-269.) These three moments will be linked to Lonergan's reflection on the Catholic traditional teaching in the theology of grace, in which nature, sin and grace are representative of the three fundamental pivots. Lonergan, however, had still a higher theological underpinning that is reflected in his religious interpretation of a redeeming history: these three "moments" progress, decline, and redemption, in which redemption is a linking principle are not only reflected in Lonergan's theology of grace, but also to be interpreted in the context of the theological virtues of charity, hope and faith. See T. A Dunne, "Faith, Charity and Hope," 49-70.

closely linked with salvation history within the context of redeeming events: life, death and resurrection. The clear interpretation of Lonergan's concept of missiology in this essay is concretely imbedded in the articulation of redemptive praxis.[602] This is where the third approximation of his three-fold dialectic, namely, redemption, becomes a turning point towards an integration of theological discourse. Hence, we now return to his theme of the ideal line of history where progress, decline and renaissance take on the dialectical principle of redemption, in which the theological virtues of faith, hope and love are made present.

## 4. A Catechetical Approach to the Application of the Theology of Mission

We have accepted the data discovered from the two essays that the core structure of Lonergan's narrative of exploring a theology of redeeming history is resourced from the Pauline scriptures. As we examine further the impact of the Pauline doctrines in Lonergan's emerging theology of redemption and how it had permeated Lonergan's conception of a theology of mission, we come to the conclusion that the Augustinian influence in Lonergan's reading of the Pauline scriptures is deeply embedded. We've noted earlier that Lonergan read the Pauline scriptures through an Augustinian lens, so that much of Lonergan's theological interpretations in these two essays had an Augustinian nuance.[603] Hence, Lonergan's articulation of St. Augustine's teaching of Original Sin a case in point.[604]

Interestingly enough, the theological themes of Original Sin, grace and redemption which have become the essential ingredients of the *Pantôn* and the ACH (2) essays are also viewed as the foundational configuration of the sacrament of baptism. Hence, the text of the Catholic catechism takes a view based on the Pauline theology and refers this Christian

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[602] Lonergan's deep thoughts shall later be enhanced by the official teaching of the Church. See "Vatican II. (1965) *Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in Modern World,* http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html accessed 15 March 2020.

[603] For example, see B. Lonergan, ACH (2), editorial footnote, # 17.

[604] B. Lonergan, ACH (2), 14.

tradition right back to St. Augustine's teaching on the sacrament of baptism.[605] As such, there is a clear line of argument to suggest that Lonergan had inherited a traditional interpretation from the texts of the catechism. Clearly, Lonergan's main theme found in the *Pantôn* and ACH (2) essays, namely a theology of restoration/renaissance/redemption utilized the Church's catechetical method. We shall argue that if Lonergan's doctrine was mainstream theology, then his approach to appropriating a theology of mission was basically following the catechetical principles. And if so, there is a further claim to suggest that Lonergan's missiological effort was drawn from the basic received principles of the sacrament of baptism. In fact, the bedrock of the theology of mission is founded on the traditional principles of Christian baptism.[606] Such a claim warrants the presentation of the following elements as evidence.

First, the theological sources of Christian baptism are substantially Pauline. These Pauline sources are also shared in Lonergan's essays. For example, Lonergan's leading themes in the *Pantôn* essay, such as harmony, peace and unity are to be found in St. Paul's baptismal discourse, notably the phrases: "For in the one Spirit we were all baptized into one body…," so "…we were all made to drink of one Spirit." (1 Cor. 12: 13). The mystical body is a significant Pauline image that underscores Lonergan's basic theological arguments in the two essays. In another Pauline text St Paul speaks of union with Christ (Gal 2:20), that the incorporation may be the most significant expression of "as many of you who were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ." (Gal 3:27). Furthermore, we come across this reference: "For in one spirit we were all baptized into one body - Jews or Greeks, slaves

[605] See for instance CCC, n. 405. http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p1s2c1p7.htm accessed 20 November 2019.

[606] Kenan Osborne developed a deep contemporary understanding of sacramental theology that presents the ritual of worship in postmodern cultural context, a new reading perhaps relevant to missiological appropriation. This study asserts that Lonergan may have devised his missiological attitude, ostensibly without realizing that he was deep into sacramental theology. For a detail read, see K. Osborne, *Christian Sacraments in a Postmodern World: A Theology for the Third Millennium* (New York: Paulist Press, 1999).

or free – and we were all made to drink of one Spirit...Now you are the body of Christ" (1Cor 12:13, 27). Though Lonergan never spoke explicitly nor did he make any direct references to the characteristics of the baptismal discourse, the themes such as unity and the mystical body are demonstrative of the catechetical narratives. Hence, the Christian catechetical narratives mainly drawn from the Pauline themes are purported to be embodied in Lonergan's theology of mission.

Second, the traditional symbol of water used in the ritual of baptism signifies the outpouring action of the Holy Spirit. Saint Paul links the notion of the incorporation of any one member of the community into Christ through the water of baptism. Symbolically, this ritual is an experiential undertaking of being immersed in the Spirit.[607] Moreover, this particular focus is on the sacramental cause of the gift of the Spirit: "For all who are led by the Spirit of God are children of God…a spirit of adoption…" (Rom 8:14-16). Baptism in the Spirit is therefore not always understood as an event subsequent to the water of baptism; it is also thought of an aspect of Christian initiation itself. Having been incorporated into the mystical body of Christ, the responsibilities of the members to serve others within the communion of the Church become a valued duty.[608] Hence, those who are immersed in the waters of baptism are reborn in Christ, who reigns as King, the Anointed one.[609] Accordingly, their role will change, and so those who are immersed into the waters of baptism likewise will imitate the servant role of the Anointed one, "Christ the King."[610] Hence, the imaginative role of "Christ the King" in the activity of each member of the mystical body is a key notion in Lonergan's essays. Inevitably, Lonergan conceived the theme of *renewal* in the light of the baptism discourse and what is discussed in his essays are the products of the Pauline

[607] CCC, n. 1220.
[608] CCC, n. 1267.
[609] The liturgy of baptism confers on the baptized one the threefold indelible marks of the common priesthood in Christ: prophet, priest and king. Essentially, whenever Lonergan emphasizes Christ the King, the image of the threefold baptism discourse is equally embodied within the text. See CCC, n. 436.
[610] See B. Lonergan, PA (1), 154.

influence. In subsequent development of his essays, these baptismal themes will have further triggered the reflections in the emerging social teachings of the Church regarding social justice, principles of subsidiarity, solidarity with poor, etc.

Above all else, what remains at the core of the ritual of baptism is the theology of Original Sin: through the waters of baptism one is reborn, in a *rebirth, in the Spirit of Christ* (Titus 3:3-5). This is a solid theological theme that occurs right throughout the study of these two essays. What lies at the center of Lonergan's discussion is the theology of Original Sin. As noted in the course of this thesis, it is an essential concept that led to the formation of Lonergan's three-fold dialectic of history: progress, decline and renaissance. Lonergan's concept of a decline has the reading of the fall; it is a history of sin, alienation and disharmony. This image is clearly a link to Christian initiation; leaving the former self, one embraces a new one. The Easter liturgies would incorporate the image of the old self: "buried in sin," we shall arise anew in Christ. What is entailed in the baptismal ritual underscores a deeper spiritual narrative of the idea of *renewal*. Perhaps Lonergan sought to relate this emerging spirituality in his three approximations as part of an expanding discourse in his compelling worldview of a 'metaphysical redemption.' Hence, the thematic conception of *renewal* by the power of the Holy Spirit leads to the restoration of a new order that effects Lonergan's conceptual theme of 'a theology for the social order,' the 'Catholic Action' and the universal 'Kingship of Christ.'

Third, Christian baptism entails duties and responsibilities towards every member of the mystical body. Hence, there are some clear co-relations that exist between the themes found in the *Pantôn* and the theology found in Christian baptism. For instance, Lonergan's theme of "Catholic Action" infers that there is a role for every member in that mystical body who is associated theologically with the implications of the baptismal discourse: a new birth in the Holy Spirt in which the activity of the Spirit in every Christian leads one to a state of

being sent-forth into the world. Hence, the theology of mission which Lonergan introduces towards the end of this essay, ACH (2) apprehends the Pauline narrative. The baptismal character denotes a mission character: one who is sent forth, a reaching out to others, especially to those found on the fringes of society. In other words, all are called into the mystical body with a clear mission of witnessing the kingdom values. These kingdom values are found in Lonergan's underlying idea of renewal. In essence, Lonergan's concept of renewal and restoration are neatly aligned with the baptismal discourse. Hence, the potential effects of a new order take us further into the reflection of a new spirituality, a spirituality to be founded for the mission of the world.

Finally, Lonergan's essentially central exposition of the theological virtues of faith, charity and hope are primarily Pauline themes. Chapter thirteen of St. Paul's first letter to the Corinthians speaks exclusively of charity, faith and hope. Though St. Paul exalts charity in this specific chapter, faith and hope are equally significant. Interestingly enough, just before his exposition of the theological virtues in chapter twelve of the same letter to the Corinthians, St. Paul speaks exclusively of the multiplicity of spiritual gifts found in the mystical body and, as such are drawn from the activity of the Spirit. Hence, St. Paul sees the activity of the Spirit in every Christian as a designated responsibility. Yet the origins of this activity are from the gifts of the Spirit (1Cor 7:7, 17); and are guided by the fruits of the Spirit (Gal 5: 23), namely love, peace, joy, patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control. These Pauline themes had unswervingly underscored Lonergan's thematic narrative of a redemptive praxis. In developing his narrative of the theological virtues Lonergan draws out a special relationship between faith, hope and charity, and the evangelical counsels of chastity, poverty and obedience; both sets of gifts are communicated to us by the interior action of the Spirit.[611] Hence, the baptismal discourse points to yet

[611]See T.A. Dunne, "Notes: Trinity and History." *Theological Studies.* 45 (1984): 139-152.

another emergence of a related supposition, the catechetical. They are to be sublated into Christ, who recreates in his Kingdom a new order of unity. Lonergan attempted to draw his vision of the mission by a process of witnessing God's redemptive works in faith, charity and hope to one another. Hence, the result of this partnership is the fruit of the gift of grace.

The selective scriptural references Lonergan chose to use from St. Paul's vast corpus clearly demonstrates that Lonergan was naturally reflecting on the post-resurrected activity of redemption. This can be clearly deduced from the study of the two manuscripts, in which Lonergan made a particular choice of the Pauline scriptural passages that link intimately to his theme of restoration and the mystical body of Christ. What Lonergan chose to dwell on in St. Paul's theology of redemption is the reflective experience of the salvific grace offered to a community of believers. This is a significant element in Lonergan's theological reflection in the development of his theology of redemption.

Overall, this study asserts that Lonergan's theology of mission is not just an intended conclusion, but an important component in effecting his catechetical narrative of a theology of redemptive praxis. When speaking about dialectics, it refers to the affairs of human life and their relationship to history. This is where natural order operates. Hence, dialectics are matters dealing with natural order, whereas supernatural order pertains to the divine gifts in which the outpouring of Spirit operates through the redemptive activities. This alteration takes place as renaissance become genuinely redemptive in dealing with the affairs of the world. Henceforth, the role of the third approximation, renaissance/redemption shall underpin the catechetical narrative of the theology of mission.

## Conclusion

We have exhausted every avenue in the study of these two essays: from history to philosophy, from dialectics to grace, method to theology and from praxis to catechetical.

While the study has been complex, it has been an adventure. The summit of it all is a synopsis that underscores Lonergan's emerging worldview of a 'new order.' This chapter reaches an understanding to concede that Lonergan's idea of a redemptive praxis emerged from socio-economic and political discussions to embody a theological domain via a comprehensively philosophical path. The evidence exhibited in the study of these two manuscripts expresses that Lonergan had a theology. Yet, reaching that conclusive stage had been empowered by the Pauline texts. They have been instrumental for following the curve of that transition. Hence, they continue to permeate the theological narrative of Lonergan's programmatic method of devising his program of a redemptive praxis.

The two essays present two different trends of the theology of redemption. Each of them had its own particular theological development. The *Pantôn* (1935) was focused on the notion of redemption, with an advent theme: The Kingship of Christ who shall restore unity in his work of redemption in time, the awaited time. The ACH (2), (1937/8) on the other hand, has a solid focus on a communitarian spirituality: a praxis theology for a redeemed people. In other word, the theology of redemption discovered in ACH (2) reveals that we are indeed, a redeemed people living in the midst of the outpouring gift of grace. There is no waiting for redemption! In fact, redemption is here. We are to embrace it by sharing love, faith and hope in our daily living.

Overall, the study of the two manuscripts has carried us to a stage of a tension. Tad Dunne sums it up neatly when he says: "History, precisely because of its permanent tension between stability and change, between community and progress, between the old and new, is a dialog of salvation between the Trinity and humanity."[612] Some of these tensions can be perceived in the way the theology of redemptive praxis is translated from one essay to the other. However, what was completed in both essays is the realization of a redemptive

[612] T.A. Dunne, "Trinity and History," 152.

mission. As a redeemed people we are impelled to be sent forth into the world. This is a mission in the Spirit of the redeeming Christ, in which we are drawn into His image (the Kingship of Christ) by virtue of baptism, to be bearers of change.

# Epilogue

The insights that have emerged from the methodical reading of the two manuscripts that informed this thesis have enabled me to devise an ideal construct of a novel roadmap of history as a human project of experimentation: what we have inherited, how we have lived and developed it, and how we shall hand on the legacy to the next generation. The given fact that each of us involved is a history maker has inspired me to translate Lonergan's idea of history inwardly: as a significant experience of self-examination of my own history and of a country into which I was born and have made my home. The experiments of making ourselves who we are or discovering a national identity have taken me to this point of awareness. However, what has plagued me both prior to and during the course of this study has been the question: Is the contemporary PNG society on the verge of collapse?[613] If so, what has happened? What legacy has the past generation handed onto my generation and what is it that my generation has lived and developed that it will then pass on to the next generation?

This critical moment of self-examination has been informed largely by a discourse offered by a polymath professor at the University of California, Jared Diamond, in his celebrated book, *Guns, Germs and Steel.*[614] Diamond went to New Guinea as early as the 1960's in his exploration of the New Guinean bird kingdom. In 1972, while taking a walk along a tropical island of New Guinea Diamond met Yali Singina, a famous cargo-cult leader (*Lo-bos* movement) of the Madang area. In their conversation Yali posed Diamond an astonishing question: "Why is it that you white people developed so much cargo and brought

[613] Some western commentators are too critical of PNG's developmental challenges. See for instance, K. Fainu, "We have nothing: Papua New Guinea's broken health system braces for Covid 19," https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/11/we-have-nothing-papua-new-guineas-broken-health-system-braces-for-covid-19 accessed 11 April 2020. Some even label PNG, a weak state or rather more dimly, a failed state. See A. Murray, *Thinking about Political Things: An Aristotelian Approach to Pacific Life* (Adelaide: ATF Theology, 2016), 1, 19, 24, & 28.

[614] J. Diamond, *Guns, Germs and Steel*, (Sydney: Random House Australia, 1997). In 1998 *Guns, Germs and Steel* won the Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction and the Aventis Prize for Best Science Book.

it to New Guinea, but we black people had little cargo of our own?"[615] Diamond was intrigued by Yali's curiosity. He did not offer Yali an answer, instead he wrote this compelling book.

*Guns, Germs and Steel* is Diamond's version of world history in the last thirteen thousand years. In it, Diamond narrates the complex evolutionary processes of human civilization. He attempts to navigate a speculative history narrating the birth of ancient societies and to explain how the pressure and intensity of geographical influences have driven some of the most sophisticated societies in modern times. In his subsequent book, *Collapse*,[616] Diamond focused on the corrosion and extinction of some of these ancient civilizations. He speculated on reasons why the choices of some of these ancient societies caused the failure of their developments, while the choices of others caused them to disintegrate and eventually become extinct.

Diamond considers New Guinea to be a success story. Hence, he deliberates that New Guinea not only chose to become a successful society but that it had survived through various periods of progress, regression and recoveries by its utter resilience and sheer determination. From the prehistory times to the present, New Guinea has weathered its birthing storms through numerous generations.[617]

> …New Guineans already adapted in the past to such big changes as the extinction of the Pleistocene megafauna, glacial melting and warming temperatures at the end of the Ice Age, the development of agriculture, massive deforestation, volcanic tephra fallouts, El Nino events, the arrival of the sweet potato, and the arrival of Europeans. Will they now also be able to adapt to the changed conditions …?[618]

They certainly will, Diamond maintains. This is a striking affirmation that Diamond reveals about an illuminating reality: New Guinea's earliest civilization and its history have been amazingly robust and sophisticated, and they continue to be so to the present. There is a

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[615] J. Diamond, *Guns, Germs and Steel*,13.
[616] J. Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies choose to fail or succeed* (New York: Penguin Group, 2005).
[617] J. Diamond, *Guns, Germs and Steel*, 304.
[618] J. Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies choose to fail or succeed*, 295.

future promise of confidence as the new born nation adapts to revolutionary changes. What enabled the success story of the ancient PNG society was its ability to adapt to enduring challenges. In his analysis Diamond exposes the strength of the contemporary society to Yali and his generation: they had inherited an ancient, yet rich and robust society, handed down through numerous passages of generations to the present.[619] What has been inherited from the ancient past has to be cherished, lived and developed so that it can be the legacy of the next generation.

## The PNG Experiment

The "PNG experiment" is a charter constructed in this thesis from Diamond's speculative history to embody Lonergan's idea of history so that there is a conversation: to engage the principles of progress, decline and redemption within the context of massive social change experienced in PNG's epoch of nationhood. Because it is of national importance, a constructive conversation is imperative. As the conversation takes a deeper turn Diamond's suggestions prompt more questions to be pondered on several fronts: What made New Guinea society so resilient? Why did the pre-colonial New Guinea society thrive into a complex society with the development of superior gardening skills, triggered by high food production,[620] while some other societies stagnated, failed, or virtually went into extinction? How did New Guinea society manage to survive? Diamond's concrete viewpoints are to be honored by being examined and critiqued.

Yet the PNG experiment raises more points for discussion. In fact, what Yali symbolizes in his thought-provoking question sparked my critical self-examination of what history entails in PNG's process to complete nationhood. The fact is, Yali's question is not to

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[619] J. Diamond, *Guns, Germs and Steel*, 298.

[620] See J. Golson, et al., *Ten Thousand Years of Cultivation at Kuk Swamp in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea* (Canberra: ANU Press, 2017).

be taken in isolation but must be considered as part of a larger conversation and remain open to questioning what was actually happening in his own life. This entails consideration of the clash between two cultures (the European and New Guinean) as the PNG-state-society began to take shape. This is important when it is remembered that Yali's own ancestors were abducted during the early pre-colonial times by the expanding imperial powers, and thrust into a completely alien system of thinking and living.[621] With this in mind it is small wonder that public institutions and systems of governance set up by these colonial governments, which we have inherited, are no longer functioning today or, if they are, they are perhaps no longer relevant.

Ironically enough, Yali's symbolism is a threshold in an evolving divide: the clash of two systems. This divide continues to permeate the development of the contemporary PNG society. The Diamond-Yali conversation not only concerns the supply of goods but more importantly it is about colonization and the subsequent development of the country. The underlying factor in this conversion is the question of how well the wealth produced by the country is to be shared by all and how social security is to be provided for the indigenous members of the community as it had been for the Europeans who were living in New Guinea during the colonial era. Broadly speaking, Yali's pressing questions increased the urgency for conducting on-going discourses regarding these inequalities in the distribution of wealth and

[621] Diamond's work on history cannot be regarded as a standard history text. For instance, he claimed in his book, *Guns, Germs, and Steel* that, "He (Yali) had never been outside of New Guinea and had not been educated beyond high school, but his curiosity was insatiable." (J. Diamond, *Guns, Germs and Steel*, 14). This claim is untrue. Diamond failed to study credible PNG texts of significant recorded data provided by the expertise from specialized fields of various sciences. One such is the English anthropologist: Peter Lawrence, of the University of Sydney. P. Lawrence, *Road Belong Cargo: A Study of the Cargo Movement in the Southern Madang District, New Guinea* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1964, 1967), 2-4. Lawrence documented Yali's brief biography during his field trips to Rai Coast, of the Madang Province beginning in 1949, and continued throughout the 1950's and 1960's. His field research dealt with the rising phenomenon of the cargo cult movements in the Madang District during the colonial era. Yali was one of the prominent leaders of the cargo cult movements and on many occasions, Lawrence had the chance to meet him personally. Contrary to Diamond's claim that Yali was never out of New Guinea was in fact inaccurate. According to Lawrence, Yali had travelled to Australia. Yali had served in several key prominent leadership roles including becoming a Sergeant of Police that landed him in Queensland, Australia for six months, undergoing special training in jungle warfare.

power.[622] Yali's wisdom does address some of the multi-faceted complexities of New Guinea's history. For instance, how well have we utilized the core values of traditional heritage, enabling them to be engaged appropriately within the context of the introduced western ways? In fact, what my generation has inherited is a dialectical impetus, a two-systems group of people and ideas rather than a unified national society.

This critical conversation takes me to the heart of Lonergan's idea of history. In a nutshell, what does Lonergan's use of a (western) philosophy of history mean to a Melanesian philosophy?[623] How do I share the dialectics of western civilization within the systems of my own society as it deals with the narrative of history? [624] To a Melanesian the Western philosophical theory of history is considered to be somewhat abstract and impersonal. Its intellectual framework and assumed rational superiority stand in sharp contrast to a New Guinean passive/receptive, descriptive, story-telling approach to the record of its past history.[625] A dominant Western education overrides the Melanesian philosophy to some extent and this might perceivably limit any possible conversation between the two cultures. Realistically, can there be any dialogue between the history of the New Guinea Stone Age enshrined in the narrative of genealogies, myths and legends and the contemporary European (Western) history which is shaped by and expressed in such things as steel, jet, computer, and "the book world"?[626]

In my reflections I wondered whether Lonergan had something to offer. If so, how relevant was Lonergan's idea of history to a transforming Melanesian worldview in a new context? This reflection has also increased my desire to ask pertinent questions, such as

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[622] F. Errington and D. Gewertz, *Yali's Question, Sugar, Culture, and History,* (Chicago: Chicago Press, 2004), 21-7.

[623] E. Mantovani, *The Dema and the Christ*, 11-8.

[624] B. Narokobi, "What is religious experience for a Melanesian?" *Point* (1977): 7-12.

[625] J. Diamond, *The World Until Yesterday* (New York: Penguin Group, 2012), 452-466.

[626] There have been some attempts to foster dialogue between Western philosophy and the ancient Pacific wisdom especially a recent one by Andrew Murray. He has devised a roadmap to mediate Aristotle's classical philosophy with the contemporary cultures of the Pacific. See A. Murray, *Thinking about Political Things*.

whether Lonergan's theological narrative of praxis have any redeeming elements of liberation pertaining to contemporary New Guinea history, culture and society.[627]

## How Might Lonergan Contribute to the PNG Experiment?

Diamond's distinct contribution to this discussion of a speculative theory of history has helped provide considerable insight into appropriating Lonergan's idea of history within a new space. Both Diamond and Lonergan have something significant to contribute in the discussion of PNG's social history, including the speculation on the origin, development and disintegration or continuity of ancient tribal societies and the emergence and transformation of a modern state such as PNG. In a specific way, Lonergan's intellectual influence has guided me to engage constructively with the status quo, i.e. to redefine the idea of history as underscoring the experiences of social concerns. It has led me to question how political corruption has been permitted to cause such devastating effects on the social health and stability of an emerging nation.[628] I acknowledge that Lonergan's theory of a dialectic of history has provided an answer that led me to propose a particular 'Catholic Action' to encourage reform. Hence, embracing a clear understanding of Lonergan's narrative of redemptive praxis will help direct and clarify ways to collaboratively and creatively find solutions to address Melanesia's most dire needs.

One of the vital outcomes of this thesis is the incentive to reinvigorate the existing dialogue in the era of changing paradigms. This thesis has helped to explore the possibilities of how Lonergan's method of doing praxis theology could engage with the Melanesian worldview. By and large, the thesis has helped to clarify how the core religious experience of Papua New Guinea can be respected while at the same time, society can reach out to the

[627] G. Whelan, *Redeeming History. Social Concerns in Bernard Lonergan and Robert Doran*.
[628] C. Papa, "Rationale for Praxis Theology in Melanesia," *Catalyst*, 49: 1 &2 (2019): 26-35.

evolving western influence and constructively cope with the effects of colonialism, globalization and the subsequent disruption that has threatened a Melanesian faith crisis. What William Burrows initiated some forty years ago has some success, yet it is still virtually in its infancy in terms of impact.[629] In augmenting the previous efforts as well as embracing the current challenges with appropriate measures, it is imperative that the national conversation accommodate the total picture of a new generation of people. It must acknowledge that it is dealing with transforming a society that is currently experiencing serious challenges. It must remain aware of the recent political history and its impact on social change.[630] Lastly, it must articulate its method of how to move towards good governance, self-autonomy, improve standards of living, preserve traditional culture and identity, promote constitutional changes and political reforms, respond to the challenge of climate change and provide basic social services to remote outposts.

Overall, what this study intends to achieve is to redefine the doing of theology in its new cultural (and also temporal) context in the new millennium, to make theology come alive in order "to talk" effectively to the people.[631] It makes a specific effort to enhance the task of engaging in praxis theology. The engagement of praxis theology is in this case relevant, for its ultimate aim is to assist in the national conversation that will equip the people with a deeper understanding of the current problems that not only beleaguer the PNG society but also promote the continuing dialogue on the application of such theological insights to our multi-faceted way of life.

Finally, Lonergan's narrative of a redemptive praxis can help provide a key framework to navigate a national conversation between theology and the robust socio-economic and political change in the contemporary PNG society. The offer of a redemptive

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[629] W R. Burrows, TMCT, 242-255.
[630] B. Lonergan, TNC, 55-67.
[631] C. Papa, "The Era of a "Fading Generation" and a new Emerging One of the Local Church in Papua New Guinea Highlands," *Verbum SVD, 58,2-3* (2017): 287-320.

praxis is a method that needs respectful discussions. This includes discussing and exploring transformative strategies which will ultimately give rise to a new foray into liberating socio-economic and geo-political discourses in particular and specific challenges.[632] Hence, it is my firm belief that Lonergan's distinct narrative of a discursive theology in redemptive praxis does contribute to cultivating a *new* and relevant Melanesian theology.

[632] B. Lonergan, TP, 184 & 186.

# Appendix A

The division and order of the manuscripts in this table is derived from Michael Shute's work.

| Document | Dates of Composition |
|---|---|
| **Batch A** | |
| "Philosophy of History" | 1933-34? |
| *"Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* - A Theory of Human Solidarity" | 1935 |
| "Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity" | 1935? |
| *"Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis"* | 1935? |
| **Batch B** | |
| "A Theory of History" | 1937? |
| "Outline of an Analytic Concept of History" | 1937-38? |
| "Analytic Concept of History, in Blurred Outline" | 1937-38? |
| "Analytic Concept of History" | 1937-38? |

# Appendix B

**This is an edited version of Lonergan's January 1935 letter to his Religious Superior, Rev. Henry Keane SJ. This reprinted pdf copy only starts on the next page.**

Via del Seminario, 120, Roma, 119, Italy
22 January 1935
(from B. Lonergan, theol. 2nd year

Reverend Father Provincial,
Pax Christi,

Though sadly late, I wish you a most happy New Year followed by many more in Canada. If it is not being extravagant, I hope you find your sojourn there as pleasant as the years spent in England. I begin with the matter of permissions and then go on to another topic at which I have been poking about for expression for some time; hence I write so late.

I have been smoking regularly since I received permission from Fr. Hingston1 in the winter of 1929. In my last retreat I thought about thinking to put an end to it but wisely compromised upon being more moderate; this has meant that I do not smoke absolutely every time that I have both the inclination and the opportunity.

The cost of smoking here is high, about $20.00 a year.

If you make it every so plain to me that it would not be the decent thing for me to continue smoking in view of the financial condition of the V-Prov., I shall be happy to do without it. That, I suppose, is the pure reason on the issue, and I desire to be reasonable.

On the other hand the practical reason is very bourgeois; no wild-eyed radicalism! In fact like others I find smoking fully worthy of the praise Macbeth bestowed on sleep: nature's second course, and the like. Then, as I write, the "genius loci" rises before me to terrify my imagination. We appreciate in a special way Berchmans' remark about vita communis.2 But if I expanded this aspect of the issue you might find it difficult to take me seriously [with the preceding]3 paragraph.

Last October I received leave from Fr Hingston to read books on the index connected with my work, that is, I was suppose to be due for a biennium in epistemology. Biennists had told me of the impossibility of getting the necessary detailed background for the thesis during the two years. I had written Fr Hingston to the effect that the sources on my subject were under the ban, that though the number of lectures and the amount of work was appalling still there was the summer while during the year a change, when not as good as a rest, was the only rest to be had. He fell in with my suggestion and sent me a permission conditioned by the approbation of my Rector or Spiritual Father. I raised the question with the latter and he placed all his powers so acquired with any of tree professors. Going to see the professors is exceedingly difficult - a trip from Toronto to Montreal is a trifle in comparison. Getting books from the university is simply a feat. So I have done nothing, but had intended to arrange something for the summer vacation.

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1 William Hales Hingston, S.J. (1877-1964), former Rector of Loyola College (later to be incorporated into Concordia University, Montreal)?

2 St. John Berchmans, a Jesuit who died quite young, said, "*Vita communis est mea maxima penitentia*." Or life in common--that is the common, daily life of every man and woman--is my greatest penance.

3 handwritten, best guess.

[2]

When I left Canada for Rome my father gave me money for a typewriter. When I arrived here the Rector gave me permission to get one through the Vatican state. I use it constantly.

I have an assortment of books. Fr Hingston had given me a leave on the ground that the way I had studied a subject or the peculiarity of my interests gave rise to needs not normally met by the somewhat restricted libraries of houses in Canada. On this score I have a number of texts from the Oxford plain Classics (4 Plato, 2 Aristotle, Thucydides, Tacitus, Aeschylus) Pindar with trans., translated selections of Plotinus, a few manuals on the mechanics of French, by some principle of accretion I have an English and a Greek dictionary and a Shakespeare; a Douay Version and the new Merk's Novum Testamentum were given me and seen simultaneously to have justified themselves; since in Italy I have yielded to the native language and to German and so have two more dictionaries; I also have a missal.

I spent last summer at the Germanico villa. It was a fifty day frontal attack upon the language of science and something of an experience; a stranger in a strange land with a still stranger language to be spoken to seminary students, who if they have been students of the society since 1552 are not yet members. This business of being a guest in every possible sense of the word made it a bit of a strain. However I do not know much German yet and there is no place else to go before one is ordained. My Italian is not a brilliant affair, I mean, not too nice about grammar and "le mot juste". But there are so few Italians here during the year and still fewer stay around for the vacation. As to choosing between the two places, it is really difficult to find reasons either way. Let me say that Frascati4 is more restful while the German place more alive and probably cheaper. I suppose I ought to get up German better than to be able to make out the sense of a biography ordination; item, there are a lot of good ideas floating around among the Germans which it would be well to pick up especially if I am not likely to have any better chance of knowing them. So if you do not mind my offending the extraordinary susceptibilities of some of the local nationalists I would suggest having another go at the German. If you decide that way, you had best drop a note to the Roman Provincial and it would be well to write the Rector of the Germanico thanking him for last year and begging a repetition of the favour. (Address: Pontificio Collegio Germanico ed Ungarico, 8 Via San Nicolo da Tolentino, Roma).

A REQUEST: I have written this letter a number of times and probably this is not only the last but also the worst. But it has to be the last. I have [to] start [again] devoting my time to learning tons of stuff by heart. So please overlook all the reasons I see for trying just once more to do a good job. The next part fits on to the preceding by means of a hysteron proteron.5

With regard to the project of my teaching philosophy I give you the following information because I think it my duty to do so, and because I am in need of advice, and finally for a reason which the information itself will explain. I am here condensing what I have already written for your consumption at too great a length; so if you find it insufficient you have but to say the word and I shall unload reams of stuff on you or, on he other hand, answer precise questions succinctly.

I left Heythrop a votary of Newman's and a nominalist. On my departure I had been to see Fr Bolland to ask him whether I had best devote my future efforts to mathematics or classics. I had done both for my external pass at London; I was obviously out to be student; I could not keep on at both. He raised the question that I might want to teach philosophy or theology; I put the obvious objection of my nominalism, while admitting philosophy to be a fine frenzy. He said no one remained a nominalist for long. He was right, in a way. I got interested in Plato during Regency and came to understand him; this left my nominalism quite intact. I read St Augustine's earlier works during the summer before theology and found him to be psychologically exact. I then put together a 25.000 word essay upon the act of faith and gave it with a challenge to Fr Smeaton now at [A?ions]. I had known him at school; he enjoyed a Homeric epithet of "invincible in argument;" he had been the star with his professors all (ie both) wanting him to defend their subject in the disputations, etc. In a word he was the sort

4 Villa Cavalletti in Frascati?

5 The hysteron proteron (from the Greek: ὕστερον πρότερον, hýsteron próteron, "latter before") is a rhetorical device. It occurs when the first key word of the idea refers to something that happens temporally later than the second key word. The goal is to call attention to the more important idea by placing it first.

I desired to try out. It was a complete success. Fr Smeaton admitted that the Catholic philosophers were content to serve theology as best they could without having any philosophic pretentions, that my views were far simpler and far more satisfactory, and that there was no cornering me by appealing to any dogmatic decision; this was a lot in itself and a great deal more from Fr Smeaton with his untarnished reputation for orthodoxy, with his undoubted brilliance, with the name he had been given for never yielding; incidentally, there are few men who would yield under the circumstances so that shows how just the names given people are. I then went on to study the Summa first hand and began to suspect that St Thomas was not nearly as bad as he is painted. At this juncture Fr Hingston paid a flying visit to the Immaculate where I had begun my theology[.] I was to go to Rome. I was to do a biennium in philosophy. He put the question, Was I orthodox? I told him I was but also that I thought a lot. I was beginning to go into detail and happened to ask if I was making myself clear. He said he considered I had already answered the question sufficiently. Probably my profession of faith has impressed him; in any case I knew the futility of trying to express myself and so I allowed the matter to remain there. You see I had been completely elated at the prospect of going to Rome. I had regarded myself as one condemned to sacrifice his real interests and, in general, to be suspected and to get into trouble for things I could not help and could not explain. Here was a magnificent vote of confidence which, combined with the great encouragement I had from Fr Smeaton after years of painful introversion and [with] the words over the high altar in the church of St Ignatius here "Rome vobis propitius ero",6 was consolation indeed.

I can give you my present position in a few words. It is definite, definitive; and something of a problem. The current interpretation of St Thomas is a consistent misinterpretation. A metaphysic is just as symmetrical, just as all-inclusive, just as consistent, whether it is interpreted rightly or wrongly. The difference lies in the possibility of convincing expression, of making applications, of solving disputed questions. I can do all three in a way that no Thomist would dream possible. I can prove out of St Thomas himself that the current interpretation is absolutely wrong. not only can I prove it, but the issue has already been raised decisively though not completely or altogether satisfactorily by Fr Marechal who views reign in our house at Louvain but are somewhat frowned upon here. The whole difficulty is to grasp Marechal point not in the abstract but in the concrete; because Fr Marechal is utterly in the abstract he in understood. This may sound arbitrary so let me give the reason: the only argument raised against Marechal is that it is "obvious" he is wrong; but in the abstract nothing is obvious either way since it is all a matter of argument and against Marechal they cannot argue; when they say it is obvious he is wrong in interpreting St Thomas, the mean no more than they want an explanation that goes into the concrete. That explanation I can give and I can prove and I can confirm from every view-point: in a word it is that, what the current Thomist call intellectual knowledge is really sense knowledge; of intellectual knowledge they have nothing to say; intellectual knowledge is, for example, the "seeing the nexus" between subject and predicate in a universal judgement: this seeing a nexus is an operation they never explain. From an initial Cartesian "cogito" I can work out aluminous and unmistakeable meaning to intellectus agens et possibilis, abstractio, conversion to phantasm, 3intellect knowing only the universal, illumination3 of phantasm, etc3. etc. The Thomists cannot even give a meaning 3to most of this. At the same time I can deduce the Thomist metaphysic: universal individuated by matter; real distinction of essence and existence; the whole theory of act and potency. Finally, I can solve problems and make new applications. The Thomists find St Thomas disappointingly brief upon the act of faith, Why? Because they do not know what the term intelligibility means. I have a complete solution to the arguments against Bellarmine's opinion in the de Auxiliis and not only is Bellarmine the only Doctor Ecclesiae who had an opinion on the precise issue but to defend Bellarmine you have to know what intelligibility is; indeed, if you know that you are inclined to leave the question where St Thomas left it. S much for samples from the matter of dispute questions. As to new applications, I am certain (and I am not one who becomes certain easily) that I can put together a Thomistic metaphysic of history that will throw Hegel and Marx, despite the enormity of their influence on this very account, into the shade. I have a draft of this already written as I have of everything else. It takes the "Objective and inevitable laws" of economics, psychology (environment, tradition) and of progress (material, intellectual; automatic up to a point, then either deliberate and planned or the end of civilization) to find the higher synthesis of these laws in the mystical Body. Primitive psychology, the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt, the Greek city, Hellenism, the Roman empire; then regalism, the protestant revolt, liberalism, romanticism, communism,

6 Translation : "You will be favored in Rome"

modernism, German and Italian Fascism and the Catholic Fascism or Action with Christ as King, - these all worked out from metaphysics and psychology together with, of course, the Divine plan of grace. I should say that my theory of the will (appetitus rationalis sequens forman intellectus) is as much above current Thomist theory above theirs; that makes a difference.

[As to "will]: I establish from introspective psychology that the "will" is what Card. Billot wants the will to be to provide himself with an analogy for the Trinity. I prove what he asserts?]

The important things about my views are that they are entirely a difference of interpretation. I do not say, Thomas said that's and I say that. I say, Thomas said this; the current Thomists going into their own experience pick out this element to be what St. Thomas is talking about; I go into my experience and find something entirely different to be what St Thomas means. Let me give you two extrinsic arguments in my favour. St. Thomas professes to agree with Augustine at every turn; the current Thomists frankly admit they do not know what Augustine is talking about when he speaks of intellect; I am quite certain that I understand Augustine, that St Thomas could hardly be playing a game of insincerity in agreeing with Augustine, that he must have understood Augustine since Bonaventure certainly did and the whole environment prior to Thomas was Augustinian, that therefore, the current admission of not understanding St Augustine is equally an admission of not understanding St. Thomas. On the other hand, there is no difficulty in conceiving a long tradition of misinterpretation. [1] There was every opportunity in the middle ages to confuse demonstrability with intelligibility, though intelligence is positive and demonstration is only per impossibilitatem contradictorii, that is, from the absence of intelligibility in the contrary proposition. Why? [2] Because philosophy and disputation coincided in the middle ages. How could such a confusion be continued? [3] Well, think of the "sententia communis" it was in the middle ages that Rome had a primacy of jurisdiction; yet Gallicanism ended only with the Vatican Council. When did it begin? [4] Immediately, since the fourteenth century could not solve the question of the nature of the act of faith and that question was in the front rank in the fourth century. Why did no one suspect there was something wrong before? [5] Really, every philosopher since has been convinced there was something wrong. After Thomas there was Scotus, the nominalists, the conceptualists; then Suarez and the Spaniards with their naïve realism (Substance is the "something there"); then, the brilliant Jesuit pupil, Descartes, who was brought up on the stuff; then the antithesis of Spinoza and Hume; then Kant (and do you see any difference between Kant's need to go back to the causal origin of knowledge to know the thing-in-itself and, on the other hand, the Thomistic conversion to phantasm to know the singular; only singular things exist; therefore existence is not in intellect alone; nor is it in intellect plus phantasm, since one can imagine what does not exist); then traditionalism, ontologism, Hermesian rationalism; finally, Pope Leo's "Back to Thomas." I take him at his word I can also accept his "veteran novis augere et perficere"; hence my excursion into the metaphysic of history.

What do I know of modern philosophy? I confess I never read a line of it but only such summaries as history of philosophy give sand occasional studies of particular authors. But I know something about it. I submitted to the professor of the history of philosophy here, Fr. Keeler, an essay on Newman; it was a feller of some 30,000 words. He did not grasp my main contention because I was not out to be unpleasantly plain-spoken. But he was quite impressed none the less. He told me that the trouble was that students [usually] came here and had no grasps whatever of modern thought, asked me had I read Hume, picked out inaccuracies etc. Now all this was not merely the kind of politeness that comes from living under the Italian sky. Because Fr. K asked me to review his book "problem of Error from Plato to Kant" for the periodical "Gregorianum", or that the biennists would all be certain to turn up their noses if given the opportunity, or that the professors are all so extremely busy, or that Fr. Keeler considers his excursion into the field of philosophic criticism such a trifle that any old fool could do it justice.

Again, it can not be said that the time is not ripe for such ideas as mine. Louvain substantially agrees with me. The students at Valkenburg complain they have a physicist not a metaphysician and an empirical psychologist not a rational psychologist teaching them in these subjects. Vals has turned out at least one man I know who is very keen on Kant and the idealists: the modern Italian thinkers, particularly Carabellese, are really brilliant, know what they are talking about, take a lot of refuting, and [rightly] simple smile at their Catholic adversaries. Again, there is something wrong when the one Catholic who cold represent Catholic thought with applause from all sides at the philosophy convention in Prague was Fr. Przywara (if that is his name) who never could pass any philosophy or theology exam in the society. Again, one does not have to be in Rome

long to find out that the Gregorian is in a fix for philosophy professors and knows it' these things trickle out from the best sources in matters of detail; the broad fact is not secret whatever.

[7] I should further say that my views are neither obscure nor difficult. It is entirely a question of being willing to submit to a bit of dialectic and, the big point, being willing to admit that (when you do not know the answer and fellows who write the text-books evade the issue and the professors you bring the question to tell you eventually that it is a very difficult and obscure point on which there are several excellent opinions none of which are completely satisfactory)7 none the less there is an answer and the answer has to be found out. The disputed question is the crucial experiment of a philosophic system; you have to explain everything except what you prove to admit no explanation; otherwise, you are not a philosopher or your system is inadequate. But this, the presupposition of the all argument, is precisely what 99% of all people you would argue with neither grasp not grant. They simply do not take philosophy seriously, they do not consider whether arguments are valid or not but simply what they prove, and they prove what seems to them the wrong thing then you are a Bolshevist in character and a heretic in mentality. For instance, otherwise you will say I am talking through my hat, it is always assumed that an argument that simply devastates the whole system is not more and can be no more that what is called difficult, that is, a little point that is a trifle obscure on earth but will be perfectly clear in heaven; in any case, not to be bothered about. To give a more precise instance, I was discussing the Nicomachean Ethics with Fr. Nunan, our biennist here writing a thesis on the idea of the good. I advanced that Aristotle was bourgeois, that he introduced the distinction between speculative and practical to put the "good" as Socrates and Plato conceived it out of court, that he did so because he could not answer the dialectic of say, the Gorgias, and could not admit its conclusion that happiness was compatible with suffering. This I believe manifest from countless texts. Anyhow I went on to argue that St. Thomas threw out the Aristotelian view of the separation of speculative and practical with a "rations aeternis non solum conspiciendis sed etiam consulendis" till finally we got down to the real issue, Is philosophy to explain? He assured me that explaining and trying to explain seemed to him to be a fundamental error of all modern thought. Now such a view is perfectly outrageous because the Divinity of Christ or the "diva legatio" is purely and simply the explanation of the facts we know from the gospels, and we believe the authenticity of the gospels because it is the only possible explanation of the facts we know about them. But it is in keeping with contemporary Catholic philosophy, and indeed, a very profound judgement upon modern philosophy, from that view-point; it is because the catholic philosopher does not formally appeal to the principle of sufficient reason even when as a matter of fact that is what he is doing; he always tends to express his thought in the form of a demonstration by arguing [8] that opposed views involve a contradiction. The method is sheer make-believe but to attack a method is a grand scale operation.

On the other hand, give me someone I can speak to plainly and bluntly, that I can attack not only by argument but with the important ally of some well-deserve ridicule, and there is little difficulty in making him see the light. Mr. Bathurst here is not given to wild speculation, used to hold the accepted view modern thought was inexplicable stupidity while the current representatives of the middle ages were absolute masters of the philosophic situation, but that I can give him an illuminating answer where the professors and the text-books make out there is a terrific problem beyond the mind of man.

Let this suffice for the present. I should add that I am substantially a Jesuit with no difficulties about obedience on this matter. Naturally I think this is my work but I know more luminously than anything else that I have nothing that I have not received, that I know nothing in philosophy that I have not received through the society. I do not say that I am a Stoic or that I don't care; were I free my cooperation with providence would have to be a more arduous affair than making my capabilities known to others; as things are, I have done my duty to Truth, to the Light that enliveneth every man, when I have laid the matter adequately before superiors. If they consider me to be under an illusion, I can only offer to prove my point. If they want no such stuff, then that is all there is about it. What is Hecuba to me or I to Hecuba>? But I am no tragedian. I do care enormously about the good of the church but I also know that what I do through obedience will be done better by some one else. God can raise up from stones children of Abraham. To produce philosophers is simply a matter of the natural order.

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7 Note in margin: "I.E. they confuse theology with philosophy. You cannot explain everything in theology. You have to in the natural order or give up."

But I write not only to inform you of the matter. I would like advice on many points which I can ask for when I learn your general attitude. As to the point that would explain itself, I suppose you fairly see it. What on earth is to be done? I have done all that can be done in spare time and without special opportunities to have contact with those capable of guiding and directing me as well as to read the oceans of books that I would have to read were I to publish stuff that is really worth-while, Briefly, this question is: shall the matter be left to providence to solve according to its own plan; or do you consider that providence intends to use my superiors as conscious agents in the furtherance of what it has already done?8

I commend myself to you holy sacrifices and prayers,

Bernard J.F. Lonergan S.J.

8 Written under his signature with an arrow pointing up to the word furtherance is the statement "I can make all sorts of suggestions on this. You have only to indicate the kind you would listen to."

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