

T. DALY'S CONVERSATIONAL COMMENT ON THE RESURRECTION

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Editor's Introduction

On the top right of the first page of this document, Fr Daly has written "Received from Peter Beer 89 02 17". This gives us both a date for the document (17 February 1989) and a clue as to its nature. The title on the first page gives another clue: "T. Daly's conversational comment on the Resurrection". It would seem these are notes from Fr Peter Beer of a conversation he had with Fr Daly. The text we have includes a series of amendments made by Daly in his own hand. These show that he read carefully through the text and corrected it where he thought necessary, so that we can assume the final product accurately represents his thought. Having said that, one should not give it the full weight one would a paper he had drafted himself and continued to edit over a period of time – the conversational nature of the origins of this document should be kept in mind.

Since Daly made corrections and additions to Beer's notes, these have been incorporated into the text of the document itself rather than being relegated to footnotes. Further amendments to punctuation and paragraph breaks have also been made where it seems appropriate to the flow of the argument.

Footnotes in square brackets are editorial. Numbers in square brackets in the text mark the start of a new page in the original manuscript and refer to the number of that new page.

T. Daly's conversational comment on the Resurrection

Part 1

What is material: parts spread out.

What is physical: what is subject to the laws of physics.

What is the form: the principle of organisation of the matter.

The soul or spirit is the **conscious** principle of organisation.

The **body** is that material organised by the soul or spirit.

The corpse has got all the matter that was in the person who died. The totality of the matter is there but it is entirely different from what we call a living body, which is that matter as organised by the soul. **Body does not just mean matter but means matter as organized by the soul, and as living by soul.** The distinction between body and soul is an inadequate distinction. Has one here a distinction between a thing and its parts? **The word 'body' already contains soul.** Here we do not have a distinction between two things, where one does not contain the other. Many people think of body and soul in the same way they think of matter and spirit, which is a tight metaphysical distinction: matter is not spirit and spirit is not matter.

The whole notion of spirit is unifying. Spirit is something that can be very positive without having to be spread out. Matter has some positive contribution but is something that is essentially spread out. A thing like spirit, which is unifying, while it unifies in itself and in its thoughts, its affirmations, its understanding, its decisions, its plans, can also unify material things and that's because a thing that unifies can also unify things that are dispersed; and so **things that are dispersed, like material things, can be unified not by themselves but by this other factor which we called spirit.** Spirit need not be separate from matter because it can be unifying material things, as in the case of the human body. **The human spirit has as one of its tasks to have the body organised and then that body as body is including the notion of spirit.**

Matter = anything extended [*res extensa*], and **extended means parts outside of parts. And matter is what enables anything to have parts outside of parts and therefore anything to be measured in space and in time.**

¹ [The reference here appears to be to Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., *A Christological Catechism: New Testament Answers* (New York; Paulist Press, 1982). On pp. 73-79, Fitzmyer discusses the question, "How Do Contemporary New Testament Interpreters Deal with the Resurrection of Jesus?" The pages referenced here, 78-79, consider questions around the nature of the Risen Jesus, noting both Paul's distinction between a physical body and a spiritual body (1 Cor 15:420-44) and that, in first century Palestine, resurrection would only ever have been understood as bodily resurrection.]

People are not happy with the notion of spirit. Most of Australian philosophes have not thought of the notion of spirit. They certainly have not defined it. They have not done the interiority of noticing their own common experience of something that is terribly rich but not spread out, namely insights, perhaps more easily decisions. You make a decision: you worry about it, you plan it, but in a single instant you say, "That's it." Having at that instant made a decision, then you are directing your car around, you're watching the other cars etc and many other things and all these material events that are [2] controlled by that decision. But the decision had all its richness in itself before you go and do all the driving. Last few hundred years one has forgotten how to notice all these spiritual events. We are experiencing them all the time and that is why Lonergan's notion of consciousness is so important.

The spirit is one sort of conscious form. Form is a more general word than spirit. Form is an organising principle and spirit is a particular sort of organising principle. **Not anything of the original organising principle remains in the corpse, because the whole point of organising is to organise as a whole.** But there are organising principles within some of the organisms and cells which are still alive, so that there are many organising lower principles in the corpse, and that remains permanently because if you keep on dispersing them you still get atoms and each atom: if it is a cell, in it you can call it the substantial form of the cell, or the soul of the cell, if it is a cell on its own. A substantial form is an organising principle of that which is a unity-identity-whole (in individual data).

Energy is a thing that you can add and measure, and potential energy has to be positioned in space, and kinetic energy depends on velocity and so on time. Chemical energy depends on distances between electrons, atoms. At least it does require those aspects. Aristotle: **matter of itself has not intelligibility.** The only intelligibility it has is that of something holding it as a form. Energy in general is matter. One is not looking for intelligibility within matter: the only intelligibilities will be those described of the chemical energy or of the kinetic energy or of the potential energy; those are the aspects that organise this matter in different ways. Something underneath that? But Aristotle: **ultimately, in Lonergan terms, there is something that is not intelligible of itself but intelligible through the thing that unifies it, through the organising that it gets, but of itself it is intelligible only tangentially:** because it is touching this or required by the chemical energising principle, and required by it as allowing it to be spread out in space and in time. So that is as close as we can get to it. Also the intelligibility in matter comes from the form and the intelligibility of existence comes from the form

Existence has not got an intelligibility of itself. In that something — all that this gives us is that there is one, that there is for example a horse. The intelligibility of an existing horse is the intelligibility of an imagined horse. The existing horse is different from an imagined horse but only by being existing, and that is not something we understand. Something we know, we can contact through our affirmations, so that is an example of tangential understanding. **But the only intelligibility in the thing is the intelligibility of its form, its organisation, of what we understand,** and the other components of the thing are not the intelligible components, but other components, namely the existence, the matter.

You [3] can get a system out of it.

The intelligibility is the answer to the question, 'What?'

The answer to the question, 'Is?' is not appropriately given as intelligibility. It is only given as 'yes' or 'no'.

The answer to the question 'Where?' or 'When?' is not given as intelligibility; it is given by pointing, and that is spread out in space and in time.

Reflective insight is different to a direct insightful. Lonergan clearly distinguishes two sorts of insight. The reflective insight is named 'judging or what Newman names 'illative sense'.

Judging is a personal grasp of the satisfactoriness of saying 'Yes'. That's an insight for Lonergan. The word insight in the book *Insight* has two different meanings both of which are interior and personal and tacit, but *one of which is getting intelligibility or understanding, and the other one is being satisfied you are in a position to say 'Yes'*. Lonergan has used the word insight for both because he is then terribly interested to help people into interiority, i.e. to recognise the events that are occurring in their mind that they have never recognised before. And concepts are things they have recognised before, and universals and ideas and affirmations. He says behind each of those there is something personal. And just to simplify his concentration on that he uses the one word, insight, for what his personal and behind. But in *Insight* in using the one word he does clearly say that there are two sorts of insight, the direct and the reflective, and he makes a distinction between them.

Intelligibility is what we experience we have a possible answer to the question, 'What?', taking possible in a rich sense not in a thin sense, that is, where I can see positive possibilities, "that this could fit in". It may not fit in to the particular thing I am asking a lot about, but I could give a model of something else that it would be positively tying together. So possibility, intelligibility, tying things together, unifying factor = intelligibility = identical to Aristotle's form = Scholastic Form = intelligibility, which ordinary English speakers can understand whether technical or not.

And intelligibility always means that which is able to be understood, in other words, that which is a factor of the object and not of me. Whereas understanding is the corresponding factor in me. But an increment of knowledge has occurred in answering the question, 'Is it so?' because I have come across not the intelligibility of the thing, but the existence of the thing. And existence of the thing is a metaphysical component of the thing, and truth is a real psychological component of my mind. So there is an increment in my mind that I have reached not only possibility but fact or truth. Factuality is the increment that is different from intelligibility. Perhaps intelligibility and factuality are nice pair there. The latter is fact or truth or existence or actuality or act (although scholastics can use 'act' vaguely). For Lonergan uses 'Act' for what corresponds to existence.

[4] The organising principle for the Risen body is the spiritual soul, a human organising principle. The divinity is not the organising principle of the soul. The divinity is a separate nature and nature = substance considered from the point of acting. Two natures are in Christ. **He has one set of powers that belong to God and one set of powers that are appropriate to humans but it is the one person possessing both these sets of powers.** Now the divinity is one of those sets of powers which is not part of the principle organising the human body or soul, so that it is linked to the body only by being possessed by the one person i.e. unity is only in the person not in the set of powers and that is exactly what we mean by hypostatic union. The thing which stands underneath. Hypostasis was a standard word for a person, an

individual human person. A union in a single person, **the unity is given only by the person, only by the fact that the two separated natures are possessed by the one person. What the fathers were getting at is that there is no single organisation other than that of the person possessing two sets of powers.**

An objection to Hume is that his book is very good but he makes a mistake in the first word of the first chapter! Because of his lack of interiority. He says all the perceptions of the human mind can be divided into impressions and ideas. Impressions are perceptions in a wide sense as they first hit the mind, and ideas are weak copies of these as we remember them. Ideas are clearly defined as these weak copies, never have the same strength as an impression; and he says that all, everything in the mind, is divided into those and those ideas are not so important, part of the imagination and memory and that, and that if your impressions are the perceptions that have hit the mind, if the colours and shapes and what he speaks of, what about insights? These have hit the mind not as sensations, and much more strongly! Hume tends to allocate them to the category of ideas, but that would make them weak. He has failed to identify insights that are much stronger than ideas and more forceful than any sensation, and are clearly not belonging to the category of sensation: so he just does not deal with insights, and spells them out as sensations or emotions, or things like that. And he says that ideas are the weak copies of these sensations. But insights do not come into these categories. Hume is not dealing with insights. Hume then has an interesting treatise on that part of the mind but it does not deal at all with the most important events in the mind which are insights and both sorts of insights: acts of understanding even decisions.

[5] While Hume says that metaphysics is just a game and cannot give truth, this is because Hume's only conception of truth is the rationalist one as what is absolutely necessary. In between just game and the laws of necessity of maths may be judgements of facts that are not necessary facts.² Maybe can get you to them. So fit in well with H Meynell, "Metaphysics is a set of the contradictions of propositions that are self-refuting. A proposition can be self-refuting without being contradictory. If it is contradictory you are into absolute necessity. But if it is merely self-refuting without being contradictory it's something you cannot hold and the opposite you can hold. Those things that are opposite to that give you the metaphysical framework. In other words Meynell defines metaphysics, unlike the rationalists who define it as absolutely necessary truths, to be stronger than contingent truths. Article in I, "Transcendental Psychology" HJ 31(1980) 153-169. Also in the Ch. 3 of *The Intelligible Universe* (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 38- 39 (& on to 44).

Hume says that doing metaphysics is not terribly powerful. May keep our superstition (Catholicism), but can get enjoyment from it. Yet not connected with truth. Criticism in reply to Hume: not connected with the sort of truth involved with mathematics, namely deduction from absolute principles, but may be open to the sort of truth you can get through interiority. The argument of retortion in MT p. 17, where Lonergan says that even positivists do not say they have not got a mind, or that the relativists are never in touch with truth etc. Those are the self-refuting things. Self-refutation is not the way Lonergan established his metaphysics but the way he cuts off criticism of it. Weakness in Hume in his position about what the human mind is so he is not open to the structure of knowledge, because he is omitted certain elements

² [The original reads "may be a judgement of fact that are not necessary facts", which is grammatically incorrect.]

of it. If Hume is used all the time as great authority, useful even from a small amount of it, one can show you are serious about an element in your system that he does not seem to have allowed for, so you are safe from criticism from him. Frege has had a big influence on modern British philosophy, on Wittgenstein etc.

A materialist defines the mind by the sorts of things you deal with in science; so he takes the example of science as material. It deals with material things (the way one deals with science should deal with mind; not a direct definition?)

[6] **T. Daly conversational comment on the Resurrection Part 2**

If you can say Christ is risen physically that means that Christ is risen materially.

*Materially means parts spread out but parts spread out physically necessarily spread out in space and time?*³

Yes I think that is what 'spread out' means. 'Spread out' simply means in space and or in time. You can have a line and mark various points on the line and these points are spread out in the sense that when you name one of the points while you are not naming one another one. They can be clearly distinct from each other by being spread out. Would be the same in time: you say 'now' and later you say 'now', and they are two different nows but they spread out from each other. For God I would say he is not spread out so all his nows are together. Christ in his humanity does have a material body or a physical body so he has a human soul or form uniting material elements and for Christ to be risen physically he must have a soul uniting some sort of material elements.

So you say that the physical means identically what is spread out in space and in time?

I suppose it adds the laws of physics. I have not thought much about it but the word physical includes obviously the laws of physics, but they are laws about what is spread out in space and in time. So they must be the laws about material things.

So those laws of physics would apply to the risen body?

Oh yes.

This is not clear: if they say that Christ now has not a physical body in glory...

Then they are saying that he has not got a body. A body means something that has a form in matter. It is not just the matter but it is the intelligibility in the matter. So that if you say he has not a physical body you're really saying he has not got a body.

What do they mean by 'physical'?

I think they mean much the same.

Do they mean 'empirical'?

Is the spiritual body really a body? A spiritual body might be taken in two senses. A term that occurs in Saint Paul. First sense: a body that is a real body, it has matter and operates according to the ordinary laws of matter, but has in addition certain special powers that we do

³ [Texts in italics appear to be questions from Fr Peter Beer SJ, Fr Daly's interlocutor in this conversation. In the original, these questions are distinguished by being included in parentheses.]

not see the ordinary body to have, powers that are spiritual powers and that are in addition to the physical powers, so that it is an elevated body. Second sense: it is not material elements, it has not got necessarily the laws of physics, it is something analogous to a body but it is totally constituted by the spirit. Some today try to use 'the risen body' in the second sense. But I do not think [7] the second sense keeps to the data of tradition or of scripture.

They discredit the apparitions? Jesus coming through closed doors etc

They will say that he does come through closed doors and that they are apparitions; but that the apparitions are different from the way an ordinary physical body appears or works and that coming through closed doors shows that he is not subject to the laws of physics. But I would say rather he has powers of transcending the laws of impermeability of the doors while still operating according to the laws of physics in his own body. He overcomes the physical laws of doors, but yet retaining the laws of his own body.

Would the science of physics cover the risen body?

I would say definitely.

But have we the data on the risen body?

We have not the data on the limits to what is possible for a physical body. One sort of physical body is the risen body which has not got many of the limits that the bodies which we see have, mainly in its relation to other physical things. Analogously, it is a little like saying that our human body cannot be here and in Europe the next day — whereas with aeroplanes we know it is possible. 200 years ago one would have said it is impossible. Perhaps a little bit like moving through closed doors.

Would you say that the risen body is in time and space?

Yes, I don't think you have a body if you don't.

So the duration is still temporal?

It need not necessarily be linked to the temporal duration of this world, but I think it is still a temporal duration. Now the books today on Einstein's theory of relativity are very clear. One of the characteristics of that theory is to say that simultaneity has no meaning and that there are places⁴ in the universe that cannot be in contact with each other within certain limited times. In other words anyone who holds that theory has to say that there are certain episodes in this universe that are not in contact with each other. And I think that sounds a little strange to us normally. But it fits with what we know of physics now and we must say something the same about people in heaven being in one of those places which are not necessarily linked to the place and time which we are experiencing. The coordinates of this may not be linked to the coordinates of that thing. Nowadays that is acceptable to anyone who holds the Einstein theory.

At the resurrection of the body the human spirit acquires new parts outside of parts, new material parts?

Yes. But they need not be new, e.g. the material parts I have today are different from what I had a few years ago.

⁴ [Original reads 'traces' but 'places' would seem to make more sense in the context.]

Take the case of cremation — you would need new material parts would you not?

Not necessarily. Theoretically all those carbon atoms that were in the body are still part of carbon dioxide or some other compound somewhere. Theoretically after cremation [8] you could gather that carbon dioxide and bring it together. I don't think that is the way it would operate. But you can't blankly deny that the same material parts could be gathered. But as I was saying I suspect that it is not essential to the view of the resurrection.

So that having an actual face and arms and things – would these belong to the structure of the ...?

Yes, having a face and arms with whatever material elements you've picked up — bits of carbon from the trees roundabout etc — but having a face and arms is part of the intelligibility of the human, of the human form, which is the way that the human soul organises. Having a face and arms is part of the definition of the human, part of the intelligibility of the human being. So that if you have not got them, you just have not got a human being.

You don't become a man from Mars, do you?

No.

D. Coffey might go for the latter definition of physical body?

Well there are a lot of theologians around today who do it. I think the main reason why they do it is because they think Paul's notion of spiritual body is incompatible with its being immaterial. I think that this is quite wrong. And I think that Lonergan's chapter 8 on things, particularly with his levels of explanatory genera, is quite an explicit attempt to overcome that sort of objection. Because he says that the lower level operates (well the lower level is physics, and the next one is chemistry, and the next is biology) and the lower level operates according to the laws of physics and when you get up to a higher level, chemistry adds new laws but does not in any way dispense with the laws of physics. Biology adds new laws but does not in any way dispense with the laws of chemistry. And when you get to the level of spiritual activity - the same. Spiritual activity adds new laws but does not dispense with the laws of biology, chemistry or physics. To a whole range of theologians, it is an insuperable objection. But to Lonergan, with the series of levels like that, there is no serious objection, no objection at all.

is Lonergan in ch. 8 speaking about sublation?

Yes sublation is exactly the same thing, as one level so related to another. The other point about the incompatibility of spirit with matter — often thought to be the case because Neo-Thomists, in their decadent state, take it for granted — the problem of the one and the many — which I think is overcome completely once you have a clear notion of what the spirit is. **I'll put it this way. The spirit need not be subject to restrictions of space and time.** That does not mean that the spirit cannot be in space and time. The spirit does not have to be in space and time but it can be in space and time. In ordinary common sense experience, a decision is a spiritual event but any human decision is related to a whole lot of movements in space and time. You decide to go to the city and you make various moves... and so on. The spiritual power can be in control of physical things and linked to them. That is the way of every spiritual thing we know [9] of. So with an insight, if you understand what is meant by a circle you have a single unitary event in you which is the act of understanding, which is tying things together, but it is tying things together. That is, if defined it has the notion of centre; points

equidistant from a fixed point, applies to every point on the circumference. So the spiritual grasp of that definition is in contact with every point on the circumference of the circle. The spirit is clearly compatible with these material ... The spirit can control these material things but need not be controlled by them. I'd say decadent philosophers, whether neo scholastic or just plain British empiricist, completely forget the notion of spirit as I have just defined it.